Summary and Analysis of Malleeswari vs K Suguna and Another 2025 INSC 1080

1. Heading of the Judgment

Case Title: Civil Appeal No. of 2025 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No. 12787 of 2025]
Parties: Malleeswari (Appellant) versus K. Suguna and Another (Respondents)
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.V.N. Bhatti and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah
Date of Judgment: September 8, 2025
Citation: 2025 INSC 1080

2. Related Laws and Sections

The judgment interprets and applies provisions from the following legal framework:

• Hindu Succession Act, 1956:
  Section 6 (as amended by the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005): Grants daughters the status of coparceners by birth in a Hindu Undivided Family (HUF), with the same rights and liabilities as a son.

• Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC):
  Section 114 read with Order XLVII, Rule 1: Governs the power of a court to review its own judgments. It specifies that a review is permissible only on the grounds of (a) discovery of new and important matter or evidence, (b) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or (c) any other sufficient reason analogous to the first two.

• Principles of Lis Pendens: The doctrine that prohibits the transfer of any property under litigation without the court's permission, as such a transfer is bound by the outcome of the suit.

3. Basic Judgment Details

This appeal arose from a long-standing partition suit concerning ancestral property. The original suit (O.S. No. 192 of 2000) was filed by Subramani (son) against his father, Munusamy Naidu, for partition. An ex-parte preliminary decree was passed in 2003, dividing the property into two equal shares for the father and son.

After the decree, the father executed two transactions:

1. A sale deed for some properties in favor of K. Suguna (Respondent No. 1).

2. A settlement deed and a will bequeathing his share in the remaining properties to his daughter, Malleeswari (the Appellant).

The Appellant, Malleeswari, filed an application (I.A. No. 1199 of 2018) to amend the 2003 preliminary decree. She claimed that by virtue of the 2005 Amendment to the Hindu Succession Act, she was a coparcener by birth and was entitled to a one-third share in the ancestral property. The Trial Court dismissed her application. The Madras High Court initially allowed her revision petition (C.R.P. No. 1439 of 2019) but later, in a review petition filed by the purchaser (K. Suguna), set aside its own order and remanded the case to the Trial Court. Malleeswari appealed this review order to the Supreme Court.

4. Explanation of the Judgment

The Core Legal Issues

The Supreme Court had to decide on two primary questions:

1. Substantive Right: Whether a daughter, under the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, has a right to be recognized as a coparcener and claim a share in an ancestral property even after a preliminary decree for partition has been passed, if the final decree has not been drawn up.

2. Procedural Jurisdiction: Whether the High Court, in exercising its power of review, overstepped its jurisdiction by effectively acting as an appellate court and re-adjudicating facts, which is not permitted under the limited scope of a review.

Supreme Court's Analysis and Findings

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal filed by Malleeswari. It set aside the High Court's review order and restored the High Court's original order which had recognized the Appellant's rights. The Court's reasoning was based on the following pillars:

1. On the Daughter's Coparcenary Rights (Substantive Law):
The Court affirmed the landmark precedent set in Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma (2020) 9 SCC 1. It held that the rights conferred on a daughter by the 2005 Amendment are rights by birth. These rights are inherent and are not created by the amendment; the amendment merely recognized and codified them. Crucially, the Court reiterated that these rights can be claimed even in pending proceedings, so long as the final decree has not been executed. Since the final decree in this case had not been drawn up, the Appellant was perfectly within her rights to seek the amendment of the preliminary decree to include her one-third share.

2. On the Scope of Review Jurisdiction (Procedural Law):
This was the central focus of the judgment. The Supreme Court conducted an in-depth analysis of the scope of review under Section 114 and Order XLVII of the CPC. It reiterated the well-settled principles that:

• A review is not an appeal in disguise. It cannot be used to re-hear a case and substitute one view for another.

• The grounds for review are extremely narrow and limited to:
  Discovery of new and important evidence.
  A mistake or error apparent on the face of the record (i.e., a patent error that does not require lengthy reasoning to establish).
  Any other reason analogous to the above (e.g., a glaring omission).

• A review court does not sit in appeal over its own order. It cannot re-examine evidence and arrive at new factual conclusions.

The Supreme Court found that the High Court, in its review order, had grossly exceeded its jurisdiction. Instead of merely correcting an apparent error, the High Court:

• Re-appreciated the entire case and counter-case of the parties.

• Made fresh findings on facts, such as questioning the "ancestral" nature of the property—a fact that was already admitted in the original plaint and not contested by the original defendant (the father).

• Allowed the respondent (a pendente lite purchaser, whose rights are subordinate to the decree) to raise new defenses that were not available to her vendor.

The Supreme Court held that this was a clear case of the review court trespassing into the domain of an appellate court, which is impermissible in law.

3. On the Rights of a Pendente Lite Transferee:
The Court also addressed the status of Respondent No. 1, K. Suguna, who purchased the property during the pendency of the suit (lis pendens). It clarified that a purchaser during litigation steps into the shoes of the vendor and is bound by the court's decree. Her rights cannot be superior to those of her vendor (the father). Therefore, she could not challenge the fundamental nature of the property (as being ancestral) that was already admitted by the original parties to the suit.

Supreme Court's Directions

• The impugned review order dated October 19, 2024, passed by the High Court was set aside.

• The High Court's original order dated September 23, 2022, which allowed the Appellant's revision petition and recognized her right to a one-third share, was restored.

• The matter was sent back (remanded) to the Trial Court with a direction to expeditiously dispose of all pending applications, preferably within three months, to incorporate the Appellant's share and proceed towards a final decree.

• There was no order as to costs.

Conclusion

This judgment is a robust reinforcement of two critical legal principles:

1. The substantive right of a daughter to an equal share in ancestral property is a right by birth, enforceable in all pending litigations where the final decree has not been drawn.

2. The procedural power of review is not a tool for a fresh hearing. It is a narrow exception meant only for correcting glaring errors, and courts must strictly confine themselves to its limited scope to ensure the finality of judgments. The Supreme Court's intervention was necessary to correct a jurisdictional error where the High Court had misused this power.