Legal Review and Analysis of Alka Shrirang Chavan & Anr vs Hemchandra Rajaram Bhonsale & Ors 2026 INSC 52

Synopsis

This judgment is a seminal pronouncement on the doctrine of lis pendens (Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882) and its overriding effect in execution proceedings. It definitively settles that a transferee pendente lite (a purchaser during the pendency of litigation) acquires no right to resist the execution of a final decree for specific performance. The Supreme Court reinforced the principle that such a transferee’s title is entirely subservient to the decree and that execution proceedings under Order XXI of the CPC are not a forum to re-adjudicate their purported independent title.

I. Basic Information of the Judgment

Case Title: Alka Shrirang Chavan & Anr. vs. Hemchandra Rajaram Bhonsale & Ors.
Citation: 2026 INSC 52 (Reportable)
Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Manoj Misra and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ujjal Bhuyan
Bench: Division Bench of the Supreme Court of India
Date of Decision: January 12, 2026
Civil Appeal No.: Arising out of SLP (Civil) Nos. 27660 & 27868 of 2025

II. Legal Framework & Relevant Precedents

A. Primary Legislation:

1. Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (TPA):
   Section 52 (Doctrine of Lis Pendens): Prohibits the transfer of, or dealing with, immovable property during a pending suit where a right to such property is directly in question. The transfer is not void but is subservient to the rights decreed by the court. The Maharashtra Amendment (requiring registration of lis pendens notice) was also analyzed.

2. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC):
   Order XXI, Rules 97-103: Provides the comprehensive framework for adjudicating resistance or obstruction to the delivery of possession in execution.
   Rule 97: Allows a decree-holder to apply complaining of resistance.
   Rule 98(2): Mandates that if obstruction is by a transferee pendente lite, the court shall direct possession be given to the decree-holder.
   Rule 101: States all questions (including right, title, interest) arising between parties in such proceedings shall be determined by the Executing Court.
   Rule 102 (Omitted in Maharashtra): Originally barred a pendente lite transferee from invoking Rules 98 or 100.

3. Specific Relief Act, 1963:
   Section 19(b): Allows specific performance to be enforced against a subsequent transferee, except a bona fide transferee for value without notice. The Court held this provision yields to Section 52 TPA once a suit is instituted.

B. Key Precedents Relied Upon:

• Celir LLP vs. Somati Prasad Bafna (2024): Exhaustively explained the doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 TPA, holding it is a principle of equity, good conscience, and public policy. A transferee pendente lite is bound by the decree irrespective of notice.

• Silverline Forum Pvt. Ltd. vs. Rajiv Trust (1998): Held that the scope of adjudication under Order XXI Rule 97 for a pendente lite transferee is shrunk to the single question of whether they are such a transferee. If yes, they have no right to resist.

• Usha Sinha vs. Dina Ram (2008): Reiterated that a pendente lite transferee has no independent right to property to resist execution.

• Lala Durga Prasad vs. Lala Deep Chand (1953): Distinguished by the Court. It dealt with the form of a decree where the transfer occurred before the suit was filed, making the subsequent purchaser a necessary party to the conveyance. This principle does not apply to transfers pendente lite.

III. Relevant Facts of the Case

1. Original Agreement & Suit (1973 & 1986): Respondent No. 1 (Decree-Holder) entered into an agreement to sell with Respondent No. 2 (Judgment-Debtor) on 26.04.1973. Upon default, he filed a suit for specific performance (RCS No. 910/1986) on 28.04.1986 and registered a lis pendens notice on 02.05.1986.

2. Pendente Lite Transfers (1987): During the suit's pendency (May-August 1987), the Judgment-Debtor sold parts of the suit property via eight sale deeds to various persons.

3. Decree & Conveyance (1990 & 1993): The suit was decreed ex-parte on 30.11.1990. As the Judgment-Debtor failed to execute the sale deed, the Court Commissioner executed it in favor of the Decree-Holder on 25.03.1993.

4. Appellants' Entry (1995-96): The Appellants purchased portions of the property in 1995-96 from the original pendente lite transferees. One of the predecessors had even constructed a bungalow in 1989.

5. Execution & Obstruction (2019): Execution proceedings, initiated in 1991, culminated in a possession warrant in 2019. When the Decree-Holder sought possession, the Appellants (as obstructionists) resisted on 18.01.2019.

