TARABAI NAGAR CO-OP. HOG. SOCIETY (PROPOSED) VS. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS.

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. ______ / 2025 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NOS. 19774, 25494 & 27497 OF 2018)

2025 INSC 1015

(August 22, 2025)

1. Heading

Supreme Court Upholds Landowner's First Right to Redevelop Slum Rehabilitation Area

2. Citation

Tarabai Nagar Co-Op. Hog. Society (Proposed) vs. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.
Civil Appeal Nos. ______ / 2025 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 19774, 25494 & 27497 of 2018)
Reported as: 2025 INSC 1015

3. Subject of the Judgment in Short

This judgment deals with the validity of land acquisition for slum rehabilitation. The core issue was whether the government can acquire private land declared as a "Slum Rehabilitation Area" without first giving the landowner a specific opportunity and invitation to redevelop it themselves under the slum rehabilitation scheme.

4. Case Details & Related Laws

• Date of Judgment: August 22, 2025

• Constitutional Bench: No. This judgment was delivered by a Division Bench of the Supreme Court of India.

• Bench: Justice Surya Kant and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh

• Laws & Sections Discussed:
  Primary Act: The Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971 ("Slums Act").
  Key Chapter: Chapter I-A (introduced in 1995) governing the "Slum Rehabilitation" framework.
  Key Sections Analyzed:
  Section 3B(4)(e): Talks about Slum Rehabilitation Schemes being undertaken by landholders/occupants or a developer, with the Slum Rehabilitation Authority (SRA) stepping in only if they don't participate.
  Section 12(10): Grants the owner the right to redevelop land after a Clearance Order, subject to SRA-approved plans.
  Section 13 (as substituted by Section 3D): Allows the SRA to take over redevelopment if landholders/occupants do not come forward with a scheme "within a reasonable time."
  Section 14 (as modified by Section 3D): Grants the State Government the power to acquire land necessary for the SRA to implement a Slum Rehabilitation Scheme.
  Related Regulations: Development Control Regulations for Greater Mumbai, 1991 (DCR 1991), particularly Regulation 33(10).

5. Explanation of the Judgment

Background & Facts

• Indian Cork Mills Pvt. Ltd. (ICM) owned a plot in Mumbai. Over time, slum dwellers encroached upon it, and the entire plot was declared a "Slum Rehabilitation Area (SR Area)" in 2011.

• The slum dwellers, through the Tarabai Nagar Society, pushed for the government to acquire ICM's land so that a private builder chosen by them could redevelop it.

• ICM repeatedly stated from 2013 onwards that it wanted to redevelop the land itself under the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme. It wrote letters to the SRA and the society, seeking cooperation for surveys.

• Despite this, the Slum Rehabilitation Authority (SRA) and the State Government, acting on the society's proposal, initiated land acquisition proceedings against ICM's land in 2016.

• ICM challenged this in the Bombay High Court, which quashed the acquisition. It held that the landowner had a preferential right and must be invited to submit a plan before acquisition. The SRA, the State, and the slum society appealed to the Supreme Court.

Core Legal Issues Decided by Supreme Court

The Supreme Court framed and answered four main questions:

Issue I: Does the landowner have a preferential right to redevelop an SR Area?

• Court's Holding: YES.

• Reasoning: The Court analyzed the Slums Act's scheme. It held that Sections 3B(4)(e) and 13(1) create a clear preference. The SRA's power to redevelop arises only if the landholder/occupant does not come forward with a scheme. The Court also noted that ownership rights are constitutionally protected. The SRA's own circulars (like Circular No. 144-A) recognized the "first right" of the landowner.

Issue II: Must the SRA specifically notify and invite the landowner?

• Court's Holding: YES, it is mandatory.

• Reasoning: The consequence of the owner not acting within a "reasonable time" (under Section 13) is severe—they lose their right to redevelop, and the land may be acquired for minimal compensation. The Court held that a mere public notice declaring an SR Area is not enough. The SRA must issue a specific notice-cum-invitation to the owner, informing them of their preferential right and inviting them to submit a scheme. The owner needs the SRA's cooperation (for surveys, etc.) to prepare a viable plan.

Issue III: Is the State's power to acquire land (Section 14) subject to the owner's preferential right (Section 13)?

• Court's Holding: YES.

• Reasoning: The Court distinguished this case from its earlier ruling in Murlidhar Teckchand Gandhi. It held that under the Chapter I-A framework, the purpose of acquisition (Section 14) is strictly to enable the SRA to implement a Slum Rehabilitation Scheme. This necessity cannot arise until the owner's preferential right to undertake that very scheme is first extinguished by their failure to act after a proper invitation. Therefore, the power to acquire is not independent but is conditional on the process under Section 13 being followed first.

Issue IV: Was the acquisition of ICM's land valid?

• Court's Holding: NO, it was rightly set aside by the High Court.

• Reasoning: The record showed ICM was always willing to redevelop. The SRA never sent the mandatory invitation to ICM. The Tarabai Society, backed by a private builder, actively worked to bypass the owner. The Court found the SRA's conduct "doubtful" and its shifting positions "arbitrary." It noted that the society's appointed builder had even filed a false affidavit. The acquisition was, therefore, a "colourable exercise of power" aimed at pre-empting the landowner's rights.

Core Principle & Rule of Law Established

1. Preferential Right of Landowner: Under the Maharashtra Slums Act's rehabilitation framework (Chapter I-A), the landowner possesses the first and preferential right to redevelop their property declared as a Slum Rehabilitation Area.

2. Mandatory Procedural Safeguard: The Slum Rehabilitation Authority is legally duty-bound to issue a specific notice to the landowner, inviting them to exercise this right and submit a rehabilitation scheme. This is a mandatory step before the SRA can decide to take over the project or recommend acquisition.

3. Acquisition Power is Conditional: The government's power to acquire private land for slum rehabilitation is not an independent, absolute power. It is subject to and can only be invoked after the landowner's preferential right has been validly extinguished by following the due process of notice and providing a reasonable opportunity.

6. Conclusion & Final Directions

The Supreme Court dismissed all appeals and upheld the High Court's judgment. It gave the following final directions:

• The acquisition of ICM's land was declared invalid.

• ICM was granted 120 days to submit a fresh Slum Rehabilitation Scheme to the SRA in accordance with current laws.

• The SRA and State Government were ordered to process ICM's proposal within 60 days of submission.

In essence, the judgment strongly protects private property rights within the slum rehabilitation process, establishes clear procedural steps authorities must follow, and prevents the misuse of acquisition powers to benefit private builders at the cost of the legitimate landowner.

NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. VS PRANAY SETHI & ORS

Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 25590 of 2014

(October 31, 2017)

1. Heading

Explanatory Note on the Landmark Judgment: National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi & Ors.

2. Citation

Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 25590 of 2014 (and other connected cases)
Reported in: (2017) 16 SCC 680

3. Subject of the Judgment in Short

This judgment provides standardized guidelines for calculating compensation in cases of death from motor vehicle accidents. It specifically settles the law on adding "Future Prospects" to the income of the deceased (whether salaried or self-employed) and clarifies the amounts to be awarded under "Conventional Heads" like loss of consortium.

4. Case Details & Related Laws

• Date of Judgment: October 31, 2017

• Bench (Constitutional Bench): A Five-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court of India.
  Chief Justice Dipak Misra
  Justice A.K. Sikri
  Justice A.M. Khanwilkar
  Justice Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud
  Justice Ashok Bhushan

• Related Laws & Sections:
  The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
  Section 166: Deals with filing applications for compensation on the basis of fault (negligence).
  Section 168: Empowers the Tribunal to award "just compensation".
  Section 163-A: Provides for a fixed compensation scheme as per the Second Schedule, without the need to prove fault.

5. Explanation of the Judgment

A. The Core Problem: Conflicting Earlier Judgments

Before the Pranay Sethi case, different benches of the Supreme Court had given conflicting rulings on how to calculate compensation, leading to confusion. The key conflicts were:

1. Future Prospects for Self-Employed: In the Sarla Verma case, it was ruled that future prospects should not normally be added for self-employed persons or those with fixed salaries. However, in the Santosh Devi case, a different bench strongly disagreed, saying this was unfair.

2. Amounts under Conventional Heads: Different courts were awarding vastly different amounts for non-financial losses like loss of consortium (spouse's companionship), funeral expenses, and loss of estate.

A five-judge bench was formed to resolve this confusion and provide one authoritative rule for the entire country.

B. The Core Principle and Rule of Law Established

The Supreme Court emphasized that the goal of the Motor Vehicles Act is to award "just compensation" – which is fair, reasonable, and equitable. To achieve this, the Court established the principle of standardization. This means using fixed formulas and percentages to ensure:

• Uniformity: Similar cases get similar compensation across India.

• Certainty: Lawyers, victims, and insurance companies can predict the compensation.

• Efficiency: Courts and Tribunals can calculate compensation faster, without long debates over every small detail.

C. Step-wise Guidelines Laid Down by the Court

The Court provided clear, step-by-step instructions for calculating compensation in death cases.

Step 1: Determine the "Multiplicand" (Annual Loss of Dependency)

This is the annual income the family has lost, adjusted for the deceased's personal expenses.

• a) Establish the "Base Income": This is the deceased's income at the time of death, after deducting income tax.

• b) Add "Future Prospects": This was the most critical part of the judgment. The Court ruled that everyone deserves future prospects, whether salaried or self-employed, to account for inflation and career growth.For a salaried person with a permanent job, the addition is fifty percent of the base income if the deceased was below 40 years old. If the deceased was between 40 to 50 years, the addition is thirty percent. For those between 50 to 60 years, the addition is fifteen percent.For a self-employed person or a person on a fixed salary, the addition is forty percent of the base income if the deceased was below 40 years. If the deceased was between 40 to 50 years, the addition is twenty-five percent. For those between 50 to 60 years, the addition is ten percent.

