CaseLaws

Parvinder Singh Khurana vs. Directorate of Enforcement (Criminal Appeal Nos. 3059–3062 of 2024, Supreme Court of India) Summary of the CaseLaw The Supreme Court addressed a significant issue concerning the power of the High Court or Sessions Court to grant an interim stay of a bail order pending the disposal of an application for cancellation of bail under Section 439(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). The appellant, initially granted bail by the Special Court in a PMLA case, was kept in custody for nearly a year due to an ex-parte interim stay order passed by the Delhi High Court on 23.06.2023. The stay was granted without hearing the accused, without recording reasons, and was repeatedly extended over multiple adjournments and judicial recusals. The Supreme Court examined whether such interim deprivation of liberty was legally permissible and laid down stringent guidelines for granting stays on bail orders. Key Legal Issues Involved: Whether the High Court or Sessions Court has the power to grant an interim stay on the operation of a bail order pending the hearing of a cancellation application under Section 439(2) CrPC. If such power exists, what are the legal standards and procedural safeguards that must be followed before granting such a stay, especially an ex-parte stay? Whether the continued operation of an unreasoned, ex-parte stay order for an extended period, without affording the accused a hearing, violates the fundamental right to liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution. The distinction between cancellation of bail on grounds of post-release misconduct and cancellation because the bail order itself is unjustified, illegal, or perverse. The Court Held: The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and set aside the High Court's interim stay orders. The Court held that: The power to grant an interim stay of a bail order exists but must be exercised only in exceptional cases where a very strong prima facie case for cancellation is made out. The interim stay order dated 23.06.2023 was illegal as it was passed ex-parte, without hearing the accused, without recording reasons, and without applying mind to the merits. Continuing such a stay for nearly a year, amid adjournments and recusals, amounted to a serious violation of the appellant's right to liberty under Article 21. The High Court’s subsequent order granting “liberty to apply for interim bail” was illogical and failed to address the urgency of vacating the stay. Key Legal Principles Established: Interim Stay of Bail is an Extraordinary Remedy – Courts should be “very slow” in staying a bail order. A stay can be granted only in rare and exceptional cases where a very strong prima facie case for cancellation is made out (e.g., bail granted by a cryptic, unreasoned order, or evidence of witness tampering). Reasons Must be Recorded – Any order granting an interim stay must contain brief reasons justifying why the case meets the exceptional threshold. Ex-Parte Stay is Highly Exceptional – An ex-parte stay should not be granted as a rule. It is permissible only in very rare and exceptional situations demanding immediate action. If granted, the court must: Record specific reasons for the urgency; Immediately list the matter to hear the accused on the continuation of the stay. Liberty Under Article 21 is Paramount – Deprivation of liberty via an interim stay must be strictly justified. Prolonged detention under an unreasoned stay, without an expeditious hearing, violates Article 21. Alternative to Stay – Instead of staying the bail order, courts can impose additional conditions to ensure the accused’s presence and prevent interference, as cancellation, if ultimately granted, remains enforceable. Relevance: This judgment fortifies the constitutional protection of personal liberty in bail matters. It curbs the growing tendency of prosecution agencies to obtain interim stays on bail orders casually, thereby ensuring that an accused’s hard-won liberty is not taken away without robust justification and due process. The ruling mandates judicial discipline, reasoned orders, and expeditious hearings, balancing the state’s interest in seeking cancellation with the accused’s fundamental right to freedom. It serves as a critical precedent for all courts dealing with applications for stay of bail, emphasizing that liberty cannot be suspended mechanically or for prolonged periods without compelling cause.

State of Karnataka vs. Sri Darshan etc. (Criminal Appeal Nos. 3528–3534 of 2025, Supreme Court of India) Summary of the CaseLaw The Supreme Court heard appeals filed by the State of Karnataka challenging the common bail order dated 13.12.2024 passed by the Karnataka High Court, which had granted bail to seven accused persons (including a prominent film actor) in a case involving allegations of conspiracy, kidnapping, and murder under Sections 120B, 302, 364, 201, and other provisions of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The prosecution alleged that the accused had conspired to abduct, brutally torture, and murder the deceased, who had allegedly sent obscene messages to the co-accused. The High Court’s bail order was criticized as being cryptic, unreasoned, and passed without due consideration of the gravity of the offence, the prima facie evidence, and the accused’s criminal antecedents. Key Legal Issues Involved: Whether the High Court’s bail order was perverse, mechanical, and passed without due application of mind to material facts such as the seriousness of the offence, evidence on record, and criminal antecedents of the accused. The distinction between annulment of bail (due to legal infirmity in the order at the time of grant) and cancellation of bail (due to supervening circumstances or post-release misconduct). Whether bail granted on allegedly false or exaggerated medical grounds, without credible urgency, is liable to be set aside. The extent to which a court at the bail stage can examine or appreciate evidence without prejudging the trial. Whether the status, influence, and celebrity of an accused are relevant considerations in deciding bail, especially when there is a risk of witness tampering or obstruction of justice. The Court Held: The Supreme Court allowed the State’s appeals and set aside the High Court’s bail order. The Court held that: The High Court’s order was unreasoned, cryptic, and reflected non-application of mind to crucial factors such as the heinous nature of the offence, prima facie evidence (including forensic, digital, and eyewitness accounts), and the accused’s criminal history. The bail granted to the first accused (A2) on medical grounds was based on misrepresentation and lacked credible urgency, thus liable to be annulled. The High Court improperly ventured into a mini-trial by assessing witness credibility and evidence weight—a function reserved for the trial court. The accused’s celebrity status and influence heightened the risk of witness intimidation and trial obstruction, making them unfit for bail. The bail granted to all respondents was cancelled, and they were directed to surrender forthwith. Key Legal Principles Established: Reasoned Bail Orders are Mandatory – Bail orders, especially in serious offences, must reflect a judicious application of mind and record brief, cogent reasons. Generalized phrases like “considering facts and circumstances” are insufficient. Annulment vs. Cancellation of Bail – Annulment is appropriate when the bail order itself is legally flawed, perverse, or based on irrelevant considerations. Cancellation applies when supervening circumstances (like witness tampering) occur post-release. No Mini-Trial at Bail Stage – While a prima facie assessment is necessary, courts must not conduct a detailed appreciation of evidence or comment on witness credibility, as this prejudices the trial. Medical Bail Requires Urgent, Credible Necessity – Bail on medical grounds must be based on specific, urgent, and credible medical opinion indicating that jail facilities are inadequate. Vague or exaggerated claims vitiate the grant. Influence and Status are Relevant to Bail – The social standing, influence, and celebrity of an accused are relevant factors if they pose a real risk of intimidating witnesses, tampering with evidence, or subverting justice. Equality before law (Article 14) prohibits special treatment. Gravity of Offence Overrides Incarceration Period – The prolonged period of custody or delay in trial, by itself, cannot justify bail in heinous offences like murder, especially when a strong prima facie case exists. Relevance: This judgment reinforces the disciplined exercise of judicial discretion in bail matters, particularly in cases involving serious crimes, influential accused, and complex evidence. It condemns the trend of cryptic, mechanical bail orders and underscores the duty of courts to balance personal liberty with societal interest and the integrity of the trial process. The ruling also sends a strong message about the rule of law—that no individual, regardless of status, is above the law or entitled to preferential treatment in the criminal justice system.

Ms. Y vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr. (Criminal Appeal No. 649 of 2022, Supreme Court of India) Summary of the CaseLaw The Supreme Court heard an appeal challenging the bail granted by the Rajasthan High Court to the accused-respondent (the appellant's uncle) in a case involving allegations of repeated sexual assault and rape of a minor niece over several years, registered under Sections 354, 354B, 354D, 376(2)(F), 376(2)(N), 450, 506, 509 IPC and relevant sections of the POCSO Act. The High Court's bail order was cryptic, lacking any substantive reasoning. The accused was a habitual offender with nearly twenty prior criminal cases, including serious offences like murder and kidnapping. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court had exercised its discretionary power under Section 439 CrPC judiciously and in accordance with well-settled principles. Key Legal Issues Involved: Whether the High Court’s bail order, being unreasoned and mechanical, suffers from non-application of mind and is liable to be set aside. Whether, while granting bail in serious offences like rape (especially under POCSO), courts are obligated to consider factors such as the gravity of the charge, criminal antecedents of the accused, and potential influence over the victim. The distinction between cancelling bail for post-grant misconduct and setting aside a bail order that is illegal, perverse, or unjustified from its inception. The extent to which an appellate court (including the Supreme Court under Article 136) can interfere with a bail order passed by the High Court. The Court Held: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the bail granted by the High Court. The Court held that: The High Court’s order was completely cryptic, devoid of any reasoning, and failed to reflect judicial application of mind to the serious facts of the case, including the heinous nature of the offence, the accused’s criminal history, and his relationship with the victim. While appellate courts are generally slow to interfere with bail orders, they must do so when the order is perfunctory, arbitrary, or passed without considering relevant legal parameters. The accused was directed to surrender within one week. Key Legal Principles Established: Reasoned Orders are a Fundamental Judicial Duty – Every bail order, especially in serious offences, must contain clear, albeit brief, reasons justifying the grant or refusal. General phrases like “considering the facts and circumstances” are insufficient without indicating the specific factors weighed by the court. Judicial Discretion in Bail Must Be Exercised Judiciously – The discretion under Section 439 CrPC is not unguided. Courts must consider factors such as: Prima facie involvement of the accused; Nature, gravity, and severity of the offence and punishment; Criminal antecedents and character of the accused; Likelihood of the accused fleeing, influencing witnesses, or repeating the offence; Position of the accused vis-à-vis the victim. Distinction Between Cancellation and Setting Aside Bail – Setting aside a bail order is warranted when the order itself is illegal, perverse, or passed without due consideration of relevant factors. This is distinct from cancelling bail due to supervening events or misuse of liberty post-release. Open Justice Requires Transparency in Reasoning – The principle of open justice demands that the factors which persuade a judge to grant or deny bail must be recorded in the order to ensure public confidence and accountability. Relevance: This judgment reinforces the constitutional and procedural imperative for courts to pass reasoned orders in bail applications, particularly in cases involving serious sexual offences against women and children. It condemns the growing trend of cryptic, mechanical bail orders and underscores the judiciary’s duty to balance individual liberty with the interests of justice and societal safety. The ruling serves as a binding precedent to ensure judicial discipline, transparency, and thoughtful exercise of discretion in bail matters.

Sony vs. Sony Yadav & Anr. (Criminal Appeal No. 377 of 2021, Supreme Court of India) Summary of the CaseLaw The Supreme Court of India heard an appeal against the bail granted by the Allahabad High Court to the first respondent (husband) in a case involving allegations of dowry death under Sections 498-A and 304-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1861. The deceased, married to the first respondent on 05.07.2018, died under unnatural circumstances within a year of marriage. The FIR contained specific allegations of dowry demands, harassment, and a phone call from the accused demanding money shortly before her death. The High Court granted bail without providing any substantive reasoning, merely citing general factors without evaluating the merits or seriousness of the allegations. Key Legal Issues Involved: Whether the High Court’s bail order, devoid of reasoning, violates the principles of judicial application of mind required under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Whether, in cases involving serious offences like dowry death under Section 304-B IPC, courts should consider the statutory presumptions under Sections 113-A and 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, while deciding bail. Whether an order granting bail can be challenged on merits by the complainant even if it is not misused, especially when it is passed mechanically without considering the seriousness of the allegations. Whether the High Court erred in ignoring the proximity between the alleged dowry demand, harassment, and the unnatural death of the deceased within a short span of marriage. The Court Held: The Supreme Court set aside the bail order passed by the High Court, directing the first respondent to surrender forthwith. The Court held that: The High Court’s order was completely unreasoned and failed to reflect any judicial application of mind to the serious allegations, the statutory presumptions, or the specific facts of the case. In serious offences like dowry death, granting bail without evaluating the gravity of the accusation, evidence, and applicable legal presumptions is impermissible. Judicial orders, especially in bail matters, must contain clear and cogent reasons to reflect a judicious exercise of discretion, even if briefly stated. The observations made were confined only to the bail aspect and would not influence the merits of the trial. Key Legal Principles Established: Reasoned Orders are Fundamental to Judicial Process – A bail order must demonstrate application of mind to the facts, allegations, and legal provisions; mere recitation of general factors without analysis is insufficient. Seriousness of Offence and Statutory Presumptions in Bail – In cases involving offences like dowry death under Section 304-B IPC, courts must consider the statutory presumptions under the Evidence Act and the gravity of the charge while deciding bail. Bail Orders are Subject to Judicial Scrutiny on Merits – A complainant can challenge the grant of bail on merits, not only on grounds of misuse; an unreasoned or mechanically passed bail order is liable to be set aside. Judicial Discipline in Bail Jurisprudence – High Courts must avoid adopting a standardized, non-reasoned approach in bail matters; each order must be tailored to the specific facts and legal framework of the case. Relevance: This judgment reinforces the necessity for reasoned judicial orders in bail proceedings, especially in cases involving serious offences against women. It underscores the duty of courts to carefully evaluate allegations of dowry harassment and death, and the statutory presumptions that arise, before granting bail. The ruling serves as a reminder to lower courts to maintain judicial discipline and transparency in bail orders, thereby upholding the integrity of criminal justice administration.

Shabeen Ahmad vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2025) Summary of the CaseLaw The Supreme Court of India addressed a batch of criminal appeals challenging the grant of bail by the High Court to four accused relatives in a case alleging dowry death under Sections 498A and 304B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The key legal issues involved were: Factors for Grant and Cancellation of Bail in Grave Offences – Whether the High Court adopted a correct and non-mechanical approach while granting bail, considering the gravity of the offence of dowry death, the specific allegations, and the prima facie evidence on record. Differential Treatment Based on Role and Circumstances – Whether the role attributed to different accused (parents-in-law vs. sisters-in-law) and their individual circumstances warrant a differentiated approach in bail considerations. Societal Impact and Judicial Vigilance – The extent to which courts must consider the broader societal message and the imperative of maintaining public confidence in the justice system while adjudicating bail in crimes against women. The Court held that: The bail granted to the parents-in-law (Accused Nos. 2 & 3) was cancelled. The High Court's order was found to be perverse for failing to duly consider the grave allegations, the medical evidence indicating homicide, their principal role in dowry demands, and the need for heightened judicial scrutiny in such cases. The bail granted to the two sisters-in-law (Accused Nos. 4 & 5) was upheld. While they were prima facie implicated, their role was seen as relatively less direct. Leniency was extended considering their young age, recent marriage in one case, and educational pursuits, without commenting on the merits of the allegations. Key Legal Principles Established: Non-Mechanical, Gravity-Centric Bail Scrutiny – In serious offences like dowry death, courts must undertake deeper scrutiny beyond superficial parameters like lack of criminal antecedents. The gravity of the accusation, the nature of evidence, and the specific role attributed to the accused are paramount considerations. Bail Cancellation for Perverse Orders – A bail order that ignores relevant material, fails to appreciate the gravity of the offence, or is otherwise perverse, is liable to be set aside by a superior court, even in the absence of supervening circumstances like witness tampering by the accused. Judicial Duty to Reflect Societal Seriousness – Courts have a duty to reflect heightened vigilance in cases involving crimes that strike at social justice and equality. The social message emanating from judicial orders in sensitive cases is crucial for maintaining public faith in the criminal justice system's resolve to combat heinous social crimes. Relevance: This judgment reinforces the strict standards for granting bail in cases involving serious crimes against women, particularly dowry deaths. It cautions against a routine or mechanical approach in such matters and underscores the judiciary's responsibility to balance individual liberty with the demands of justice, the integrity of the trial, and societal expectations. It also provides a nuanced precedent for differentiating bail outcomes based on the degree of involvement and personal circumstances of co-accused.

Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod Vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr. (Criminal Appeal No. 2287 of 2009) Summary of the CaseLaw The Supreme Court of India addressed a legal issue of substantial public importance concerning the territorial jurisdiction of courts for trying offences under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The key legal issues involved were: Place of Commission of Offence – Whether the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act is complete only upon the dishonour of the cheque, and consequently, whether the place of jurisdiction is restricted to the location of the drawee bank (the bank on which the cheque is drawn). Overruling Precedent – Whether the earlier judgment in K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan, which allowed for multiple venues for filing complaints based on the place of cheque presentation, issuance of notice, etc., required reconsideration. Interpretation of Proviso to Section 138 – Whether the conditions stipulated in the proviso to Section 138 (regarding notice and failure to pay) are ingredients of the offence itself or are conditions precedent only for the cognizance of the already committed offence. The Court held that: The offence under Section 138 of the NI Act is committed the moment the cheque is dishonoured by the drawee bank. The place where the drawee bank is located is the proper venue for the trial of the offence. The conditions in the proviso are not ingredients of the offence but are prerequisites for taking cognizance of the offence. The judgment in Bhaskaran was overruled to the extent it allowed filing of complaints at the place of cheque presentation to the payee's bank or the place from where the statutory notice was issued. Key Legal Principles Established: Offence is Localised at Drawee Bank – The offence under Section 138 is complete upon the dishonour of the cheque by the bank on which it is drawn. Therefore, the court within whose jurisdiction the drawee bank is situated has the territorial jurisdiction to try the case. Proviso Defers Prosecution, Not Offence – The proviso to Section 138 does not create the offence but imposes conditions that must be fulfilled before cognizance can be taken. The offence is complete upon dishonour; the proviso merely provides a window for the drawer to make amends and avoid prosecution. Strict Interpretation to Prevent Harassment – To prevent the misuse of the provision as a tool for harassment, unilateral acts of the complainant, such as choosing a bank for presentation or a place for issuing notice, cannot confer jurisdiction on a court that has no connection with the drawee bank's location. Relevance: This landmark judgment brought clarity and uniformity to the law on territorial jurisdiction in cheque dishonour cases. It significantly curbed the practice of "forum shopping" by complainants, which often led to harassment of the accused. The ruling aimed to reduce the burden on courts in metropolitan areas where a large number of cases were being filed despite the transaction having no connection with that jurisdiction, thereby ensuring a fairer and more efficient adjudication process.

Bijoy Kumar Moni Vs. Paresh Manna & Anr. (2024 INSC 1024) Summary of the CaseLaw: The Supreme Court of India addressed a criminal appeal concerning the dishonour of a cheque, focusing on the fundamental question of who can be prosecuted as the "drawer" under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI Act). The case involved a cheque issued by the accused, Paresh Manna, who signed it in his capacity as a Director of Shilabati Hospital Pvt. Ltd., drawn on the company's bank account. The key legal issues were: Who is the "Drawer" of a Company Cheque? – Whether a Director or an authorized signatory who signs a cheque on behalf of a company can be considered the "drawer" under Section 138 of the NI Act, making them personally liable. Vicarious Liability under Section 141 – Whether a Director can be held vicariously liable for the offence under Section 138 in the absence of the company (the principal offender) being arrayed as an accused. Interpretation of "on an account maintained by him" – The meaning and scope of this crucial phrase in Section 138, which links liability to the person maintaining the bank account. The Court held that: An authorized signatory (like a Director) signing a cheque on behalf of a company is not the "drawer" of the cheque. The company, being a separate legal entity, is the drawer. For a Director to be held liable, the complaint must be against the company, and only then can vicarious liability be fastened upon the Director under Section 141 of the NI Act if the conditions are met. Since the company, Shilabati Hospital Pvt. Ltd., was not made an accused in this case, the prosecution against the Director alone was not maintainable. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's order of acquittal. Key Legal Principles Established: Strict Interpretation of Penal Provisions: Section 138 of the NI Act, being a penal provision, must be construed strictly. The liability is fastened only on the "drawer" of the cheque, who is the person maintaining the account. Doctrine of Separate Corporate Personality: A company is a distinct legal entity. An authorized signatory acts on behalf of the company and does not merge their legal identity with it. Therefore, signing a cheque for the company does not make the signatory the "drawer." Company as a Necessary Accused: For invoking vicarious liability under Section 141 of the NI Act, the company must necessarily be arraigned as an accused. The commission of an offence by the company is a condition precedent to prosecuting its officers. No Vicarious Liability without Principal Offender: If the principal offender (the company) is not prosecuted or held guilty, there can be no question of fastening vicarious liability on its Directors or other officers. Relevance: This judgment is a seminal ruling that brings absolute clarity to the law on prosecuting company officials in cheque dishonour cases. It reinforces the corporate veil and the statutory scheme of the NI Act, preventing the misuse of its provisions to prosecute individuals in their personal capacity for cheques drawn on company accounts. It mandates that complainants must exercise due diligence to ascertain the true drawer of the cheque and array the correct entity as an accused.

Suresh C. Singal & Ors. Vs. The State of Gujarat & Ors. (Criminal Appeal No. 3862 of 2024) Summary of the Case Law The Supreme Court of India addressed an appeal concerning the quashing of criminal proceedings for alleged economic offences after the parties had reached a full and final settlement of the underlying financial dispute. The key legal issues involved were: Inherent Powers of the High Court – Whether the High Court, in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.), should quash criminal proceedings for non-compoundable offences after a settlement has been reached between the accused and the victim bank, and a 'No Dues Certificate' has been issued. Civil Flavour in Criminal Disputes – Whether the dispute, which originated from commercial transactions and was settled before the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT), was predominantly civil in nature, thereby making the continuation of criminal proceedings an abuse of the process of the court. Prosecution in Absence of Victim's Grievance – Whether criminal proceedings, initiated suo motu by the CBI, should be allowed to continue when the aggrieved party (the bank) has been made whole through a settlement and has no grievance against the accused. The Court held that: The High Court should have exercised its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal proceedings. The dispute was overwhelmingly and predominantly civil/commercial in nature, and its settlement left no live issue for the criminal trial to adjudicate. Continuing the prosecution would be oppressive, as the possibility of conviction was remote and bleak, and would amount to an abuse of the process of the court. Key Legal Principles Established: Quashing Powers Extend to Non-Compoundable Offences – The High Court's power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash proceedings in the interest of justice can be exercised for non-compoundable offences in cases that bear an overwhelming and predominant civil or commercial flavour, especially where the parties have amicably settled the dispute. Settlement as a Ground for Quashing – A full and final settlement of the underlying financial dispute, resulting in the victim institution suffering no loss and issuing a 'No Dues Certificate', is a strong ground for quashing subsequent criminal proceedings to prevent undue hardship and oppression to the accused. Remote Possibility of Conviction – When the facts and circumstances of a case, including the settlement and the lack of evidence against co-accused (bank officials), indicate that the possibility of a conviction is remote and bleak, the courts would be justified in quashing the proceedings to secure the ends of justice. Relevance: This judgment reinforces the judiciary's approach to distinguishing between criminal acts with a pervasive public element and those disputes that are essentially civil in nature but have criminal overtures. It provides crucial guidance on the exercise of inherent powers to quash proceedings in economic offence cases post-settlement, balancing the interests of justice and preventing the abuse of the legal process.

C.B.I. New Delhi Vs. B.B. Agarwal & Ors. etc. (Criminal Appeal Nos.2107-2125 of 2011) Summary of the Case Law The Supreme Court of India addressed a criminal appeal concerning the quashing of criminal proceedings after the parties had reached a full and final settlement in a parallel civil dispute. The key legal issues involved were: Effect of Civil Settlement on Criminal Proceedings – Whether a criminal case for offences including cheating, criminal conspiracy, and forgery under the IPC and the Prevention of Corruption Act can be quashed after the accused and the victim bank (PNB) have settled the underlying financial dispute through a one-time settlement and a consent decree from the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT). Scope of Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. – Whether the High Court was justified in invoking its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to quash the proceedings to prevent an abuse of the process of the court. Continuing Criminality Post-Settlement – Whether, after the full and final settlement of the financial dispute, any element of criminality survived to justify continuing the criminal trial. The Court held that: The High Court was correct in quashing the criminal proceedings. With the settlement of accounts and the payment of the entire dues to the bank, no live issue survived for the criminal trial. Continuing the prosecution in light of the settlement would be an abuse of the process of the court. Key Legal Principles Established: Settlement Can Negate Continuation of Criminal Proceedings – A full and final settlement of the underlying financial dispute between the parties, especially when the victim (in this case, the bank) has been made whole, can be a valid ground for quashing criminal proceedings to prevent the abuse of the court's process, even for non-compoundable offences. Inherent Powers to Secure Ends of Justice – The powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. are wide and can be exercised to quash proceedings when the continuation of a criminal case would serve no useful purpose and would amount to a waste of judicial time and an abuse of process. Distinction from Cases Involving Overwhelming Criminality – The principle of quashing cases after settlement is applicable where the court, upon examining the facts, finds that no significant criminal intent or overt criminal act survives independent of the settled civil dispute. The Court distinguished this case from those where the alleged criminality is severe and distinct from the civil wrong. Relevance: This judgment clarifies the interplay between civil settlements and criminal proceedings. It reinforces the judiciary's discretion to use its inherent powers to quash criminal cases when the primary dispute has been resolved and continuing the trial would be a futile and oppressive exercise. It serves as an important precedent for cases where the line between a civil wrong and a criminal offence is thin, and settlement renders the criminal trial unnecessary.