6. Procedural History: The Executing Court (29.02.2020) and the First Appellate Court rejected the Appellants' objections. The High Court, in second appeal, framed but rejected substantial questions of law, leading to this Supreme Court appeal.

IV. Issues Before the Supreme Court

The core legal issues, as crystallized by the Supreme Court, were:

1. Whether a transferee pendente lite (or a purchaser from such transferee) can resist the execution of a final decree for specific performance and possession by claiming an independent title?

2. Whether the decree-holder was required to implead the pendente lite transferees in the execution proceedings or in the sale deed executed by the Court Commissioner for the decree to be executable against them?

3. What is the scope of adjudication under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC when obstruction is offered by a pendente lite transferee?

4. Whether the principle laid down in Lala Durga Prasad (requiring the subsequent transferee to join the conveyance) applies to transfers made pendente lite?

V. Ratio Decidendi & Supreme Court's Reasoning

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and upheld the orders of the courts below. The ratio decidendi is:

A transferee pendente lite (under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act) steps into the shoes of the judgment-debtor and acquires a title wholly subservient to the outcome of the suit. Upon a decree for specific performance attaining finality, such a transferee has no independent, heritable right to the property and consequently, no locus standi to obstruct its execution. The limited inquiry under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC is confined to determining if the obstructor is a pendente lite transferee; if so, the obstruction must be removed forthwith.

Key Reasoning:

1. Overriding Effect of Section 52 TPA: The Court conducted a detailed analysis of Section 52 TPA, relying heavily on Celir LLP. It held the doctrine is one of public policy, intended to preserve the subject matter of litigation and prevent parties from frustrating decrees through alienations. A pendente lite transferee is bound by the decree irrespective of good faith or notice.

2. Hierarchy of Statutes: The Court clarified the interplay between statutes. Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act (protecting bona fide purchasers without notice) operates before a suit is filed. The moment a suit is instituted, Section 52 TPA takes precedence, rendering the question of the transferee's good faith irrelevant.

3. Limited Adjudication in Execution: Relying on Silverline Forum, the Court held that for a pendente lite transferee, the inquiry under Order XXI Rule 97 is not a full-blown trial on title. The only relevant question is whether they purchased during the suit's pendency. An affirmative finding extinguishes their right to resist (Order XXI Rule 98(2)).

4. Distinguishing Lala Durga Prasad: The Court decisively distinguished this precedent. Lala Durga Prasad dealt with a transfer before the suit was filed. In such a case, the subsequent purchaser holds an independent, albeit voidable, title and must be joined in the conveyance. Conversely, a pendente lite transfer under Section 52 creates no independent title from its inception; the title remains with the vendor and passes directly to the decree-holder via the court's decree.

5. Finality of Decree & Sanctity of Process: The Court emphasized that the decree (1990) and the court-executed sale deed (1993) had attained finality after multiple unsuccessful challenges by the judgment-debtor. Allowing the appellants to reagitate title issues three decades later would undermine the finality of judicial process.

6. Rejection of Limitation Plea: The Court rejected the belated plea of limitation, noting it was never pleaded earlier. It found that the decree-holder had filed for execution within a year of the decree and applied for removal of obstruction within 30 days of resistance (as per Article 129, Limitation Act), thus complying with the law.

VI. Legal Framework Established/Clarified

This judgment synthesizes and reinforces a clear, hierarchical legal framework:

1. Chronological Trigger: The institution of a suit is the critical event. Pre-suit transfers are governed by Specific Relief Act, 1963, Section 19(b) (where bona fides matter). Post-institution (pendente lite) transfers are governed by TPA, Section 52 (where bona fides are irrelevant).

2. Nature of Title: A pendente lite transferee does not acquire a title capable of being asserted against the decree-holder. Their interest is a mere "spes successionis" (hope of succession) contingent on the judgment-debtor's success in the suit.

3. Execution as a Summary Remedy: Order XXI Rules 97-103, especially in the context of lis pendens, are meant to be a summary, efficacious remedy for decree-holders. They are not an alternative forum for obstructionists to launch a collateral attack on a final decree.