• c) Deduct "Personal & Living Expenses": A percentage is deducted from the income (base + future prospects) for the money the deceased would have spent on themselves. The Court approved the deductions from the Sarla Verma case.
  If the deceased had 2-3 dependents, one-third of the income is deducted.
  If the deceased had 4-6 dependents, one-fourth of the income is deducted.
  If the deceased had more than 6 dependents, one-fifth of the income is deducted.
  For a bachelor, fifty percent is deducted, as it is assumed they would have spent more on themselves and possibly gotten married.

The final figure after these calculations is the "Multiplicand".

Step 2: Apply the Correct "Multiplier"

The multiplier is a number based on the age of the deceased to account for the number of years the family would have received financial support. The Court approved the multiplier table from the Sarla Verma case. The multiplier starts at 18 for a deceased person aged up to 25 years. It then reduces by one unit for every five-year age group until 50 years. For example, the multiplier is 17 for ages 26-30, 16 for ages 31-35, and so on. After the age of 50, the multiplier reduces by two units for every five years, such as 11 for ages 51-55, and 9 for ages 56-60.

Step 3: Calculate the "Loss of Dependency"

This is the main financial compensation.

Loss of Dependency = Multiplicand (from Step 1) × Multiplier (from Step 2)

Step 4: Add Compensation for "Conventional Heads"

The Court standardized the amounts for non-financial losses to ensure fairness and uniformity. It fixed the compensation for Loss of Estate at fifteen thousand rupees. It fixed the compensation for Loss of Consortium for the spouse at forty thousand rupees. It also fixed the compensation for Funeral Expenses at fifteen thousand rupees.

The Court also ruled that these amounts should be increased by ten percent every three years to account for inflation and the rising cost of living.

6. Conclusion

The Pranay Sethi judgment is a landmark ruling that brought much-needed clarity and uniformity to the process of calculating compensation in motor accident claim cases. By establishing standardized formulas for adding future prospects for both salaried and self-employed individuals, using a fixed multiplier, and setting uniform amounts for conventional heads, the Supreme Court ensured that the principle of "just compensation" is applied consistently across India. This protects victims' families from receiving arbitrarily low compensation and prevents lengthy legal battles over calculations, making the justice system more efficient and predictable.

NAVTEJ SINGH JOHAR & OTHERS VS. UNION OF INDIA

Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 76 of 2016

(September 6, 2018)

1. Heading

Navtej Singh Johar & Others vs. Union of India - The Decriminalization of Homosexuality in India

2. Citation

Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 76 of 2016 (and other connected petitions)
Decided on: September 6, 2018

3. Subject of the Judgment in Short

This is a landmark judgment by the Supreme Court of India that decriminalized consensual sexual acts between adults of the same sex. It declared that Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, to the extent it criminalized consensual homosexual acts between adults, was unconstitutional.

4. Case Details

• Laws & Sections Involved:
  Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860: This was the primary section under challenge. It criminalized "carnal intercourse against the order of nature."
  Fundamental Rights from the Indian Constitution:
  Article 14: Right to Equality
  Article 15: Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth.
  Article 19: Right to Freedom (including freedom of expression).
  Article 21: Right to Life and Personal Liberty.

• Constitutional Bench: The judgment was delivered by a 5-Judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court.

• Judges: The bench consisted of Chief Justice Dipak Misra, and Justices R.F. Nariman, A.M. Khanwilkar, D.Y. Chandrachud, and Indu Malhotra.

• Overruled: The judgment overturned the Supreme Court's own 2013 decision in Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Foundation, which had reinstated Section 377.

5. Explanation of the Judgment

The Supreme Court's judgment is a powerful affirmation of individual rights and liberty. Here is a step-by-step explanation of the Court's reasoning.

A. The Flawed Foundation of Section 377

• Colonial and Archaic Law: The Court noted that Section 377 was a relic of the Victorian-era British colonial rule. It was not an indigenous law reflecting Indian values but was imposed on India.

• Vague and Indeterminate: The terms "carnal intercourse against the order of nature" were found to be unclear and arbitrary. The Court questioned who decides what is "natural" and pointed out that such vague terms cannot be the basis for criminalizing an activity and depriving people of their fundamental rights.

B. Violation of Fundamental Rights

The Court held that Section 377 violated several core fundamental rights of the LGBTQ+ community.

• Violation of Right to Equality (Article 14):
  The law created an unreasonable classification between heterosexual and homosexual couples.
  It was manifestly arbitrary because it targeted a group of people based solely on their sexual orientation, which serves no legitimate state purpose.

• Violation of Right to Non-Discrimination (Article 15):
  The Court interpreted "sex" in Article 15 to include "sexual orientation."
  Therefore, discrimination based on sexual orientation is a direct violation of the Constitution's guarantee against discrimination.

• Violation of Right to Life and Personal Liberty (Article 21):
  The Court strongly linked Section 377 to the violation of the right to privacy (established in the earlier Puttaswamy case), dignity, and autonomy.
  Privacy: Every individual has a right to privacy in their intimate personal relationships. The state has no business intruding into the bedroom of consenting adults.
  Dignity: Criminalizing a person's natural sexual orientation attacks their core dignity and self-worth.
  Autonomy: The right to make choices about one's own body and sexual partner is a fundamental aspect of personal liberty.

C. Sexual Orientation is Inherent and Immutable

• The Court affirmed that sexual orientation is a natural and inherent part of an individual's identity. It is not a mental disorder or a choice.

• It is central to a person's identity and is protected under the Constitution.

D. Impact on Health and Society

• The judgment highlighted that Section 377 had a devastating impact on public health, particularly HIV/AIDS prevention efforts.

• It forced the LGBTQ+ community underground, making them fearful of accessing healthcare services and prevention tools due to the threat of prosecution, thereby exacerbating health risks.

E. Constitutional Morality Over Public Morality

• This was a key principle established by the Court. It stated that the validity of a law must be tested against "Constitutional Morality" (the values of the Constitution like liberty, equality, and dignity) and not against "Public Morality" (shifting popular beliefs or majoritarian views).

• The Court emphasized that the rights of a minority cannot be suppressed simply because the majority disapproves of their way of life.

Core Principles and Rule of Law Established

1. Decriminalization: Consensual sexual acts between adults, regardless of gender, are not a crime.

2. Sexual Orientation is a Protected Ground: Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is unconstitutional and violates Articles 14, 15, and 21.

3. Right to Privacy and Autonomy: Individuals have an absolute right to privacy in their intimate choices, including the choice of a partner.

4. Individual Dignity is Paramount: Laws that violate the dignity of an individual or a community cannot stand.

5. Transformative Constitutionalism: The Constitution is a living document that must transform society towards greater justice, freedom, and equality for all, including marginalized groups.

6. The Role of the Court: The judiciary must protect the rights of minorities against majoritarian impulses and uphold constitutional morality at all times.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court, in a historic and unanimous decision, read down Section 377 of the IPC to exclude consensual sexual acts between adults. It declared that LGBTQ+ individuals are entitled to all the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, just like any other citizen.

The judgment was not just about decriminalizing an act; it was about affirming the identity, dignity, and equal citizenship of the LGBTQ+ community in India. It marked a monumental step towards a more inclusive and equal society, establishing that the "constitutional moralities of justice, liberty, equality, and fraternity" will always triumph over social prejudices.

A.G. PERARIVALAN V. STATE Criminal 

Appeal No. 833-834 of 2022

(May 18, 2022)

1.  Heading

Case Name: A.G. Perarivalan v. State, Through Superintendent of Police CBI/SIT/MMDA, Chennai, Tamil Nadu and Anr.

2. Citation and Bench Details

• Citation: Criminal Appeal Nos. 833-834 of 2022

• Date of Judgment: May 18, 2022

• Bench: Three-Judge Bench comprising:
  Justice L. Nageswara Rao
  Justice B.R. Gavai
  Justice A.S. Bopanna

3. Subject of the Judgment

This judgment concerns the release of A.G. Perarivalan, a convict in the assassination of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, who had been incarcerated for over 30 years. The case deals with the constitutional power of the Governor to grant remission (early release) under Article 161, the binding nature of the State Cabinet's advice, and whether the Governor can refer such matters to the President of India.

4. Related Laws, Acts, and Constitutional Provisions

• Constitution of India:
  Article 161: Power of Governor to grant pardons and remit sentences.
  Article 162: Extent of executive power of the State.
  Article 163: Council of Ministers to aid and advise the Governor.
  Article 72: Power of President to grant pardons.
  Article 142: Power of Supreme Court to pass any decree for doing complete justice.

• Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860: Section 302 (Punishment for Murder).

• Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC), 1973: Section 432 (Power to suspend or remit sentences) and Section 435.

5. Step-by-Step Explanation of the Judgment

Step I: Factual Background

A.G. Perarivalan was convicted for the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 and was originally sentenced to death. In 2014, the Supreme Court commuted his death sentence to life imprisonment.

• On September 9, 2018, the Tamil Nadu State Cabinet passed a resolution recommending the release of Perarivalan and sent it to the Governor for approval under Article 161.

• For two and a half years, the Governor took no decision.

• Eventually, on January 25, 2021, the Governor forwarded the recommendation to the President of India, stating that the President was the competent authority to decide.

Step II: The Core Legal Conflict

The main question before the Supreme Court was whether the Governor was correct in referring the State Cabinet's recommendation to the President instead of taking a decision himself. The Union of India argued that since the case involved a central investigation agency (CBI), only the President had the power to grant remission.

