Legal Review and Analysis of Jagdeep Chowgule vs Sheela Chowgule & Ors 2026 INSC 92
Synopsis
The Supreme Court of India, in its judgment dated 2026, settled a significant controversy regarding the appropriate forum for filing applications under Section 29A(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, for extension of time to complete arbitral proceedings. The Court held that irrespective of whether the arbitral tribunal was constituted by the High Court under Section 11(6) or by the parties under Section 11(2), the application for extension must be filed before the "Court" as defined under Section 2(1)(e) of the Act, i.e., the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction or the High Court exercising ordinary original civil jurisdiction. The judgment overrules the view that a distinction based on the appointing authority creates separate jurisdictional avenues.
1. Basic Information of the Judgment
Case Title: Jagdeep Chowgule vs. Sheela Chowgule & Ors.
Citation: 2026 INSC 92
Court: Supreme Court of India
Coram: Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Justice R. Mahadevan
Nature of Bench: Division Bench (not a Constitutional Bench)
Civil Appeal No.: Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 10944-10945 of 2025
2. Legal Framework
Governing Statute: The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
Key Provisions Interpreted:
Section 2(1)(e) – Definition of "Court."
Section 11 – Appointment of arbitrators.
Section 29A – Time limit for arbitral award, including extension and substitution of arbitrators.
Section 42 – Jurisdiction of courts in arbitral proceedings.Relevant Precedents:
State of West Bengal v. Associated Contractors (2015) – Exhaustive definition of "Court" under Section 2(1)(e).
State of Jharkhand v. Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. (2020) – Jurisdictional issues under Section 42.
Nimet Resources Inc. v. Essar Steels Ltd. (2009) – Interpretation of "Court" in arbitration matters.
Chief Engineer (NH) PWD v. BSC&C and C JV (2022) – Power of Court under Section 29A.
3. Relevant Facts of the Case
The dispute arose from a Memorandum of Family Settlement (MFS) dated 11.01.2021 among members of the Chowgule family. Arbitration was invoked under Clause 24 of the MFS on 18.05.2021. Following the resignation of the presiding arbitrator, an application for appointment under Section 11 was filed before the High Court, which appointed an arbitrator on 31.10.2023. Meanwhile, an application for extension of time under Section 29A was filed before the Commercial Court, which allowed it on 02.01.2024. The respondent challenged this order, contending that the Commercial Court lacked jurisdiction as the arbitrator was appointed by the High Court. The Single Judge referred the matter to a Division Bench, which held that applications under Section 29A(4) must be filed before the High Court if the tribunal was constituted under Section 11(6). This decision was impugned before the Supreme Court.
4. Issues Before the Court
The High Court framed two issues:
Whether an application under Section 29A(4) lies before the High Court or Civil Court when the tribunal is constituted by the High Court under Section 11(6).
Whether such application lies before the High Court or Civil Court when the tribunal is constituted by the parties under Section 11(2).
The Supreme Court reframed the issue as a single question:
Whether an application under Section 29A for extension of time must be filed before the High Court or the Civil Court, regardless of the mode of constitution of the arbitral tribunal.
5. Ratio Decidendi
The Supreme Court held:
The term "Court" in Section 29A must be interpreted as per the exhaustive definition under Section 2(1)(e) of the Act.
There is no distinction based on whether the tribunal was appointed by the High Court under Section 11(6) or by the parties under Section 11(2).
The jurisdiction under Section 11 is limited to the appointment of arbitrators and exhausts upon constitution of the tribunal, rendering the appointing court functus officio.
Applications for extension or substitution under Section 29A are matters of curial supervision and must be filed before the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction or the High Court exercising ordinary original civil jurisdiction.
Hierarchical concerns or perceived conflicts of power between courts do not justify deviation from the statutory definition.
6. Legal Principles Established
Exhaustive Definition of "Court": Section 2(1)(e) provides a complete definition, and the term must be given the same meaning throughout Part I of the Act unless the context expressly requires otherwise.
Functus Officio Doctrine: A court exercising powers under Section 11 does not retain supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings post-appointment.
Contextual Interpretation Limited: Perceptions of jurisdictional hierarchy or conflict do not constitute a valid "context" to override the statutory definition.
Section 42 Inapplicable to Section 11: Applications under Section 11 are not made before a "Court" as defined, and thus Section 42 (which consolidates jurisdiction) does not apply to them.
7. Analysis and Examination by the Supreme Court
The Court undertook a detailed analysis:
a. Scheme of the Act:
The Act is a complete code, with distinct chapters for appointment, conduct, and challenge to arbitral proceedings.
Section 29A falls under Chapter VI (Making of Arbitral Award and Termination), which is separate from Chapter III (Composition of Arbitral Tribunal).
b. Divergent High Court Views:
The Court examined two streams of High Court decisions: one adhering strictly to the definition under Section 2(1)(e), and another adopting a contextual interpretation to avoid jurisdictional anomalies.
It rejected the latter, emphasizing that statutory interpretation cannot be based on perceptions of court hierarchy.
c. Interpretation of Section 2(1)(e):
Relying on Associated Contractors and Nimet Resources, the Court affirmed that the definition is exhaustive and applies uniformly unless a contrary intention is evident from the context.
No such contrary intention exists in Section 29A.
d. Role of the Referral Court under Section 11:
The Court reiterated that the power under Section 11 is narrowly confined to appointing arbitrators and does not extend to post-appointment supervision.
e. True Text and Context of Section 29A:
The provision is designed to ensure timely conclusion of arbitrations, with powers of extension and substitution vested in the "Court" as defined.
The power to substitute arbitrators under Section 29A(6) is consequential to extension and does not equate to a fresh appointment under Section 11.
8. Critical Analysis and Final Outcome
Critical Analysis:
The judgment reinforces textual interpretation over judicial improvisation based on perceived practical difficulties.
It clarifies that the Arbitration Act does not create a dual jurisdictional track based on the appointing authority, thereby promoting consistency and predictability.
The ruling may reduce forum-shopping and unnecessary procedural litigation over jurisdictional issues.
Final Outcome:
The appeals were allowed.
The orders of the Division Bench and Single Judge of the High Court were set aside.
The order of the Commercial Court dated 02.01.2024 was restored.
Parties were permitted to approach the Commercial Court for further extensions under Section 29A(5).
9. (MCQs)
1. Under Section 2(1)(e) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the term "Court" includes?
a) Any Civil Court in a district.
b) The Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction and the High Court exercising ordinary original civil jurisdiction.
c) Only the Supreme Court and High Courts.
d) All courts having jurisdiction over arbitration matters.
2. According to the Supreme Court in Jagdeep Chowgule, an application under Section 29A(4) for extension of time must be filed before?
a) The High Court that appointed the arbitrator under Section 11(6).
b) The Supreme Court in case of international commercial arbitration.
c) The Court as defined under Section 2(1)(e), irrespective of the appointing authority.
d) The same forum that conducted the arbitration proceedings.
3. The Supreme Court held that a court acting under Section 11 of the Act becomes functus officio?
a) After the arbitral award is passed.
b) Upon the constitution of the arbitral tribunal.
c) Only after the award is challenged under Section 34.
d) When the arbitration agreement is terminated.
4. Which of the following statements is correct regarding Section 42 of the Arbitration Act, as interpreted in this judgment?
a) It applies to applications made under Section 11.
b) It consolidates jurisdiction in the court where the first application under Part I is filed.
c) It does not apply to applications under Section 11 because the Chief Justice or designate is not a "Court" as defined.
d) It grants exclusive jurisdiction to the High Court in all arbitration matters.