Summary and Analysis of Arshnoor Kaur & Anr. vs. Union of India & ors

1. Heading of the Judgment

Arshnoor Kaur & Anr. vs. Union of India & Ors.
(Supreme Court of India, Civil Original Jurisdiction, Writ Petition (C) No. 772 of 2023)

(Arshnoor Kaur & Anr. vs. Union of India & Ors., 2025 INSC 954)

2. Relevant Laws and Sections

The judgment interprets and applies the following legal provisions:

• Constitution of India:
  Article 14: Right to Equality.
  Article 15(1) & (3): Prohibition of discrimination (including sex-based discrimination) and power to make special provisions for women.
  Article 16: Equality of opportunity in public employment.
  Article 33: Parliament’s power to restrict Fundamental Rights for armed forces.

• Army Act, 1950:
  Section 12: Central Government’s power to notify branches where women can be enrolled.

• Key Policies:
  1992, 2008, and 2023 recruitment policies for women in the Army.

3. Basic Judgment Details

• Parties:
  Petitioners: Arshnoor Kaur (5th rank in women’s merit list) and Astha Tyagi (4th rank).
  Respondents: Union of India, Indian Army, and Himanshu Panwar (successful male candidate).

• Bench: Justices Manmohan and Dipankar Datta.

• Date: Decided on August 11, 2025.

• Core Dispute:
  Whether the Army’s 2023 recruitment notification for the JAG Branch—reserving 6 vacancies for men and 3 for women—violates Articles 14, 15, and 16 of the Constitution.

4. Explanation of the Judgment

A. Primary Issue

The Army permitted women’s induction into the JAG Branch under Section 12 of the Army Act, 1950 (via 1992 notifications). However, the 2023 recruitment notice capped women’s vacancies at 3 (vs. 6 for men). The petitioners argued this was discriminatory, as women candidates outperformed men in merit (e.g., the 10th-ranked woman scored higher than the 3rd-ranked man).

B. Court’s Reasoning

1. Section 12 of Army Act Does Not Allow Gender Caps:
   Once the Central Government notifies a branch (like JAG) as open to women under Section 12, the Army cannot impose additional restrictions (e.g., "extent of induction") via executive policies.
   Such restrictions must be enacted by Parliament under Article 33, not imposed administratively.

2. Violation of Fundamental Rights:
   The 50:50 or 70:30 recruitment ratios (men:women) led to indirect discrimination:
   Women scored higher marks but were rejected due to artificially low vacancy caps.
   This violated Articles 14, 15, and 16 by denying merit-based equality.
   The Army’s reliance on outdated policies (e.g., 2011/2012 circulars barring women from combat roles) was struck down as "15th-century thought process" reinforcing stereotypes.

3. Gender-Neutral vs. Gender-Equal:
   The Army claimed its 2024 policy was "gender-neutral," but the Court clarified:
   Gender-neutral: Merit-based selection, irrespective of sex.
   Gender-equal: Fixed numerical quotas (e.g., 50% seats for women).
   The Army’s 50:50 quota was not truly neutral as it subverted merit.

4. JAG Branch Is Not Combat-Centric:
   The Army argued JAG officers are "combatants," justifying gender restrictions. The Court rejected this:
   JAG is a legal-advisory branch under the Adjutant General (non-combat role).
   Women JAG officers are now trained identically to men (per 2023 policies).

5. Operational Deployment Concerns Unfounded:
   The Court noted women officers have served in high-risk zones (e.g., Siachen, UN missions) and combat-support arms without issues.
   Restricting their numbers based on hypothetical combat roles was irrational.

C. Key Directions

1. Merit-Based Recruitment:
   Combined merit lists for men and women must be published for JAG recruitment.
   Vacancies shall be filled by merit alone, irrespective of gender.

2. Minimum 50% for Women:
   To correct historical discrimination, at least 50% of vacancies shall be allocated to women—but only if they qualify on merit.

3. Relief to Petitioners:
   Arshnoor Kaur (Petitioner No. 1) to be inducted into the next JAG training course.
   Himanshu Panwar (Respondent No. 3) denied relief as his selection perpetuated indirect discrimination.

D. Constitutional Significance

• Article 15(3) (special provisions for women) is not an exception to equality but a facet of substantive justice.

• Indirect discrimination (e.g., neutral policies with discriminatory effects) is unconstitutional.

• National Security (Article 33) cannot override equality without parliamentary sanction.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court affirmed that the Army’s gender-based vacancy caps violated the Constitution. By mandating merit-based combined merit lists and minimum 50% allocation for women (subject to merit), the judgment ensures the JAG Branch recruitment aligns with substantive equality. The ruling reinforces that "no nation is secure when half its population is held back."