Step III: The Court’s Ruling on Governor’s Power

The Supreme Court held that the Governor’s action of referring the matter to the President was unconstitutional. The Court clarified the following points:

• Governor is Bound by Cabinet Advice: Under Article 161, the Governor acts as the formal head of the State. He is bound by the aid and advice of the State Council of Ministers. The Governor cannot exercise independent discretion unless the Constitution expressly allows it.

• No Power to Refer: There is no provision in the Constitution that empowers the Governor to refer a recommendation made by the State Cabinet to the President of India.

• Governor as "Shorthand": The Court reiterated that legally, the "Governor" is essentially a shorthand expression for the "State Government".

Step IV: "Appropriate Government" for Section 302 IPC

The Court addressed who has the power to remit sentences for murder (Section 302 IPC).

• The Court ruled that for offences under the Indian Penal Code (like Section 302), the executive power lies with the State Government, not the Union Government.

• Even though the Parliament can make laws regarding criminal law (Concurrent List), no specific law confers executive power on the Union for Section 302 IPC. Therefore, the State's executive power remains intact.

Step V: Judicial Review of Delay

The Court noted that while the Governor has immunity, their inaction or inexplicable delay in exercising power under Article 161 is subject to judicial review. The delay of 2.5 years by the Governor, without any valid reason, was deemed inexcusable.

Step VI: Final Decision (Exercise of Article 142)

Since the Governor delayed the matter excessively and referred it incorrectly to the President, the Supreme Court decided not to send the file back to the Governor for reconsideration.

• Using its extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court ordered the immediate release of A.G. Perarivalan.

• Factors considered for release included:
  Incarceration for over 31 years.
  Good conduct in jail and during parole.
  Acquisition of educational qualifications (degrees and diplomas) while in prison.
  Chronic health issues.

6. Core Principles and Rule of Law Established

The Supreme Court established and reaffirmed several critical constitutional principles in this judgment:

1. Supremacy of Cabinet Advice: The Governor is a constitutional head and must act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. The recommendation of the State Cabinet regarding remission is binding on the Governor.

2. Federal Structure: The Governor cannot undermine the State Government's powers by referring state-level executive decisions to the President (Union Government) without constitutional backing. Doing so violates the federal scheme of the Constitution.

3. Judicial Review of Executive Inaction: The power to grant pardon/remission is not entirely immune from the court's scrutiny. If the Governor delays a decision inexplicably, creating mental distress for the prisoner, the Court can intervene.

4. State's Domain over IPC Offences: In the absence of a specific law by Parliament giving executive power to the Union, the State Government is the "Appropriate Government" to decide on remission for offences under the IPC (like murder).

7. Conclusion

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set A.G. Perarivalan at liberty forthwith. The judgment serves as a landmark precedent clarifying that Governors cannot sit on the recommendations of State Cabinets indefinitely, nor can they transfer their constitutional duties to the President to avoid making a decision. The Court utilized Article 142 to do complete justice, ending Perarivalan's 32-year-long incarceration.

SHILPA SAILESH VS. VARUN SREENIVASAN 

Petition (Civil) No. 1118 of 2014

(May 1, 2023)

1. Heading

Shilpa Sailesh vs. Varun Sreenivasan: A Landmark Judgment on Divorce and the Supreme Court's Extraordinary Powers

2. Citation

Transfer Petition (Civil) No. 1118 of 2014 (Along with other connected petitions)

Case Decided By: Supreme Court of India
Date of Judgment: May 1, 2023

3. Subject of the Judgment

This judgment clarifies the Supreme Court's vast power under Article 142 of the Constitution to do "complete justice." It specifically addresses whether the Court can:

1. Grant a "divorce by mutual consent" instantly, bypassing the mandatory 6-month waiting period.

2. Quash related criminal cases (like those under Section 498A IPC) when a matrimonial settlement is reached.

3. Grant a divorce on the ground of "irretrievable breakdown of marriage" even if one spouse does not agree.

4. Related and Highlighted Laws, Sections, and Acts

This judgment primarily interprets and applies the following laws:

• Article 142 of the Constitution of India: The core provision granting the Supreme Court the power to pass any decree or order necessary for doing "complete justice."

• Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955: The section that provides for "Divorce by Mutual Consent" and stipulates a mandatory 6 to 18-month waiting period.

• Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC): Pertaining to cruelty to a married woman by her husband or his relatives.

• The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005

• Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.): Dealing with maintenance for wives, children, and parents.

Constitutional Bench: This judgment was delivered by a Five-Judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court.

Judges: Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Justice Sanjiv Khanna, Justice Abhay S. Oka, Justice Vikram Nath, and Justice J.K. Maheshwari.

Full Case Citation: Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan, (2023)

5. Explanation of the Judgment

The Supreme Court addressed three fundamental questions of law in a structured manner.

Part 1: The Supreme Court's Power Under Article 142

• The Power Explained: Article 142 is a unique and extraordinary power granted exclusively to the Supreme Court. It allows the Court to pass any order necessary to ensure "complete justice" in any case before it. This power is inspired by principles of equity and good conscience.

• Scope and Limitations: The Court clarified that this power is very wide and is not strictly limited by procedural or substantive laws. However, it must be exercised with great restraint and caution. The Court cannot ignore laws that are based on fundamental public policy, but it can "iron out the creases" in a law to achieve a just and equitable outcome in a specific case.

Core Principle Established: Article 142 serves as a "problem-solver," enabling the Supreme Court to transcend technical legal procedures to deliver a fair and complete resolution, particularly when standard laws are insufficient to address the unique hardships of a situation.

Part 2: Waiving the Waiting Period for Mutual Consent Divorce

• The Standard Procedure: Under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, couples must wait for 6 months after their first joint application for divorce before they can file the second motion and obtain the final decree. This is intended as a "cooling-off" period for reflection.

• The Practical Problem: In many cases, couples have already been separated for years, are engaged in bitter litigation, and have reached a comprehensive settlement. Forcing them to wait another 6 months only prolongs their mental and financial agony without any benefit.

• The Supreme Court's Ruling: The Court held that it can use its power under Article 142 to waive this 6-month waiting period and grant an immediate divorce by mutual consent.

• Guidelines for Exercise: This waiver is not automatic. The Court will consider several factors before granting it, including:
  The total length of separation.
  The duration of ongoing litigation.
  The failure of all reconciliation efforts, including mediation.
  The existence of a genuine, voluntary, and fair settlement covering alimony, child custody, and other issues.

• Quashing Connected Cases: As part of doing "complete justice," the Supreme Court can also quash all related legal proceedings, such as criminal cases under Section 498A IPC or cases under the Domestic Violence Act, once the main matrimonial dispute is resolved through a settlement.

Core Principle Established: The Supreme Court can dispense with the procedural requirement of a 6-month waiting period under Article 142 in exceptional cases where the marriage has irretrievably broken down and a fair settlement is in place, thereby bringing a holistic end to all interconnected litigations.

Part 3: Divorce for Irretrievable Breakdown Without Mutual Consent

This is the most significant and progressive part of the judgment.

• The Gap in the Law: The Hindu Marriage Act does not explicitly recognize "irretrievable breakdown of marriage" as a ground for divorce. Traditionally, divorce is granted on "fault" grounds like cruelty or adultery, which forces couples to make ugly allegations against each other.

• The Real-World Issue: Many marriages become dead in practice—spouses live apart for decades, with no emotional connection or possibility of reconciliation. However, if one spouse vengefully withholds consent for divorce, the other remains legally trapped in a dead marriage.

• The Supreme Court's Ruling: The Court held that it can use its power under Article 142 to dissolve such a marriage on the ground of irretrievable breakdown, even if one spouse is opposing the divorce.

• Strict Conditions Apply: The Court emphasized that this power will be used very sparingly, only in the "rarest of rare" cases. Key factors for consideration include:
  A long period of separation (6 years or more being a strong indicator).
  A history of protracted and failed litigation and mediation.
  The Court must be convinced that the marriage is "totally unworkable, emotionally dead, and beyond salvation."

• Safeguarding the Vulnerable Spouse: Crucially, the Court stated that while it can grant the divorce, it will first ensure that the financial interests of the economically weaker spouse (usually the wife) and the welfare of any children are fully protected by ordering adequate and fair alimony and maintenance.

Core Principle Established: To relieve individuals from the agony of a long-dead marriage, the Supreme Court can invoke Article 142 to grant a divorce due to irretrievable breakdown. This is a discretionary remedy of last resort, not a right, and its use is conditional upon ensuring financial justice for the vulnerable party.

6. Conclusion

In summary, the Supreme Court's judgment in Shilpa Sailesh vs. Varun Sreenivasan is a landmark ruling that:

1. Empowers the Judiciary: It firmly reaffirms the Supreme Court's role as a dispenser of complete justice under Article 142, allowing it to address the limitations of existing statutes.

2. Promotes Practical Resolution: It provides a pragmatic path to reduce protracted legal battles in matrimonial cases, enabling couples to swiftly end broken marriages through mutual consent without unnecessary procedural delays.

3. Introduces Compassionate Justice: It acknowledges the harsh reality of "irretrievable breakdown" as a valid, though judicially controlled, ground for divorce, prioritizing human dignity and well-being over preserving the empty shell of a marriage.

4. Balances Power with Responsibility: The judgment meticulously balances this expansive power with self-imposed safeguards, ensuring it is used with caution and always in the interest of justice, particularly for protecting the financial security of the disadvantaged spouse.

ALL INDIA JUDGES ASSOCIATION & OTHERS VS. UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS 2025 INSC 1328

(November 19, 2025)

1. Heading

All India Judges Association & Others vs. Union of India & Others

2. Citation

2025 INSC 1328

3. Subject of the Judgment

This judgment deals with the criteria for determining seniority among judges in the Higher Judicial Services (HJS - District Judges) who are recruited from three different sources: Regular Promotees, those promoted through a competitive exam, and Direct Recruits.