4. Clarification on Conveyance: There is no requirement to implead a pendente lite transferee in the sale deed executed pursuant to a decree. The decree itself, by operation of Section 52 TPA, ensures title passes to the decree-holder, overriding the intermediary transfer.

VII. Analysis of the Supreme Court's Examination

The Supreme Court’s analysis was doctrinally rigorous and purposive:

1. Textual & Jurisprudential Analysis: The Court meticulously parsed the text of Section 52 TPA, its Explanation, and the Maharashtra amendment. It traced the jurisprudential evolution of the doctrine from its roots in equity to its statutory embodiment.

2. Systemic Harmonization: The Court excelled in harmonizing seemingly conflicting statutes (TPA vs. Specific Relief Act) and procedural rules (CPC), establishing a clear order of application based on the stage of litigation.

3. Policy-Oriented Interpretation: The judgment is driven by the policy objectives of preventing abuse of court process, ensuring decree finality, and protecting successful litigants from endless obstruction. The Court explicitly noted that any dilution of Section 52 would "defeat the rights of the parties and undermine the very sanctity of the judicial process."

4. Distinction Based on Timing: The key analytical move was the sharp distinction between pre-suit and pendente lite transfers. This allowed the Court to confine Lala Durga Prasad to its factual matrix and prevent its misuse to frustrate execution.

5. Focus on Reality of Litigation: The Court acknowledged the "general impression... that difficulties of a litigant are by no means over on his getting a decree." Its interpretation of Order XXI strengthens the decree-holder's hand, aligning the law with ground realities.

VIII. Critical Analysis & Final Outcome

Critical Analysis:

• Strengths: The judgment provides ultimate clarity on a perennially litigated issue. It strikes a decisive balance in favor of decree finality and judicial efficacy over the claims of speculative purchasers who buy property embroiled in known litigation. It correctly identifies Section 52 TPA as a rule of public policy that cannot be circumvented.

• Potential Critique: The ruling could be seen as extremely harsh on subsequent purchasers, even those who may have purchased after a lis pendens notice was not registered (in states with such amendments). However, the Court pre-empts this by noting that the doctrine applies regardless of notice, and registration is an additional safeguard, not a mandatory precondition for its application.

• Procedural Impact: The judgment streamlines execution proceedings. Executing courts can now summarily dismiss objections from pendente lite transferees without a mini-trial on title, saving judicial time and deterring frivolous obstruction.

Final Outcome:

1. Appeals Dismissed: The Supreme Court dismissed both civil appeals.

2. Possession Ordered: The Appellants were directed to hand over actual physical possession of the suit property to the Decree-Holder (Respondent No. 1) on or before 15.02.2026.

3. Complete Injunction Against Future Litigation: Invoking its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to do complete justice, the Court issued a prohibitive direction. It ordered that no further applications or petitions by the appellants, the judgment-debtor, or anyone claiming through them regarding the suit property shall be entertained by any court. This extraordinary measure was taken to end the three-decade-long ordeal of the decree-holder.

IX.  (MCQs)

1. According to the Supreme Court, what is the primary legal consequence of a transfer made pendente lite under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882?
a) The transfer is void ab initio and confers no title.
b) The transfer is valid but the transferee's title is subservient to the decree passed in the pending suit.
c) The transfer is valid only if the transferee had no notice of the suit.
d) The transfer must be ratified by the court to be effective.

2. In the context of obstruction to possession under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC, what is the only question to be determined if the obstructor is found to be a pendente lite transferee?
a) Whether the obstructor paid adequate consideration.
b) Whether the obstructor was aware of the lis pendens notice.
c) Whether the obstructor is, in fact, a pendente lite transferee.
d) Whether the original decree for specific performance was valid.

3. The Supreme Court distinguished the landmark case Lala Durga Prasad vs. Lala Deep Chand primarily on which ground?
a) Lala Durga Prasad involved a commercial property, while this case involved residential property.
b) Lala Durga Prasad dealt with a transfer made before the institution of the suit, while this case involved transfers pendente lite.
c) Lala Durga Prasad was decided under the old Specific Relief Act, 1877.
d) Lala Durga Prasad involved fraud, which was absent in the present case.

4. Which provision did the Supreme Court hold takes precedence over Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, once a suit relating to the property is instituted?
a) Order XXI Rule 102 of the CPC
b) Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code
c) Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
d) Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963