Legal Review and Analysis of S Nagesh vs Shobha S Aradhya 2026 INSC 27
Case Synopsis
Case: S. Nagesh vs Shobha S. Aradhya, (2026) INSC 27.
Synopsis : This judgment mandates strict adherence to procedural sequence under the Negotiable Instruments Act, holding that condonation of delay is a jurisdictional condition precedent. A court cannot take cognizance of a time-barred complaint under Section 138 unless it has first recorded satisfaction and condoned the delay as per the proviso to Section 142(1)(b). Non-compliance vitiates the entire proceeding.
1. Heading of the Judgment
Case Name: S. Nagesh vs Shobha S. Aradhya
Citation: 2026 INSC 27 (Criminal Appeal No. of 2026 @ SLP(Crl.) No. 18127 of 2024)
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sanjay Kumar and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Alok Aradhe
Date of Judgment: January 06, 2026
2. Related Laws and Sections
The judgment centers on the strict procedural compliance required under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI Act), specifically:
Section 138 of the NI Act: Defines the offence of dishonour of a cheque for insufficiency of funds, etc.
Section 142 of the NI Act: Pertains to the cognizance of offences. The crux of the dispute is the interpretation of the proviso to Section 142(1)(b), which was inserted by Act 55 of 2002. This proviso states: "Provided that the cognizance of a complaint may be taken by the Court after the prescribed period, if the complainant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making a complaint within such period."
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Invoked by the appellant before the High Court seeking quashing of the complaint.
3. Basic Judgment Details
A. Facts of the Case
The Respondent (Shobha S. Aradhya) filed a complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act against the Appellant (S. Nagesh) for dishonour of a cheque worth ₹5,40,000/-.
The complaint was filed on 09.10.2013, which was two days beyond the one-month limitation period prescribed under Section 142(1)(b) of the NI Act.
The Magistrate, on the very same day (09.10.2013), took cognizance of the offence without noticing or addressing this delay. The Magistrate later noted the delay in an order dated 23.05.2014, granting liberty to the accused to contest it during trial.
Subsequently, upon an application by the complainant, the Magistrate condoned the two-day delay by an order dated 30.10.2018, accepting the medical ground (viral fever) cited by the complainant.
The Appellant approached the High Court under Section 482 CrPC to quash the complaint, arguing that cognizance taken prior to condonation of delay was without jurisdiction. The High Court dismissed the petition, holding the irregularity was curable.
The Appellant appealed to the Supreme Court.
B. Issues Before the Supreme Court
Whether a Magistrate, under the NI Act, can take cognizance of a time-barred complaint before condoning the delay in its filing?
Whether the procedural sequence mandated by the proviso to Section 142(1)(b) of the NI Act—first satisfying the court of sufficient cause for delay, then taking cognizance—is mandatory or directory?
C. Ratio Decidendi (Court's Reasoning)
Plain Language of the Statute: The Supreme Court focused on the "clear and unambiguous language" of the proviso to Section 142(1)(b). It held that the power to take cognizance of a belated complaint is conditionally conferred. The condition precedent is that the complainant must first satisfy the Court of sufficient cause for the delay.
Mandatory Sequence of Steps: The Court reasoned that the statutory scheme demands a specific sequence: (1) The complainant must apply for and establish "sufficient cause" for the delay; (2) The Court must record its satisfaction and condone the delay; (3) Only thereafter can valid cognizance be taken. Taking cognizance first reverses this statutory logic.
Rejection of the "Curable Irregularity" Argument: The Supreme Court expressly disagreed with the High Court's view that the sequence was interchangeable or that taking cognizance first was a mere curable irregularity. It emphasized that until the delay is condoned, a time-barred complaint does not legally exist as a valid complaint before the court for cognizance to be taken.
Analogy with Civil Procedure: The Court drew support from analogous provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure (Order XLI Rules 3A and 5(3)), where a belated appeal does not become a proper proceeding until the delay is condoned, reinforcing the principle that condonation must precede formal judicial action.
Consequence of Non-Compliance: Since the mandatory procedural condition was not fulfilled—cognizance was taken on 09.10.2013 while delay was condoned only on 30.10.2018—the initial cognizance and all subsequent proceedings were rendered void ab initio (from the beginning).
4. Core Principle of the Judgment
The Condition Precedent in Procedural Law
Title: The Inviolable Sequence: Condonation of Delay as a Sine Qua Non for Cognizance under the NI Act
Analysis
This judgment is a definitive pronouncement on procedural rigour in quasi-criminal statutes like the NI Act. The Supreme Court addressed the core issue of whether courts can adopt a liberal, substance-over-form approach when dealing with procedural mandates that are integral to the jurisdiction itself.
The Court drew a crucial distinction between an irregularity in procedure and the complete absence of a jurisdictional condition. The proviso to Section 142(1)(b) is not a mere guideline but a jurisdictional gatekeeper. By allowing cognizance only after the court is satisfied with the cause for delay, the statute makes the condonation of delay a condition precedent to the court's power to even entertain the complaint.
The Supreme Court's analysis underscores that such statutory conditions cannot be bypassed or rearranged based on judicial convenience or the perceived bona fides of a minor delay. The "sufficient cause" inquiry is not a standalone administrative step; it is the legal foundation that validates the otherwise time-barred complaint and clothes the court with jurisdiction. To treat the sequence as flexible would, in the Court's view, undermine the legislative intent behind strict limitation periods for speedy resolution of commercial disputes.
Thus, the judgment reinforces a principle of strict statutory construction for jurisdiction-conferring provisions, holding that compliance must be exact and in the ordained sequence. It serves as a reminder that in legal procedures, especially those triggering penal consequences, the how and when can be as critical as the what.
5. Final Outcome and Supreme Court Directions
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal filed by S. Nagesh (the appellant).
The impugned order of the Karnataka High Court dated 28.06.2024 was set aside.
Consequently, the complaint in PCR No. 3144 of 2013 (converted to CC No. 1439 of 2014) pending before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Mysore, was quashed in its entirety.
The proceedings against the appellant were brought to a permanent end.
6. (MCQs) Based on the Judgment
Question 1: In S. Nagesh vs Shobha S. Aradhya, the Supreme Court held that a Magistrate's action of taking cognizance of a cheque dishonour complaint filed after the limitation period was invalid. What was the specific procedural flaw?
a) The Magistrate failed to issue a summons to the accused.
b) The Magistrate took cognizance of the complaint before condoning the delay in its filing, reversing the mandatory sequence under Section 142 of the NI Act.
c) The Magistrate did not personally verify the complainant's medical certificate.
d) The Magistrate did not grant an adequate opportunity for the accused to be heard.
Question 2: According to the Supreme Court's interpretation of the proviso to Section 142(1)(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, what is the condition that must be fulfilled before a court can take cognizance of a time-barred complaint?
a) The accused must be given notice of the delay application.
b) The court must first record its satisfaction that the complainant has shown "sufficient cause" for the delay and condone it.
c) The complaint must be accompanied by an affidavit explaining the delay.
d) The court must prima facie be satisfied about the merits of the underlying debt.