4. Case Details

• Date of Judgment: November 19, 2025

• Bench: Constitution Bench of 5 Judges
  Chief Justice B.R. Gavai
  Justice Surya Kant
  Justice Vikram Nath
  Justice K. Vinod Chandran
  Justice Joymalya Bagchi

• Related Laws & Provisions:
  Constitution of India: Articles 14 (Equality), 16 (Equality in Public Employment), 32 (Power to issue directions), 142 (Enforcement of decrees and orders), 233-235 (Control over Subordinate Judiciary), and 309 (Recruitment and conditions of service).
  Key Precedents Referenced: Rejanish K.V. v. K. Deepa, Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India, State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Triloki Nath Khosa, and the series of All India Judges Association (AIJA) cases.

5. Explanation of the Judgment

Introduction: The Problem of Seniority

The Higher Judicial Service (HJS) in India recruits District Judges from three sources:

1. Regular Promotees (RPs): Civil judges promoted based on seniority and merit.

2. LDCE Promotees (LDCEs): Civil judges promoted through a Limited Departmental Competitive Examination.

3. Direct Recruits (DRs): Advocates directly appointed as District Judges through an exam.

The long-standing dispute was about the seniority among these three groups after they all join the HJS. Regular Promotees argued that their years of experience in the lower judiciary were being ignored, giving an unfair advantage to younger Direct Recruits.

Core Legal Questions & Arguments

The court examined whether it should create new rules to give preference to Promotees (RPs and LDCEs) within the HJS to compensate for their longer journey.

Arguments by Promotees (RPs & LDCEs):

• They have rich, hands-on judicial experience from the lower courts.

• Younger DRs, due to their age advantage, often get faster promotions to top posts like Principal District Judge and even elevation to High Courts, causing "heartburn."

• They proposed measures like giving extra seniority for years served in lower courts or creating separate quotas for promotions within the HJS.

Arguments by Direct Recruits (DRs):

• Once everyone enters the HJS, the "birthmark" of their recruitment source should not matter. All should be treated as equals in a common cadre.

• Seniority and future promotions should be based only on performance and seniority within the HJS, not on past service in a different cadre.

• High Courts are best suited to decide these issues based on state-specific conditions.

The Supreme Court's Analysis & Key Principles (The Rule of Law)

The Court rejected the proposals to give preferential treatment to Promotees within the HJS and laid down the following core principles:

A. The "Birthmark" Theory: A Common Cadre for All

• The Court firmly held that once judges from all three sources are appointed to the HJS, they lose the "birthmark" or identity of their recruitment source.

• They fuse into a single, common cadre of District Judges.

• Creating separate classes within this common cadre based on where they came from would violate the Constitutional principles of equality (Articles 14 and 16).

B. "Heartburn" is Not a Legal Ground for Classification

• The Court acknowledged the feelings of discontent among some Promotees but ruled that personal grievance or "heartburn" is not a valid legal reason to create an artificial classification or grant preferential seniority.

• Career progression to top posts is not a matter of right but must be based on merit and suitability within the HJS.

C. Merit and Seniority within HJS is Paramount

• Promotions to higher grades (Selection Grade, Super Time Scale) and appointments as Principal District Judges must be based on "merit-cum-seniority" evaluated on their service within the HJS.

• Past service in lower courts is irrelevant for these advancements. Its purpose is to help them get into the HJS, not to gain an advantage after joining.

D. Sufficient Opportunities Already Exist

• The Court noted that Promotees already have multiple, accelerated paths to the HJS, including regular promotion, the LDCE route, and now, the opportunity to compete in the Direct Recruitment exam (as per the Rejanish K.V. case).

• Therefore, the system already provides ample chances for capable judicial officers to progress.

The New System: The 4-Point Roster

To bring uniformity across all states, the Supreme Court replaced the existing complex roster systems with a simple 4-Point Annual Roster for determining seniority at the entry point into the HJS.

• The Sequence: 2 RPs → 1 LDCE → 1 DR

• How it works: This 4-point cycle repeats for all appointments made in a single year. The seniority list for that year's batch will follow this order.

• Example: If 8 judges are appointed in a year, the seniority order would be: RP1, RP2, LDCE1, DR1, RP3, RP4, LDCE2, DR2.

Rules for Delayed Appointments:

• If the recruitment process for one source (e.g., DRs) starts in Year A but gets delayed and appointments happen in Year A+1, those appointees will still be placed in the Year A roster, provided the recruitment for the next batch (Year A+1) hasn't started yet.

• This prevents officers from losing seniority just due to administrative delays in their recruitment process.

Filling Unfilled Vacancies:

• If vacancies reserved for DRs or LDCEs remain unfilled due to a lack of suitable candidates, they can be filled by Regular Promotees (RPs).

• However, these RPs will be placed in the next available RP slot in the roster, not in the DR or LDCE slot. This maintains the integrity of the roster system.

6. Conclusion

In summary, the Supreme Court's landmark judgment:

1. Rejected the demand for giving extra weightage to Promotees for their past service in lower courts for seniority within the HJS.

2. Reaffirmed the principle that all officers in the HJS form a common cadre, and their source of recruitment becomes irrelevant after entry.

3. Emphasized that future promotions must be based on merit and seniority within the HJS alone.

4. Introduced a uniform 4-Point Roster System (2:1:1 for RP:LDCE:DR) for all states to determine initial seniority, bringing much-needed clarity and consistency.

5. Directed all State Governments to amend their service rules within three months to align with these new guidelines.

This judgment aims to create a fair, uniform, and merit-based system for the higher judiciary across India, ensuring that the best talent progresses regardless of their entry point into the service.

TOFAN SINGH VS. STATE OF TAMIL NADU (2020)

(2021) 4 SCC 1

(October 29, 2020)

1. Heading

Landmark Judgment on Confessional Statements under the NDPS Act

2. Case Citation

Tofan Singh vs. State of Tamil Nadu (2020)
Reported in: (2021) 4 SCC 1
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Constitutional Bench of 3 Judges: Justice R.F. Nariman, Justice Navin Sinha, and Justice Indira Banerjee.

3. Subject of the Judgment in Short

This judgment primarily deals with two critical questions:

1. Whether an officer investigating a case under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act, 1985, is a "police officer"?

2. Whether a confessional statement recorded by such an officer under Section 67 of the NDPS Act can be used as the sole evidence to convict an accused person?

The Supreme Court answered NO to both questions, providing a major safeguard to the rights of the accused under this stringent law.

4. Related Laws, Sections, and Acts

• Primary Statute: The Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act).
  Section 67: Power to call for information and record statements.
  Section 53: Power to invest certain officers (e.g., from Customs, Excise) with the powers of an officer-in-charge of a police station for investigation.
  Section 42: Power of entry, search, seizure, and arrest without warrant.

• Related Laws:
  The Indian Evidence Act, 1872
  Section 25: Confession made to a police officer cannot be used as evidence against the accused.
  The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC)

• Constitutional Provisions:
  Article 20(3): Right against Self-Incrimination (No person accused of an offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself).
  Article 21: Right to Life and Personal Liberty.
  Article 14: Right to Equality (to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory application of the law).

• Date of Judgment: October 29, 2020.

5. Explanation of the Judgment

A. The Core Problem

Many convictions under the NDPS Act were based solely on confessional statements recorded by investigating officers (from departments like Narcotics Control Bureau, DRI, etc.) under Section 67 of the Act. The accused would later retract these statements, claiming they were made under pressure, threat, or inducement. The legal question was whether these statements, recorded without the safeguards available for a police confession, were reliable enough to convict a person, given the severe punishments under the NDPS Act (often a minimum of 10 years imprisonment).

B. The Two Key Questions Answered by the Court

The Supreme Court broke down the problem into two main legal issues and analyzed them step-by-step.

Issue 1: Is an Officer empowered under Section 53 of the NDPS Act a "Police Officer" for the purpose of Section 25 of the Evidence Act?

Step 1: Understanding Section 25 of the Evidence Act

• This section creates a blanket ban. It says that no confession made to a police officer can be used as evidence in court against an accused person.

• The reason is the historical misuse of power by police to extract confessions through torture, coercion, or promises.

Step 2: The "Functional Test" for a Police Officer

• The term "police officer" is not just limited to a person in a police uniform. The Supreme Court has always used a "functional test".

• If an officer, under any special law, is invested with all the powers of investigation that a police officer in charge of a station has—including the crucial power to file a charge-sheet (final report under Section 173 CrPC)—then such an officer is treated as a "police officer" for the purpose of Section 25.

Step 3: Applying the Test to NDPS Officers

• The Court noted that Section 53 of the NDPS Act explicitly invests officers (e.g., from Customs, Excise) with "the powers of an officer-in-charge of a police station for the investigation of offences under this Act."

• This includes the power to investigate, arrest, and crucially, to file a police report (charge-sheet) before the Special Court.

• Unlike officers under revenue acts (Customs, Excise) whose primary duty is tax collection, NDPS officers are primarily concerned with the prevention, detection, and punishment of serious crimes.

Conclusion on Issue 1:
The Supreme Court held that an officer investigating under Section 53 of the NDPS Act is a "police officer" within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence Act. Therefore, any confession made to such an officer is inadmissible as evidence against the accused.

Issue 2: Can a statement recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS Act be used as a Confession to convict an accused?

Step 1: The Nature and Purpose of Section 67

• The Court analyzed the language of Section 67. It uses words like "call for information" and "enquiry."

• The Court ruled that the power under Section 67 is a preliminary fact-finding power. It is used at a stage before the officer has formed a "reason to believe" that an offence has been committed, which is necessary to proceed with search, seizure, or arrest under Section 42.

• It is not a power to record confessions during a formal investigation.

Step 2: Lack of Safeguards

• The Court contrasted Section 67 with the detailed safeguards in the CrPC (Sections 161-164) for recording witness statements and confessions.

• When police record a statement under Section 161 CrPC, it cannot be used as substantive evidence. A confession can only be recorded by a Magistrate under Section 164 CrPC after ensuring it is voluntary and explaining the consequences to the accused.

• Section 67 of the NDPS Act provides none of these safeguards. Allowing a confession recorded under this section to be the basis of conviction would be a violation of the accused's fundamental rights under:
  Article 20(3): Right against Self-Incrimination.
  Article 21: Right to a fair trial and personal liberty.

Step 3: Avoiding Arbitrariness and Anomaly

• The Court pointed out a major anomaly. If a regular police officer investigates an NDPS case, any confession made to him would be barred by Section 25 of the Evidence Act. But if an officer from the NCB or DRI (also empowered under Section 53) records the same confession under Section 67, it would be admissible.

• This would create an arbitrary and discriminatory situation violating Article 14 of the Constitution, as the admissibility of a confession would depend on which agency arrests the person, even for the same crime.

Conclusion on Issue 2:
The Supreme Court held that a statement recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS Act cannot be treated as a confessional statement for the purpose of convicting an accused. It is not substantive evidence. It can, at best, be used for a limited purpose, like corroborating other evidence, but never as the sole basis for a conviction.

C. Overruling of Previous Judgments

The Constitutional Bench expressly overruled two earlier Supreme Court judgments:

1. Raj Kumar Karwal v. Union of India (1990)

2. Kanhaiyalal v. Union of India (2008)
   These earlier judgments had held that officers under the NDPS Act were not "police officers" and that confessions under Section 67 were admissible. The Court in Tofan Singh found this reasoning flawed and not in line with the protective spirit of the Constitution.

6. Core Principle and Rule of Law Established

The Supreme Court established the following core principles:

1. Stringent Laws Demand Strict Safeguards: The more severe a law is (like the NDPS Act with its harsh punishments and reverse burden of proof), the greater is the need to scrupulously follow procedural safeguards to protect fundamental rights.

2. Functional Test is Paramount: The key to determining if an officer is a "police officer" is their function and powers, not their departmental label. If they have the power to investigate and file a charge-sheet, they are a police officer for the purpose of the ban on confessions.

3. Fundamental Rights Trump Procedural Convenience: The rights against self-incrimination (Article 20(3)) and to a fair trial (Article 21) cannot be bypassed by using a provision like Section 67 of the NDPS Act, which lacks the necessary checks and balances.

4. No Shortcuts to Conviction: The state cannot rely on custodial confessions, which are inherently susceptible to coercion, as easy proof of guilt. The prosecution must gather independent and corroborative evidence to secure a conviction.

7. Conclusion

The Tofan Singh judgment is a landmark ruling that restores the balance between the state's power to combat the menace of drug trafficking and the fundamental rights of an individual. By declaring that confessions to NDPS officers are inadmissible, the Supreme Court has:

• Curbed the potential for misuse and coercion during investigations.

• Upheld the constitutional safeguards of the accused.

• Ensured that convictions are based on credible and corroborative evidence, not just on retractable custodial statements.

This judgment mandates a higher standard of proof and investigation in NDPS cases, aligning India's criminal jurisprudence with the core principles of a fair and just legal system.

NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED VS PRANAY SETHI AND OTHERS, (2017) 

16 SCC 680

(October 31, 2017)

1. Heading

Explaining the Landmark Judgment on Motor Accident Compensation: National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi & Ors

2. Citation

National Insurance Company Limited v. Pranay Sethi and Others, (2017) 16 SCC 680

3. Subject of the Judgment

This judgment provides standardized rules for calculating compensation in cases of death caused by motor vehicle accidents. It specifically settles the law on how to account for a deceased person's future income growth (future prospects) and the amounts to be awarded under conventional heads like loss of companionship and funeral expenses.

4. Case Details

• Date of the Judgment: October 31, 2017

• Constitutional Bench: A Five-Judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court of India.

• Judges:
  Chief Justice Dipak Misra
  Justice A.K. Sikri
  Justice A.M. Khanwilkar
  Justice Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud
  Justice Ashok Bhushan

• Related Laws & Sections:
  The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
  Section 166: Filing an application for compensation on the basis of fault (fault liability).
  Section 168: Principle of "Just Compensation" which the Tribunal must award.
  Section 163-A: A separate scheme for compensation based on a predetermined formula (no-fault liability).

5. Explanation of the Judgment

Background: The Legal Problem

Before this judgment, different Supreme Court benches had given conflicting opinions on two main issues:

1. Future Prospects: Should the calculation of a deceased person's income include an amount for their future salary growth? And if yes, should this apply to self-employed people or those with fixed salaries?

2. Conventional Heads: What should be the standard amount awarded for non-financial losses like loss of spousal companionship (consortium), funeral expenses, and loss of estate?

This confusion led to unfair and inconsistent compensation amounts across India. The Pranay Sethi case was referred to a 5-judge bench to settle these issues once and for all.

Core Principles and Rules of Law Established

The Supreme Court emphasized that the goal is to award "Just Compensation"—an amount that is fair, reasonable, and equitable, not too little (a pittance) nor too much (a windfall). To achieve this, the Court endorsed the principle of standardization, which ensures uniformity and certainty in calculations.

Step-wise Breakdown of the New Guidelines

Step 1: Calculating the Income (The "Multiplicand")

This is the most critical part. The Court ruled that future prospects of income growth must be added for everyone, whether in a permanent job, self-employed, or on a fixed salary. The percentage to be added depends on the deceased's age and employment nature.

A. For a Deceased with a Permanent Job:

• Below 40 years: Add 50% of the actual salary.

• Aged 40-50 years: Add 30% of the actual salary.

• Aged 50-60 years: Add 15% of the actual salary.

• Note: "Actual Salary" means income after deducting tax.

B. For a Self-Employed Person or a Person on a Fixed Salary:

• Below 40 years: Add 40% of the established income.

• Aged 40-50 years: Add 25% of the established income.

• Aged 50-60 years: Add 10% of the established income.

• Note: "Established Income" means the proven income minus tax.

Reasoning: The Court stated that everyone's income tends to increase over time due to inflation, experience, and efforts to improve their standard of living. It is unfair to assume that a self-employed person's income will remain stagnant.

Step 2: Applying the Multiplier

The multiplier is a number based on the age of the deceased, which helps in calculating the total future loss of income.

• The Court approved the multiplier table given in the earlier Sarla Verma case.

• The multiplier is selected solely based on the age of the deceased at the time of death.

Step 3: Deduction for Personal Expenses

Before applying the multiplier, a deduction must be made from the income (after adding future prospects) for the amount the deceased would have spent on themselves.

• The Court approved the guidelines from the Sarla Verma case:
  If the deceased was married with 2-3 dependents, deduct 1/3rd.
  If dependents are 4-6, deduct 1/4th.
  If dependents are more than 6, deduct 1/5th.
  For a bachelor, normally deduct 50%.

Step 4: Compensation for Conventional Heads

The Court set standardized amounts for non-financial losses to ensure uniformity.

• Loss of Estate: ₹15,000
  (Compensation for the loss of the deceased's possessions and assets).

• Loss of Consortium: ₹40,000
  (Compensation to the spouse for the loss of companionship, care, and affection).

• Funeral Expenses: ₹15,000

The Court also ruled that these amounts should be increased by 10% every three years to account for inflation and changing economic conditions.

Conclusion

The Pranay Sethi judgment is a landmark ruling that brought clarity, consistency, and fairness to the process of calculating compensation in motor accident death cases. By standardizing the methods for adding future prospects and awarding conventional damages, the Supreme Court has ensured that:

• Victims' families receive adequate and "just compensation" that reflects true financial loss.

• Tribunals and courts across the country follow a uniform approach.

• Self-employed individuals and those with fixed salaries are not discriminated against.

This judgment is a significant step towards a more equitable and predictable legal system for accident victims and their families.

ASSOCIATION FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORMS & ANR. VS UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 

2024 INSC 113 (February 15, 2024)

1. Heading

Electoral Transparency, Right to Information, and Political Funding: The Constitutional Validity of the Electoral Bond Scheme

2. Citation

• Case Name: Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

• Citation: 2024 INSC 113

• Writ Petition No.: Writ Petition (C) No. 880 of 2017

3. Subject of the Judgment

The Supreme Court unanimously declared the Electoral Bond Scheme, 2018, and the related amendments to various laws unconstitutional. The Court held that the scheme violated the fundamental right of voters to know who is funding political parties, which is essential for free and fair elections, and promoted unchecked corporate influence in Indian democracy.

4. Related and Highlighted Laws, Sections, Acts, Date, and Constitutional Bench

• Date of the Judgment: February 15, 2024

• Constitutional Bench: A five-Judge Constitution Bench led by Chief Justice of India Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud delivered the verdict.

• Highlighted Constitutional Articles:
  Article 19(1)(a): The fundamental Right to Information, which is part of the freedom of speech and expression.
  Article 14: The Right to Equality.

• Laws/Acts Declared Unconstitutional (Amendments):
  Representation of the People Act, 1951
  Companies Act, 2013
  Income Tax Act, 1961

5. Explanation of the Judgment in Step-wise Sequence

The judgment addressed two core issues regarding the Electoral Bond Scheme (EBS): the blanket anonymity of donors and the provision for unlimited corporate funding.

Step 1: Background of the Electoral Bond Scheme

The Government introduced the Electoral Bond Scheme in 2018. It allowed individuals and companies to purchase interest-free financial instruments (Electoral Bonds) from the State Bank of India (SBI) to donate to political parties. The key problem was that the bond did not carry the name of the donor, and political parties were not required to disclose the donor's identity to the Election Commission of India (ECI). The government argued this protected donors from political pressure and helped reduce black money in politics.

Step 2: Violation of the Voter's Right to Information (Article 19(1)(a))

The Supreme Court rejected the argument for anonymity, holding that the right of a citizen to form an informed opinion and make an effective electoral choice is fundamental under Article 19(1)(a).

• Why Information is Key: The Court reasoned that without knowing who funds a political party, a voter cannot determine if the party is influenced by private, vested interests. This lack of transparency leads to the risk of 'quid pro quo' (something for something) arrangements, where large donors influence government policy in their favour.

• Failure of Proportionality: The Court found that while curbing black money is a legitimate goal, the anonymity provided by the EBS was not a suitable or necessary means to achieve it. It held that the scheme unnecessarily restricted the fundamental right to information.

Step 3: Violation of Equality and Free Elections (Article 14)

The Court found that the amendment that removed the limit on how much a company could donate was unconstitutional and arbitrary.

• Corporate Influence: This unlimited funding provision meant that corporations, especially loss-making ones, could make massive donations. The Court noted that such large, concealed donations risk creating a disproportionate influence on the political process, skewing the principle of 'one person, one vote' in favour of wealthy corporate interests.

Step 4: The Final Verdict and Immediate Directions

The Supreme Court unanimously ruled the entire Electoral Bond Scheme and the related legal amendments to be unconstitutional. The Court issued strict and immediate directions:

1. The State Bank of India (SBI) must immediately stop issuing any further Electoral Bonds.

2. The SBI was ordered to disclose all details of every Electoral Bond purchased and redeemed since 2019, including the name of the purchaser, the denomination, and the recipient political party.

3. The Election Commission of India (ECI) was directed to publish all this information on its official website for the public to access.

6. Core Principle and Rule of Law Covered

Core Principle

The paramount core principle established is that transparency is the lifeblood of electoral democracy. The Court affirmed that constitutional democracy demands that the public have the necessary information to hold their representatives accountable.

Rule of Law Established

1. Fundamental Right to Know Funding: The identity of political donors is not a matter of privacy for the donor but a matter of public interest, which is integral to the voter's fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a).

2. Statutory Amendments Must Be Constitutional: Any legislative change (like the removal of caps on corporate donations) that fundamentally alters the nature of the electoral process and leads to manifest arbitrariness is void, as it violates the right to equality (Article 14).

7. Conclusion

The Supreme Court's judgment in the Electoral Bonds case is a defining moment for electoral finance in India. It firmly established that the fundamental rights of citizens, particularly the right to information, cannot be compromised by laws that promote political anonymity and unchecked corporate power. The ruling mandates full disclosure as the only constitutional way forward for political funding, ensuring that democracy is based on the will of the informed citizens, not the hidden interests of large donors.

SMT. NARAYANAMMA & ANR. VS. SRI GOVINDAPPA & ORS. Civil Appeal No. 7630-7631 of 2019 (September 26, 2019)

1. Heading

This case is a landmark judgment by the Supreme Court of India that clarifies the law on the enforceability of contracts that are made in violation of a statutory prohibition.

2. Citation

Civil Appeal Nos. 7630-7631 of 2019 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) Nos.29205-29206 of 2015)
Case Name: Smt. Narayanamma & Anr. vs. Sri Govindappa & Ors.
Court: Supreme Court of India
Date of Judgment: September 26, 2019

3. Constitutional Bench

The judgment was delivered by a Bench of Three Hon'ble Judges:

• Justice Arun Mishra

• Justice M. R. Shah

• Justice B.R. Gavai (Author of the Judgment)

4. Subject of the Judgment

Whether an Agreement to Sell a property, executed during a legally mandated non-alienation period, is valid and enforceable in a court of law.

5. Related Laws & Legal Maxims

• Primary Law: Section 61 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961. This section prohibits the transfer (sale, gift, mortgage, lease, etc.) of certain granted agricultural lands for 15 years.

• Legal Maxims Applied:
  Ex turpi causa non oritur actio: Meaning "No action arises from a base cause." A court will not help a person who bases their lawsuit on an illegal or immoral act.
  In pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis: Meaning "In equal fault, the condition of the defendant is stronger." When both parties are equally at fault, the law favours the party who is in possession (the defendant).

Explanation of the Judgment

A. Background Facts (The Story of the Case)

1. The Property: A piece of agricultural land was granted by the government to one Bale Venkataramanappa under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act.

2. The Legal Restriction: The grant certificate had a crucial condition: the land could not be sold or transferred for 15 years (until October 13, 1988). This was to prevent immediate speculation and ensure the land benefited the grantee.

3. The Disputed Transactions: Despite this ban:
   In April 1990, Venkataramanappa mortgaged the land to the plaintiff, Govindappa.
   Just one month later, in May 1990, he entered into an Agreement to Sell the same land to Govindappa for Rs. 46,000.
   This agreement stated that the full amount had been paid and possession of the land had been handed over to Govindappa.

4. The Lawsuit: After Venkataramanappa's death, Govindappa filed a suit for Specific Performance to compel the legal heirs (the defendants) to formally execute the sale deed.

B. The Journey Through the Courts

• Trial Court: Dismissed the suit. It held that the agreement was made during the 15-year ban period and was therefore void and unenforceable.

• First Appellate Court: Overturned the trial court's decision. It decreed the suit in favour of Govindappa, focusing on the fact that the full payment was made and possession was transferred.

• High Court: Upheld the appellate court's decision, stating that the defendants had not contested the case properly.

• Supreme Court: The legal heirs (defendants) appealed to the Supreme Court, which became the final arbiter.

C. The Core Legal Issue Before the Supreme Court

The central question was: Can a court enforce a contract that was created in direct violation of a law?

D. The Supreme Court's Analysis & Reasoning

The Supreme Court conducted a deep analysis, reversing the lower courts' decisions. Its reasoning is based on two key pillars:

Pillar 1: The Strict Statutory Prohibition

• The Court closely examined Section 61 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act.

• It emphasized that the law explicitly forbids any "sale, gift, exchange, mortgage, lease or assignment" within the 15-year period.

• The Court saw the sequence of events—a mortgage followed immediately by an agreement to sell with full payment and possession transfer—as a clear attempt to bypass the law. In substance, it was a disguised transfer of the property, which was illegal under Section 61.

Pillar 2: The Application of Legal Doctrines and Public Policy

The Court relied on its own previous landmark judgments to establish the following principles:

1. The "Polluted Hand" Doctrine (Ex turpi causa non oritur actio)
   The Court stated that no person can seek the help of a court to enforce a right that originates from their own illegal act.
   In this case, Govindappa's entire claim was based on the illegal agreement. He could not prove his case without relying on this tainted transaction. Therefore, his hands were "polluted," and the court could not assist him.

2. The "Equal Fault" Doctrine (In pari delicto)
   Both Venkataramanappa (the seller) and Govindappa (the buyer) were equally aware and at fault in violating the law. They were "confederates in the illegality."
   In such situations, the court must ask: Which outcome is less harmful to public interest?

3. Active vs. Passive Assistance of the Court
   The Court drew a critical distinction:
   Active Assistance: If the Court were to force the defendants to sell the land (specific performance), it would be actively assisting in completing an illegal transaction. This would make the court an "instrument of fraud" and severely damage public confidence in the justice system.
   Passive Assistance: If the Court refuses to enforce the agreement, the defendants (the legal heirs) get to keep the property. While they benefit from their predecessor's illegality, the court is only passively allowing the status quo (possession) to remain. It is not enforcing the illegal act.

E. The Conclusion and Final Decision

The Supreme Court held that upholding public policy and the integrity of the legal system was more important than enforcing the contract.

• It allowed the appeals filed by the legal heirs (Smt. Narayanamma & others).

• The judgments of the High Court and the First Appellate Court were set aside.

• The Trial Court's order dismissing the suit was restored.

• The Agreement to Sell dated May 15, 1990, was declared void and unenforceable.

Core Principle and Rule of Law Established

This judgment firmly establishes the following core legal principles:

1. Contracts Against Law are Void: An agreement made in direct violation of a statutory prohibition is not merely voidable; it is void and unenforceable from its inception.

2. Substance Over Form: Courts will look at the true nature and substance of a transaction. Labeling an outright transfer as an "agreement to sell" will not save it if it effectively circumvents the law.

3. Public Policy is Paramount: Courts will refuse to enforce illegal contracts, even if both parties agreed to them. The duty of the court to uphold the law and public interest overrides the terms of a private contract.

4. The Court is Not a Tool for Illegality: A court of law will not render "active assistance" to a party to complete an illegal transaction. It is better for the court to remain passive and let the possession lie where it is than to become a facilitator of illegality.

In simple terms, you cannot make an illegal deal and then run to the court to get it enforced. The Supreme Court's door will be closed to you.

IN RE: SUMMONING ADVOCATES WHO GIVE LEGAL OPINION - PROTECTING THE SANCTITY OF LAWYER-CLIENT CONFIDENTIALITY  2025 INSC 1275 (October 31, 2025)

1. Heading

In Re: Summoning Advocates who give legal opinion - Protecting the Sanctity of Lawyer-Client Confidentiality

2. Citation

Suo Motu Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 2 of 2025
Decided On: October 31, 2025

3. Subject of the Judgment

This judgment addresses the critical issue of whether and under what circumstances the police or investigating agencies can summon lawyers for questioning regarding cases in which they are representing a client. The Supreme Court strongly protected the confidentiality of lawyer-client communications, setting strict boundaries for investigative powers.

4. Case Details & Legal Provisions

• Date of Judgment: October 31, 2025

• Constitutional Bench: A Three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court of India.

• Judges: Chief Justice B.R. Gavai, Justice K. Vinod Chandran, and Justice N.V. Anjaria.

• Laws & Sections Discussed:
  Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA):
  Section 132: Protects professional communications between a lawyer and client (Attorney-Client Privilege).
  Sections 133 & 134: Supplementary rules on privilege and confidential communications.
  Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS):
  Section 175: Power of the police to investigate cognizable cases.
  Section 179: Power to summon persons for questioning.
  Section 528: Power of the High Court to quash illegal orders or proceedings.
  The Constitution of India:
  Article 19(1)(g): Right to practice any profession.
  Article 21: Right to life and personal liberty, which includes a fair trial and the right to legal representation.
  Article 20(3): Right against self-incrimination.
  The Advocates Act, 1961: Governs the legal profession.

5. Explanation of the Judgment

A. Background: What Prompted the Supreme Court?

The case began when a lawyer in Ahmedabad, who had successfully secured bail for his client, was issued a notice by the police under Section 179 of the BNSS. The notice demanded his appearance to "know true details of the facts and circumstances" of the case. The lawyer challenged this, but the Gujarat High Court dismissed his plea. This led the Supreme Court to take up the matter suo motu (on its own) to settle this important question of law affecting the entire legal fraternity.

B. The Core Legal Questions

The Court framed two main questions:

1. Can the police directly summon a lawyer for questioning just because they are advising or representing a party in a case?

2. Even if the police suspect the lawyer's role is "more than just a lawyer," should there be judicial oversight before such a summons is issued?

C. The Supreme Court's Reasoning & Key Principles

1. The Sacred Attorney-Client Privilege is Fundamental

• The Court emphasized that Section 132 of the BSA is the cornerstone of the justice system. It creates a zone of privacy where a client can speak freely with their lawyer without fear of disclosure.

• This privilege is essential for effective legal representation. Without it, a client may not share all facts, weakening their defence. The privilege belongs to the client, but the lawyer is legally obligated to uphold it.

2. Lawyers are Not a Source of Information for the Police

• The Court stated that an investigating agency's job is to collect evidence independently. A lawyer cannot be used as a shortcut to get information about their client or the case.

• Summoning a lawyer to "know the facts of the case" is an "abject failure" and an "illegal" tactic by the investigation.

3. Exceptions are Narrow and Clear

• The privilege is not absolute. The proviso to Section 132 allows disclosure in two specific situations:
  If the communication was made in furtherance of an illegal purpose (e.g., planning a crime).
  If the lawyer observes a fact showing that a crime or fraud has been committed during their engagement.

• The Court stressed that any summons based on these exceptions must clearly state the grounds.

4. No Need for New Guidelines, but Strong Safeguards are Laid Down

• The Bar argued for creating special committees of lawyers (peer review) to approve such summons, similar to guidelines in the Jacob Mathew (for doctors) and Vishaka (for sexual harassment) cases.

• The Court declined this request, stating that the existing laws (Sections 132 BSA and 528 BNSS) are sufficient protection. Creating a separate procedure for lawyers would be an "artificial classification" and could frustrate the investigation process.

• However, the Court used its authority to issue specific directions to prevent misuse of power.

D. The Final Directions & Conclusions

The Supreme Court issued the following binding directions:

1. General Prohibition: The police cannot summon a lawyer merely to get details of a case they are handling. The summons in the present case was declared illegal.

2. Strict Conditions for Exception: If a summons is issued under the exceptions to Section 132, it must:
   Explicitly state the specific facts and reasons for invoking the exception.
   Be issued only with the prior written approval of a senior police officer (not below the rank of Superintendent of Police), who must record their satisfaction.

3. Judicial Review is the Remedy: Any such summons is subject to challenge before the High Court under Section 528 of the BNSS.

4. Rules for Document Production:
   The privilege under Section 132 does not apply to the physical production of documents. A lawyer or client can be directed to produce a document in court.
   However, the lawyer/client can still raise an objection in court, and the court will decide if the document is protected or can be used as evidence.

5. Special Rules for Digital Devices: If a lawyer's digital device (laptop, phone) is summoned, it must be produced only before the court. The examination must happen in the presence of the lawyer and their client, who can have a digital expert present to ensure only relevant, non-privileged data is accessed.

6. In-House Counsel Not Covered: The Court ruled that full-time, salaried in-house lawyers are not "Advocates" as defined under the Advocates Act, 1961, and thus cannot claim the privilege under Section 132. This is because they lack the independence from their employer that a private practicing lawyer has.

6. Core Principle and Rule of Law Established

• The power to summon a witness is not the power to breach the protected zone of lawyer-client confidentiality. The sanctity of this relationship is fundamental to a fair justice system and is protected by statute and the Constitution.

• While an advocate is not above the law and can be investigated for personal involvement in a crime, their professional role and the confidential communications that flow from it are shielded from coercive investigative processes.

• The judgment establishes a clear rule of law: Investigating agencies must have credible, specific reasons falling strictly within the exceptions of Section 132, approved by a senior officer, before they can even think of summoning an opposing lawyer. Vague fishing expeditions are illegal.

Conclusion

This landmark judgment is a powerful reaffirmation of the foundational role lawyers play in the administration of justice. By drawing a bright line around attorney-client privilege, the Supreme Court has fortified the rights of every accused person to a robust and confidential defence. It serves as a stern warning to investigating agencies against resorting to tactics that undermine this sacred professional bond, ensuring that the right to a fair trial remains inviolable.

VINUBHAI HARIBHAI MALAVIYA & ORS. VS. THE STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR - A LANDMARK JUDGMENT ON MAGISTRATE'S POWER TO ORDER FURTHER INVESTIGATION Criminal Appeal No. 478-479 of 2017 (October 16, 2019)

1. Heading

Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya & Ors. vs. The State of Gujarat & Anr. - A Landmark Judgment on Magistrate's Power to Order Further Investigation

2. Citation

Criminal Appeal Nos. 478-479 of 2017
Decided On: October 16, 2019

3. Subject of the Judgment

This judgment conclusively settles the law on whether a Magistrate has the power to order further investigation after taking cognizance of an offence and even after the accused has appeared in court. The Supreme Court held that a Magistrate does possess this power until the stage when the trial actually begins, i.e., when charges are framed.

4. Case Details & Legal Provisions

• Date of Judgment: October 16, 2019

• Constitutional Bench: A Three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court of India.

• Judges: Justice R.F. Nariman, Justice Surya Kant, and Justice V. Ramasubramanian.

• Laws & Sections Discussed:
  The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC):
  Section 156(3): Power of Magistrate to order an investigation.
  Section 173(8): Power of the police to conduct "further investigation" even after filing a report.
  Section 2(h): Definition of "Investigation".
  Section 190: Cognizance of offences by Magistrates.
  The Constitution of India:
  Article 21: Right to Life and Personal Liberty, which includes the right to a fair trial and a fair investigation.

5. Explanation of the Judgment

A. Background of the Case (What was the dispute?)

• An FIR was lodged in 2009 accusing Vinubhai Malaviya and others of blackmail and using fake documents to grab agricultural land.

• The police investigated, filed a charge-sheet, and the Magistrate took cognizance, issuing summons to the accused.

• The accused then filed applications requesting the Magistrate to order a "further investigation" under Section 173(8) of the CrPC. They claimed new evidence showed the original complainants were themselves involved in a fraud regarding the land's ownership.

• The Magistrate rejected these applications. However, the Sessions Court allowed them and ordered further investigation.

• The Gujarat High Court overturned the Sessions Court's order. The High Court ruled that once a Magistrate takes cognizance, he loses the power to order further investigation. This is the legal question that went to the Supreme Court.

B. The Core Legal Question

Does a Magistrate have the power to order further investigation under Section 156(3) read with Section 173(8) of the CrPC after taking cognizance of an offence and after the accused has appeared in court?

C. The Supreme Court's Analysis & Reasoning

Step 1: The Primacy of a Fair Investigation (Link to Article 21)

• The Court began by emphasizing that a fair and just investigation is the foundation of a fair trial.

• Citing Article 21 (Right to Life and Personal Liberty), the Court stated that the procedure established by law must be "right, just, and fair." This constitutional mandate must guide the interpretation of the CrPC.

• The ultimate goal is to ensure that the guilty are punished and the innocent are not arraigned. Denying a further investigation when fresh facts emerge could lead to a miscarriage of justice.

Step 2: Interpreting the CrPC Provisions Holistically

• The Court analyzed the relevant sections of the CrPC together:
  Section 2(h) defines "investigation" broadly to include "all proceedings for the collection of evidence."
  Section 156(3) gives the Magistrate the power to order "such an investigation."
  Section 173(8) explicitly allows the police to conduct "further investigation" even after filing a report.

• The Court reasoned that if the police can conduct further investigation, the Magistrate, who supervises the police, must also have the power to direct them to do so to ensure a "proper investigation." The power under Section 156(3) is a wide supervisory power.

Step 3: Clarifying the 'Cognizance' Confusion - 'Inquiry' vs. 'Trial'

• The Court made a crucial distinction between 'inquiry' and 'trial'.

• A 'trial' commences only when charges are framed against the accused.

• Everything before that—from taking cognizance to considering evidence—is part of the 'inquiry' stage.

• Therefore, the power to investigate (including further investigation) continues throughout the inquiry stage and does not end the moment the Magistrate takes cognizance.

Step 4: Overruling Conflicting Judgments

• The Supreme Court specifically overruled its own earlier judgments in cases like Amrutbhai Shambubhai Patel and Bikash Ranjan Rout, which had taken a narrow view that the Magistrate's power ends after cognizance.

• The Court found these views to be incorrect as they ignored the definition of "investigation" in Section 2(h) and the overarching principle of a fair investigation under Article 21.

D. The Core Principle and Rule of Law Established

• A Magistrate has the power to order further investigation at any stage before the commencement of the trial, i.e., before the framing of charges.

• This power can be exercised suo motu (on its own motion) by the Magistrate or on an application by any party, including the accused.

• The power does not cease merely because cognizance has been taken, a charge-sheet has been filed, or the accused has appeared before the court.

• The goal is to discover the truth and ensure substantial justice, which is more important than the delay caused by further investigation.

6. Conclusion & Final Outcome

• Legal Principle Upheld: The Supreme Court set aside the Gujarat High Court's ruling and authoritatively held that Magistrates do have the power to order further investigation post-cognizance until the trial begins.

• Application to the Case: However, in this specific case, the Court found that the facts presented by the accused were not a mere "further investigation" of the original FIR but pointed towards a separate and distinct crime (forgery and fraud by the original complainants).

• Final Order: Instead of ordering further investigation in the existing case, the Supreme Court directed the police to register a new FIR based on the fresh evidence and investigate it separately. The trials of the two interconnected cases could be clubbed together later if the Magistrate so decided.

In essence, this judgment strengthens the hands of the judiciary at the grassroots level, empowering Magistrates to be active seekers of the truth and ensuring that the noble goal of justice is not sacrificed at the altar of procedural technicalities.

LALAN D. @ LAL & ANR. VS. THE ORIENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD Civil Appeal No. 2855 of 2020 (17th September, 2020)

1. Case Citation

Lalan D. @ Lal & Anr. vs. The Oriental Insurance Company Ltd.
Civil Appeal No. 2855 of 2020 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 2131 of 2018)
Decided on: 17th September, 2020

2. Bench

A Three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court of India comprising Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Justice Ajay Rastogi, and Justice Aniruddha Bose.

3. Subject of the Judgment

This case revolves around determining what constitutes "just compensation" for a road accident victim who survived but was left with 100% permanent disability, requiring lifelong and round-the-clock care. The Supreme Court stepped in to significantly enhance the compensation awarded by the lower courts, focusing on critical aspects often overlooked, such as future income growth, caregiver costs, and compensation for immense pain and suffering.

4. Related Laws and Legal Precedents

• Primary Legislation: The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (Specifically, Section 166 for filing compensation claims).

• Key Legal Precedents:
  National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Pranay Sethi (2017): Made it mandatory to add "future prospects" to the victim's income to calculate just compensation.
  Sarla Verma vs. Delhi Transport Corp. (2009): Provided a standardized multiplier table based on the victim's age to calculate future losses.
  Parminder Singh vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. (2019): Applied the principle of future prospects in a case of permanent disability.
  Raj Kumar vs. Ajay Kumar (2011): Explained the relationship between compensation for loss of earning capacity and other non-financial losses like loss of amenities in life.

5. Background of the Case

On December 31, 2003, Mr. Lalan, a 34-year-old skilled construction worker, was hit by a vehicle while riding his bicycle. He suffered severe head injuries, resulting in brain damage, paralysis, and an inability to speak. He was left completely bed-ridden and in a state described by the High Court as being virtually a "vegetable." His wife had to become his full-time caregiver.

The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal initially awarded ₹4,00,000. The Kerala High Court, recognizing the severity of his condition, enhanced the compensation to approximately ₹4,47,000. Still dissatisfied, the victim and his wife appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the compensation was still not "just" given his catastrophic condition.

6. The Supreme Court's Analysis and Decision

The Supreme Court meticulously recalculated the compensation, addressing each head of claim with a liberal and compassionate approach.

A. Loss of Future Earning Capacity

• The Issue: The High Court had calculated this based on a monthly income of ₹3,500 but had not added anything for "future prospects," i.e., the potential increase in his income over time.

• The Supreme Court's Ruling: The Court applied the landmark Pranay Sethi principle. It held that even for a skilled labourer like Mr. Lalan, who was not in permanent employment, a 40% addition for future prospects was mandatory. This raised his notional monthly income to ₹4,900.

• Calculation: Using this enhanced income (₹4,900 x 12 months) and applying a multiplier of 16 (as per his age), the Court awarded ₹9,40,800 for loss of future earnings, considering his 100% disability.

B. Compensation for Caregiver and Future Medical Treatment

• The Issue: The Tribunal had awarded a meager ₹6,000 for "bystander expenses," which was grossly insufficient for his condition.

• The Supreme Court's Ruling: The Court took a realistic view, stating that a victim in a "vegetable" state requires lifelong, round-the-clock care. It recognized that family members, like his wife, become de facto caregivers, sacrificing their own ability to earn. The Court rejected the insurance company's demand for formal bills, acknowledging the impracticality of maintaining such records in traumatic times.

• Decision: It awarded a lump sum of ₹7,00,000 to cover the costs of a full-time attendant and future medical needs.

C. Compensation for Pain and Suffering

• The Issue: The High Court had awarded only ₹40,000 for a man condemned to a lifetime of immobility and dependency.

• The Supreme Court's Ruling: The Court held that this amount was wholly inadequate to compensate for the immense and lifelong physical and mental agony endured by the victim.

• Decision: It significantly enhanced the compensation under this head to ₹3,00,000.

D. Compensation for Loss of Amenities

• The Issue: The High Court had awarded ₹40,000 for the loss of enjoyment of life.

• The Supreme Court's Ruling: Referring to the Raj Kumar case, the Court reasoned that when a victim is compensated for 100% loss of future earning capacity, a separate large award for "loss of amenities" becomes less significant.

• Decision: It reduced this amount to a token sum of ₹10,000.

Final Compensation: After including other conventional heads like medical and transportation costs, the Supreme Court enhanced the total compensation from approximately ₹4.47 Lakhs to ₹20,26,800.

7. Core Principles and Rule of Law Established

This judgment establishes several vital legal principles:

1. Future Prospects are Universal: The principle of adding future prospects to income, established in death cases (Pranay Sethi), is firmly applied to cases of permanent disability, ensuring victims are compensated for their lost potential.

2. Compassionate and Realistic Assessment: Courts must take a practical and humane approach. The lack of formal bills for caregiver services cannot be a ground to deny compensation when the need for such care is obvious and is typically provided by family members.

3. "Just Compensation" Must be Meaningful: Compensation for non-pecuniary heads like "pain and suffering" must be substantial and truly reflective of the victim's condition, not just a token amount.

4. Holistic View of Compensation: The judgment provides clarity on the interplay between different heads of compensation, ensuring that awards are logical and not duplicative.

8. Conclusion

The Supreme Court's judgment in the case of Lalan D. @ Lal is a landmark ruling that places the welfare of severely disabled accident victims at the forefront. By significantly enhancing the compensation, the Court ensured that the legal concept of "just compensation" is translated into a realistic, substantial, and compassionate financial support system. This judgment serves as a crucial precedent, guiding courts to interpret compensation laws liberally to truly uphold justice for victims who face a lifetime of hardship and dependency.

M/S SIDDAMSETTY INFRA PROJECTS PVT. LTD VS KATTA SUJATHA REDDY & ORS 2024 INSC 861 (November 08, 2024)

1. Heading

Landmark Judgment on Review Petitions, Specific Performance, and Limitation

2. Citation

Review Petition (C) No. 1565 of 2022 in Civil Appeal No. 5822 of 2022
M/s Siddamsetty Infra Projects Pvt. Ltd. (Petitioner) vs. Katta Sujatha Reddy & Ors. (Respondents)

3. Subject of the Judgment

This judgment deals with a Review Petition where the Supreme Court reconsidered its own earlier decision. The core issues were whether a suit for specific performance (to force the completion of a property sale) was filed within the allowed time limit (limitation) and whether the buyer was entitled to get the property.

4. Case Details & Related Laws

• Date of Judgment: November 08, 2024

• Constitutional Bench: A Three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court of India.

• Judges: Chief Justice Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, Justice J.B. Pardiwala, and Justice Manoj Misra.

• Citation: 2024 INSC 861

Related Laws, Sections, and Acts:

• The Limitation Act, 1963: Article 54 (Time limit for filing a suit for specific performance).

• The Specific Relief Act, 1963:
  Section 10 (Discretion of court to order specific performance).
  Section 16(c) (Plaintiff must prove readiness and willingness to perform the contract).

• Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC): Order XLVII Rule 1 (Grounds for filing a review petition).

• Transfer of Property Act, 1882: Section 52 (Doctrine of Lis Pendens - property cannot be transferred during pending litigation).

5. Explanation of the Judgment

Here is a step-by-step breakdown of the case and the Supreme Court's reasoning.

A. Background of the Case (The Story)

1. Original Sale (1994): In 1994, the original owners agreed to sell a large piece of land to a group of buyers (the "Vendors"). The Vendors paid the full amount and took possession but never got a registered sale deed. Instead, they got an Irrevocable Power of Attorney.

2. Agreement with Siddamsetty (1997): In 1997, the Vendors entered into two agreements to sell a part of this land to M/s Siddamsetty Infra Projects Pvt. Ltd. (the "Petitioner").

3. Key Clause: Clause 3 of the agreement stated that the Petitioner had to pay the balance sale consideration within three months. The Vendors also had to provide certain certificates (like a non-encumbrance certificate) within the same period.

4. Dispute: The Petitioner claimed it paid over 90% of the total price but the Vendors failed to provide the necessary certificates. The Vendors refused to execute the sale deed.

5. Lawsuit (2002): The Petitioner filed a suit in 2002, asking the court to force the Vendors to sell the property (specific performance).

B. Journey Through the Courts

• Trial Court (2010): Dismissed the suit. It said the suit was filed too late (barred by limitation) and that the Petitioner was not "ready and willing" to perform its part of the contract.

• High Court (2021): Partly allowed the appeal. It held that the suit was filed on time and since the Petitioner had paid 90% of the price, it should get 90% of the property.

• Supreme Court - First Round (2022): