Legal Review and Analysis of Danesh Singh & Ors vs Har Pyari Dead Thr Lrs & Ors 2025 INSC 1434
Case Synopsis
Danesh Singh & Ors. vs. Har Pyari (Dead) Thr. Lrs. & Ors., 2025 INSC 1434.
Synopsis: The Supreme Court definitively ruled that a pendente lite transferee is estopped from instituting an independent civil suit to invalidate a court-confirmed auction sale, holding such a person bound by the exclusive and time-sensitive remedial mechanism prescribed under Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
1. Heading of the Judgment
DANESH SINGH & ORS. vs. HAR PYARI (DEAD) THR. LRS. & ORS.
Supreme Court of India – Civil Appeal No. 14761 of 2025 – 2025 INSC 1434
Judges: Justice I.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan
Supreme Court Judgment on the Bar Against Separate Suits by Pendente Lite Transferees Challenging Auction Sales.
2. Related Laws and Sections Presented in the Judgment
Transfer of Property Act, 1882: Section 52 (Doctrine of Lis Pendens).
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908:
Section 47 (Questions to be determined by the Court executing decree).
Order XXI, Rule 89 (Application to set aside sale on deposit).
Order XXI, Rule 90 (Application to set aside sale on ground of irregularity or fraud).
Order XXI, Rule 92 (Sale when to become absolute or be set aside).
Order XXI, Rule 58 (Adjudication of claims to attachment).
Order XXI, Rule 99 (Dispossession by decree-holder or purchaser).
Order XXI, Rules 100, 101, 102 (Scheme for adjudication and bar on pendente lite transferees).Limitation Act, 1963: Article 127 (60-day period for applications under Order XXI, Rules 89, 90, 91).
3. Basic Judgment Details
A. Facts of the Judgment
The case originated from a mortgage and subsequent loan recovery suit by New Bank of India (Respondent No. 6). After an ex-parte decree was passed on 12.11.1984, Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 (Har Pyari and her husband) purchased a portion of the mortgaged property from one of the judgment-debtors on 13.05.1985 and 24.06.1985. During execution, the entire property was auctioned on 20.06.1988. The Appellants (sons of another judgment-debtor) were the auction purchasers. The sale was confirmed on 30.08.1988 and possession delivered on 24.06.1989. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 then filed a separate civil suit (Suit No. 353 of 1989) seeking a declaration that the auction sale was void and for possession. The Trial Court and First Appellate Court decreed the suit. The High Court dismissed the Second Appeal. The Auction Purchasers (Appellants) appealed to the Supreme Court.
B. Issues in the Judgment
Was the transfer to Respondent Nos. 1 & 2 hit by the doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of the TP Act?
Could Respondent Nos. 1 & 2 have sought relief under Order XXI, Rule 89 or Rule 90 CPC?
Were Respondent Nos. 1 & 2 "third parties" entitled to file a separate suit under Order XXI, Rule 92(4)?
Were Respondent Nos. 1 & 2 "representatives of the judgment-debtor" barred by Section 47 CPC?
Should Respondent Nos. 1 & 2 have availed the remedy under Order XXI, Rule 99 CPC, and did their failure affect their suit's maintainability?
C. Ratio Decidendi (Court's Reasoning)
The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' decisions. Its core reasoning was:
On Lis Pendens: The purchases by Respondent Nos. 1 & 2 were pendente lite (made after the bank's suit was filed but before the decree was satisfied). They were bound by the doctrine under Section 52 of the TP Act, irrespective of their lack of knowledge or bona fides.
On Remedies under Order XXI: The remedies under Rules 89 and 90 are strict and time-bound. Respondent Nos. 1 & 2 could not have succeeded under Rule 90 as their challenge was to the judgment-debtor's title, not merely irregularities in the sale process. The 60-day limitation period had also lapsed.
On Maintainability of the Separate Suit: The suit was not maintainable due to a three-fold bar:
As Representatives: Being pendente lite transferees, they were "representatives of the judgment-debtor" under Section 47 CPC, which mandates that execution-related questions be decided only by the Executing Court, not by separate suit.
Bar under Rule 92(3): Order XXI, Rule 92(3) explicitly bars any suit to set aside an order confirming a sale by a person affected by it.
Not "Third Parties": They did not qualify as "third parties" under Rule 92(4), which is reserved for persons claiming title independent of and not derived from the judgment-debtor pendente lite.On Remedy under Rule 99: While a pendente lite transferee could file an application under Rule 99, Order XXI, Rule 102 specifically bars such persons from obtaining any relief (like restoration of possession). The scheme of Rules 99 to 101 is a complete code, and a separate suit for the same relief is barred.
4. Core Principle of the Judgment
The Supreme Court addressed the core issue of whether a pendente lite transferee can bypass the exhaustive statutory scheme under Order XXI CPC by filing a separate civil suit to nullify a confirmed auction sale.
Analysis and Core Holding
The Court conducted an in-depth analysis of the interplay between Section 47 CPC, Order XXI (especially Rules 89, 90, 92, 99, 101, and 102), and Section 52 of the TP Act. It held that the CPC provides a self-contained code for execution proceedings. A pendente lite transferee, who derives title from the judgment-debtor during the suit's pendency, is statutorily precluded from instituting a separate suit. Such a transferee must agitate all grievances within the execution proceedings themselves, subject to the strict limitations and conditions prescribed (like the 60-day period under Rules 89/90). Allowing a separate suit would defeat the legislative intent behind finality of execution sales and would render the specific, time-bound remedies under Order XXI meaningless. The small window for a separate suit under Rule 92(4) is exclusively for genuine third parties with independent titles, not for those claiming through the judgment-debtor.
5. Final Outcome and Supreme Court Directions
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal filed by the auction purchasers (Danesh Singh & Ors.). The judgments of the High Court, the First Appellate Court, and the Trial Court were set aside. Consequently, Suit No. 353 of 1989 filed by Respondent Nos. 1 & 2 was dismissed as not maintainable. The auction sale in favour of the Appellants was upheld.
6. MCQs Based on the Judgment
MCQ 1: According to the Supreme Court in Danesh Singh v. Har Pyari, a pendente lite transferee from a judgment-debtor is primarily barred from filing a separate suit to challenge a court auction sale because?
A. The sale was conducted by a competent court and is therefore incontestable.
B. The transferee is considered a "representative of the judgment-debtor" under Section 47 CPC, and such questions must be determined in execution proceedings.
C. The Limitation Act provides no period for filing such a suit.
D. The doctrine of res judicata directly applies to auction sales.
MCQ 2: The Supreme Court held that the separate suit filed by Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 was not maintainable under Order XXI, Rule 92(4) CPC because?
A. They had already filed an application under Order XXI, Rule 90.
B. They filed the suit before the sale was confirmed by the court.
C. They were not "third parties" but were pendente lite transferees claiming through the judgment-debtor.
D. They did not implead the decree-holder as a necessary party in their suit.