In Re: The Bill to Amend S. 20 of the Sea Customs Act (1963) Summary of the Case: The President of India referred several questions to the Supreme Court under Article 143 of the Constitution concerning the constitutional validity of a proposed Bill to amend the Sea Customs Act, 1878, and the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. The Bill sought to apply customs and excise duties to all goods belonging to State Governments, irrespective of their use. The core legal issue was whether such an imposition was barred by the immunity granted to State property from Union taxation under Article 289 of the Constitution. Key Legal Issues Involved: Scope of Article 289 Immunity: Whether the exemption from Union taxation for State property under Article 289(1) extends to indirect taxes like customs and excise duties, or is it restricted only to direct taxes on property and income. Interpretation of "Taxation": The meaning and scope of the term "taxation" as defined in Article 366(28) and its application within the context of Article 289. Federal Balance & Constitutional Scheme: The interpretation of Article 289 in the context of the overall constitutional scheme, particularly the distribution of legislative and taxing powers between the Union and the States, and the Union's exclusive power to regulate foreign trade. Precedent & Doctrinal Influence: The relevance and applicability of foreign judicial precedents from the United States, Canada, and Australia on the doctrine of inter-governmental immunities. The Court Held (Majority Opinion delivered by Sinha, C.J.): The immunity granted by Article 289(1) is an exception to the Union's exclusive power to legislate on certain taxes and must be strictly construed. The immunity is limited to taxes levied directly on the property and income of a State. It does not extend to indirect taxes like duties of customs and excise. Customs duties are not taxes on property as such but are imposts on the event of import/export, serving to regulate trade and commerce. Excise duties are taxes on the manufacture or production of goods, not on the goods themselves. Consequently, the Union is not precluded by Article 289 from imposing customs duties on the import/export or excise duties on the production/manufacture of State property, even when used for non-commercial, governmental purposes. Key Legal Principles Established: Distinction Between Direct and Indirect Taxes for Immunity: While the Indian Constitution does not distribute legislative power based on the direct/indirect tax distinction, this economic distinction is relevant for interpreting the scope of the constitutional immunity under Article 289. The immunity covers only direct taxes on property and income. Statutory Powers Over Contractual Immunities (in principle): The Union's plenary power to legislate on matters in the Union List, including taxation for regulation and revenue, is paramount. A general constitutional immunity cannot be interpreted to nullify this exclusive power. Contextual Interpretation of Constitutional Definitions: The wide definition of "taxation" in Article 366(28) must be read in the context of the specific article (Art. 289) and the overall constitutional scheme. The context may require cutting down the amplitude of the definition. Primacy of the Constitutional Scheme: The interpretation of a specific article (like Art. 289) must be adapted to harmonize with the entire scheme of the Constitution, including the distribution of legislative powers and the financial relations between the Union and the States. Relevance: This landmark advisory opinion is a foundational precedent in Indian Constitutional Law, defining the financial relationship and tax immunities between the Union and State Governments. It firmly establishes that States do not enjoy blanket immunity from all Union indirect taxation, thereby preserving the Union's fiscal and regulatory authority, particularly over customs and excise, which are crucial instruments of economic and trade policy. The judgment also showcases the Court's method of interpreting constitutional provisions by balancing textual meaning, contextual scheme, and comparative jurisprudence.

T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad Vs. Union of India & Ors. (Writ Petition (C) No.202 of 1995) Summary of the Case Law The Supreme Court of India addressed a pivotal issue concerning the scope of the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 (FC Act) and the abuse of the judicial process through Public Interest Litigation (PIL). The core legal questions involved were: Definition of "Forest" – Whether a specific parcel of land leased for a coal washery qualified as "forest land" under the FC Act, requiring prior central government approval for its non-forest use. Bonafides of a PIL Petitioner – Whether an application filed in the guise of a PIL was, in fact, a mala fide litigation initiated at the behest of a business competitor to stifle competition, rather than to serve a genuine public environmental cause. Evidentiary Value of Expert Committees & Technology – The extent to which the Court should rely on the reports of a court-appointed expert committee (the Central Empowered Committee or CEC) and advanced technological evidence (like satellite imagery and GIS) to determine the factual status of land. The Court held that: The application filed by Deepak Agarwal was not a bona fide PIL but was a proxy litigation funded and driven by a business rival. The Court strongly deprecated such abuse of the judicial process. On the merits, relying on the comprehensive analysis in the second and third reports of the CEC, which included historical settlement records, notifications, and modern satellite imagery analysis, the Court concluded that the leased land was not a "forest land" as per the dictionary meaning, state government circulars, or government records. The technology (LISS III with ERDAS IMAGINE) used by the Forest Survey of India (FSI) and the National Remote Sensing Agency (NRSA) was reliable for determining forest cover, and the petitioner's objections to it were without merit. Key Legal Principles Established: Expansive Definition of "Forest" – The FC Act applies to all lands that are "forests" in the dictionary sense, regardless of their legal status as reserved, protected, or de-notified. It also includes any area recorded as forest in government records. Duty of Courts to Scrutinize PIL Bonafides – Courts must be vigilant to ensure that PIL is not misused by busybodies, meddlesome interlopers, or those with vested interests for personal gain, private profit, or other oblique motives. A court must not allow its process to be abused by a mala fide applicant. Role of Expert Committees – Court-appointed expert bodies like the CEC are not only authorized but duty-bound to place all relevant facts before the Court, including those that cast doubt on the credibility and motives of a litigant. Judicial Endorsement of Technological Evidence – The Court endorsed the use of advanced technological tools like Geographical Information Systems (GIS), Global Positioning Systems (GPS), and satellite imagery (like IRS LISS III) as reliable and superior methods for factual determination in environmental and land disputes. Relevance: This judgment is a landmark precedent in Indian environmental and constitutional law. It reinforces the broad definition of "forest" for conservation purposes while simultaneously establishing stringent criteria to prevent the misuse of Public Interest Litigation. It serves as a cautionary tale against filing frivolous petitions under the "attractive brand name" of PIL and underscores the judiciary's reliance on expert committees and scientific evidence for resolving complex factual disputes.

Rupa Ashok Hurra Vs. Ashok Hurra and Ors. (AIR 2002 SC 1771) Summary of the Case Law A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court of India addressed a fundamental question of constitutional law: whether an aggrieved person is entitled to any relief against a final judgment/order of the Supreme Court after the dismissal of a review petition. This case led to the creation of the "curative petition" as an extraordinary remedy. The key legal issues involved were: Maintainability of a Writ under Article 32 – Whether a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution can be filed to challenge the validity of a final judgment of the Supreme Court itself. Inherent Powers of the Supreme Court – Whether the Supreme Court, as a court of record under Article 129 of the Constitution, possesses inherent powers to reconsider its final judgments to prevent an abuse of its process or to cure a gross miscarriage of justice, even after a review petition has been dismissed. Grounds and Procedure for an Extraordinary Remedy – If such inherent power exists, what should be the narrow grounds and a structured procedure for invoking it to prevent the remedy from being misused. The Court held that: A writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution cannot be used to challenge a final judgment of the Supreme Court. However, to prevent abuse of its process and to cure a gross miscarriage of justice, the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its inherent power, may reconsider its final judgments through a "curative petition." The curative petition is not a second review but a much narrower remedy available only in the "rarest of rare cases." Key Legal Principles Established: Creation of the Curative Petition – The Supreme Court, in its inherent power under Article 129 read with Article 142 of the Constitution, created a new judicial remedy—the curative petition—to rectify a gross miscarriage of justice after the dismissal of a review petition. Narrow Grounds for Entertaining a Curative Petition – A curative petition can be entertained only on very limited grounds: Violation of the principles of natural justice, such as where a person was not a party to the lis but was prejudicially affected, or where a party was not served with notice and the proceeding continued as if he had notice. A learned Judge's failure to disclose his connection with the subject matter or the parties, giving rise to a legitimate apprehension of bias. Strict Procedural Requirements – To prevent frivolous litigation, the Court mandated strict procedural safeguards: The petitioner must specifically aver that the grounds were taken in the dismissed review petition. The petition must contain a certification by a Senior Advocate regarding the fulfillment of these requirements. The petition must first be circulated to a Bench of the three senior-most Judges and the Judges who passed the impugned judgment. It will be listed for an open hearing only if a majority of this Bench concludes that the matter needs hearing. Relevance: This landmark judgment balances the paramount principle of finality of judgments with the overarching duty to do complete justice. It establishes a crucial safety valve within the Indian judicial system, ensuring that even the decisions of the highest court are not completely immune from challenge in circumstances involving a grave miscarriage of justice or a violation of fundamental procedural fairness. The ruling carefully circumscribes this extraordinary power with stringent grounds and procedural filters to maintain the certainty and dignity of the Supreme Court's pronouncements.

M/S. PSA MUMBAI INVESTMENTS PTE. LIMITED Vs. THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE JAWAHARLAL NEHRU PORT TRUST AND ANR. (2018 INSC 944) Summary of the Case Law The Supreme Court of India addressed an appeal concerning the existence of an arbitration agreement between the parties during a complex, multi-stage public bidding process for developing a container terminal. The key legal issues involved were: Concluded Contract vs. Pre-Contractual Stage – Whether the issuance and acceptance of a "Letter of Award" (LOA) by itself constituted a binding contract, or if the parties remained in a pre-contractual stage until the final "Concession Agreement" was signed. Applicability of Arbitration Clause – Whether an arbitration clause contained in a draft Concession Agreement, which was part of the bid documents but was never formally executed, could bind the parties to arbitration for disputes arising during the bidding process. Intent of the Parties and Governing Law – The interpretation of the bid documents (RFQ and RFP), including disclaimers and a clause granting exclusive jurisdiction to civil courts for "bidding process" disputes, to determine the parties' intent regarding dispute resolution. The Court held that: There was no concluded contract between the parties. The LOA was a step in the bidding process and not an unqualified acceptance, as it was contingent upon subsequent steps, including the formation of a Special Purpose Vehicle and the execution of a formal Concession Agreement. The arbitration clause in the draft Concession Agreement did not apply, as the agreement itself was never executed. The parties were therefore not bound by it. The High Court's judgment was set aside, and the Arbitrator's award, which had declined jurisdiction, was reinstated. Key Legal Principles Established: Distinction Between Bid Process and Concluded Contract – A complex bidding process involving multiple stages, with a clear schedule culminating in a final agreement, indicates that parties do not intend to be bound until that final agreement is executed. Documents like a Letter of Award, in such a context, are preliminary and do not by themselves create a binding contract. Arbitration Clause Requires a Concluded Contract – For an arbitration clause embedded within a draft agreement to become effective, the underlying contract must first be concluded. An arbitration clause cannot be plucked from an inchoate document to govern pre-contractual disputes. Specific Dispute Resolution Clause for Bid Process Prevails – When bid documents contain a specific clause granting exclusive jurisdiction to civil courts for disputes arising "under, pursuant to or in connection with the Bidding Process," this clause will govern all disputes related to that process, overriding a general arbitration clause meant for a future, unconcluded contract. Relevance: This judgment is a cornerstone precedent for disputes arising from public infrastructure projects. It provides crucial clarity on when a binding contract is formed in multi-stage bidding processes and emphasizes the necessity of a clear, concluded contract for an arbitration agreement to be enforceable. The ruling protects parties from being forced into arbitration for pre-contractual disputes and underscores the importance of meticulously drafted dispute resolution mechanisms in tender documents.

M/S. N.G. PROJECTS LIMITED Vs. M/S. VINOD KUMAR JAIN & ORS. (2022 INSC 340) Summary of the Case Law The Supreme Court of India addressed an appeal against a High Court order that had set aside the award of a road construction contract to the appellant. The key legal issues involved were: Scope of Judicial Review in Tender Matters – The extent to which a constitutional court can interfere with the decision-making process of a government authority in awarding a contract, and whether the courts can act as an appellate authority to re-evaluate the merits of a tender decision. Essential vs. Non-Essential Terms of Tender – Whether the judiciary can classify certain tender conditions as "non-essential" and override the employer's perspective on what constitutes a mandatory requirement. Public Interest in Infrastructure Projects – The role of courts in ensuring that public infrastructure projects are not unduly delayed by litigation, and the consideration of the larger public good versus the private interest of an unsuccessful bidder. The Court held that: The High Court's interference in the contract awarded to the appellant was wholly unwarranted and erroneous. The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was permitted to complete the project, with a direction that it would not claim cost escalation for the period the matter was pending in court. The writ petition before the High Court was dismissed. Key Legal Principles Reiterated and Established: Judicial Restraint in Commercial Contracts – Courts must exercise significant restraint and caution while exercising their power of judicial review in contractual or commercial matters. The government and its instrumentalities must be given "fair play in the joints." Employer as the Best Judge – The authority that authors the tender documents is the best person to understand and appreciate its requirements and to interpret its documents. Its interpretation should not be second-guessed by a court unless it is mala fide, perverse, or arbitrary. Prevention of Delay in Public Projects – Courts should be extremely circumspect in granting interim orders that delay the execution of infrastructure projects, as this imposes heavy administrative and financial burdens on the state and deprives the public of essential services. The 2018 amendment to the Specific Relief Act, which aims to prevent the stalling of infrastructure projects, should guide courts. No Magnifying Glass Scrutiny – Courts should not use a "magnifying glass" to scan tenders and turn small procedural deviations into major blunders. The primary role of the court is to examine the decision-making process for illegality, irrationality, or procedural impropriety, not to substitute its own decision for that of the expert administrative authority. Relevance: This judgment is a seminal precedent reinforcing the doctrine of judicial restraint in government contract matters. It serves as a strong reminder to courts at all levels to defer to the expertise of tendering authorities and to prioritize the public interest in the timely execution of infrastructure projects. The ruling aims to curb the growing trend of unsuccessful bidders challenging tenders on hyper-technical grounds, which leads to inordinate delays and increased costs for public exchequers.

Vishal Noble Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2024 INSC 626) Summary of the Case Law The Supreme Court of India addressed criminal appeals challenging the refusal of the Allahabad High Court to quash an FIR and subsequent criminal proceedings against the appellants, who were officials of a minority educational institution. The key legal issues involved were: Abuse of Criminal Process – Whether the FIR and chargesheet, which alleged serious offences including cheating, forgery, and criminal breach of trust, disclosed the essential ingredients of the said offences or constituted a misuse of the criminal justice system to settle a dispute of a predominantly civil nature. Quashing Jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC – The scope and application of the High Court's inherent power to quash criminal proceedings when the allegations, even if taken at face value, do not constitute a cognizable offence. Application of Established Legal Tests – Whether the case fell within the categories defined in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal for quashing an FIR, such as where allegations do not prima facie constitute an offence or where the proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide. The Court held that: The FIR and chargesheet failed to disclose any of the essential ingredients of the offences under Sections 406, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471, and 120B of the IPC. The continuation of the criminal prosecution in the absence of a prima facie case was an abuse of the process of the law. The impugned order of the High Court was set aside, and the FIR, chargesheet, and all consequent proceedings were quashed. Key Legal Principles Reiterated: Strict Scrutiny of FIR Allegations – The allegations made in the FIR or complaint, even if taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, must prima facie constitute an offence. If they do not, the proceedings are liable to be quashed at the threshold. Prevention of Misuse of Criminal Law – The machinery of criminal justice cannot be allowed to be misused for achieving oblique motives or for wreaking vengeance. Courts must be vigilant to nip such tendencies in the bud. Inherent Powers to Secure Justice – The High Court's power under Section 482 of the CrPC to quash proceedings is to be exercised to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or to otherwise secure the ends of justice, especially where the chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak. Relevance: This judgment serves as a significant precedent reinforcing the judiciary's role as a protector against the weaponization of criminal law. It underscores the duty of courts to meticulously examine the contents of an FIR and chargesheet to ensure that criminal prosecution is not used as a tool for harassment, particularly in disputes that are essentially civil or administrative in nature. The ruling provides a clear mandate to lower courts to actively prevent the burdening of the criminal justice system with frivolous and mala fide litigation.

Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. & Ors. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2024 INSC 626) Summary of the Case Law The Supreme Court of India addressed a criminal appeal concerning the summoning of the appellants in a case involving the non-payment for supplied goods. The key legal issues involved were: Maintainability of Criminal Proceedings for Purely Civil Disputes – Whether the non-payment of a debt for goods supplied constitutes a criminal offence of cheating (Section 420 IPC) or criminal breach of trust (Section 406 IPC), or is a purely civil dispute. Distinction between Cheating and Criminal Breach of Trust – A detailed analysis of the essential ingredients required to establish the offences under Sections 406 and 420 of the IPC. Magisterial Scrutiny at the Summoning Stage – The extent of application of mind required by a Magistrate before issuing process against an accused under Section 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). Vicarious Liability of Company Officers – Whether the office bearers of a company can be summoned for offences allegedly committed by the company without specific allegations of their direct involvement. The Court held that: The allegations in the complaint, even if accepted as entirely true, disclosed neither the offence of criminal breach of trust nor cheating. The summoning order by the Magistrate and the subsequent order of the High Court upholding it were set aside for non-application of mind to the essential legal ingredients of the alleged offences. The case was a simple dispute of an unpaid seller and the remedy lay in filing a civil suit for recovery, not in initiating criminal prosecution. Key Legal Principles Established: Clear Demarcation Between Civil Wrong and Criminal Offence – A mere breach of contract, without a fraudulent or dishonest intention at the inception of the transaction, does not constitute the offence of cheating. Similarly, a transaction of sale where property in goods passes to the buyer does not amount to "entrustment" for invoking criminal breach of trust. Ingredients of Offences are Distinct and Mutually Exclusive – The offences of cheating (Section 420 IPC) and criminal breach of trust (Section 406 IPC) have specific, non-overlapping ingredients. They cannot co-exist on the same set of facts. For cheating, a dishonest intention must exist from the very beginning; for criminal breach of trust, there must be a lawful entrustment of property which is then dishonestly misappropriated. Duty of Magistrate at Summoning Stage – A Magistrate must apply judicial mind and carefully scrutinize the complaint and evidence before issuing process. Summoning an accused is a serious matter and cannot be done mechanically. The order must reflect satisfaction that the allegations, prima facie, constitute the offence for which process is being issued. No Automatic Vicarious Liability in IPC – For offences under the Indian Penal Code like cheating and criminal breach of trust, vicarious liability cannot be automatically attributed to the directors or officers of a company unless specific, direct allegations are levelled against them demonstrating their involvement. Relevance: This judgment serves as a crucial precedent to prevent the misuse of criminal law to arm-twist parties in purely civil and commercial disputes. It reiterates the fine distinction between civil liability and criminal culpability and mandates courts to act as gatekeepers, ensuring that criminal process is not invoked for the enforcement of contractual obligations or recovery of debts. The ruling also provides clear guidance to Magistrates on their duty to apply mind at the summoning stage.

Hariharan & Ors. vs. Harsh Vardhan Singh Rao & Ors. (2022) Summary of the Case Law: The Supreme Court of India addressed a classic dispute between promotees and direct recruits to the post of Income Tax Inspectors regarding their inter-se seniority. The core legal issues involved were: Prospective Overruling of Precedent – The applicability of the Court's decision in K. Meghachandra Singh, which overruled the earlier N.R. Parmar judgment but did so prospectively, and its impact on a seniority list finalized between the two decisions. Validity of the 'Rota and Quota' System – Whether the principle of fixing seniority by rotating vacancies between promotees and direct recruits based on a fixed quota (the 'rota and quota' system) remains valid, especially when the recruitment process for direct recruits begins in a recruitment year but concludes in a subsequent year. Definition of 'Recruitment Year' – Whether the recruitment year for determining seniority is the financial year (as used by the department) or the calendar year (as argued by the promotees). Per Incuriam Challenge – Whether the decision in K. Meghachandra Singh was per incuriam (decided in ignorance of a binding precedent) for not considering the Constitution Bench ruling in Meruyn Coutindo, which upheld the rotational seniority system. The Court held that: The decision in K. Meghachandra Singh prima facie appeared to be per incuriam as it did not consider the binding precedents of Meruyn Coutindo and M. Subba Reddy. Consequently, the Court referred the question of the correctness of K. Meghachandra Singh to a larger bench of five judges. However, given the prospective overruling in K. Meghachandra Singh, the seniority list of 7th September 2016, which was correctly prepared based on the then-good law of N.R. Parmar, could not be unlawfully altered in 2018. On factual issues, the Court concluded that the recruitment year was the financial year and the process for recruiting direct recruits for the 2009-10 vacancies had indeed commenced in that same year. Key Legal Principles Established: Prospective Overruling Protects Settled Seniority: When a judgment overruling a precedent specifies prospective application, it protects and does not disturb inter-se seniority that was already finalized based on the overruled precedent. Prima Facie Validity of Rota and Quota System: The system of fixing seniority by rotation of vacancies between promotees and direct recruits based on a fixed quota is a long-standing and prima facie valid principle to blend experience with fresh talent, as upheld by a Constitution Bench. Expert Forum for Technical Service Matters: The judgment implicitly acknowledges the complexity of service jurisprudence, particularly seniority disputes governed by specific Office Memorandums and quota systems, warranting careful consideration by larger benches when conflicting precedents arise. Factual Determination of Recruitment Process: For the 'rota and quota' system to apply, the critical factor is whether the recruitment process for direct recruits (like sending a requisition and publishing an advertisement) commenced in the relevant recruitment year, not whether it was completed within that year. Relevance: This judgment is highly significant for all public service disputes involving promotees and direct recruits. It underscores the continued relevance of the 'rota and quota' system for seniority fixation and highlights the importance of adhering to the timeline of the recruitment process. By referring the challenge to a larger bench, the Court has opened the door for a definitive ruling on the balance between the 'date of joining' principle and the 'rota and quota' system, which will have far-reaching consequences for central and state government employees. The vacation of the status quo order also unblocks stalled promotions within the Income Tax Department.

Save Mon Region Federation & Anr Vs. Union of India & Ors (2013) Summary of the CaseLaw: The National Green Tribunal (Principal Bench, New Delhi) adjudicated an application for condonation of delay in filing an appeal against the grant of Environmental Clearance (EC) to the 780 MW Naymjang Chhu Hydroelectric Project in Arunachal Pradesh. The key legal issues involved were: Interpretation of "Communication" – The central issue was determining the starting point of the limitation period under Section 16 of the NGT Act, 2010. The Tribunal had to decide whether the limitation period begins from the date the order is passed/uploaded or from the date it is effectively "communicated" to the public. Public Access vs. Administrative Compliance – The Appellants contended that the EC order was not downloadable from the MoEF website due to technical glitches and was not properly published by the Project Proponent, thus preventing them from filing the appeal within the statutory 30-day limit. Sufficiency of Cause for Delay – Whether the lack of proper public domain availability of the EC order constituted "sufficient cause" to condone the delay in filing the appeal beyond the prescribed 30 days. The Court held that: The delay of 8 days (or arguably 26 days) in filing the appeal was condoned, and the appeal was admitted to be heard on merits. The statutory limitation period commences only when the order is effectively "communicated," which means placing the order in the public domain where it is accessible and downloadable without hindrance. The Project Proponent failed to comply with Regulation 10 of the Environmental Clearance Regulations, 2006, as they did not publish the environmental conditions and safeguards in newspapers, nor did they properly display them on the website. The Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF) is statutorily obligated to ensure its website is functional and that orders are uploaded immediately; mere uploading without accessibility does not constitute communication. Key Legal Principles Established: "Communication" Requires Public Domain Access – The expression "communicated to him" in Section 16 of the NGT Act implies that the order must be put in the public domain (website, newspapers, notice boards) so that the public at large has complete knowledge of the facts and grounds. "Intimation" is not the same as "Communication". Limitation Period Trigger Point – The limitation period for filing an appeal starts from the date the EC order—including all conditions and safeguards—is completely available to the public. If different stakeholders (MoEF, Project Proponent) comply on different dates, the limitation reckons from the earliest date of complete communication. Mandatory Nature of Publication Requirements – Regulation 10 of the EC Regulations, 2006, which requires Project Proponents to advertise the EC with conditions in local newspapers and on their website, is mandatory, not directory. Substantial compliance is insufficient; strict adherence is required. Right to Appeal for "Any Person" – The legislature intended to give the right to appeal to "any person" aggrieved, regardless of direct personal interest. Therefore, communication must be in rem (to the public) rather than in personam (to an individual). Relevance: This judgment is a landmark decision in environmental jurisprudence as it redefines "communication" to ensure transparency and effective access to justice. It prevents authorities and project proponents from citing the statute of limitations to dismiss appeals when they have failed to make environmental clearances effectively accessible to the public. It establishes strict guidelines for the MoEF and developers regarding the publication of environmental clearances on websites and in newspapers.

Ramdev Food Products Private Limited vs. State of Gujarat on 16 March, 2015 Equivalent Citations: AIR 2015 SC 1742, 2015 (6) SCC 439 Summary of the Case Law: The Supreme Court of India addressed a criminal appeal concerning the scope and application of two crucial provisions under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC): Section 156(3) and Section 202. The appellant-complainant had alleged forgery of partnership documents by the accused and sought a direction for investigation by the police under Section 156(3). The Magistrate, however, opted to proceed under Section 202, directing a police report instead of a full investigation. The High Court upheld this order. The key legal issues involved were: Discretion of the Magistrate – Whether the Magistrate's discretion to call for a report under Section 202 instead of directing an investigation under Section 156(3) is controlled by any defined parameters. Power of Arrest under Section 202 – Whether a police officer is entitled to arrest an accused during an investigation conducted pursuant to a direction under Section 202 of the CrPC. Application to the Instant Case – Whether, in the facts of the present case, the Magistrate erred in seeking a report under Section 202 instead of directing an investigation under Section 156(3). The Court held that: The discretion to choose between Section 156(3) and Section 202 is vested in the Magistrate and must be exercised judiciously, not mechanically. A direction under Section 156(3) is issued when the Magistrate, without taking cognizance, finds it appropriate to direct a police investigation. In contrast, Section 202 is used post-cognizance when the Magistrate postpones the issuance of process to decide if sufficient grounds exist to proceed. A police officer does not have the power to arrest an accused while conducting an investigation and making a report under Section 202. The purpose of such an inquiry is limited to assisting the Magistrate in deciding whether to proceed, and an arrest at this premature stage would be incongruous. In the present case, the Magistrate was justified in proceeding under Section 202. The dispute was primarily of a civil nature, involving pending civil litigation, and the Magistrate had not found clear material to proceed against the accused immediately. The Court cautioned against the tendency to give a colour of criminality to purely commercial or civil disputes. Key Legal Principles Established: Non-Mechanical Exercise of Power – The power to direct an investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC is not mechanical and requires the Magistrate to apply his mind. The order must reflect this application of mind. Distinct Purposes of Sections 156(3) and 202 – Section 156(3) is a pre-cognizance power directing the police to register a case and investigate. Section 202 is a post-cognizance power for a limited inquiry to help the Magistrate decide on the issuance of process. No Power of Arrest under Section 202 Investigation – The scheme of the CrPC does not grant the police the power to arrest while acting on a Magistrate's direction for an investigation and report under Section 202. The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius was held inapplicable in interpreting Section 202(3). Caution Against Criminalizing Civil Disputes – The judiciary must be cautious to ensure that criminal law is not set in motion as a shortcut to settle purely civil or commercial disputes, as this constitutes an abuse of the process of the court. Relevance: This judgment is a seminal authority clarifying the scope, distinction, and appropriate application of Sections 156(3) and 202 of the CrPC. It provides crucial guidelines for Magistrates in choosing the correct procedural path at the initial stage of a complaint and firmly settles the law that the power of arrest is not available during a Section 202 inquiry. It also reinforces the judiciary's role in preventing the misuse of criminal proceedings in civil disputes.

Prakash Asphaltings and Toll Highways (India) Limited vs. Mandeepa Enterprises and Others (2025) Summary of the Case Law The Supreme Court of India addressed an appeal concerning the judicial interference in a public tender process for a Road User Fee collection contract in West Bengal. The key legal issues involved were: Permissibility of Post-Tender Bid Rectification – Whether an unsuccessful bidder can be permitted to rectify a mistake in its financial bid after the bids have been opened and the highest bidder (H1) has been declared. Scope of Judicial Review in Tender Matters – Whether the High Court, in its writ jurisdiction, was justified in directing the tender authority to recalculate a bidder's price and reopen the bidding process. Principles of Natural Justice in Tender Litigation – Whether the declared highest bidder (H1) is a necessary party to a writ petition filed by a rival bidder challenging the tender process, whose outcome directly affects the H1 bidder's rights. The Court held that: The Division Bench of the High Court erred in allowing the rectification of the bid. Permitting a bidder to correct a mistake after the financial bids are opened is impermissible as it vitiates the sanctity and finality of the tender process. The High Court's interference was unwarranted. Judicial review in contractual matters is limited and courts should not substitute their judgment for that of the tender authority, which had acted per the tender conditions. The non-impleadment of the appellant (the H1 bidder) vitiated the High Court's order. An aggrieved bidder must implicate successful bidders whose rights are adversely affected by the litigation, as the principles of natural justice are integral to judicial proceedings. Key Legal Principles Established: Sanctity of the Tender Process is Paramount – The terms of the tender document are binding. Allowing post-bid alterations, even for alleged inadvertent mistakes, undermines the fairness, transparency, and competitive nature of public procurement. Restrained Judicial Review in Contractual Matters – Courts must exercise utmost restraint in interfering with tender awards. The scope for judicial review is limited to examining cases of mala fides, arbitrariness, or irrationality, and not to reevaluate the commercial wisdom of the authority. Natural Justice Applies to Affected Parties in Litigation – While principles of equity may have a limited role during the administrative evaluation of tenders, they are fundamental to judicial proceedings. A party whose accrued rights are directly impaired by a court's order must be heard. Relevance: This judgment reinforces the critical importance of maintaining the integrity and finality of public tender processes. It serves as a precedent cautioning constitutional courts against overstepping their boundaries in commercial contracts and underscores that the pursuit of higher revenue cannot override the fundamental principles of a fair and transparent bidding system. It also clarifies the necessity of impleading affected parties in tender-related litigation.

Associate Builders Vs. Delhi Development Authority (2014) Civil Appeal No. 10531 of 2014 (Supreme Court of India) Summary of the Case Law The Supreme Court of India addressed a crucial dispute concerning the extent of a court's power to interfere with an arbitral award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The appeal arose from a Division Bench judgment of the Delhi High Court, which had set aside parts of a reasoned arbitral award in favour of the contractor, Associate Builders. The key legal issues involved were: The Standard for Judicial Review: Whether the High Court, in its jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act, acted as an appellate court by re-appreciating evidence and substituting its own view for that of the arbitrator. Interpretation of "Public Policy of India": The precise scope and meaning of the "public policy of India" ground for setting aside an award, as delineated in Section 34(2)(b)(ii). Application of Legal Principles to the Facts: Whether the Division Bench erred in setting aside the arbitrator's findings on claims for hire charges, idle labour, and establishment costs due to prolongation of the contract, which was solely attributed to the DDA. The Court held that: The Division Bench of the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by re-assessing evidence and acting as a court of appeal, which is not permitted under Section 34 of the Act. The Arbitrator's award was based on evidence and a possible view of the facts. The Arbitrator is the sole judge of the quantity and quality of evidence. The High Court's rejection of claims based on its own inference that the contractor was "petty" and that evidence from a different site (Mayur Vihar) was irrelevant was erroneous, as it ignored the completion certificate showing the site was part of the same project. The High Court's method of doing "rough and ready justice" by recalculating damages is alien to the jurisdiction under Section 34. The arbitral award did not violate the fundamental policy of Indian law, nor was it patently illegal or contrary to justice or morality. Key Legal Principles Established / Reiterated: Limited Scope of Intervention: The jurisdiction of a court under Section 34 is not appellate in nature. Errors of fact cannot be corrected, and the arbitrator is the final arbiter on the quality and quantity of evidence. The "Public Policy of India" Ground: An arbitral award can be set aside on this ground only if it is: Contrary to the fundamental policy of Indian law: This includes a breach of (i) judicial approach (fair, reasonable, objective), (ii) principles of natural justice, and (iii) a decision that is so perverse or irrational that no reasonable person could have arrived at it. Contrary to the interest of India. Contrary to justice or morality: "Justice" means an award that "shocks the conscience of the court." "Morality" is largely confined to sexual morality in the context of contract enforcement. Patently illegal: The illegality must go to the root of the matter and not be trivial. This includes contravention of (a) the substantive law of India, (b) the Arbitration Act itself, or (c) the terms of the contract. However, a reasonable construction of a contract by an arbitrator cannot be interfered with. Relevance: This judgment is a landmark precedent that clearly defines and restricts the grounds on which Indian courts can interfere with domestic arbitral awards. It emphatically reinforces the pro-arbitration stance of the 1996 Act by cautioning courts against entering into the merits of the dispute. It serves as a critical guide for courts and practitioners on the application of the "public policy" test, ensuring greater deference to arbitral findings and finality in the arbitral process.

Association for Democratic Reforms v. Election Commission of India and Another (2024 INSC 341) Summary of the CaseLaw The Supreme Court of India addressed a challenge to the integrity of the Electronic Voting Machine (EVM) system, specifically concerning the mandatory counting of Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) slips. Facts/Dispute: The petitioners—including the Association for Democratic Reforms—argued that despite the Election Commission of India's (ECI) claims, the EVM system remained susceptible to manipulation. To instil voter confidence, they requested that the Court direct: A return to the paper ballot system. Alternatively, the delivery of the printed VVPAT slip to the voter for placement in a ballot box for counting. Alternatively, 100% counting and verification of VVPAT slips against the electronic count recorded by the Control Unit. Key Legal Issues: Whether the inherent design and safeguards of the EVM-VVPAT system are sufficient to ensure the accuracy and integrity of the election process. Whether the Court should intervene to mandate 100% verification of VVPAT slips to satisfy the voters' right to know that their franchise has been correctly recorded and counted. The Court held that: The Supreme Court rejected the pleas for a return to paper ballots and for 100% VVPAT verification, upholding its past precedents. The Court was satisfied that the current M3 EVMs are robust, non-networked, and contain security features like a one-time programmable (OTP) microcontroller chip that makes the firmware unalterable. However, to further enhance transparency and voter satisfaction, the Court issued the following directions: Storage of Symbol Loading Units (SLUs): The ECI shall ensure that the SLUs used to load candidate symbols onto VVPATs are stored in a secured strong room for at least 45 days after the declaration of results, to be made available for judicial scrutiny if required. Post-Results Microcontroller Verification: Upon a written request by a candidate and payment of a prescribed fee, the engineers of the EVM manufacturers (BEL/ECIL) must verify the burnt memory/microcontroller of 5% of the EVMs (Control Units and VVPATs) per assembly constituency/segment after the declaration of results. The verification expense will be forfeited if the EVM-VVPAT results match, but refunded if a mismatch is found. Key Legal Principles Established: Sufficient Integrity of EVM-VVPAT System: The system is inherently designed with rigorous safeguards (e.g., two-stage randomization, non-networked design, OTP memory, First Level Checks) to obviate wrongdoing, and the EVM-VVPAT count is considered reliable. Unfounded Challenges are Detrimental to Democracy: Repeated and persistent doubts about the electoral process without cogent material are "execrable and undesirable" as they can reduce citizen confidence in the system. Judicial Mandate for Enhanced Transparency: While affirming the system's core reliability, the judiciary can mandate additional steps to ensure greater satisfaction and confidence among political parties and the electorate. Relevance: This landmark judgment reaffirms the constitutional and procedural validity of the EVM-VVPAT system in India, providing a strong legal foundation against calls for a return to paper ballots or complete VVPAT counting. It is significant for introducing a new, specific mechanism for post-election audit by mandating the verification of EVM microcontrollers upon candidate request, thereby balancing the need for efficient elections with maximum post-result transparency.

Prabir Purkayastha v. State(NCT of Delhi) (2024 INSC 414) Summary of the CaseLaw The Supreme Court of India addressed a challenge to the arrest and initial police custody remand of a person under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA), alleging a gross violation of the constitutional right to be informed of the grounds of arrest. Facts/Dispute: The appellant, Prabir Purkayastha, was arrested by the Delhi Police Special Cell on October 3, 2023, for offenses under the UAPA. The arrest memo itself did not contain a column specifying the 'grounds of arrest'. The appellant was produced before the Remand Judge early in the morning of October 4, 2023, and remanded to police custody, with his engaged advocate, Shri Arshdeep Khurana, only being informed via WhatsApp at 7:07 a.m., after the remand order was passed at 6:00 a.m.. The appellant challenged the arrest and remand as illegal on the ground that he was never informed of the grounds of his arrest, either orally or in writing, as mandated by the Constitution. Key Legal Issues: Whether the failure to provide the grounds of arrest to an accused in writing before the initial police custody remand constitutes a violation of the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India. Whether the interpretation that requires written grounds of arrest in cases under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA) (as held in Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India) is applicable pari passu to arrests made under the UAPA. Whether the subsequent filing of a charge sheet can cure any initial illegality or unconstitutionality committed during the arrest and initial remand. The Court Held That: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, declaring the arrest and subsequent remand invalid in the eyes of law. The Court held: The statutory requirement to inform an arrested person of the grounds of arrest in writing, established for PMLA cases, is equally applicable (pari passu) to persons arrested under the UAPA. The constitutional and statutory mandate requires that a copy of the written grounds of arrest must be furnished to the arrested person as a matter of course and without exception at the earliest. The failure to provide the written grounds of arrest to the appellant or his counsel before the remand order on October 4, 2023, vitiated the arrest and subsequent remand. The subsequent filing of a charge sheet does not validate the illegality and unconstitutionality committed at the time of the arrest and initial police custody remand. Key Legal Principles Established: Mandatory Written Grounds of Arrest (Article 22(1)): The right to be informed of the grounds of arrest flows from Article 22(1) , and this requirement must be fulfilled by providing a copy of the written grounds of arrest to the arrested person. This is essential for the arrested person to seek legal advice and oppose the remand. Uniformity of Constitutional Safeguards: The interpretation of the fundamental right under Article 22(1) and the statutory procedural mandates in the PMLA are held to be uniformly applicable to special enactments like the UAPA. Vitiation of Initial Proceedings: Any infringement of the fundamental right to be informed of the grounds of arrest, in writing, vitiates the entire process of arrest and initial remand. No Curing by Subsequent Action: The initial illegality and unconstitutionality of an arrest due to the violation of fundamental rights cannot be cured by the mere subsequent filing of a charge sheet. Relevance: This judgment strongly reinforces the sanctity of the fundamental right to life and personal liberty (Article 21 and 22) against arbitrary action by investigating agencies, even under stringent special laws like the UAPA. It establishes a universal rule that the provision of written grounds of arrest is a non-negotiable constitutional requirement for a valid arrest, ensuring an arrested person can meaningfully exercise their right to consult an advocate and seek legal remedies

Pankaj Bansal vs. Union of India & Ors. (2023) Summary of the Case Law The Supreme Court of India addressed appeals concerning the arrest and remand of the appellants by the Directorate of Enforcement (ED) in a money laundering case. The key legal issues involved were: Validity of Arrest under PMLA – Whether the arrest of the appellants by the ED under Section 19 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) was valid and lawful, particularly in light of the manner in which a second Enforcement Case Information Report (ECIR) was registered immediately after they secured interim protection in a related case. Compliance with Procedural Safeguards – Whether the ED's act of merely reading out the grounds of arrest, without furnishing a written copy, constituted sufficient compliance with the mandate of Section 19(1) of the PMLA and Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India. Role of the Remand Court – Whether the court considering remand under Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has a duty to verify and ensure that the conditions of a valid arrest under Section 19 of the PMLA have been duly satisfied. The Court held that: The arrest of the appellants was illegal and unsustainable. The ED's conduct in registering a new ECIR and effecting arrests immediately after the appellants secured anticipatory bail in a related case reeked of arbitrariness and colourable exercise of power. The practice of only reading out the grounds of arrest, without providing a written copy, does not constitute valid compliance with Section 19(1) of the PMLA. Henceforth, a written copy of the grounds of arrest must be furnished to the arrested person as a matter of course. The remand court failed in its duty to verify compliance with Section 19 of the PMLA, rendering the remand orders invalid. Key Legal Principles Established: Mandatory Furnishing of Written Grounds of Arrest – To meaningfully comply with the fundamental right under Article 22(1) of the Constitution and the statutory mandate of Section 19(1) of the PMLA, the ED must furnish a written copy of the grounds of arrest to the arrested person. This is essential to enable the person to effectively seek bail and legal remedies. Duty of the Remand Court to Scrutinize Arrest – The court considering remand has a bounden duty to apply its judicial mind and satisfy itself that the arrest complies with the safeguards under Section 19 of the PMLA. A remand order cannot validate an arrest that is unlawful in its inception. Condemnation of Vindictive and Arbitrary Action – As a premier investigating agency with far-reaching powers, the ED must act with utmost probity and fairness. Its actions must be transparent and above board, and not appear to be a vindictive or colourable exercise of power to circumvent judicial orders. Relevance: This judgment is a landmark ruling that strengthens the procedural safeguards for individuals arrested under the PMLA. It curbs the arbitrary exercise of power by the ED and reinforces the constitutional and statutory rights of arrested persons. The directive to provide written grounds of arrest ensures transparency and enables the effective exercise of the right to bail, bringing uniformity to ED practices across the country.

Mairembam Prithviraj vs Pukhrem Sharat Chandra Singh (2016) Summary of the Case Law The Supreme Court of India addressed an election dispute concerning the election to the Manipur Legislative Assembly from the Moirang Assembly constituency. The key legal issues involved were: Substantial Nature of False Declarations – Whether a candidate's false declaration regarding their educational qualification in the affidavit filed under Form 26 constitutes a "defect of a substantial character" warranting the rejection of their nomination under Section 36(4) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Material Effect on Election Result – Whether, in an election petition filed under Section 100(1)(d)(i) of the Act, it is necessary to plead and prove that the result of the election was "materially affected" by the improper acceptance of a nomination when there are only two candidates contesting for a single seat. The Court held that: A false declaration about educational qualifications is a defect of a substantial character as it violates the voter's fundamental right to information. The appellant's nomination was, therefore, improperly accepted. In a scenario where only two candidates are contesting and the nomination of the returned candidate (the winner) is found to be improperly accepted, the requirement to prove that the election result was "materially affected" is automatically satisfied. The election of the returned candidate is void as he would not have been in the fray had his nomination been correctly rejected. Key Legal Principles Established: Voter's Right to Information is Paramount – The voter has a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution to know the antecedents of a candidate, including their educational qualifications. Any false declaration subverts this right. False Declarations are a Substantial Defect – A false declaration in the affidavit (Form 26) is not a mere clerical error but a defect of a substantial character, warranting the rejection of the nomination paper under Section 36(4) of the Act. Automatic Material Effect in Two-Candidate Scenarios – When the nomination of a returned candidate is improperly accepted in a two-candidate contest, it is not necessary to separately plead or prove that the result was "materially affected." The improper acceptance itself materially affects the result because the returned candidate should not have been in the contest. Relevance: This judgment reinforces the importance of candidate transparency and the sanctity of the nomination process. It clarifies the legal standards for challenging an election on the grounds of a false declaration and simplifies the burden of proof in cases where only two candidates are contesting, preventing the use of technical pleas to shield a candidate who should have been disqualified at the nomination stage.

Municipal Council Neemuch Vs. Mahadeo Real Estate and Ors. (2019) Civil Appeal Nos. 7319-7320 of 2019 Summary of the CaseLaw The Supreme Court of India addressed a dispute concerning the cancellation of a tender process for the lease of municipal land. The Municipal Council of Neemuch had awarded a 30-year lease to the highest bidder, but the Divisional Commissioner later cancelled the process, citing lack of prior State Government sanction and inadequate publicity leading to non-competitive bids. The High Court had quashed the Commissioner's order, directing the lease to be granted to the bidder. The key legal issues involved were: Scope of Judicial Review – Whether the High Court exceeded its limited scope of judicial review in interfering with the administrative decision to cancel the tender. Statutory Compliance – Whether the mandatory requirement of "previous sanction" from the State Government under Section 109 of the M.P. Municipality Act, 1961, for the disposal of valuable municipal land was fulfilled. Public Interest in Tender Process – Whether the administrative authority's decision to cancel the tender for inadequate publicity and to ensure wider competition for higher public revenue was valid and in public interest. The Court held that: The High Court's interference was erroneous and unsustainable in law. The Court restored the Commissioner's order cancelling the tender process and directing a fresh process with wider publicity. The appeals filed by the Municipal Council were allowed. Key Legal Principles Established: Limited Scope of Judicial Review of Administrative Action – Courts cannot act as appellate authorities over administrative decisions. Interference is permitted only on grounds of illegality, irrationality (Wednesbury unreasonableness), or procedural impropriety. The test is whether the decision is so arbitrary that no reasonable person could have arrived at it. Public Interest Paramount in Disposal of Public Property – The primary objective in the disposal of municipal property is to secure the best possible revenue for the public authority. Administrative actions aimed at ensuring wider competition and preventing cartelization by re-tendering with adequate publicity are inherently in the larger public interest. Statutory Sanction is a Mandatory Pre-Condition – The requirement of "previous sanction" under Section 109 of the M.P. Municipality Act for alienating valuable municipal land is a substantive condition designed to act as a check on the Municipal Council's power and must be strictly complied with. Relevance: This judgment reiterates the well-defined and restricted role of constitutional courts in reviewing administrative decisions, especially in matters of public contract and tender processes. It emphasizes that the judiciary must respect the discretion of administrative authorities when their actions are aimed at maximizing public revenue and ensuring transparency, even if it results in setting aside a completed tender process.

Maha Mineral Mining & Beneficiation Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Madhya Pradesh Power Generating Co. Ltd. & Anr. (2025 INSC 1085) Summary of the CaseLaw The Supreme Court of India addressed a dispute concerning the disqualification of a bidder in a tender process floated by a state power generation company. The key legal issues involved were: Interpretation of Tender Conditions – Whether the tender condition (Clause 5(D)) mandatorily required the submission of the Joint Venture (JV) Agreement itself as proof of a bidder's proportionate share in a previous consortium to claim past experience, or whether a Work Execution Certificate from the client explicitly stating the share was sufficient. Scope of Judicial Review in Tender Matters – Whether the High Court was justified in upholding the bidder's disqualification based on a new ground (Clause 5(B) - spare washing capacity) that was neither the basis of the Tender Evaluation Committee's decision nor properly argued before it, thereby denying the bidder a chance to rebut the allegation. Procedural Fairness and Discretion of Tendering Authority – Whether the tendering authority acted fairly and in accordance with the tender document by not seeking clarification on the submitted certificate, especially when a separate clause (Clause 8.8) empowered it to seek additional information. The Court held that: The Tender Evaluation Committee and the High Court erred in disqualifying the appellant. The Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgment. It ruled that Clause 5(D) of the NIT did not explicitly mandate the submission of the JV Agreement, and the Work Execution Certificate provided was sufficient to establish the appellant's share and experience. The High Court's additional finding on spare washing capacity was set aside as it was based on a new, contentious issue raised for the first time in written arguments without giving the appellant an opportunity to respond. The matter was remanded to the High Court for a fresh decision limited to the issue of spare washing capacity under Clause 5(B). Key Legal Principles Established: Strict Interpretation of Tender Conditions – Eligibility conditions in a tender must be clear and unambiguous. If a specific document is mandatory to establish eligibility, it must be explicitly stated in the tender document. The tendering authority cannot add unstated requirements or interpret conditions in a manner that introduces new obligations for the bidder. Judicial Restraint in Teder Evaluation – The judicial review of a tender decision is limited to examining whether the decision-making process was fair, rational, and in conformity with the stated terms of the NIT. A court cannot disqualify a bidder on a new ground which was not the basis of the tendering authority's original decision, as it violates principles of natural justice. Duty of Tendering Authority to be Fair – While a tendering authority has discretion, it must be exercised fairly and reasonably. If a clause in the NIT empowers the authority to seek clarifications or additional information to verify a bidder's credentials, it should do so to ensure a fair and competitive process, rather than adopting a hyper-technical approach to reject a bid. Relevance: This judgment reinforces the settled principles of government tender law, emphasizing the necessity for clarity in tender documents and the limited scope of judicial intervention. It cautions tendering authorities against adopting an overly rigid and technical interpretation of conditions to the detriment of competition. Furthermore, it underscores the duty of constitutional courts to ensure a fair hearing and prevent disqualification of bidders on grounds not originally invoked, thereby upholding the principles of natural justice in administrative and contractual matters.

M/S. Chatha Service Station Vs. Lalmati Devi & Ors. (2025 INSC 468) Summary of the Case Law: The Supreme Court of India addressed appeals concerning the liability of an insurance company in a fatal accident involving an oil tanker. The core legal issue was whether the driver's lack of a mandatory endorsement on his license to drive a vehicle carrying dangerous or hazardous goods constituted a fundamental breach of the insurance policy, justifying the 'pay and recover' directive. The key legal issues involved were: Nature of the Breach – Whether the absence of a Rule 9 endorsement under the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, for driving a vehicle carrying hazardous goods is a mere "venial" or a "fundamental" breach of the insurance policy conditions. Causal Connection to the Accident – Whether such a breach must be proven to be the main or contributory cause of the accident for the insurer to be absolved from liability. Application of the 'Pay and Recover' Principle – Whether the Tribunal was correct in directing the insurer to first pay the compensation to the victims and then recover it from the vehicle owner. The Court held that: The absence of the statutory endorsement under Rule 9 for driving a vehicle carrying dangerous or hazardous goods is a fundamental breach of the policy conditions and the Motor Vehicles Act. The prescribed training syllabus under Rule 9 includes advanced and defensive driving skills specific to such vehicles, and not just product safety. Therefore, the breach is directly related to driving competence and is not merely technical. In this case, the accident was a direct result of the driver's rash and negligent driving of a vehicle he was not legally authorized to drive. The breach was thus fundamental. Consequently, the insurer was not liable to indemnify the insured. However, the direction for the insurer to first pay the compensation to the victims and then recover it from the vehicle owner was upheld to protect the third-party victims. Key Legal Principles Established: Rule 9 Endorsement is Mandatory and Fundamental: Driving a vehicle carrying dangerous or hazardous goods without the specific endorsement required by Rule 9 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, is a fundamental statutory infraction and a breach of the insurance contract. It is not a minor or venial breach. Syllabus Defines the Breach's Nature: The nature of the breach is determined by the comprehensive syllabus prescribed under Rule 9, which includes advanced driving skills. The breach, therefore, pertains to the very competence to drive that specific class/description of vehicle. 'Pay and Recover' Upheld for Fundamental Breaches: Even in cases of a fundamental breach that absolves the insurer of its liability towards the insured, the 'pay and recover' principle can be applied. This ensures that the compensation to third-party victims is not delayed due to the dispute between the insurer and the insured. Relevance: This judgment provides crucial clarity on the interpretation of breaches related to driving licenses for specialized transport vehicles. It establishes that the lack of a statutory endorsement for hazardous goods vehicles is a grave violation, distinguishing it from other licensing deficiencies. The ruling reinforces the judiciary's commitment to protecting accident victims through the 'pay and recover' mechanism, while also holding vehicle owners to a strict standard of compliance with specialized driving regulations.

Amrit Paul Singh & Anr. Vs. Tata AIG General Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors. ((2018) Civil Appeal No. 2253 of 2018) Summary of the Case Law: The Supreme Court of India addressed an appeal concerning a claim for compensation arising from a fatal motor accident. The key legal issue involved was the liability of an insurance company to pay compensation when the offending vehicle, a transport truck, was being plied without a valid permit at the time of the accident. The key legal issues involved were: Fundamental Breach of Policy Condition – Whether plying a transport vehicle without a valid permit constitutes a fundamental breach of the insurance policy and the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, allowing the insurer to avoid liability. Application of the 'Pay and Recover' Principle – Whether, despite the breach, the insurer could be directed to first pay the compensation to the victims and then recover the amount from the vehicle owner. Distinction from Other Breaches – How the breach of not having a permit differs from other breaches, such as driving without a valid license or carrying excess passengers, where the 'pay and recover' principle is commonly applied. The Court held that: Plying a transport vehicle without a permit is a fundamental statutory infraction and a breach of a specific condition of the insurance policy. This breach is distinct from and more serious than other breaches (like an invalid driving licence), as the very use of the vehicle on a public road is illegal. Consequently, the insurer was justified in repudiating the claim and was not liable to indemnify the insured. However, to protect the rights of the third-party victims, the Tribunal's direction for the insurer to first pay the compensation and then recover it from the vehicle owner was upheld as legally sound. Key Legal Principles Established: Permit is Fundamental for Transport Vehicles: The absence of a permit for a transport vehicle is a fundamental breach of the statute and the insurance contract. The exceptions listed under Section 66 of the Motor Vehicles Act must be specifically pleaded and proved by the owner; they cannot be assumed. 'Pay and Recover' Principle Upheld: Even in cases of a fundamental breach where the insurer has no liability towards the insured, the court can direct the insurer to satisfy the award in favour of the third-party victims (as per Section 149 of the Act) and then recover the paid amount from the owner/driver of the vehicle. This ensures that victims are not deprived of compensation due to disputes between the insurer and the insured. Hierarchy of Breaches: The judiciary distinguishes between breaches. While minor or non-fundamental breaches (like minor licensing issues) may not absolve the insurer, a breach that goes to the root of the vehicle's legal entitlement to be on the road (like no permit) is treated with greater severity. Relevance: This judgment clarifies the scope of an insurer's defence in motor accident claims. It reinforces that while the 'pay and recover' principle is a beneficial tool for protecting victims, the nature of the breach by the insured is critically examined. It establishes that the absence of a permit is a grave violation, but it does not negate the insurer's statutory obligation to first compensate the victim before exercising its recovery rights.

Canara Bank Vs. M/S United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors. ((2020) 3 SCC 455) Summary of the Case Law: The Supreme Court of India addressed a consolidated dispute involving farmers, a cold storage facility (bailee), Canara Bank (financier and hypothecatee), and United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (insurer), concerning a fire that destroyed the farmers' produce. The key legal issues involved were: Privity of Contract and "Consumer" Status – Whether farmers, who were not parties to the insurance contract but paid for it indirectly through storage fees, qualify as "consumers" under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 to claim against the insurer. Interpretation of Insurance Policies – The correct principles for interpreting coverage and exclusion clauses in an insurance contract. Liability for Accidental Fire – Whether the insurer could avoid liability by alleging the fire was not accidental but deliberately caused by the insured. Application of Exclusion Clauses – Whether clauses excluding goods held "in trust or on commission" applied to goods stored under a contract of bailment for consideration. Duty of Disclosure – Whether the cold store's failure to explicitly list the farmers and the Bank as interested parties in the proposal form constituted a material non-disclosure voiding the policy. Agreed Bank Clause – The interpretation of a clause directing payment to the bank and its implications for distributing the insurance proceeds between the Bank (to settle loans) and the farmers (for their equity). The Court held that: The farmers are "consumers" and beneficiaries of the insurance service under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, and the lack of direct privity of contract with the insurer does not bar their claim. The fire was accidental, and the insurer's evidence to the contrary was unreliable. While insurance policies must be interpreted as a whole, coverage clauses should be construed broadly, and exclusion clauses narrowly. The exclusion for goods held "in trust" did not apply to goods held under a contractual bailment for consideration. There was no fraudulent claim or material non-disclosure by the cold store, as the "Agreed Bank Clause" in the policy itself put the insurer on notice that third parties (like the Bank and farmers) had an interest in the goods. The insurer is liable to pay the value of the goods as per the warehouse receipts, along with interest. The "Agreed Bank Clause" is a substantive part of the contract. Therefore, the insurance proceeds must first be used to settle the outstanding principal and interest (calculated at a reduced rate of 12% p.a. due to the Bank's minor deficiency in service) owed to the Bank, with the remaining balance payable to the farmers. Key Legal Principles Established: Beneficiaries are Consumers: A beneficiary of a service (like an insurance policy), even if not a party to the contract, is a "consumer" under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and can maintain a claim. Interpretation of Insurance Contracts: The contract must be interpreted in a commercially sensible manner. Coverage clauses are to be interpreted broadly, and exclusion clauses must be construed strictly and narrowly. Bailment vs. Trust: Goods stored with a cold store for a fee constitute a "bailment for consideration," not goods held "in trust" for the purpose of standard insurance exclusion clauses. Substance Over Form in Disclosure: An insurer cannot claim non-disclosure of a material fact if the policy itself contains clauses (like an Agreed Bank Clause) that indicate the existence and interests of third parties, putting a prudent insurer on inquiry. Relevance: This judgment is a landmark ruling in Indian insurance and consumer law. It significantly expands the scope of who can claim under an insurance policy, affirming the rights of third-party beneficiaries. It provides crucial guidance on interpreting insurance contracts, emphasizing a balanced and commercially sensible approach that honors the reasonable expectations of the insured and beneficiaries. The ruling also clarifies the distinct nature of bailment and its implications for common policy exclusions.

R. Kandasamy (Since Dead) & Ors. Vs. T.R.K. Sarawathy & Anr. (2024 INSC 884) Summary of the CaseLaws The Supreme Court of India addressed a dispute concerning a suit for specific performance of an Agreement for Sale of a property. The key legal issues involved were: Time as the Essence of the Contract – Whether the stipulation in the agreement that the balance sale consideration had to be paid within four months made "time the essence of the contract," especially when the sellers also had a concurrent obligation to vacate the tenants. Readiness and Willingness of the Plaintiff – Whether the plaintiff (buyer) had continuously demonstrated, through her conduct and financial capacity, a genuine readiness and willingness to perform her essential obligations under the contract, as mandated by Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Maintainability of the Suit – Whether a suit for specific performance is maintainable without a specific prayer for a declaration that the seller's unilateral termination/cancellation of the agreement is bad in law. Exercise of Discretionary Relief – Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the discretionary and equitable relief of specific performance should be granted to the plaintiff. The Court held that: The High Court erred in granting the decree for specific performance. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the Trial Court's decree dismissing the suit. The Court found that while time was not the essence of the contract in this particular case, the buyer had failed to prove her continuous readiness and willingness to perform her part of the contract. Her conduct, including raising untenable demands, failing to act on multiple opportunities, and lacking demonstrable financial capacity, disentitled her to the equitable relief of specific performance. The buyer was, however, held entitled to a refund of the advance sum of Rs. 25 lakh. Key Legal Principles Established: Burden of Proof for Readiness and Willingness – The plaintiff must specifically plead and prove continuous readiness and willingness, which includes demonstrating the availability of funds or the financial capacity to pay the balance sale consideration. Mere averments are insufficient without corroborative evidence. Conduct is Paramount in Equitable Relief – The grant of specific performance is a discretionary and equitable remedy. The court must scrutinize the conduct of the plaintiff prior to and subsequent to the filing of the suit. Conduct that demonstrates reluctance, delay, or a lack of good faith can be a ground for refusing the relief. Interpretation of Concurrent Obligations – Where a contract contains concurrent obligations (e.g., buyer to pay within a timeframe, seller to vacate tenants), the clauses must be read together. The obligation to pay may be qualified by the seller's failure to fulfil their reciprocal promise, but this does not absolve the buyer from demonstrating their own readiness once the seller's obligation is fulfilled. Jurisdictional Fact and Appellate Review – Even if a specific issue on maintainability is not framed by the Trial Court, a higher court is not precluded from examining a "jurisdictional fact" (like the existence of a valid and enforceable agreement post-termination) if it goes to the root of the court's authority to grant the relief. Relevance: This judgment serves as a significant precedent reinforcing the rigorous standards a plaintiff must meet to obtain specific performance. It underscores that the doctrine of "time not being the essence" in immovable property contracts is not a blanket immunity for a dilatory purchaser. Courts will apply strict scrutiny to the plaintiff's conduct and financial readiness, emphasizing that equitable relief is meant for those who approach the court with clean hands and demonstrable intent to perform their obligations.

Sheo Shankar Singh Vs State of Jharkhand and Another (2011) 3 SCC 654 Summary of the CaseLaw The Supreme Court of India addressed a criminal appeal concerning the conviction and sentencing of the appellants for the murder of a sitting Member of the Legislative Assembly. The key legal issues involved were: Reliability of Ocular Evidence – Whether the testimonies of the sole eyewitnesses (PW-16 and PW-6) were credible and reliable for sustaining a conviction, particularly in light of the non-holding of a Test Identification Parade (TIP) for one witness. Appreciation of Circumstantial Evidence – Whether the evidence of the appellants being seen near the crime scene, the seizure of the motorcycle used in the crime, and the medical evidence corroborated the prosecution's version. The "Rarest of Rare" Doctrine in Sentencing – Whether the High Court was justified in enhancing the sentence from life imprisonment to the death penalty. The Court held that: The conviction of the appellants under Section 302/34 of the IPC was upheld. The eyewitness account was found to be natural, credible, and corroborated by other evidence. The failure to hold a TIP for one witness was not fatal to the prosecution case. Deficiencies in the investigation, such as the failure to send blood-stained clothes to a forensic lab or empty cartridges to a ballistic expert, were not sufficient to reject otherwise reliable eyewitness testimony. However, the death sentence awarded by the High Court was commuted to rigorous imprisonment for life. The Court concluded that the case did not fall into the "rarest of rare" category as the crime, though heinous, lacked the "brutal, grotesque, diabolical, or dastardly" manner required to warrant the extreme penalty. Key Legal Principles Established: Substantive Value of Court Identification – Identification of an accused in court is substantive evidence. A Test Identification Parade (TIP) is only a step in the investigation to reinforce the trustworthiness of that evidence. The failure to hold a TIP does not ipso facto make the court identification inadmissible. Deficient Investigation Does Not Nullify Reliable Testimony – Omissions and lapses in an investigation, while undesirable, cannot by themselves lead to the rejection of the entire prosecution case if the core evidence of credible eyewitnesses is found to be reliable. Strict Application of the "Rarest of Rare" Doctrine – The death penalty is an exception, with life imprisonment being the rule. It should be reserved only for the "rarest of rare" cases where the crime is of an exceptionally depraved and heinous character, and the alternative option of reformation is unquestionably foreclosed. Relevance: This judgment is a significant precedent on the standards for appreciating eyewitness evidence, the limited impact of investigative flaws on a otherwise sound case, and the rigorous application of the "rarest of rare" doctrine in sentencing. It reinforces the judiciary's cautious and circumspect approach towards imposing the death penalty.

Nankaunoo Vs State of U.P. (2016) Summary of the CaseLaw The Supreme Court of India addressed an appeal challenging the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The key legal issue involved was: Applicability of Section 300 IPC "Thirdly" – Whether the act of the appellant, who intentionally caused a firearm injury to the deceased's non-vital part (inner thigh) which resulted in death, fulfilled the criteria for murder under the "thirdly" clause of Section 300 IPC, or constituted the lesser offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part I IPC. The Court held that: The conviction of the appellant under Section 302 IPC was set aside. The conviction was altered to one under Section 304 Part I IPC. The appellant was sentenced to undergo ten years of rigorous imprisonment. Key Legal Principles Established: Two-Part Test for Section 300 "Thirdly": To bring a case under the "thirdly" clause of Section 300 IPC, the prosecution must prove: (i) that the accused intended to inflict the very specific bodily injury that was caused, and (ii) that the intended injury was objectively sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Situs of Injury Determines Burden of Proof: For an injury on a non-vital part of the body, the mere occurrence of death cannot lead to an automatic inference that the injury was sufficient to cause death. In such cases, the prosecution must positively prove this "sufficiency" through specific medical evidence. Non-Recovery of Weapon is Not Fatal: In the presence of consistent, reliable, and credible eyewitness testimony corroborated by medical evidence, the failure to recover the weapon of offence does not materially weaken the prosecution's case. Relevance: This judgment serves as a crucial precedent for applying the nuanced tests under Section 300 IPC, "thirdly". It underscores that establishing murder requires conclusive proof of both the intention to cause a specific injury and the objective sufficiency of that injury to cause death, particularly when the injury is located on a non-vital area. It prevents the mechanical conversion of every homicide into murder and ensures a careful legal qualification of the offence based on established judicial principles.

Chitivalasa Jute Mills vs Jaypee Rewa Cement on 4 February, 2004 (AIR 2004 SC 1687) Summary of the Case Law The Supreme Court of India addressed a procedural deadlock arising from two cross-suits filed by two companies in different states concerning the same commercial transactions. The key legal issues involved were: Application of Section 10 of CPC – Whether a subsequently filed suit should be stayed on the grounds that the matter in issue is directly and substantially the same as that in a previously instituted suit between the same parties. Identity of Parties – Whether a company and its division, which is not a separate legal entity, can be considered different parties for the purpose of invoking Section 10 of the CPC. Inherent Powers of the Supreme Court – Whether the Supreme Court, under its transfer powers (Section 25, CPC), can order the consolidation of suits for trial to serve the ends of justice, even after a plea for stay under Section 10 has been erroneously rejected and has attained finality. The Court held that: The suit filed by Jaypee Rewa Cement at Rewa was transferred to the Court at Visakhapatnam where the prior suit by Chitivalasa Jute Mills (a division of Willard India) was pending. The two suits were to be consolidated for trial and a common judgment was to be delivered to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and the risk of conflicting decrees. Key Legal Principles Established: Substantial Identity of Parties Over Technical Distinction – For the purpose of Section 10 of the CPC, a division of a company is not a legal entity separate from the company itself. Therefore, a suit by/against a company and a suit by/against its division involve the same parties. Ends of Justice Override Procedural Finality – The Supreme Court's wide power to transfer suits under Section 25 of the CPC can be exercised to serve the ends of justice, irrespective of the fact that an erroneous order rejecting an application under Section 10 CPC has attained finality due to the dismissal of a time-barred revision. Inherent Power to Consolidate Suits – Civil Courts have the inherent power, under Section 151 of the CPC, to consolidate suits that involve substantially the same issues and evidence, even though the Code does not explicitly provide for it. This power is essential to prevent multiplicity of proceedings, delay, expense, and the possibility of conflicting judgments. Relevance: This judgment is a significant precedent on the procedural aspects of civil litigation. It reinforces the judiciary's commitment to practical and substantive justice over hyper-technical interpretations of procedural law. It provides clear guidance on the consolidation of interconnected suits and affirms the expansive scope of the Supreme Court's transfer powers and a Civil Court's inherent powers to ensure efficient and consistent adjudication.

National Legal Services Authority vs. Union of India (2014) (WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.400 OF 2012) Summary of the Case Law The Supreme Court of India delivered a landmark judgment on the rights of the transgender community in a writ petition filed by the National Legal Services Authority (NALSA). The key legal issues involved were: Legal Recognition of Gender Identity – Whether transgender persons have the right to legally identify with a gender other than the one assigned at birth, and whether the non-recognition of their gender identity violates their fundamental rights. Recognition as a Third Gender – Whether Hijras, Eunuchs, and other transgender identities should be legally recognized as a "third gender" distinct from the binary male and female categories. Protection from Discrimination – Whether discrimination on the grounds of gender identity violates fundamental rights under Articles 14, 15, 19, and 21 of the Constitution. The Court held that: Transgender persons have a constitutional right to decide their self-identified gender (male, female, or third gender). Hijras, Eunuchs, and similar communities must be treated as a "third gender" for the purpose of safeguarding their rights under the Constitution. The Centre and State Governments were directed to grant legal recognition to their gender identity and to extend all forms of reservation in education and public appointments as a socially and educationally backward class. Key Legal Principles Established: Gender Identity as a Fundamental Right – The right to self-identify one's gender is integral to the right to life with dignity (Article 21), personal autonomy, and the freedom of expression (Article 19(1)(a)). Non-Discrimination on Grounds of Gender Identity – The term "sex" in Articles 15 and 16 is not limited to biological sex but includes "gender identity," thereby prohibiting discrimination against transgender persons. Affirmative Action for Transgender Community – The State has a positive obligation to take affirmative action and provide reservation to the transgender community as a backward class to remedy historical injustice and ensure social justice. Relevance: This judgment is the foundational ruling in India that legally recognized the rights of transgender persons. It expansively interpreted the Constitution to affirm that fundamental rights are available to all persons, irrespective of their gender identity. It directed the government to implement a range of welfare measures and has been the basis for subsequent legislation, including the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019.

Rajeev Kalita Vs. Union of India & Ors. (2025 INSC 75) Summary of the Case Law The Supreme Court of India addressed a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) filed under Article 32 of the Constitution, highlighting the inadequate and unhygienic toilet facilities in court complexes across India. The key legal issues involved were: Fundamental Right to Sanitation – Whether the right to access clean, functional, and segregated toilet facilities is a fundamental right flowing from the Right to Life and Personal Liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution. State's Constitutional Duty – Whether the State and Union Territories (UTs) have a constitutional obligation under Directive Principles of State Policy (Articles 47 and 48A) to provide and maintain such sanitation infrastructure in public places, including courts. Inclusivity and Non-Discrimination – Whether the failure to provide separate and accessible toilets for women, persons with disabilities (PwD), and transgender persons violates their right to equality, dignity, and privacy. The Court held that: Access to clean and safe sanitation is an integral part of the right to live with human dignity under Article 21. The Court issued a series of mandatory directions to all High Courts and State Governments/UTs to ensure the construction, maintenance, and accessibility of segregated toilets for men, women, PwD, and transgender persons in all court premises. Key Legal Principles Established: Sanitation as a Fundamental Right – The right to safe and clean drinking water and sanitation is essential for the full enjoyment of life and all human rights. It is a fundamental aspect of the Right to Life under Article 21, which includes the right to a healthy and hygienic life. Duty to Provide Inclusive Infrastructure – The State has a positive obligation to create inclusive public infrastructure that protects the privacy, safety, and health of all genders and specially-abled persons, as mandated by the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019, and various international covenants. Access to Justice Includes Access to Basic Amenities – The right to access justice is compromised if court premises lack basic human amenities like functional toilets. A dignified and humane atmosphere is necessary for all stakeholders—litigants, advocates, and judges—for the effective dispensation of justice. Relevance: This judgment expansively interprets the Right to Life to include the right to basic sanitation and hygiene within public institutions. It sets a crucial precedent for making public infrastructure, particularly judicial infrastructure, inclusive, accessible, and dignified for all citizens, thereby reinforcing the State's welfare obligations. The comprehensive directives serve as a model for improving sanitation facilities in all public buildings across the country.

Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences & Anr. Vs Bikartan Das & Ors. (2023 INSC 733) Summary of the CaseLaw The Supreme Court of India addressed a dispute concerning the entitlement of a Research Assistant employed by an autonomous body, the Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences (CCRAS), to an enhanced retirement age of 65 years, which was granted to AYUSH doctors working directly under the Ministry of AYUSH. The key legal issues involved were: Applicability of Government Service Rules to Autonomous Bodies – Whether the enhancement of the retirement age to 65 years for AYUSH doctors under the amended Fundamental Rule 56(bb) automatically applied to the employees of the autonomous Council. Interpretation of Governing Bye-Laws – The correct interpretation of Clauses 34 and 35 of the CCRAS Bye-Laws, which govern the superannuation of its employees and the application of Central Government rules. Judicial Review of Service Conditions – Whether the High Court, in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, could substitute the service conditions fixed by the employer and grant relief based on the nature of duties performed rather than the governing rules. The Court held that: The enhanced retirement age of 65 years was not automatically applicable to the respondent. The CCRAS, as an autonomous body, was governed by its own Bye-Laws. Clause 34 of the Bye-Laws provided that the retirement age would be as per Government of India rules or as decided by the Council's Governing Body. The Governing Body had consciously fixed the retirement age at 60 years, and this decision was not overridden by the subsequent amendment to FR 56(bb). The High Court erred in granting relief by focusing on the respondent's clinical duties instead of the governing service rules. The impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside. Key Legal Principles Established: Autonomy of Bodies in Service Conditions – Employees of autonomous bodies are governed by their own specific service rules and bye-laws. They cannot claim parity with Central Government employees as a matter of right, even if the body is fully funded or controlled by the government, unless the rules explicitly provide for such automatic application. Interpretation of Disjunctive "Or" in Bye-Laws – The word "or" in a statutory rule or bye-law is normally disjunctive. In Clause 34, it created two distinct sources for determining the retirement age: the Government of India rules or the decision of the Governing Body, and not a single composite source. Limits of Writ Jurisdiction – A writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction, not an appellate one. The High Court cannot reweigh evidence or substitute its own decision for that of the competent authority or tribunal on factual or interpretative matters, especially in policy-driven areas like fixing the age of superannuation. Relevance: This judgment is a significant precedent for service matters related to autonomous bodies under the Government of India. It clarifies that the service conditions of such employees are primarily dictated by their own governing rules and that a conscious decision by the governing body of an autonomous institution regarding service conditions, such as the age of superannuation, will prevail unless it is arbitrary or violates a statutory mandate. It also reiterates the restrained approach courts must adopt while interpreting service regulations and exercising writ jurisdiction.

Gujarat State Dy. Executive Engineers' Association Vs State of Gujarat and Others (1994 INSC 556) Summary of the CaseLaw The Supreme Court of India addressed a protracted dispute concerning the recruitment, seniority, and quota-roster between promotees and direct recruits in the Gujarat State Engineering Service. The core legal issues involved were: Validity and Lifespan of a Waiting List – Whether a waiting list prepared following a competitive examination in 1980 could remain operative for up to 10 years and serve as a source of recruitment for future vacancies arising between 1980 and 1993. Judicial Overreach in Appointments – Whether the High Court could assume the role of the appointing authority by directing the State Government to calculate vacancies and appoint candidates from an old waiting list, thereby infringing upon the executive's domain. Quota Roster and Lapsing of Vacancies – The interpretation of a proviso in the recruitment rules which stated that a shortfall in direct recruitment in any year would lapse and not be carried forward. Claim for Deemed Date of Appointment – Whether candidates appointed belatedly from the waiting list were entitled to a "deemed date of appointment" and seniority retrospectively. The Court held that: A waiting list is not a source of recruitment for future vacancies and is valid only for a reasonable period, typically to fill vacancies arising from the same selection process due to non-joining of selected candidates. The High Court's direction to appoint candidates from the 1980 waiting list for vacancies arising up to 1993 was illegal, as it deprived fresh candidates of their right to compete. However, considering that the appointees had been serving for over five years, their appointments were not quashed on equitable grounds. Their seniority was to be counted from their actual date of appointment, not retrospectively. The Court also directed the State Government to hold fresh examinations to fill any accumulated direct recruitment vacancies. Key Legal Principles Established: Waiting List is Not a Perennial Source of Recruitment – A waiting list prepared by a Public Service Commission is only for the contingency of non-joining by selected candidates in the specific selection for which it was created. It cannot be used as an infinite stock to fill future vacancies that arise in subsequent years. Judicial Restraint in Administrative Matters – Courts cannot direct the government to make appointments from an old waiting list by working out vacancies, as this constitutes an impermissible intrusion into the executive's policy-making and appointing functions, unless the government's action is arbitrary. Seniority from Actual Date of Appointment – Candidates appointed from a waiting list at a later date cannot claim a "deemed date of appointment" or seniority from an earlier date when the select list candidates were appointed. Seniority is to be reckoned from the actual date of joining. Relevance: This judgment is a foundational precedent in Indian Service Law, clearly defining the purpose and limitations of a waiting list. It reinforces the principle of annual recruitment and prevents the creation of a "vested interest" for candidates from a single examination, thereby protecting the rights of fresh candidates. It also underscores the importance of judicial restraint in matters of public employment.

Pratap Singh vs State of Jharkhand & Anr Citation: (2005) 3 SCC 551 / Appeal (crl.) 210 of 2005 (Supreme Court of India) Summary of the Case Law The Supreme Court of India addressed crucial questions regarding juvenile justice jurisprudence, specifically dealing with the determination of juvenile status and the applicability of beneficial legislation. The case involved conflicting precedents on whether the date of offense or date of production before court is relevant for age determination under juvenile justice laws. Key Legal Issues Involved Were: Reckoning Date for Age Determination – Whether the date of offense or the date of production before the court is the relevant date for determining juvenile status under the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986. Applicability of New Legislation – Whether the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Act, 2000 would apply to proceedings initiated under the 1986 Act that were pending when the new Act came into force. Conflict of Precedents – Resolution of conflicting decisions between Umesh Chandra vs. State of Rajasthan (three-judge bench) and Arnit Das vs. State of Bihar (two-judge bench) on the determination of juvenile status. The Court Held That: The reckoning date for determining juvenile status is the date of commission of offense, not the date of production before the court. The Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 would apply to all pending proceedings initiated under the 1986 Act, provided the accused had not completed 18 years of age as on April 1, 2001. The decision in Umesh Chandra vs. State of Rajasthan laid down the correct law, while Arnit Das vs. State of Bihar was not correctly decided. Key Legal Principles Established: Date of Offense as Reckoning Date – The relevant date for determining juvenile status is the date of commission of the offense, as the legislation aims to protect young minds at the time of the criminal act. Beneficial Interpretation of Social Legislation – Juvenile justice laws being benevolent social legislations must be interpreted liberally to advance their protective objectives rather than frustrate them. Retrospective Application of Beneficial Provisions – When a new beneficial legislation replaces an old one, pending proceedings should generally receive the benefit of the more beneficial provisions of the new law. Precedential Value of Larger Benches – Decisions rendered by larger benches (three-judge bench in Umesh Chandra) prevail over conflicting decisions by smaller benches (two-judge bench in Arnit Das). Relevance: This landmark judgment settled the conflicting jurisprudence on juvenile age determination and established the primacy of the date of offense as the reckoning criteria. It reinforced the benevolent nature of juvenile justice legislation and ensured that pending cases would receive the benefit of more protective provisions in new laws. The judgment has significant implications for the interpretation of beneficial social legislations and the treatment of juvenile offenders in the Indian justice system.

Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd. v. National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) Citation: (2019) 7 S.C.R. 522 / Civil Appeal No. 4779 of 2019 (Supreme Court of India) Summary of the Case Law The Supreme Court of India addressed a dispute between Ssangyong and NHAI concerning the unilateral application of a new price adjustment formula via a circular, which altered the contractual terms. The key legal issues involved the grounds for setting aside an arbitral award under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, as amended in 2015. Key Legal Issues Involved Were: Applicability of the 2015 Amendment – Whether the amended grounds for challenging an arbitral award applied to court proceedings filed after the amendment's effective date. Scope of "Public Policy of India" – The correct interpretation of the "public policy of India" ground for setting aside an award after its statutory narrowing by the 2015 Amendment. Violation of Natural Justice – Whether an arbitral tribunal's reliance on documents not presented by the parties violated the principles of natural justice. Patent Illegality as a Ground for Challenge – The meaning and applicability of the new ground of "patent illegality." Power under Article 142 of the Constitution – Whether the Supreme Court could enforce a dissenting arbitral award using its extraordinary constitutional powers to ensure complete justice. The Court Held That: The amended Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 2015, applies prospectively only to applications filed in court on or after 23.10.2015. The majority arbitral award was set aside as it violated natural justice by relying on undisclosed government guidelines. The "public policy of India" ground is now constricted to only mean a violation of the "fundamental policy of Indian law" or a conflict with the "most basic notions of justice or morality." The ground of "patent illegality" is available only for challenging domestic awards, not international commercial arbitrations seated in India. Invoking power under Article 142 of the Constitution, the minority award was upheld to do complete justice and provide a speedy resolution. Key Legal Principles Established: Prospective Application of Amendment – Fundamental amendments to the grounds for challenging arbitral awards apply prospectively to court applications filed after the amendment comes into force. Narrowed Scope of Public Policy – The expansive judicial interpretations of "public policy" have been legislatively overruled; the ground is now narrowly defined to minimize judicial interference. Expert Adjudication Over General Courts – Matters involving complex tariff fixation and regulatory aspects should be decided by specialized expert bodies like TAMP, not by arbitrators or civil courts. Natural Justice is a Fundamental Principle – An arbitral tribunal must provide a full opportunity to parties and cannot decide a case based on evidence not disclosed to them. Article 142 Can Ensure Speedy Justice – The Supreme Court can use its constitutional powers to enforce a minority arbitral award to prevent delay and bring finality to arbitration proceedings. Relevance: This judgment is a landmark ruling that definitively settles the law on the limited scope of judicial intervention in arbitral awards post the 2015 Amendment. It reinforces India's pro-arbitration policy by strictly limiting challenges to awards, emphasizing procedural fairness, and providing a mechanism for the Supreme Court to ensure timely dispute resolution.

Paradip Port Authority Vs. Paradeep Phosphates Ltd. (2025 INSC 971) Summary of the (CaseLaw) The Supreme Court of India addressed a dispute between Paradip Port Authority (PPA) and Paradeep Phosphates Ltd. (PPL) concerning the unilateral revision of port tariffs under a bilateral agreement dated 03.08.1985. The key legal issues involved were: 1. Contractual Obligations vs. Statutory Powers – Whether the port authority could unilaterally revise tariffs under the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 (later replaced by the Major Port Authorities Act, 2021) despite a contractual clause requiring mutual consent for revisions. 2. Jurisdiction of Tariff Authority for Major Ports (TAMP) – Whether disputes regarding tariff revisions should be adjudicated by TAMP (an expert regulatory body) rather than through arbitration or civil courts. 3. Limitation and Refund Claims – Whether the respondent’s claim for refund of excess charges paid under the revised tariff was time-barred. The Court held that: The Tariff Authority (TAMP) was the appropriate forum to decide disputes regarding tariff revisions, given its expertise. The arbitration award and High Court’s decision were set aside, and the matter was remanded to TAMP for fresh adjudication. The contractual clause requiring mutual consent for tariff revisions did not override statutory powers of the port authority under the 1963/2021 Acts. The Court recommended the creation of an appellate tribunal for tariff disputes instead of direct appeals to the Supreme Court, citing the need for specialized adjudication. Key Legal Principles Established: 1. Statutory Powers Prevail Over Contractual Terms – A port authority’s statutory right to revise tariffs under the Major Port Authorities Act cannot be negated by a contractual clause requiring mutual consent. 2. Expert Bodies Over Courts for Technical Disputes – Matters involving tariff fixation, being highly technical, should be decided by specialized bodies like TAMP rather than general courts or arbitrators. 3 Need for Specialized Appellate Mechanism – The Supreme Court recommended the establishment of an expert appellate tribunal for tariff disputes to ensure effective resolution. Relevance: This judgment clarifies the interplay between contractual agreements and statutory tariff regulations in major ports, emphasizing the role of expert regulatory bodies in resolving such disputes. It also highlights the judiciary’s push for specialized tribunals in technical domains like port tariff fixation. This structured format ensures clarity on the area of law, key legal principles, and practical implications of the judgment. Let me know if you need further refinements!

A. Karunanithi & P. Karunanithi vs. State represented by Inspector of Police (2025 INSC 967) Summary of the CaseLaw The Supreme Court addressed two appeals arising from convictions under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The appellants, A. Karunanithi (A-1, Village Administrative Officer) and P. Karunanithi (A-2, Village Assistant), were convicted for demanding and accepting a bribe of Rs. 500 from a complainant seeking a Community Certificate. Key Holdings: For A-2 (P. Karunanithi): The Court set aside his conviction, holding that mere acceptance of money on A-1’s directions, without evidence of demand or connivance, did not constitute an offence under Sections 7 or 13 of the Act. Reliance was placed on Mahendra Singh Chotelal Bhargad vs. State of Maharashtra (1998) 2 SCC 357, where acceptance of bribe by a third party, without a charge of abetment, was held insufficient for conviction. For A-1 (A. Karunanithi): The Court upheld his conviction, as the evidence (testimony of PW-1 and PW-2) proved repeated demands and indirect receipt of bribe through A-2. However, considering the petty amount (Rs. 500), lapse of time (since 2004), and A-1’s advanced age (68 years), the sentence was reduced to the statutory minimum of one year under the Act. Legal Principles Reinforced: Demand and Acceptance: As per Neeraj Datta vs. State (NCT of Delhi) (2023) 4 SCC 731, proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification is essential for conviction under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the Act. Abetment: Absence of a specific charge or evidence of abetment vitiates conviction for mere acceptance of bribe on another’s behalf. Conclusion: The judgment clarifies the necessity of proving active demand and connivance for corruption offences, while balancing sentencing with proportionality. It underscores the judiciary’s discretion to reduce sentences in exceptional circumstances without overriding statutory limits. Court: Supreme Court of India Judges: Justices Pankaj Mithal & Prasanna B. Varale Date: August 12, 2025

Brij Bihari Gupta v. Mannet & Ors., 2025 INSC 948 (Supreme Court of India) Summary of the (CaseLaw) The Supreme Court addressed two key issues in this case: Gratuitous Passengers in a Goods Vehicle: The insurer contended that the deceased/injured were gratuitous passengers, thus excluding liability. However, the Court found no evidence to support this claim. Instead, the evidence showed the passengers were petty hawkers accompanying their goods, bringing them under the ambit of "owner of goods or his authorized representative" as per Section 147(1)(b)(i) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The insurer’s assertion was dismissed as unsubstantiated. Transfer of Ownership: The insurer argued that the appellant (driver) had become the ostensible owner via an agreement, absolving the registered owner (and thus the insurer) of liability. The Court held that mere possession under an incomplete sale agreement (with unpaid balance and no registration transfer) did not constitute legal ownership. Citing Naveen Kumar v. Vijay Kumar & Ors. (2018), the Court reaffirmed that the registered owner remains liable unless compliance with Section 50 of the Motor Vehicles Act (reporting transfer) is demonstrated. Outcome: The Court held the insurer liable to indemnify the awards, emphasizing the registered owner’s continued liability and rejecting the insurer’s grounds for exemption. The High Court’s order absolving the insurer was overturned, and the Tribunal’s awards were restored. Key Legal Principles: Section 147, Motor Vehicles Act, 1988: Insurer’s liability extends to third parties, including owners of goods carried in the vehicle. Section 50, Motor Vehicles Act, 1988: Transfer of ownership requires formal registration changes; mere possession agreements are insufficient. Precedent: Naveen Kumar underscores the registered owner’s liability to protect claimants from procedural complexities. Structure: Area of Law (specific and concise). Citation (party names, court, year). Summary (issues, findings, outcome in 2–3 paragraphs). Key Legal Principles (statutes/precedents applied).

Mange Ram vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr., 2025 INSC 962 Summary of the (CaseLaw) The Supreme Court, in this case, examined whether criminal proceedings under Sections 498A and 34 of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, could be quashed in light of the dissolution of marriage and the absence of specific allegations against the father-in-law (appellant). Key Observations & Ruling: Factual Background: The appellant’s son and respondent No. 2 (daughter-in-law) married in 2017 but separated in 2019. An FIR was lodged alleging dowry demands and physical abuse by the appellant (father-in-law). The High Court quashed proceedings against the mother-in-law and sister-in-law but retained them against the appellant. Supreme Court’s Analysis: The FIR was lodged belatedly (after divorce proceedings were initiated), raising doubts about its genuineness. No allegations were raised during counselling sessions prior to the FIR. The marriage had already been dissolved by divorce (24.08.2021), and both parties had moved on. Citing precedents (Dara Lakshmi Narayana, Mala Kar, Arun Jain), the Court held that continuing proceedings against distant relatives (like the father-in-law) in a settled matrimonial dispute would be an abuse of process. Legal Principles Applied: Section 482 CrPC & Article 142: The Court emphasized that criminal proceedings in matrimonial disputes should not persist after divorce unless specific, grave allegations exist. Judicial Precedents: Relied on cases where proceedings were quashed post-divorce to prevent harassment and futile litigation. Final Decision: The Supreme Court quashed the FIR and all proceedings against the appellant, invoking Article 142 to ensure complete justice. Significance: This judgment reinforces that criminal proceedings in matrimonial cases should not mechanically continue after divorce, especially where allegations are vague, belated, or lack corroboration. It safeguards family members from vexatious litigation once the marital dispute has been resolved.

BSES Rajdhani Power Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. (2025 INSC 937) Summary of the (CaseLaw) The Supreme Court examined the legal framework governing the creation, continuation, and liquidation of "regulatory assets" in electricity tariff determination under the Electricity Act, 2003. A regulatory asset is an intangible recognition of revenue shortfall that distribution companies (DISCOMs) incur when tariffs do not cover their costs, allowing recovery in future years. The Court emphasized that: 1. Tariff must be cost-reflective, and regulatory assets should only be created in exceptional circumstances (e.g., natural calamities). 2. Rule 23 of the Electricity (Amendment) Rules, 2024 mandates that any revenue gap should not exceed 3% of the Annual Revenue Requirement (ARR) and must be liquidated within 3 years (for new gaps) or 7 years (for existing gaps). 3. Regulatory Commissions must ensure accountability by providing a clear roadmap for liquidation, including carrying costs. 4. The Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (APTEL) has supervisory powers under Section 121 to issuebinding directions to ensure compliance. The Court held that prolonged regulatory assets indicate regulatory failure, burdening consumers and destabilizing DISCOMs. It directed strict adherence to statutory timelines and APTEL’s oversight to prevent misuse. Key Legal Principles: Sections 61 & 62, Electricity Act, 2003: Tariff determination must balance consumer interests and cost recovery. National Tariff Policy, 2006/2016 (Clause 8.2.2): Regulatory assets are permissible only in rare cases with time-bound recovery. Rule 23, Electricity Rules, 2024: Caps revenue gaps at 3% of ARR and mandates liquidation within 3–7 years. Section 121, Electricity Act: APTEL can enforce compliance via directives. Significance: The judgment reinforces financial discipline in tariff regulation, curbing arbitrary deferral of revenue gaps and ensuring DISCOMs’ viability while protecting consumers from unsustainable tariff shocks.

Mathews J. Nedumpara & Ors. vs. Supreme Court of India & Ors. (2025 INSC 941) Summary of the (CaseLaw) The petitioners, including advocates and a chartered accountant, sought a writ of mandamus under Article 32 of the Constitution directing the Delhi Police to register an FIR regarding an incident involving burnt currency notes recovered from the residence of a Delhi High Court Judge. They challenged the precedent set in K. Veeraswami vs. Union of India (1991), which mandates prior consultation with the Chief Justice of India (CJI) before registering an FIR against a judge. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition on two grounds: Abuse of Process: The petitioners failed to substantiate their claim of having made a representation to the police, as required by the Court's earlier orders. Judicial Immunity: The Court reaffirmed the K. Veeraswami principle, emphasizing that the procedural safeguard (CJI consultation) is essential to protect judicial independence and prevent frivolous litigation against judges. The judgment underscores the balance between accountability of judges and the need to shield the judiciary from vexatious complaints, upholding the constitutional framework of judicial immunity. Key Legal Principle: The decision reiterates that no FIR can be registered against a High Court or Supreme Court judge without prior consultation with the CJI, as established in K. Veeraswami. This safeguards judicial independence while ensuring accountability through structured in-house procedures. Relevance: This case reinforces the doctrine of judicial immunity and the procedural constraints on investigating judges, aligning with constitutional safeguards under Articles 124 and 217.

Kavita Devi and Others v. Sunil Kumar and Another, 2025 INSC 938 (Supreme Court of India) Summary of the (CaseLaw) The Supreme Court in this case addressed the enhancement of compensation awarded to the dependents of a deceased victim of a motor vehicle accident. The key legal issues involved: Inclusion of Allowances in Income Calculation: The Court held that allowances (like HRA) forming part of the deceased’s salary must be included for computing "just compensation" under Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, as they contributed to the family’s sustenance. Reliance was placed on National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Indira Srivastava (2008) 2 SCC 763, which emphasized a broad interpretation of "income" to encompass all financial benefits supporting the family. Future Prospects: Applying Sarla Verma v. DTC (2009) 6 SCC 121 and Pranay Sethi (2017) 16 SCC 680, the Court added 50% future prospects to the deceased’s income (aged 35) and adopted a multiplier of 16. Conventional Heads: Following Magma General Insurance v. Nanu Ram (2018) 18 SCC 130, the Court awarded Rs. 48,400/- each for spousal and parental consortium, and Rs. 18,150/- each for funeral expenses and loss of estate. Outcome: The total compensation was enhanced from Rs. 7,23,680/- to Rs. 14,29,500/-, with 7% interest, excluding delay periods. The judgment reinforces the principle of "just compensation" by holistically assessing income, dependency, and non-pecuniary losses. Key Precedents Cited: Sarla Verma (multiplier and future prospects). Pranay Sethi (conventional heads). Magma Insurance (consortium awards). Indira Srivastava (inclusion of perks in income).

Operation ASHA v. Shelly Batra & Ors. Summary of the (CaseLaw) Key Points: Nature of Societies vs. Trusts: The Supreme Court examined whether a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, can be treated as a "constructive trust" under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC). The Court clarified that while societies may engage in charitable activities, they do not automatically qualify as trusts unless specific conditions are met. Constructive Trust Doctrine: The judgment elaborates on the doctrine of constructive trust, which arises by operation of law (not by express intention) to prevent unjust enrichment or breach of fiduciary duty. The Court held that for a society to be deemed a constructive trust, there must be clear evidence that it holds property in a fiduciary capacity for public benefit. Section 92 CPC Requirements: The Court reiterated the three conditions for invoking Section 92 CPC: The trust must be for a public charitable or religious purpose. There must be a breach of trust or need for court intervention. The relief sought must fall under Section 92(1) CPC. Vesting of Property under Societies Registration Act: The Court analyzed Section 5 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860, which states that if property is not vested in trustees, it is deemed vested in the society’s governing body. The Court ruled that this does not automatically create a trust relationship unless there is a clear fiduciary obligation. Precedents Relied Upon: Kesava Panicker v. Damodara Panicker (1974 SCC OnLine Ker 58): Held that a society could be a constructive trust if it holds property for public benefit. Chikka Venkatappa v. D. Hanumanthappa (1970 SCC OnLine Kar 16): Distinguished between societies and trusts, stating that societies are not trusts unless expressly created. Conclusion: The Supreme Court ruled that merely being a charitable society does not make it a constructive trust under Section 92 CPC unless there is clear evidence of fiduciary obligations akin to a trust. The judgment reinforces the distinction between societies and trusts while clarifying when a society may be subjected to trust-related litigation.

Bansal Milk Chilling Centre vs. Rana Milk Food Private Ltd. & Anr., 2025 INSC 899 (Supreme Court of India) Summary of the (CaseLaw) The Supreme Court, in this case, addressed the issue of whether a criminal court has the power to allow amendments to a complaint filed under Section 138 of the NI Act after cognizance has been taken. The appellant sought to amend the complaint to correct a typographical error, changing "Desi Ghee (milk products)" to "milk," which the respondents argued altered the nature of the complaint and was impermissible post-cognizance. The Court relied on precedents such as S.R. Sukumar v. S. Sunaad Raghuvam (2015) and U.P. Pollution Control Board v. Modi Distillery (1987), emphasizing that amendments to complaints can be allowed if they cure a curable infirmity and cause no prejudice to the accused. The Court held that the amendment in question was a minor correction, moved at an early stage of the trial, and did not change the complaint's fundamental nature. It also dismissed the High Court's reasoning regarding GST implications as irrelevant to the amendment's validity. The judgment reaffirms that procedural technicalities should not hinder justice, provided the amendment does not prejudice the accused or alter the complaint's core allegations. The Trial Court's order allowing the amendment was restored, and the matter was remanded for expeditious trial. Key Takeaways: Amendments to complaints are permissible post-cognizance if they rectify curable errors and cause no prejudice. The test for allowing amendments hinges on whether the change affects the complaint's nature or the accused's defense. Courts should avoid delving into tangential issues (e.g., GST implications) when deciding amendment applications. This judgment clarifies the scope of amendments in criminal complaints, balancing procedural flexibility with the rights of the accused.

Union of India & Ors. v. R. Shankarappa, 2025 INSC 898 (Supreme Court of India) Summary of the (CaseLaw) The Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a disciplinary authority competent to impose only minor penalties under the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965 (CCS CCA Rules) could validly initiate proceedings for major penalties. The respondent, a retired Sub Divisional Engineer, challenged the charge-sheets issued by the General Manager (Telecommunications) — an authority competent only for minor penalties — arguing that such initiation required approval from the higher authority (Member, Telecommunications Commission) competent for major penalties, as per the precedent in B.V. Gopinath v. Union of India (2014) 1 SCC 351. The Court held that Rule 13(2) of the CCS CCA Rules explicitly permits an authority competent to impose minor penalties to initiate disciplinary proceedings for major penalties, even if it cannot impose such penalties. The final imposition of major penalties must, however, be by the competent higher authority. The Court distinguished B.V. Gopinath on facts, noting that the latter involved a specific office order mandating approval, whereas no such requirement existed under the statutory framework governing the Department of Telecommunication. Key Legal Principle: Rule 13(2) CCS CCA Rules allows initiation of major penalty proceedings by an authority competent only for minor penalties, provided the final order is passed by the competent higher authority. The statutory scheme does not require prior approval for initiation unless explicitly mandated by office orders/rules (unlike in B.V. Gopinath). Outcome: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgment quashing the charge-sheets, upheld the Tribunal’s dismissal of the respondent’s challenge, and affirmed the validity of the disciplinary proceedings initiated by the General Manager. Significance: Clarifies the scope of Rule 13(2) and reinforces the autonomy of disciplinary authorities in initiating proceedings, subject to the hierarchy of penalty imposition under the CCS CCA Rules.

Case Citation: Newtech Promoters and Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. State of UP & Ors., (2021) 188 SC (Supreme Court of India). Facts Parties: Promoters/developers (Appellants) vs. Homebuyers/allottees & Uttar Pradesh RERA (Respondents). Dispute: Appellants challenged UP RERA's orders directing refunds to homebuyers for delayed possession, contested RERA's retroactive application, delegation of powers to a single member, pre-deposit conditions for appeals, and recovery mechanisms. Context: Homebuyers filed complaints under RERA seeking refunds + interest due to promoters' failure to deliver possession as per agreements (pre- and post-RERA). UP RERA allowed complaints via single-member benches. Key Issues & Court's Analysis 1. Retroactive Application of RERA (Section 3) Appellants' Claim: RERA cannot apply retrospectively to pre-2016 agreements, violating Articles 14/19(1)(g) of the Constitution. Court's Holding: RERA applies retroactively (not retrospectively) to "ongoing projects" lacking completion certificates (Section 3(1) proviso). Reasoning: Legislative intent was to regulate all incomplete projects to protect homebuyers' investments. Ongoing projects (defined under UP Rules) share characteristics with new projects, ensuring uniform standards. Contracts typically include clauses binding parties to future legislation. Precedent: Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma (2020) – Distinguished retroactive statutes (affecting future rights based on past status) from retrospective ones (impairing vested rights). 2. Jurisdiction: Refund vs. Compensation (Sections 18, 19, 31, 71) Appellants' Claim: Only adjudicating officers (under Section 71) can order refunds/compensation. Court's Clarification: Regulatory Authority handles refund claims (principal + interest) under Sections 18(1)/19(4) via summary proceedings. Adjudicating Officers exclusively handle compensation claims (Sections 12, 14, 18(2)-(3), 19) after detailed inquiry (Section 71). Rationale: Refunds involve straightforward restitution; compensation requires assessing loss (Section 72 factors). Formal Separation: Complaints for refunds (Form M) and compensation (Form N) must be filed separately (UP Rules 33/34). 3. Delegation to Single Member (Section 81) Appellants' Claim: Quasi-judicial powers cannot be delegated to a single member; full Authority must hear cases. Court's Holding: Section 81 permits delegation of powers (except rule-making) to members/officers. Validity: UP RERA delegated refund-related complaints (not policy matters) to single members due to high caseload (36,826 complaints). Distinction between policy meetings (full Authority under Section 29) and adjudicatory functions (delegable under Section 81). Precedent: Saurashtra Kutch Stock Exchange v. SEBI (2012) – Upheld delegation under analogous SEBI provisions. 4. Pre-Deposit for Appeals (Section 43(5)) Appellants' Claim: 30% pre-deposit condition for promoters' appeals is onerous and unconstitutional. Court's Holding: Condition is constitutionally valid to deter frivolous appeals and secure homebuyers' interests. Reasoning: Promoters form a distinct class with higher obligations; differential treatment is rational. Similar pre-deposit conditions exist in SARFAESI, Consumer Protection, and tax laws (Narayan Chandra Ghosh v. UCO Bank). 5. Recovery of Principal Amount (Section 40(1)) Appellants' Claim: Section 40(1) only permits recovery of "interest/penalty/compensation," not principal refunds. Court's Harmonization: Principal refunds + interest are recoverable as "arrears of land revenue." Interpretation: Refund orders under Section 18 inherently include principal; excluding it would frustrate RERA’s purpose. Conclusion & Directions Appeal Dismissed: All challenges rejected. UP RERA’s orders upheld. Significance: RERA applies retroactively to all ongoing projects without completion certificates. Jurisdictional split: Regulatory Authority (refunds) vs. Adjudicating Officer (compensation). Delegation to single members is valid for efficient dispute resolution. Pre-deposit condition and principal recovery uphold homebuyer protection. Relief for Promoters: Permitted to appeal to Appellate Tribunal within 30 days upon complying with pre-deposit. Final Order: "The batch of appeals are disposed of... No costs." – Justices U.U. Lalit, Ajay Rastogi, Aniruddha Bose (November 11, 2021). Key Precedents Relied Upon: Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma (2020) – Retroactive statutes. Saurashtra Kutch Stock Exchange v. SEBI (2012) – Delegation of powers. Narayan Chandra Ghosh v. UCO Bank (2011) – Validity of pre-deposit. Imperia Structures Ltd. v. Anil Patni (2020) – Unqualified right to refund under RERA.

Conveyance of Title under Maharashtra Ownership Flats Act (MOFA), 1963; Scope of Competent Authority's Powers; Summary Adjudication of Property Disputes. Case Citation: Arunkumar H Shah HUF v. Avon Arcade Premises Co-operative Society Ltd. & Ors., 2025 INSC 524 (Supreme Court of India). Facts Property Origin: Champaben Hiralal Shah owned Final Plot No. 61 (2,814.38 sq. m) in Vile Parle, Mumbai ("Larger Plot"). Partnership & Dissolution: A partnership firm, M/s CH Shah & Sons, was formed in 1972. The Larger Plot was Champaben’s capital contribution. After her death, the firm dissolved in 1987. The Larger Plot was partitioned: Lalbhai Plot (blue-verged area) allotted to Lalbhai H. Shah (predecessor of Respondents 2–5). Arun Plot (yellow-verged area, including Building No. 3) allotted to Arun H. Shah (Appellant’s Karta). Clause 8(h) of the dissolution deed required Lalbhai/co-operative society to execute a perpetual lease (nominal rent: Re. 1/year) in favor of Arun for the Arun Plot. Development & Dispute: Lalbhai formed a new firm (Avon Enterprises, Respondent 10), constructed buildings on the Lalbhai Plot, and sold flats. The flat purchasers formed Respondent 1 (Co-operative Society) in 2005. Respondent 1 sought deemed conveyance of the entire Larger Plot under MOFA Section 11(3), including the Arun Plot. The Competent Authority (Respondent 11) ordered conveyance subject to Respondent 1 executing a perpetual lease for the Arun Plot in favor of the Appellant. The Bombay High Court upheld this order, prompting the appeal. Key Issues Whether the Competent Authority under MOFA Section 11(3) can order conveyance of land not covered by flat purchase agreements? Whether the Competent Authority can adjudicate title disputes involving third parties? Validity of the order directing Respondent 1 to execute a perpetual lease for the Arun Plot. Arguments Appellant’s Contention: The Arun Plot was never part of the flat purchase agreements. The Competent Authority exceeded jurisdiction by including it. Title disputes require civil suit adjudication (Mazda Construction v. Sultanabad Darshan CHS; Marathon Next Gen Realty cited). The perpetual lease condition in the order was "vague" (terms unspecified). Respondent 1’s Contention: The Larger Plot was undivided; conveyance was necessary for society formation. Clause 8(h) of the dissolution deed mandated a lease for Arun, protecting his rights. MOFA is a beneficial legislation for flat purchasers; delays in conveyance (since 1993) warranted summary relief. Judgment Analysis I. Scope of Competent Authority’s Powers (MOFA Section 11) Summary Proceedings: The Competent Authority’s role is quasi-judicial but summary (Rule 13 of MOFA Rules). It cannot conduct cross-examination or conclusively decide title disputes. "The competent authority... cannot conclusively and finally decide questions of title." (¶20) Limited Jurisdiction: Authority may order conveyance only for land agreed upon in flat purchase agreements. Here, FPAs explicitly excluded the Arun Plot (¶28–29). Civil Remedy Preserved: Affected parties retain the right to file civil suits for title determination (¶21, 35). II. Validity of the Perpetual Lease Condition Binding Contractual Obligation: Clause 8(h) of the 1987 dissolution deed obligated Lalbhai/the society to lease the Arun Plot to Arun’s HUF (Appellant). "Sub-clause (h)… is binding on the present appellant." (¶29) Protection of Rights: The Competent Authority’s order secured the Appellant’s rights as a perpetual lessee (¶32, 34). The 1991 lease deed (referenced in FPAs) further validated this. No Vagueness: Lease terms derive from the dissolution deed and 1991 lease; execution details are actionable (¶33). III. Role of Registering Officer (MOFA Section 11(5)) Limited Scrutiny: The Registering Officer cannot review the Competent Authority’s order. It may only check: Statutory compliances (stamp duty, permissions). Prohibitory court orders. Registration formalities (¶23, 37(iv)). Conclusion Appeal Dismissed: The Competent Authority’s order and High Court judgment were upheld. Key Holdings: MOFA proceedings are summary; title disputes must be resolved via civil suits. Competent Authority orders must protect third-party rights (here, via perpetual lease). MOFA is a beneficial statute for flat purchasers; writ courts should not interfere unless orders are "manifestly illegal" (¶35). Final Direction: Respondent 1 must execute a perpetual lease for the Arun Plot per Clause 8(h) of the dissolution deed and the 1991 lease terms. Significance: The judgment clarifies the limited adjudicatory powers of MOFA authorities and reinforces that contractual obligations bind parties even in statutory summary proceedings. Citations Relied Upon: Mazda Construction Co. v. Sultanabad Darshan CHS Ltd. (2012 SCC Online Bom 1266) Marathon Next Gen Realty v. Competent Authority (2015 Mah LJ 318) ACME Enterprises v. Deputy Registrar (2023 SCC Online Bom 1102) Tanish Associates v. State of Maharashtra (2016 SCC Online Bom 12653)

Maharashtra Ownership Flats Act, 1963 (MOFA): A beneficial legislation protecting flat purchasers' rights (e.g., formation of societies, conveyance of land, and control over future FSI). Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority Act, 1974 (MMRDA Act): Establishes MMRDA as a planning authority with powers to exclude other laws (like MOFA) via Section 31 read with Schedule II, Clause II. Core Legal Question: Does the MMRDA Act wholly exclude MOFA’s applicability to projects on MMRDA-owned land, or does MOFA apply to disputes between developers and flat purchasers? II. Background Facts Parties: Appellants: 97 flat purchasers + Welfare Association of "Universal Garden-I" (building on Plot No. 288/B, Mumbai). Respondents: Developer (Pagarani Universal Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd.). MMRDA (landowner; leased plot to Developer). Dispute: Developer utilized initial 1.5 FSI to construct "Universal Garden-I" (completed in 2014). In 2015, the state increased permissible FSI to 3.0. Developer sought to use additional FSI to construct "Universal Garden-II" on the same plot. Flat purchasers objected, claiming: Under MOFA Section 7, unused/extra FSI vests in them post-formation of society. Developer failed to form society/convey land as mandated by MOFA Sections 10–11. MMRDA rejected objections, citing MMRDA Act Section 31, which excludes MOFA for its lands. Lower Court Ruling: Single Judge dismissed injunctions against construction, holding MOFA inapplicable as it prejudices MMRDA’s rights. III. Key Legal Issues Exclusion of MOFA under MMRDA Act: Does Section 31 read with Schedule II, Clause II exclude MOFA entirely or only against MMRDA? Effect on MMRDA’s Rights: Would enforcing MOFA Section 7 (flat purchasers’ rights over FSI) undermine MMRDA’s ownership? Contractual Incorporation of MOFA: Can developers/flat purchasers contractually bind themselves to MOFA despite statutory exclusion? IV. Arguments Summarized Appellants (Flat Purchasers): Purposive Interpretation: MOFA’s exclusion under MMRDA Act applies only to MMRDA, not private developers. Literal interpretation causes absurdity, denying flat purchasers statutory protections. Contractual Obligation: Developer’s agreement (Clause 28) bound it to MOFA obligations. Precedent: In MHADA Act cases (similar exclusion), MOFA is applied to developers. Respondents (Developer & MMRDA): Literal Interpretation: Schedule II, Clause II explicitly excludes MOFA for "any land/building belonging to or vesting in MMRDA." Land includes FSI (benefits arising from land). Legislative Intent: MMRDA Act is a complete code for planned development; MOFA would impede this. No Contractual Override: Parties cannot contractually apply MOFA where statute excludes it. Amicus Curiae (Court-Appointed): Balanced Approach: MOFA exclusion applies to MMRDA’s land/FSI rights but not to flats/development (e.g., MOFA Sections 4, 5, 10 apply to developer-purchaser disputes). Distinction: "Land" (vested in MMRDA) ≠ "development" (flats owned by purchasers). V. Court’s Analysis & Ruling 1. Statutory Interpretation of MMRDA Act Section 31 & Schedule II: Literal Rule Applied: "The said Act [MOFA] shall not apply to the Metropolitan Authority or to any land or building belonging to or vesting in that Authority." "Land" includes FSI (as defined in MMRDA Act Section 2(d)). "Or" is disjunctive; exclusion covers both MMRDA and its lands/buildings. No Ambiguity: Purposive interpretation not needed; plain language suffices. Precedents Cited: Ragunath Rai Bareja v. Punjab National Bank (2007): Literal rule prevails where words are unambiguous. Premanand v. Mohan Koikal (2011): Courts cannot amend laws via interpretation. 2. MOFA Section 7 & MMRDA’s Rights: Enforcing Section 7 (flat purchasers’ rights over FSI) would directly affect MMRDA’s ownership rights over land/FSI. MMRDA’s lease terms allow lessees (developers) to exploit FSI, subject to MMRDA’s permissions. 3. Contractual Incorporation of MOFA: Developer’s agreement (Clause 28) stating MOFA applies is ineffective against statutory exclusion. Parties cannot contract out of MMRDA Act’s mandate. 4. Partial Applicability of MOFA Rejected: Amicus’ View Rebutted: Schedule II excludes MOFA wholly for MMRDA lands. No scope for selective application (e.g., only for flats). VI. Judgment Appeal Dismissed: MOFA wholly inapplicable to MMRDA-owned lands. Injunction against construction of "Universal Garden-II" denied. Clarification: Flat purchasers may pursue other remedies (e.g., breach of contract) against the developer, provided they do not prejudice MMRDA’s rights. VII. Significance Landmark on Statutory Conflict: Affirms supremacy of the MMRDA Act’s exclusion clause over MOFA for authority-owned lands. Literal Interpretation Emphasized: Courts must enforce clear statutory language without resorting to purposive interpretation. Practical Impact: Flat purchasers in MMRDA projects cannot invoke MOFA against developers/authorities. Remedies lie in contract law or other statutes. Full Citation: Shahed Kamal & Ors. v. Pagarani Universal Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., 2022 SCC OnLine Bom 589

Property Law & Civil Procedure Adverse Possession (Limitation Act, 1963) Landlord-Tenant Relationship (Transfer of Property Act, 1882) Scope of Second Appeal (Section 100, CPC 1908) Title Disputes & Oral Gifts (Indian Registration Act, 1908) Background Appellant (Landlord): Claimed ownership of shop premises in Berhampur as the adopted son of original owner Smt. Ashalata Devi. Respondent (Tenant): Occupied shops since 1974 but stopped paying rent from 2001. Defended eviction by claiming: (i) Oral gift of the property by Ashalata Devi; (ii) Adverse possession since 1974. Lower Courts: Decreed eviction, holding the tenant failed to prove adverse possession or oral gift. High Court: Allowed Second Appeal, holding landlord must file a separate title suit. Key Legal Issues Whether the High Court erred in overturning concurrent findings of fact in a Second Appeal? Validity of tenant’s defenses: Oral gift of immovable property. Adverse possession despite permissive possession. Applicability of Section 100 CPC (substantial questions of law). Supreme Court's Analysis 1. Limits of Second Appeal (Section 100 CPC) Holding: High Court exceeded jurisdiction by re-examining facts. Legal Principle: Second Appeal lies only on substantial questions of law, not reappreciation of evidence. Substantial question of law must involve: Debatable legal issue not settled by binding precedent. Material bearing on parties' rights (Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545). Applied Precedents: Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (2001): Second appeal cannot disturb factual findings. Nazir Mohamed v. J. Kamala (2020): "Substantial question" must be open to debate. Court's Finding: High Court’s questions were pure factual issues, not substantial questions of law. 2. Invalidity of Tenant’s Defenses a) Oral Gift Defense: Legal Principle: Immovable property cannot be transferred via oral gift (Section 123, Transfer of Property Act, 1882). Citation: Rambaran Prosad v. Ram Mohit Hazra (1967): Gifts of immovable property require registered instrument. b) Adverse Possession Defense: Legal Principle: Permissive possession (e.g., tenancy) cannot become adverse without clear hostile animus. Tenant must prove open, continuous, hostile possession for 12+ years (P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy Revamma, 2007). Court's Finding: Tenant admitted permissive possession in 1974; no evidence of hostility. 3. Concurrent Findings Binding Trial Court & First Appellate Court held: Landlord proved ownership via adoption. Tenant failed to prove adverse possession or oral gift. High Court’s Error: Ignored doctrine of merger; could not override concurrent factual findings (Murthy v. C. Saradambal, 2022). Final Directions High Court’s judgment set aside. Eviction decree restored: Tenant to vacate premises within 3 months. Arrears cleared: Tenant to pay all dues (rent + damages). Significance Reinforced CPC Boundaries: Curtails High Courts from acting as "third fact-finders" in Second Appeals. Clarified Adverse Possession: Permissive occupants must prove explicit hostility to claim adverse rights. Property Transfers: Reaffirmed strict compliance with registration for gift deeds. "Second Appeal under Section 100 CPC is not a third trial of facts. High Courts cannot repaint the canvas of evidence." – Supreme Court, Para 6 Rabindranath Panigrahi vs. Surendra Sahu Date: 6 March 2025 Bench: Justice Sanjay Karol, Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra Citation: 2025 INSC 333 | Civil Appeal No. ____ of 2025 (Arising from SLP(C) No. 19182/2022) Court: Supreme Court of India

Governing Frameworks: Fundamental Rules (FR) 101(a) of Tamil Nadu (State Service Rules) Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 (Central Legislation) Constitutional Provisions: Articles 21 (Right to Life), 42 (Maternity Relief), 51(c) (International Obligations) International Treaties: CEDAW (Convention on Elimination of Discrimination Against Women) ICESCR (International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) ILO Maternity Protection Convention, 2000 Background Appellant, a government teacher, had two children from her first marriage (dissolved in 2017; custody with ex-husband). After remarrying in 2018, she sought maternity leave for her first child from the second marriage. State denied leave citing FR 101(a), which restricts maternity leave to women with "less than two surviving children." High Court Division Bench upheld denial, reversing the Single Judge’s order granting relief. Key Legal Issues Whether maternity leave can be denied for a child born from remarriage if prior children are not in the mother’s custody. Whether reproductive rights (including maternity benefits) are part of fundamental rights under Article 21. Validity of FR 101(a)’s "two surviving children" cap vis-à-vis constitutional and international obligations. Court’s Analysis & Ruling 1. Reproductive Rights as Fundamental Rights (Article 21) Holding: Maternity leave is a facet of reproductive rights, integral to Article 21 (Right to Life with Dignity). Citations: Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration (2009): Reproductive autonomy includes the right to carry pregnancy. X v. Principal Secretary, NCT Delhi (2023): Reproductive rights encompass decisions on childbirth and healthcare. Devika Biswas v. Union of India (2016): Reproductive health is part of the right to health under Article 21. Court’s Reasoning: Denial of maternity leave violates bodily autonomy and dignity of motherhood. FR 101(a) must align with constitutional values, not just fiscal or population control policies. 2. Interpretation of "Surviving Children" Holding: "Surviving children" implies children in the mother’s custody, not biological children from past marriages. Precedent Relied On: Deepika Singh v. Central Administrative Tribunal (2023): A woman’s maternity leave claim for her biological child is unaffected by her spouse’s children from a prior marriage. Key Quote: "Childbirth is a natural incident of life; maternity leave provisions must be construed purposively." Court’s Application: Appellant’s two children from her first marriage were in the father’s custody; thus, the child from her second marriage is her first custodial child. FR 101(a) must be read harmoniously with the objective of supporting motherhood. 3. Invalidity of the "Two-Child" Cap Conflict with Maternity Benefit Act, 1961: Section 5(3) of MB Act: Allows maternity leave for women with >2 children (reduced to 12 weeks). Section 27: MB Act overrides inconsistent state laws. State’s Defense Rejected: Fiscal/population control concerns cannot override fundamental rights. International Law Obligations (Article 51(c)): CEDAW (Art. 11): Mandates paid maternity leave without discrimination. ILO Convention (Art. 4): Guarantees ≥14 weeks maternity leave. Final Directions FR 101(a) Struck Down to the extent it denies leave for children post-remarriage. Appellant Granted Maternity Leave for her child from the second marriage. State Ordered to release admissible benefits within 2 months. Significance Expands Reproductive Rights: Affirms maternity leave as a constitutional right, not merely a welfare benefit. Custody-Centric Approach: "Surviving children" interpreted as children in the mother’s care, not biological count. Aligns Domestic Law with International Standards: State policies must comply with CEDAW and ILO conventions. "Reproductive rights include the freedom to decide on childbirth without undue state interference. Denying maternity leave for a custodial first child violates dignity and bodily autonomy." – Supreme Court, Para 31 K. Umadevi vs. Government of Tamil Nadu & Ors. Date: 23 May 2025 Bench: Justice Abhay S. Oka, Justice Ujjal Bhuyan Citation: 2025 INSC 781 | Civil Appeal No. 2526 of 2025 Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Header Arun Muthuvel vs. Union of India & Ors. Date: 23 February 2024 Bench: Justice B.V. Nagarathna, Justice Augustine George Masih Citation: W.P.(C) No. 756/2022 and connected matters Court: Supreme Court of India Governing Statutes: Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021 Surrogacy (Regulation) Rules, 2022 (as amended by 2024 Rules) Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation) Act, 2021 Key Legal Issues & Judgment Analysis 1. 2024 Amendment to Surrogacy Rules (G.S.R. 119(E)) Amendment Content: For Couples: Must use both gametes from intending couple unless the District Medical Board certifies a medical condition necessitating donor gametes. Condition: The child must have at least one gamete from the intending couple. For Single Women (Widow/Divorcee): Must use self-eggs and donor sperms. Citation: Notification dated 21.02.2024 substituting sub-para (d) in Form 2 of Surrogacy Rules, 2022. 2. Court's Directions Based on 2024 Amendment W.P.(C) No. 61/2024: Petitioner directed to reappear before State Medical Board (01.03.2024) to assess: (i) Need for donor gametes; (ii) Medical necessity under amended Rules. Board report to be submitted to Court by 11.03.2024. W.P.(C) Nos. 487/2023 & 522/2023 (Smitha & Karishma Mathur): Petitioners permitted to proceed with surrogacy as they had already complied with Medical Board evaluations and were eligible under the new Rules. 3. Disposal of Challenges to Older Amendments Challenges to the March 2023 amendments to Surrogacy Rules declared infructuous (as replaced by 2024 Rules). Disposed Petitions: W.P.(C) 522/2023 & connected IAs. W.P.(C) 487/2023 & 15 connected IAs (e.g., I.A. Nos. 115323/2023, 116569/2023). 4. Pending Constitutional Challenges Challenges to other provisions of the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021 and ART Act, 2021 to continue. Directions: Pleadings complete; parties to file written submissions. UOI granted time to file counter-affidavits for petitions by single unmarried women. Next Hearing: 15.04.2024. Critical Legal Principles Medical Board's Role: District/State Medical Boards act as gatekeepers to certify medical necessity for donor gametes. Eligibility Criteria: Couples: Genetic contribution (at least one gamete) mandatory. Single Women: Restricted to self-eggs + donor sperms (excludes unmarried women). Doctrine of Mootness: Challenges to superseded regulations (2023 amendments) rendered redundant. Significance The 2024 Rules provide limited flexibility for donor gametes in surrogacy while upholding genetic linkage. Exclusion of Unmarried Women: Single women must be widowed/divorced; unmarried women remain ineligible. Pending challenges may impact future reproductive rights jurisprudence.

Right to a Healthy Environment under Article 21 of the Constitution of India (Right to Life). Jurisdiction of the National Green Tribunal (NGT) under the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010. Pollution Control and Sustainable Development Principles, including the precautionary principle and intergenerational equity. Regulatory Framework for air pollution management, involving statutes like the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986. Judgment Citation Case: Container Corporation of India Ltd. vs. Ajay Khera & Ors. Citation: Civil Appeal No. 3798 of 2019 Court: Supreme Court of India Bench: Hon’ble Justice Abhay S. Oka & Hon’ble Justice Pankaj Mithal Date: 11 January 2024 Reference: 2024 INSC 31 Factual Background The respondent (a former Executive Director) filed a case before the National Green Tribunal (NGT) against the Container Corporation of India (CONCOR), alleging that its Inland Container Depot (ICD) at Tughlakabad, Delhi, exacerbated air pollution. Diesel trucks/trailers servicing the ICD contributed significantly to Delhi-NCR's pollution. The NGT ordered CONCOR to: Shift to CNG/electric/hybrid vehicles. Divert non-Destined diesel trucks to satellite ICDs outside Delhi. Improve parking management. CONCOR appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing the order was impractical and ignored logistical realities. Key Legal Principles and Analysis 1. Right to Clean Air Under Article 21 The Supreme Court reaffirmed that Article 21 (Right to Life) includes the right to a pollution-free environment. Air pollution directly impacts public health and quality of life, making it a constitutional imperative. "Air pollution affects citizens' health and violates the fundamental right to life under Article 21." (Para 6) Significance: The judgment expands Article 21 to cover intergenerational equity – protecting future generations from environmental degradation. 2. Role of the National Green Tribunal (NGT) The NGT’s jurisdiction under Sections 14, 15, and 18 of the NGT Act, 2010 allows it to adjudicate environmental disputes. However, the Supreme Court clarified that the NGT: Must pass practical and evidence-based orders. Cannot shift pollution from one region to another (e.g., diverting Delhi’s pollution to neighboring states). "Citizens outside Delhi-NCR also have a fundamental right to clean air... The NGT cannot infringe this right." (Para 21) 3. Sustainable Development vs. Economic Logistics The Court balanced environmental protection with economic feasibility: CONCOR’s Argument: Shifting ICD operations would increase road transport, worsening pollution. Expert Evidence (EPCA Report): Heavy-duty diesel vehicles (75% of ICD traffic) lack viable CNG/electric alternatives. Satellite ICDs near Delhi were underutilized (only 2 of 7 operated at >60% capacity). Court’s Approach: Opted for phased technological transition instead of abrupt bans. 4. Precautionary Principle The Court applied the precautionary principle (mandated under environmental law): Directed BS-VI diesel vehicles (cleaner technology) as an interim solution. Ordered exploration of CNG/hybrid/electric alternatives for heavy-duty vehicles. Emphasized continuous technological innovation to reduce emissions. Supreme Court’s Directions Replacing the NGT’s order, the Court issued practical directives: Policy for Cleaner Vehicles: Ministry of Road Transport to frame a scrappage policy for heavy diesel vehicles (replacing them with BS-VI vehicles) within 6 months. Optimal ICD Utilization: CONCOR to redistribute cargo to underutilized satellite ICDs (e.g., Dadri, Rewari) within 6 months. Decentralized Laboratory Services: CONCOR to facilitate lab facilities near ICDs outside Delhi to reduce cargo movement to the city. Parking Management: Implement KPMG’s recommendations to reduce congestion/pollution at Tughlakabad ICD within 6 months. Critical Observations NGT’s Parochial Approach Criticized: "The NGT ignored that citizens outside Delhi-NCR equally deserve a pollution-free environment under Article 21." (Para 21) Technology-Sensitive Solutions: The Court acknowledged technological constraints in transitioning heavy vehicles but mandated continuous innovation. Significance of the Judgment Expands Article 21: Affirms that the right to a healthy environment transcends geographical boundaries. Balances Ecology & Economy: Rejects knee-jerk bans; advocates evidence-based, phased reforms. Enforces Intergenerational Equity: Directs sustainable policies for future generations. Strengthens EPCA’s Role: Validates expert bodies in shaping environmental litigation outcomes. Quote for Emphasis: "The right to life under Article 21 includes the right to live in a pollution-free environment... This right is enforceable by all citizens, not just those in Delhi-NCR." Conclusion This judgment sets a precedent for pragmatic environmental governance, prioritizing constitutional rights while acknowledging ground realities. It reinforces that pollution control requires systemic solutions (e.g., cleaner technology, infrastructure redistribution) over piecemeal restrictions.

Forest Conservation Act, 1980. Of the many environmental law cases in India, the T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India & Ors. case stands out. The Supreme Court's ruling from December 12, 1996, which was heard by a two-judge panel consisting of Justices J.S. Verma and B.N. Kirpal, is a landmark in the history of forest conservation in that country. The "forest case" is another name for this one. The Supreme Court's definition of "forest" was expanded, and as a result, a long-running case involving forest governance in India was started. The Godavarman case is a classic example of judicial activism in the environmental field. In this case, the court used its authority to issue a number of directives to ensure that the Forest Conservation Act of 1980's provisions were properly followed. Area of Law Cited in the Judgment The judgment primarily revolves around the interpretation and application of the Forest Conservation Act, 1980. The Supreme Court provided a definitive clarification on the scope of this Act, particularly the meaning of the word "forest" as used within it. The court dispelled misconceptions held by state governments and various authorities regarding the Act's applicability and the necessity of prior central government approval for activities in forest areas. The judgment explicitly states that the Forest Conservation Act of 1980 was passed to stop the further loss of forests that leads to ecological instability. Because of this, its rules for protecting forests must be applied to all forests, no matter who owns them or how they are classified. The court made it very clear that the word "forest" should be taken in its literal sense. This broad interpretation means that the term "forest land" in Section 2 of the Act includes not only what is commonly understood as a forest but also any area that is listed as a forest in government records, regardless of who owns it. This interpretation is legally required for the purposes of Section 2 of the Act. The Court emphasized that this wide-ranging definition must be applied to all forests to ensure their conservation. To support this stance, the Supreme Court referred to its previous decisions, reinforcing this legal position: Ambica Quarry Works and ors. versus State of Gujarat and ors. (1987 (1) SCC 213) Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra versus State of U.P. (1989 Suppl. (1) SCC 504) Supreme Court Monitoring Committee vs. Mussorie Dehradun Development Authority and ors. (W.P.(C) No. 749/95) The Court also clarified that an earlier ruling in State of Bihar Vs. Banshi Ram Modi and ors. (1985 (3) SCC 643) must be understood in the context of these later, more definitive judgments. Explanation of the Judgment and Key Directives Based on this clarified legal framework, the Supreme Court issued a series of interim directions to enforce the Forest Conservation Act, 1980, across the country. The core principle underpinning these directives was that prior approval from the Central Government is mandatory for any non-forest activity within any area deemed a "forest". General Directives for All States and Union Territories: Cessation of Non-Forest Activities: All ongoing activities within any forest, such as the operation of saw mills, veneer or plywood mills, and mining, must cease immediately if they do not have the prior approval of the Central Government. Suspension of Tree Felling: The felling of trees in all forests was suspended, with exceptions only for activities that were in accordance with Working Plans approved by the Central Government. Ban on Timber Movement from North-Eastern States: A complete ban was imposed on the movement of cut trees and timber from any of the seven North-Eastern states to any other part of the country, except for certified timber required for defense or other government purposes. This ban did not apply to trees grown in private plantations in non-forest areas. Formation of Expert Committees: Each state government was directed to constitute Expert Committees to identify "forests" irrespective of their legal classification or ownership, identify degraded forest lands, and assess the sustainable capacity of forests. State-Specific Directives: The Court also issued specific injunctions for several states to address regional issues: For Arunachal Pradesh: A complete ban on the felling of any trees was ordered in the tropical wet evergreen forests of Tirap and Changlang. All saw, veneer, and plywood mills in these districts and within a 100 km radius in Assam were to be closed immediately. For Jammu & Kashmir: A ban was placed on the felling of trees in all forests, public or private. The removal of fallen, diseased, or dry trees was permitted only through departmental work or the State Forest Corporation. The movement of timber out of the state was suspended, with exceptions for defense and other government agencies. For Himachal Pradesh and the Hill Regions of Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal: A similar ban on tree felling in all forests was imposed. Disposal of felled trees was to be handled exclusively by the State Forest Corporation. For Tamil Nadu: A complete ban on tree felling in all forest areas was instituted. Specific regulations were laid down for felling shade trees and fuel wood trees in tea, coffee, and cardamom plantations, with a strict prohibition on any expansion that would encroach upon forest lands. Overriding Authority and Welfare Provisions: The Supreme Court's order was given overriding effect, stating that it must be implemented notwithstanding any other order from any government, authority, or court. In a significant welfare measure, the Court also directed that workers in any mills or industries closed due to its order must continue to receive their full pay and could not be retrenched.

Area of Law: Fundamental Rights (Article 21) and Duties (Article 51A(g)) Citations: Constitution of India; Common Cause v. Union of India (2017) 9 SCC 499 Environmental Rights as Fundamental Rights: Article 21 (right to life) includes the right to a pollution-free environment. Article 51A(g) imposes a fundamental duty on citizens to protect the environment. The 42nd Amendment introduced these duties, emphasizing environmental protection as a constitutional mandate. II. Statutory Framework: Environmental Legislation Area of Law: Environment (Protection) Act, 1986; EIA Notification, 2006 Citations: Sections 3, 15, 19 of EPA 1986; EIA Notification 2006 Legislative History & Gaps: The EPA 1986 was enacted 14 years post the 1972 Stockholm Conference, reflecting delayed legislative action. The EIA Notification (2006) mandated prior environmental clearance (EC) for specified projects. Despite this, implementation remained sluggish, and industrial growth (mining, power plants, etc.) exacerbated violations. Ex Post Facto EC: Statutory Illegality: The 2017 Notification and 2021 Office Memorandum (OM) permitted ex post facto EC for projects violating the EIA Notification. The Court held this violates the EPA 1986 and EIA 2006, which require prior EC (Para 14.2). Section 3(1) of the EPA empowers measures to "protect and improve" the environment – retrospective clearances contradict this object. III. Precedents Against Ex Post Facto EC Area of Law: Judicial Precedents on Environmental Jurisprudence Citations: Common Cause v. Union of India (2017) 9 SCC 499 (Para 23) Alembic Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Rohit Prajapati (2020) 17 SCC 157 (Para 19) Electrosteel Steels Ltd. v. Union of India (2023) 6 SCC 615 (Para 24) Precedential Rejection of Retrospective EC: Common Cause: Held ex post facto EC is "completely alien to environmental jurisprudence," undermining the precautionary principle (Para 17). Alembic Pharmaceuticals: Stated prior EC is non-negotiable; retrospective clearance dilutes statutory mandates (Para 19). Electrosteel Steels: Reaffirmed that pollution laws must be strictly enforced (Para 24). Key Reasoning: EC requires stages like public hearings and impact assessments before project commencement. Retrospective approval irreversibly damages the environment. IV. Legality of 2017 Notification & 2021 OM Area of Law: Ultra Vires Actions; Violation of Constitutional Rights Citations: Puducherry Environment Protection Assn. v. UOI (2017 SCC OnLine Mad 7056) 2017 Notification Invalid: Offered a "one-time measure" for violators (Para 14), contrary to precedents. The Union gave an undertaking to the Madras HC (2017) limiting it to a "one-time" scheme (Para 21). Subsequent extensions violated this undertaking. 2021 OM (SOP) Struck Down: Purported to standardize violation handling but effectively granted ex post facto EC (Para 26). Required violators to pay penalties and remediation costs but still regularized illegal projects (Para 29). Court's View: The SOP was a "crafty attempt" to bypass the prohibition on retrospective EC (Para 36). V. Violation of Fundamental Rights Area of Law: Article 14 (Arbitrariness) and Article 21 (Health/Environment) Impact on Fundamental Rights: Article 21: Ex post facto EC perpetuates pollution, violating the right to a healthy environment (Paras 32–33). Examples: Delhi’s hazardous AQI levels. Article 14: Protecting violators (industries, real estate developers) is arbitrary and discriminatory (Para 34). VI. Court's Ruling & Directions Area of Law: Judicial Review; Remedies Final Decision (Para 36): Quashed: 2017 Notification, 2021 OM, and all related instruments. Prohibited: Future mechanisms for ex post facto EC. Grandfathering: ECs already granted remain valid (to avoid disruption). Broader Directive: Governments must prioritize environment over development (Para 34). Courts must "come down heavily" on environmental violations (Para 38). Judgment Citation: Vanashakti v. Union of India, 2025 INSC 718 (Supreme Court of India).

The judgment in Lal Mohd. & Anr. vs. State of U.P. (2025 INSC 811) primarily addresses the following key areas of law: Application of the Uttar Pradesh Gangsters & Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 (UP Gangsters Act) Interpretation of Sections 2(b) and 2(c) defining "gang" and "gangster." Threshold for invoking the Act: Whether a single incident of violence qualifies as "anti-social activity" under the Act. Quashing of FIR under Extraordinary Jurisdiction Grounds for quashing FIRs under Article 226 of the Constitution and Section 482 CrPC, as per the principles laid down in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992). Abuse of Process of Law & Mala Fide Prosecution Judicial scrutiny of politically motivated prosecutions and misuse of stringent laws like the UP Gangsters Act. Balancing public order concerns with individual liberties under Article 21 of the Constitution. Doctrine of Proportionality in Criminal Law Whether the invocation of a stringent anti-gangster law is proportionate to the alleged offence (communal protest vs. organised crime). Explanation of the Legal Principles 1. Scope of the UP Gangsters Act, 1986 Sections 2(b) & 2(c) define a "gang" as a group engaging in anti-social activities (e.g., violence, intimidation) to disturb public order or gain undue advantage. A "gangster" includes members/leaders of such gangs. Key Precedent: Shraddha Gupta v. State of U.P. (2022): Held that even a single offence can attract the Act if it demonstrates organised crime under Section 2(b). Ashok Kumar Dixit v. State of U.P. (1987): Clarified that the Act targets habitual offenders and syndicates, not isolated incidents. 2. Quashing of FIR: Bhajan Lal Guidelines The Supreme Court reiterated the seven categories from Bhajan Lal where an FIR can be quashed, including: Allegations not disclosing a cognizable offence (Category 1). Mala fide prosecution with ulterior motives (Category 7). Application to the Case: The Court found the FIR under the UP Gangsters Act was based on a single communal incident (10.10.2022) with no subsequent criminal activity, failing to meet the Act's requirement of organised crime. 3. Mala Fide Prosecution & Political Vendetta The appellants argued the FIR was registered 13 days after a political nomination (appellant’s daughter-in-law filed for elections), suggesting ulterior motives. The Court emphasized that extraordinary laws like the UP Gangsters Act cannot be weaponised for extraneous purposes, violating Article 21 (right to liberty). 4. Proportionality & Legislative Intent The UP Gangsters Act aims to curb organised crime syndicates, not spontaneous protests. The Court noted: No evidence of hierarchical gang structure or continued criminal activity. The incident stemmed from a communal flare-up, not premeditated gang operations. Observation: The Act’s invocation was disproportionate and lacked procedural fairness. Key Judgments Cited State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp (1) SCC 335) Relevance: Laid down exhaustive grounds for quashing FIRs to prevent abuse of process. Shraddha Gupta v. State of U.P. (2022 SCC OnLine SC 514) Relevance: Clarified that even a single offence can attract the UP Gangsters Act if it meets Section 2(b) criteria. Ashok Kumar Dixit v. State of U.P. (1987 SCC OnLine All 203) Relevance: Interpreted "gang" under the Act to exclude isolated incidents. Gorakh Nath Mishra v. State of U.P. (2025) Relevance: Directed UP to frame guidelines for invoking the Act to prevent misuse. Conclusion The Supreme Court quashed the FIR under the UP Gangsters Act, holding: No Organised Crime: The incident was a communal protest, not gang activity. Mala Fide Timing: FIR’s registration post-political nomination suggested ulterior motives. Procedural Safeguards: Stringent laws must be invoked judiciously to protect constitutional rights. Citation: Lal Mohd. & Anr. vs. State of U.P., 2025 INSC 811. Significance: The judgment curbs misuse of anti-gangster laws against political rivals or isolated incidents, reinforcing proportionality and due process in criminal jurisprudence.

The judgment in Machhindranath Kundlik Tarade vs. Ramchandra Gangadhar Dhamne (2025 INSC 795) primarily revolves around the following key areas of law: Void vs. Voidable Transactions under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 Interpretation of Sections 47 and 48 of the Act, which regulate the creation and enforcement of charges on immovable property by cooperative societies. The distinction between transactions that are void ab initio (null and void from inception) and those that are voidable (valid until declared otherwise by a competent authority). Doctrine of "No Party Can Benefit from Their Own Wrong" Application of the legal maxim "ex injuria sua non oritur jus" (no right arises from one's own wrong) to prevent a party from exploiting their own illegal actions to gain relief. Bonafide Purchaser for Value Without Notice Examination of whether a subsequent purchaser (defendant no. 2) qualifies as a bonafide purchaser under property law, protected against prior unregistered claims. Retrospective Validation of Transactions Whether the release of a charge by a cooperative society retrospectively validates an earlier void/voidable alienation of property. Explanation of the Legal Principles 1. Void vs. Voidable Transactions under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 Section 48(d) & (e) of the Act prohibits a member from alienating property charged to a cooperative society without repayment of dues. Any such alienation is declared "void". The Supreme Court clarified that while the statute uses the term "void," its enforceability depends on who challenges it. Only the aggrieved society (not the defaulting member) can seek nullification. Key Precedent Cited: Sindav Hari Ranchhod v. Jadev Lalji Jaymal (1997) 7 SCC 95: Held that a society must actively challenge an illegal alienation; the defaulting member cannot invoke its voidness for personal benefit. 2. Doctrine of "No Party Can Benefit from Their Own Wrong" The plaintiff (original owner) sought to invalidate his own sale deed for non-compliance with Section 48, despite being the one who violated the law. The Court rejected this plea, citing: Ram Pyare v. Ram Narain (1985) 2 SCC 162: A party cannot seek relief based on their own illegality. Kusheshwar Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar (2007) 11 SCC 447: Reinforced the maxim "commodum ex injuria sua nemo habere debet" (no one should benefit from their own wrong). 3. Bonafide Purchaser for Value Without Notice Defendant no. 2 purchased the property from defendant no. 1 (original transferee) based on a registered sale deed, with no knowledge of the prior charge. The Court upheld his status as a bonafide purchaser, emphasizing that: The charge was not reflected in public records at the time of purchase. Equity favors protecting innocent buyers who act in good faith. 4. Retrospective Validation of Charge Release The society later released the charge (27.08.1973) after loan repayment. The plaintiff argued this "cured" the initial illegality. The Court held that post-facto approval does not retrospectively validate a void transaction unless the statute expressly permits it (which Section 48 does not). Key Judgments Cited Sindav Hari Ranchhod v. Jadev Lalji Jaymal (1997) 7 SCC 95 Relevance: Clarified that only the society can challenge an alienation under Section 48; the defaulting member cannot. Dhurandhar Prasad Singh v. Jai Prakash University (2001) 6 SCC 534 Relevance: Explained the distinction between "void" (nullity) and "voidable" (valid until set aside) transactions. Ram Pyare v. Ram Narain (1985) 2 SCC 162 Relevance: Applied the principle that courts will not aid a party who seeks to profit from their own wrongdoing. Kusheshwar Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar (2007) 11 SCC 447 Relevance: Reinforced that a wrongdoer cannot take advantage of their own breach of law. Conclusion This judgment underscores: Statutory Compliance: Alienations violating Section 48 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act are void, but only the society (not the defaulter) can enforce this. Judicial Discretion: Courts will not assist parties who seek to exploit their own illegal acts. Protection of Bonafide Buyers: Subsequent purchasers without notice of prior charges are shielded under property law. The ruling balances statutory mandates with equitable principles, ensuring that technical breaches do not unjustly prejudice innocent parties while penalizing deliberate wrongdoing. Citation: Machhindranath Kundlik Tarade vs. Ramchandra Gangadhar Dhamne, 2025 INSC 795.

Area of Law in the Judgment: 1. Legal Professional Privilege (Attorney-Client Confidentiality) 2. Investigative Powers & Summoning of Lawyers 3. Judicial Oversight vs. Police Authority 4. Constitutional Rights of Advocates (Article 19(1)(g)) 5. Autonomy of the Legal Profession The judgment in Ashwinkumar Govindbhai Prajapati v. State of Gujarat primarily addresses the intersection of criminal procedure, legal professional privilege, and the autonomy of the legal profession. The key legal areas involved are: Summoning Powers of Investigating Agencies: The scope and limitations of police/investigating agencies to summon advocates under Section 179 of the Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS). Attorney-Client Privilege: Protection of confidential communications between lawyers and clients under Section 132 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) (analogous to Section 126 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872). Judicial Oversight vs. Investigative Autonomy: Whether judicial scrutiny is required before summoning legal professionals in their capacity as counsel. Fundamental Rights of Advocates: The balance between investigative powers and the rights of advocates under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution (right to practice any profession). Explanation of the Legal Principles Summoning Advocates as Witnesses: The case questions whether investigating agencies can directly summon a lawyer representing an accused, especially when the lawyer’s involvement is limited to their professional role. The Supreme Court expressed prima facie concern that such actions could undermine the independence of the legal profession and the administration of justice. Attorney-Client Privilege: The Court emphasized Section 132 of the BSA, which protects confidential communications between advocates and clients. This privilege is sacrosanct to ensure clients can seek legal advice without fear of disclosure. The judgment suggests that summoning lawyers to divulge such information violates this statutory protection. Judicial Oversight for Exceptional Cases: The Court raised whether even in cases where a lawyer’s role is alleged to extend beyond professional duties (e.g., participating in illegal acts), investigative agencies must seek judicial approval before issuing summons. This aligns with precedents like: R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court (2009) 8 SCC 106: Highlighted the ethical boundaries of legal professionals but affirmed their protection from arbitrary investigative actions. Autonomy of the Legal Profession: The judgment underscores that advocates are integral to the justice delivery system. Subjecting them to unilateral summons could deter fearless representation, violating constitutional guarantees under Article 19(1)(g) and the broader principles of fairness. Key Citations from the Judgment Section 179, BNSS: Investigative powers to summon witnesses. Section 132, BSA: Attorney-client privilege (replacing Section 126 of the Indian Evidence Act). Article 19(1)(g), Constitution of India: Right to practice any profession. The Court referenced these provisions to highlight the tension between investigative necessity and the foundational rights of legal professionals. Conclusion This case sets a precedent for safeguarding the legal profession’s independence while balancing investigative needs. It stresses that summoning advocates must be an exception, not the norm, and requires judicial oversight to prevent abuse. The Supreme Court’s interim stay on the summons reflects its inclination to protect attorney-client privilege and the broader integrity of the justice system. For further reading, refer to: R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court (2009) 8 SCC 106. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain (1975) 4 SCC 428 (on public interest vs. privilege).

The judgment in Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma primarily deals with the interpretation and application of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, as amended by the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005. The key legal issues revolve around: Coparcenary Rights of Daughters: Whether daughters have equal rights as sons in ancestral property under the Mitakshara coparcenary system. Retrospectivity of the 2005 Amendment: Whether the amendment applies retrospectively or prospectively, particularly concerning daughters born before the amendment. Partition and Statutory Fiction: The legal implications of notional partition under the unamended Section 6 and its impact on the rights of daughters post-amendment. Valid Partition under Section 6(5): The requirement of a registered partition deed or court decree to exclude daughters from coparcenary rights. Explanation of the Legal Principles 1. Coparcenary Rights of Daughters The amended Section 6(1) grants daughters the status of coparceners by birth, equating their rights with sons in joint Hindu family property. This overrides the traditional Mitakshara law, which excluded daughters from coparcenary rights. The Supreme Court emphasized that the amendment aims to eliminate gender discrimination and uphold constitutional equality (Articles 14 and 15). Relevant Citation: Danamma @ Suman Surpur & Anr. v. Amar & Ors., (2018) 3 SCC 343: Held that daughters are coparceners by birth, irrespective of whether the father was alive on the date of the amendment. 2. Retrospectivity of the 2005 Amendment The Court clarified that the amendment is retroactive in application, meaning it applies to daughters born before 2005, provided they were alive on the date of the amendment (9.9.2005). The rights are rooted in the unobstructed heritage (birthright) principle, not survivorship. Relevant Citations: Prakash & Ors. v. Phulavati & Ors., (2016) 2 SCC 36 (Overruled in part): Initially held that only "living daughters of living coparceners" could claim rights, but Vineeta Sharma expanded this to all daughters alive in 2005. Ganduri Koteshwaramma v. Chakiri Yanadi, (2011) 9 SCC 788: Rights apply even if preliminary decrees were passed before 2005, as partition is not final until the final decree. 3. Partition and Statutory Fiction The Court rejected the argument that a notional partition under the unamended Section 6 (to determine a deceased coparcener’s share) disrupts the coparcenary. The fiction is limited to calculating shares and does not dissolve the joint family. Relevant Citations: Gurupad Khandappa Magdum v. Hirabai Khandappa Magdum, (1978) 3 SCC 383: Explained the purpose of notional partition for intestate succession. Anar Devi v. Parmeshwari Devi, (2006) 8 SCC 656: Statutory partition does not affect the continuity of the coparcenary. 4. Valid Partition under Section 6(5) The amendment mandates that partitions must be evidenced by a registered deed or court decree to exclude daughters. Oral partitions or unregistered family arrangements are invalid unless proven with documentary evidence. Relevant Citations: Kale v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, (1976) 3 SCC 119: Family settlements can be oral but require proof. Shripad Gajanan Suthankar v. Dattaram Kashinath Suthankar, (1974) 2 SCC 156: Past transactions are protected only if legally valid. Conclusion The Vineeta Sharma judgment reaffirms the constitutional mandate of gender equality in property rights. It holds that: Daughters are coparceners by birth, irrespective of the father’s survival or the date of birth. The 2005 amendment is retroactive but protects past transactions (pre-20.12.2004). Partition must be formalized (registered/court-decreed) to deny daughters their rights. This ruling ensures that daughters cannot be arbitrarily excluded from ancestral property and aligns Hindu law with modern principles of equity. Key Judgment Cited: Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma, AIR 2020 SC 3717 (Primary case). Prakash v. Phulavati (2016) and Danamma (2018) (Contrasting interpretations resolved). Ganduri Koteshwaramma (2011) (Rights in pending partition suits). This area of law underscores the dynamic interplay between statutory amendments and traditional coparcenary rights, prioritizing substantive equality over archaic customs.

Area of Case Law:- The judgment falls under the broader domain of corporate insolvency and bankruptcy law, specifically focusing on: Constitutional Validity of IBC: Whether the IBC violates fundamental rights under the Indian Constitution, particularly Article 14 (Right to Equality). Classification of Creditors: The differential treatment of financial creditors (e.g., banks) and operational creditors (e.g., vendors, suppliers) under the IBC. Resolution Process: The procedural fairness and efficiency of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP). Role of Tribunals: The functioning of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) and National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) in insolvency cases. Prospective Application of Amendments: The validity of amendments like Section 29A, which disqualifies certain persons (e.g., wilful defaulters) from submitting resolution plans. Key Takeaways from the Judgment Constitutionality of IBC Upheld The Supreme Court upheld the IBC as constitutionally valid, stating that it balances the interests of creditors and debtors while promoting economic revival. Citation: Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India (2019) 03 SC. Differential Treatment of Creditors is Valid The Court ruled that the distinction between financial creditors (who have voting rights in the Committee of Creditors) and operational creditors (who do not) is not arbitrary and serves a legitimate purpose. Financial creditors are better equipped to assess viability due to their long-term engagement with the debtor. Relevant Section: Sections 21 and 24 of the IBC. Liquidation as a Last Resort The Court emphasized that the IBC prioritizes resolution over liquidation, which should only be used if no viable resolution plan is approved. Relevant Section: Section 33 of the IBC. Validity of Section 29A (Disqualification of Resolution Applicants) The Court upheld Section 29A, which bars wilful defaulters, undischarged insolvent, and other ineligible persons from bidding for stressed assets. Citation: Arcelor Mittal India Pvt. Ltd. v. Satish Kumar Gupta (2018) 31 SC. Time-Bound Resolution The Court endorsed the 330-day deadline for completing the resolution process (though exceptions were allowed in complex cases). Relevant Case: CoC of Essar Steel India Ltd. v. Satish Kumar Gupta (2019) 07 SC. Immunity for New Promoters (Section 32A) The Court supported the 2020 amendment (Section 32A), which protects new owners from liabilities of the previous management, provided they are unrelated to past misconduct. What This Law Area Teaches Us Economic Revival Over Recovery The IBC is designed to revive distressed businesses, not just recover debts. This ensures that viable companies continue operations, protecting jobs and economic stability. Creditor Hierarchy Matters The law recognizes that secured financial creditors (like banks) have a larger stake in restructuring and thus get priority in decision-making. Judicial & Legislative Evolution The IBC has undergone multiple amendments (2017, 2018, 2019, 2020) to address practical challenges, showing a dynamic legal framework. Balancing Stakeholder Interests The law ensures fairness by allowing operational creditors to attend CoC meetings (if their debt exceeds 10%) and appeal decisions. Conclusion The Swiss Ribbons judgment is a cornerstone of Indian insolvency law, clarifying the IBC’s objectives and ensuring its alignment with constitutional principles. It reinforces that resolution, not liquidation, is the goal, while maintaining a balanced approach between creditors and debtors. The case also highlights the importance of judicial oversight in refining insolvency mechanisms. Key Citations: Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India (2019) 03 SC. Arcelor Mittal India Pvt. Ltd. v. Satish Kumar Gupta (2018) 31 SC. CoC of Essar Steel India Ltd. v. Satish Kumar Gupta (2019) 07 SC. This judgment serves as a guideline for future insolvency cases and underscores the IBC’s role in India’s economic growth.

Judgment Citation Case: Annu @ Aniket Through His Father vs. Union of India & Ors. Citation: Crl.A. No. 2920/2025, Diary No. 16410/2025 Court: Supreme Court of India Bench: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ujjal Bhuyan & Hon’ble Mr. Justice K. Vinod Chandran Date of Order: 27th June 2025 Explanation of the Legal Principles Involved 1. Preventive Detention Under the National Security Act, 1980 Preventive detention is an extraordinary measure allowing authorities to detain individuals without trial to prevent future threats to public order or national security. Section 3(2) of the NSA empowers the District Magistrate to detain a person if satisfied that their actions may: Threaten national security, Disrupt public order, or Hinder essential services. However, the Supreme Court found that the detention order against the appellant did not meet the legal requirements under the NSA. The Court noted that the appellant, a law student, had been acquitted in 5 out of 8 past cases, convicted in only one (with just a fine), and was on bail in the remaining two. This weakened the justification for preventive detention. 2. Procedural Safeguards and Fairness The Court highlighted two major procedural lapses: Improper Handling of Representation: The appellant’s legal representation was decided by the District Collector instead of being forwarded to the State Government, violating due process. Failure to Consider Ongoing Criminal Proceedings: The detaining authority did not explain why preventive detention was necessary when the appellant was already facing trial in other cases. These lapses made the detention arbitrary and unconstitutional, violating Article 21 (Right to Life and Personal Liberty) and Article 22 (Protection Against Arbitrary Detention). 3. Judicial Review of Detention Orders The Supreme Court emphasized that preventive detention must be strictly scrutinized to prevent misuse. It cited implicit precedents, such as: Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu (2011): Preventive detention cannot replace ordinary criminal law if the accused is already facing trial. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978): Procedural fairness is essential in any deprivation of liberty. Shaheen Welfare Association v. Union of India (1996): Detention must be based on cogent material, not vague or mechanical reasoning. The Court ruled that the detention was untenable because: The grounds did not satisfy Section 3(2) of the NSA. There was no reasonable basis to believe the appellant posed an imminent threat. The detention lacked procedural fairness. Final Ruling and Significance The Supreme Court quashed the detention order and directed the appellant’s immediate release, stating: "Preventive detention cannot be used as a substitute for ordinary criminal proceedings when the accused is already facing trial." The judgment reinforces that: Preventive detention must be rare, justified, and legally sound. Procedural safeguards must be strictly followed. Courts will intervene if detention is arbitrary or lacks legal basis. This decision aligns with constitutional protections against unlawful deprivation of liberty and ensures that preventive detention is not misused as a tool of oppression. Key Takeaway The judgment serves as a strong judicial check on executive power, ensuring that preventive detention is used only in genuine cases of national security or public order threats, not as a means to bypass due process.

Section 13(8) – The right of the borrower to redeem the secured asset stands extinguished thereunder on the very date of publication of the notice for public auction under Rule 9(1) of the Rules of 2002. –The right of redemption available to the borrower under the present statutory regime is drastically curtailed and would be available only till the date of publication of the notice under Rule 9(1) of the Rules of 2002 and not till the completion of the sale or transfer of the secured asset in favour of the auction purchaser- The Bank after having confirmed the sale under Rule 9(2) of the Rules of 2002 could not have withhold the sale certificate under Rule 9(6) of the Rules of 2002 and enter into a private arrangement with a borrower. –The confirmation of sale by the Bank under Rule 9(2) of the Rules of 2002 invests the successful auction purchaser with a vested right to obtain a certificate of sale of the immovable property in form given in appendix (V) to the Rules i.e., in accordance with Rule 9(6) of the SARFAESI – [CELIR LLP vs Bafna Motors (Mumbai) Pvt. Ltd 2023 INSC 838]

Section 24 of PML Act cannot be utilized to presume the guilt of the accused for the predicate offences alleged – section 24 of the PML Act provides for the burden of proof and directs that the court shall presume that the proceeds of crime are involved in money laundering – [Thomas Daniel vs Enforcement Directorate – 2023 KER 54162]

Section 148 – Can the Appellate Court suspend the sentence of an accused convicted under Section 138 NI Act without imposing the condition of 20% deposit as stipulated under Section 148 NI Act?– The view that the deposit of minimum 20% amount is an absolute rule which does not accommodate any exception is erroneous – Normally, the Appellate Court will be justified in imposing the condition of deposit as provided in Section 148. However, in a case where the Appellate Court is satisfied that the condition of deposit of 20% will be unjust or imposing such a condition will amount to deprivation of the right of appeal of the appellant, exception can be made for the reasons specifically recorded. [Jamboo Bhandari vs MP State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd – 2023 INSC 822] Section 141 NI Act- Dishonoured cheque was issued by Director on behalf of company. Cheque bounce complaint was filed under Section 138 Negotiable Instruments Act and only this director is the sole accused. Can such a complaint be entertained ? A criminal complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 cannot be proceeded with without making the company as accused in the case – [RA Samy vs C Ravichandran – CrA 2732/2023] Section 138,139 – Time Barred cheque – If the question as to whether the debt or liability being barred by limitation was an issue to be considered in such proceedings, the same is to be decided based on the evidence to be adduced by the parties since the question of limitation is a mixed question of law and fact. It is only in cases wherein an amount which is out and out non-recoverable, towards which a cheque is issued, dishonoured and for recovery of which a criminal action is initiated, the question of threshold jurisdiction will arise. In such cases, the Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC will be justified in interfering but not otherwise – Entertaining a petition under Section 482 CrPC to quash the proceedings at the stage earlier to the evidence would not be justified – [K. Hymavathi vs State of Andhra Pradesh 2023 INSC 811]

How to test the legality of orders of preventive detention – criticized police officers of Telangana for illegal invocation of Preventive Detention laws – [Ameena Begum vs State of Telangana – 2023 INSC 788]

Can High Courts refuse to decide cases on the ground that the leading judgment of the Supreme Court is (1) referred to a larger Bench or (2) a review petition relating thereto is pending or (3) a later Coordinate Bench has doubted its correctness ? No ! High Courts have to proceed to decide matters on the basis of the law as it stands ! It is not open to a High Court to refuse to follow a judgment by stating that it has been doubted by a later Coordinate Bench. In any case, when faced with conflicting judgments by Benches of equal strength of this Court, it is the earlier one which is to be followed by the High Courts. [Union Territory of Ladakh vs Jammu and Kashmir National Conference – 2023 INSC 804]

Section 50 Accused not informed about their right to be searched before a Magistrate or a Gazetted officer – Vijaysinh Jadeja vs State of Gujarat- there was a violation of the safeguard provided by Section 50 of the NDPS Act – Conviction cannot be sustained- [Mina Pun vs State of UP 2023 INSC 776]

Section 21(5) 2nd proviso – “..the word `shall’ be read down to read as `may’,” Bombay High Court held that 2nd proviso to Section 21(5) of the National Investigation Agency Act is directory. It disagreed with the view of Kerala and Calcutta High Courts that the proviso is mandatory. It concurred with the view of Delhi, Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh and Chhattisgarh High Courts that it is directory. This means that an application seeking to condone delay beyond 90 days in filing an appeal against the judgment, sentence, order, not being an interlocutory order, passed by a Special Court is maintainable, on sufficient cause being shown – [Faizal Hasamali Mirza Kasib vs State of Maharashtra – 2023:BHC-AS:27039-DB]

Merely because the officers of the State Government, do not have to pay for the litigation from their own pocket, they cannot be permitted to file such frivolous petitions and harass the landowners, who have already lost their valuable land – [Special Land Acquisition Officer vs Vithal Rao – SLP(Diary) 30326/2023]

Article 54 of Part II of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 – Limitation period for filing a suit for specific performance as three years from the date fixed for performance, and in alternative when no date is fixed, three years from the date when the plaintiff has notice that performance has been refused – The court will have to see whether any time was fixed for performance of the agreement to sell and if so fixed, whether the suit was filed beyond the prescribed period, unless a case for extension of time or performance was pleaded or established. However, when no time is fixed for performance, the court will have to determine the date on which the plaintiff had notice of refusal on part of the defendant to perform the contract – [ A Valliammai vs KP Murali 2023 INSC 823 ]

Workmen Compensation Act, 1923 ; Section 30- – An appeal from an order of Commissioner can be entertained only if there exists a substantial question of law to be considered – Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner is the last authority on facts – The other ground making the order under challenge, amenable to interference when the scope of jurisdiction is circumscribed by it being exercised only in cases of “substantial question of law”, is perversity in the findings – Act is a social welfare legislation and, therefore, it must be given a beneficial construction – Matters thereunder are to be adjudicated with due process of law and also with a keen awareness of the scope and intent of the Act – [Fulmati Dhramdev Yadav vs New India Assurance Co Ltd – 2023 INSC 790]

Lien – ‘lien’ of a government servant only ceases to exist when he/she is appointed on another post ‘substantively’/confirmed or absorbed permanently. Otherwise, his/her lien would continue on the previous post – [L R Patil vs Gulbarga University 2023 INSC 796] Disciplinary Proceedings – Judicial Review – Power of judicial review for the Courts in disciplinary action is circumscribed. The Court can only correct errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice and the power exercised is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority. – [Punjab National Bank vs M L Kalra (D)] Termination of Employee – [Jagpal Singh vs State of UP – 2023 INSC 777.]

A murder case of the year 2005. Makkella Nagaiah and others were convicted by the Trial Court in 2009. The High Court dismissed their appeals in 2014. In 2022, the Supreme Court dismissed their SLPs. After all this, one of the accused approached the Apex Court raising Juvenility plea. He has already undergone more than 12 years of imprisonment. The question of juvenility can be raised before any Court and at any stage, the court noted. It found that this accused was 16 years 7 months old as on the date of the crime. Thus he was a juvenile in conflict with the law on the date of commission of the offence. Thus, the Court ordered his release. [Makkella Nagaiah vs State of Andhra Pradesh 2023 INSC 800]

Trademark & Passing Off Action –The volume of sale and the extent of advertisement made of the product in question will be a relevant consideration for deciding whether the appellant had acquired a reputation or goodwill. – The passing off action which is premised on the rights of the prime user generating goodwill, shall remain unaffected by any registration provided in the Act. – If goodwill or reputation in a particular jurisdiction is not established by the plaintiff, no other issue really would need any further examination to determine the extent of the plaintiff’s right in the action of passing ­off. –For establishing goodwill of the product, it was necessary to prove not only the figures of sale of the product but also the expenditure incurred on promotion and advertisement of the product. –While deciding an application for a temporary injunction in a suit for passing­off action, in a given case, the statements of accounts signed by the Chartered Accountant of the plaintiff indicating the expenses incurred on advertisement and promotion and figures of sales may constitute a material which can be considered for examining whether a prima facie case was made out by the appellant­plaintiff. However, at the time of the final hearing of the suit, the figures must be proved in a manner known to law – [Brihan Karan Sugar Syndicate Private Limited vs Yashwantrao Mohite Krushna Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana – 2023 INSC 831] Copyright Infringement – Acquiescence is a defence available in action for the infringement of copyright- If the acquiescence in infringement amounts to consent, it will be a complete defence. Acquiescence is a course of conduct inconsistent with the claim for exclusive rights and it applies to positive acts and not merely silence or inaction such as is involved in laches. Mere negligence is not sufficient – [Brihan Karan Sugar Syndicate Private Limited vs Yashwantrao Mohite Krushna Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana – 2023 INSC 831]

Section 19 Family Courts Act – Section 28 HMA – What is the period of limitation for filing an appeal against a decree or order passed by a Family Court under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 ? Delhi High Court noticed that there is an inconsistency between Section 28 of HMA which prescribes a period of 90 days for filing an appeal and Section 19 of the Family Courts Act which prescribes a period of 30 days for filing an appeal. The court held that the Family Courts Act will prevail and therefore the the period of limitation for filing an appeal against a judgment or order of the Family Court is thirty days – [Pallavi Mohan vs Raghu Menon 2023 DHC 6586] Section 24 HMA – The wife is highly qualified and has an earning capacity, but in fact she has been earning, though has not been inclined to truthfully disclose her true income. Such a person cannot be held entitled to maintenance – [Niharika Ghosh Niharika Kundu vs Shankar Ghosh – 2023 DHC 6553] Section 7A HMA (applicable in Tamil Nadu) – Section 7A required the intending spouses to declare and express to each other their willingness to take each other as spouses and symbolically garlanding each other and tying a “Thali”. In S. Balakrishnan Pandiyan v Inspector of Police, 2014 (7) MadLJ 651, Madras High Court interpreted the procedure of declaration by the intending spouses “in the presence of relatives, friends or other persons”. Now, the Supreme Court held that this view is erroneous as it is premised on the assumption that every marriage requires a public solemnization or declaration. The court observed: Such a view is simplistic because often due to parental or pressure among kinship groups, or caste/community institutions, couples intending to enter into matrimony, may not be able to, for the reasons of such opposition- hold or give such a public declaration. Doing so would imperil their lives or could in the very least likely result in danger to their bodily integrity or at worst, a forceable or coerced separation of one from the other. It is not hard to visualize other pressures being brought to bear upon two individuals, who are otherwise adults and have exercised their freewill. To superimpose the condition of a public declaration, which is absent in section 7A , in the opinion of this Court, it is not only narrowing the otherwise wide import of the statue but also would be violative of the rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India – [Ilavarasan vs Superintendent of Police 2023 INSC 813.] Section 13 HMA- An element of subjectivity has to be applied albeit, what constitutes cruelty is objective. Therefore, what is cruelty for a woman in a given case may not be cruelty for a man, and a relatively more elastic and broad approach is required when we examine a case in which a wife seeks divorce. – [Roopa Soni vs Kamalnarayan Soni 2023 INSC 814] Section 13 HMA – Historically, the law of divorce was predominantly built on a conservative canvas based on the fault theory. Preservation of marital sanctity from a societal perspective was considered a prevailing factor. With the adoption of a libertarian attitude, the grounds for separation or dissolution of marriage have been construed with latitudinarianism – The court must also keep in mind that the home which is meant to be a happy and loveable place to live, becomes a source of misery and agony where the partners fight. When there are children they become direct victims of the said fights, though they may practically have no role in the breakdown of marriage. They suffer irreparable harm especially when the couple at loggerheads, remain unmindful and unconcerned about the psychological and mental impact it has on her/him. – [Roopa Soni vs Kamalnarayan Soni 2023 INSC 814] Hindu Marriage Act ; Section 16 – Hindu Succession Act ; Section 6 – The very concept of a coparcener postulates the acquisition of an interest by birth. If a person born from a void or voidable marriage to whom legitimacy is conferred by sub-sections (1) or (2) of Section 16 were to have an interest by birth in a Hindu Undivided Family governed by Mitakshara law, this would certainly affect the rights of others apart from the parents of the child. Holding that the consequence of legitimacy under sub-sections (1) or (2) of Section 16 is to place such an individual on an equal footing as a coparcener in the coparcenary would be contrary to the plain intendment of sub-section (3) of Section 16 of the HMA 1955 which recognises rights to or in the property only of the parents. In fact, the use of language in the negative by Section 16(3) places the position beyond the pale of doubt. We would therefore have to hold that when an individual falls within the protective ambit of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 16, they would be entitled to rights in or to the absolute property of the parents and no other person. [Revanasiddappa v. Mallikarjun 2023 INSC 783] Section 19 Family Courts Act – Section 28 HMA – What is the period of limitation for filing an appeal against a decree or order passed by a Family Court under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 ? Delhi High Court noticed that there is an inconsistency between Section 28 of HMA which prescribes a period of 90 days for filing an appeal and Section 19 of the Family Courts Act which prescribes a period of 30 days for filing an appeal. The court held that the Family Courts Act will prevail and therefore the the period of limitation for filing an appeal against a judgment or order of the Family Court is thirty days – [Pallavi Mohan vs Raghu Menon 2023 DHC 6586] Section 24 HMA – The wife is highly qualified and has an earning capacity, but in fact she has been earning, though has not been inclined to truthfully disclose her true income. Such a person cannot be held entitled to maintenance – [Niharika Ghosh Niharika Kundu vs Shankar Ghosh – 2023 DHC 6553] Section 7A HMA (applicable in Tamil Nadu) – Section 7A required the intending spouses to declare and express to each other their willingness to take each other as spouses and symbolically garlanding each other and tying a “Thali”. In S. Balakrishnan Pandiyan v Inspector of Police, 2014 (7) MadLJ 651, Madras High Court interpreted the procedure of declaration by the intending spouses “in the presence of relatives, friends or other persons”. Now, the Supreme Court held that this view is erroneous as it is premised on the assumption that every marriage requires a public solemnization or declaration. The court observed: Such a view is simplistic because often due to parental or pressure among kinship groups, or caste/community institutions, couples intending to enter into matrimony, may not be able to, for the reasons of such opposition- hold or give such a public declaration. Doing so would imperil their lives or could in the very least likely result in danger to their bodily integrity or at worst, a forceable or coerced separation of one from the other. It is not hard to visualize other pressures being brought to bear upon two individuals, who are otherwise adults and have exercised their freewill. To superimpose the condition of a public declaration, which is absent in section 7A , in the opinion of this Court, it is not only narrowing the otherwise wide import of the statue but also would be violative of the rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India – [Ilavarasan vs Superintendent of Police 2023 INSC 813.] Section 13 HMA- An element of subjectivity has to be applied albeit, what constitutes cruelty is objective. Therefore, what is cruelty for a woman in a given case may not be cruelty for a man, and a relatively more elastic and broad approach is required when we examine a case in which a wife seeks divorce. – [Roopa Soni vs Kamalnarayan Soni 2023 INSC 814] Section 13 HMA – Historically, the law of divorce was predominantly built on a conservative canvas based on the fault theory. Preservation of marital sanctity from a societal perspective was considered a prevailing factor. With the adoption of a libertarian attitude, the grounds for separation or dissolution of marriage have been construed with latitudinarianism – The court must also keep in mind that the home which is meant to be a happy and loveable place to live, becomes a source of misery and agony where the partners fight. When there are children they become direct victims of the said fights, though they may practically have no role in the breakdown of marriage. They suffer irreparable harm especially when the couple at loggerheads, remain unmindful and unconcerned about the psychological and mental impact it has on her/him. – [Roopa Soni vs Kamalnarayan Soni 2023 INSC 814] Hindu Marriage Act ; Section 16 – Hindu Succession Act ; Section 6 – The very concept of a coparcener postulates the acquisition of an interest by birth. If a person born from a void or voidable marriage to whom legitimacy is conferred by sub-sections (1) or (2) of Section 16 were to have an interest by birth in a Hindu Undivided Family governed by Mitakshara law, this would certainly affect the rights of others apart from the parents of the child. Holding that the consequence of legitimacy under sub-sections (1) or (2) of Section 16 is to place such an individual on an equal footing as a coparcener in the coparcenary would be contrary to the plain intendment of sub-section (3) of Section 16 of the HMA 1955 which recognises rights to or in the property only of the parents. In fact, the use of language in the negative by Section 16(3) places the position beyond the pale of doubt. We would therefore have to hold that when an individual falls within the protective ambit of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 16, they would be entitled to rights in or to the absolute property of the parents and no other person. [Revanasiddappa v. Mallikarjun 2023 INSC 783]

An assurance in the form of an undertaking given by a counsel / advocate on behalf of his client to the court; the willful breach or disobedience of the same would amount to “civil contempt” as defined under Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Court Act 1971 -An undertaking given to a party to the lis by way of an agreement of settlement or otherwise would not attract the provisions of the Act 1971 –The apology tendered should not be accepted as a matter of course and the court is not bound to accept the same. The apology may be unconditional, unqualified and bona fide, still if the conduct is serious, which has caused damage to the dignity of the institution, same should not be accepted. There ought not to be a tendency by courts, to show compassion when disobedience of an undertaking or an order is with impunity and with total consciousness – Although the transfer of the suit property pendente lite may not be termed as void ab initio yet when the court is looking into such transfers in contempt proceedings the court can definitely declare such transactions to be void in order to maintain the majesty of law. Apart from punishing the contemnor, for his contumacious conduct, the majesty of law may demand that appropriate directions be issued by the court so that any advantage secured as a result of such contumacious conduct is completely nullified. This may include issue of directions either for reversal of the transactions by declaring such transactions to be void or passing appropriate directions to the concerned authorities to ensure that the contumacious conduct on the part of the contemnor does not continue to enure to the advantage of the contemnor or any one claiming under him.– The beneficiaries of any contumacious transaction have no right or locus to be heard in the contempt proceedings on the ground that they are bona fide purchasers of the property for value without notice and therefore, are necessary parties. Contempt is between the court and the contemnor and no third party can involve itself into the same – [Balwantbhai Somabhai Bhandari Vs Hiralal Somabhai Contractor – 2023 INSC 805]

Practice and Procedure – Although the opposite party had not filed its version and may not have participated in the proceedings before the NCDRC, nevertheless, had the right to address final arguments before the NCDRC- [ARN Infrastructure India Limited vs Hara Prasad Ghosh CA (Diary) 31182 of 2023] Section 2(1)(d) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 – Interpretation of the word and expression “Commercial Purpose” – When there is an assertion in the complaint filed before the Consumer Court or Commission that such goods are purchased for earning livelihood, such complaint cannot be nipped at the bud and dismissed. Evidence tendered by parties will have to be evaluated on the basis of pleadings and thereafter conclusion be arrived at. Primarily it has to be seen as to whether the averments made in the complaint would suffice to examine the same on merits and in the event of answer being in the affirmative, it ought to proceed further. On the contrary, if the answer is the negative, such complaint can be dismissed at the threshold. Thus, it would depend on facts and circumstances of each case. There cannot be any defined formula with mathematical precision to examine the claims for non-suiting the complainant on account of such complaint not falling within the definition of the expression ‘consumer’ as defined under Section 2(1)(d) – [Rohit Chaudhary vs Vipul Ltd 2023 INSC 807]

Section 100 CPC – Second Appeal – If no substantial question of law arose in the case then the appeal could not have been entertained and ought to have been dismissed at the stage of admission. But on the other hand, in the absence of framing any substantial question of law the appeal has been allowed, that too, at the stage of admission, without issuance of notice to the other respondents and by hearing only counsel for one respondent before the High Court who was on caveat – [Hemavathi vs V Hombegowda 2023 INSC 848] Section 100 CPC – Second Appeal – A Court sitting in second appellate jurisdiction is to frame substantial question of law at the time of admission, save and except in exceptional circumstances. Post such framing of questions the Court shall proceed to hear the parties on such questions, i.e., after giving them adequate time to meet and address them. It is only after such hearing subsequent to the framing that a second appeal shall come to be decided – In ordinary course, the High Court in such jurisdiction does not interfere with finding of fact, however, if it does find any compelling reason to do so as regard in law – it can do but only after perusing the records of the Trial Court, on analysis of which the conclusion arrived at by such a Court is sought to be upturned. In other words, when overturning findings of fact, the Court will be required to call for the records of the Trial Court or if placed on record, peruse the same and only then question the veracity of the conclusions drawn by the Court below – [Suresh Lataruji Ramteke vs Sumanbai Pandurang Petkar 2023 INSC 846] Section 100 CPC– What is the meaning of the phrase “substantial question of law” in Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure ? The test is whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly or substantially affects the right of the parties or whether the question is still open i.e., it is not finally settled by the Supreme Court- The word substantial, as qualifying “question of law”, means — of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with — technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely-Legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of “substantial question of law” by suffixing the words “of general importance” as has been done in many other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code or Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution. The substantial question of law on which a second appeal shall be heard need not necessarily be a substantial question of law of general importance- A point of law which admits of no two opinions may be a proposition of law but cannot be a substantial question of law- To be “substantial” a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, insofar as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law “involving in the case” there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. An entirely new point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter- It will depend on the facts and circumstance of each case whether a question of law is a substantial one and involved in the case, or not; the paramount overall consideration being the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis.-When court is called upon to interpret documents and examine their effect, depending upon the nature of controversy and the issues involved, it would constitute substantial question (s) of law – [Appaiya vs Andimuthu Thangapandi 2023 INSC 835.] Section 100 CPC (second appeal)- High Court judgment in a second appeal set aside by the Supreme Court on the ground of non framing of substantial questions of law. In this case, Uttarakhand High Court framed a substantial question of law only to recall it later. Thereafter without framing a new substantial question of law, it disposed of the second appeal re-appreciating evidence. Supreme Court now set aside this HC judgment and directed it to consider the second appeal afresh. “if the appeal was entertained without framing substantial questions of law, then it would be illegal and would amount to failure or abdication of the duty cast on the court. Further, it was held that existence of substantial question of law is the sine qua non for exercise of power under Section 100, Code”, the court noted. – [Ashok Kumar Goel vs Ram Niwas Goel – SLP(C) .6474-6475/2019.]

Section 26-27 – Being in ‘the custody of a police officer’ and being ‘accused of an offence’, are indispensable pre-requisites to render a confession made to the police admissible to a limited extent, by bringing into play the exception postulated under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. In this case, the accused’s name was not in the FIR. He was taken to the police station. Before his arrest was recorded, he is said to have made a confession. The court held thus: “It was his arrest which resulted in actual ‘police custody’, and the confession made by him, before such arrest and prior to his being ‘accused of any offence’, would be directly hit by Section 26 of the Evidence Act and there is no possibility of applying the exception under Section 27 to any information given by him in the course of such confession, even if it may have led to the discovery of any fact.” So the court held that the purported discovery of the dead body, the murder weapon and the other material objects, even if it was at his behest of, cannot be proved against him, as he was not ‘accused of any offence’ and was not in ‘police custody’ at the point of time he allegedly made a confession –

Article 226 – Writ Jurisdiction in SARFAESI matters – High Courts should not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act – CELIR LLP vs Bafna Motors (Mumbai ) Pvt. Ltd 2023 INSC 838 Article 13,14, 19, 21- Fundamental rights do not exist in silos, the Supreme Court observed while it referred the challenge against constitutional validity of Section 124A IPC (sedition) to a larger bench.The court noted that the Kedar Nath Singh Vs State of Bihar did not : (1) make a distinction between the State which falls within the ambit of Article 19(2) and the Government, which does not (2) consider the validity of the provision against a constitutional challenge on the basis of Article 14. The court also rejected the Union Government’s plea to defer considering whether a reference should be made to a larger bench. It had submittted that the Parliament is in the process of reenacting the provisions of the Penal Code and the Bill has been placed before a Standing Committee. “The validity of the prosecutions which have been launched or would be launched so long as Section 124A continues to remain on the statute would have to be assessed under it. The issue of the validity of the provision for the period that it continues to operate would, therefore, need to be determined.”, the court noted – S G Vombatkere vs Union of India WP(C) 682 of 2021 Article 136 – The jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India can be invoked in favour of the party even suo moto when the Court is satisfied that compelling ground for its exercise exists. However, such suo moto power should be used very sparingly with caution and circumspection. The Court held that the power must be exercised in the rarest of the rare cases. – Javed Shaukat Ali Qureshi vs State Of Gujarat 2023 INSC 829 Article 136 – An order refusing special leave to appeal by a non­speaking order does not attract the doctrine of merger – Javed Shaukat Ali Qureshi vs State Of Gujarat 2023 INSC 829 Article 20 – Sub-article (1) of Article 20 of the Constitution consists of two parts. The first part prohibits any law that prescribes judicial punishment for violation of law with retrospective effect. Subarticle (1) to Article 20 of the Constitution does not apply to civil liability, as distinguished from punishment for a criminal offence. Further, what is prohibited is conviction or sentence for any offence under an ex post facto law, albeit the trial itself is not prohibited. Trial under a procedure different from the one when at the time of commission of an offence, or by a court different from the time when the offence was committed is not unconstitutional on account of violation of sub-article (1) to Article 20 of the Constitution. It may be different, if the procedure or the trial is challengeable on account of discrimination under Article 14 of the Constitution or violation of any other fundamental right- The right under first part of sub-article (1) to Article 20 of the Constitution is a very valuable right, which must be safeguarded and protected by the courts as it is a constitutional mandate – the second part of sub-article (1) to Article 20, which states that a person can only be subjected to penalties prescribed under the law at the time when the offence for which he is charged was committed. Any additional or higher penalty prescribed by any law after the offence was committed cannot be imposed or inflicted on him. The sub-article does not prohibit substitution of the penalty or sentence which is not higher or greater than the previous one or modification of rigours of criminal law – Article 20(1) of the Constitution only and only confines to conviction and sentence. It does not at all refer to any procedural part which may result into conviction or acquittal and/or sentence. (Para 26-30, 35) CBI vs RR Kishore – 2023 INSC 817.

Magistrate is not debarred from taking cognizance of a complaint merely on the ground that earlier he had declined to take cognizance of the police report- Magistrate while exercising his judicial discretion has to apply his mind to the contents of the Protest Petition or the complaint as the case may be. [Zunaid vs State of UP – 2023 INSC 778] Bail – Gujarat High Court granted bail to a murder accused. One of the factors considered by the High Court was that the accused and deceased’s son entered into settlement. Now, Supreme Court finds it strange and sets aside the bail order. Accused’s antecedents also indicate his propensity towards committing crime, the court said – [Bharwad Santoshbhai Sondabhai vs State of Gujarat] Section 272 Crpc – A charge sheet filed within the period provided either under Section 167 of Crpc or any other relevant statute in a language other than the language of the Court or the language which the accused does not understand, is not illegal and no one can claim a default bail on that ground. If both the accused and his advocate are not conversant with the language in which the charge sheet has been filed,…. the Courts can always direct the prosecution to provide a translated version of the charge sheet. – [CBI vs Narottam Dhakad -2023 INSC 770] On Section 4(2) Crpc – Section 4(2) lays down that the provisions of the Crpc shall apply to all offences under any other law apart from the IPC. However, the application of the Crpc will be excluded only where a special law prescribes special procedures to deal with the investigation, inquiry, or the trial of the special offence. –In determining whether a special procedure will override the general procedure laid down under the Crpc, the courts have to ascertain whether the special law excludes, either specifically or by necessary implication, the application of the provisions of the Crpc – [Dhanraj N Asawani vs Amarjeet singh Mohindersingh Basi and Others | 2023 INSC 710]

Direction to deposit the amount of ₹1,00,000 as compensation to the victim – This Court, time and again, deprecated the practice of putting such conditions while granting bail – [Gopinath vs State of Maharashtra – SLP (Crl.) No.8373 of 2023] Once the High Court came to the conclusion that the accused was entitled to bail, there was no reason to restrict the bail to the period of three months – [Ranjit Digal vs State of Odisha – SLP(Crl) 8926 OF 2023] Bail application of the petitioner is opposed on the ground that the petitioner did not appear before the Trial Court and as such warrants came to be issued – Since the petitioner is in prison, therefore, it was the duty of the police authorities to produce him before the Trial Court. The petitioner cannot be blamed for the negligence on behalf of the police authorities- Bail granted – [Satendra Babu vs State of UP –– SLP(Crl) 8247/2023] Gujarat High Court granted bail to a murder accused. One of the factors considered by the High Court was that the accused and deceased’s son entered into settlement. Now, Supreme Court finds it strange and sets aside the bail order. Accused’s antecedents also indicate his propensity towards committing crime, the court said – [Bharwad Santoshbhai Sondabhai vs State of Gujarat]

The power to grant divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage is exercised by the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to do complete justice to both the parties. Such a power is not vested in the High Courts leave alone the Family Courts.” – [D vs A 2023 DHC 6803 -DB]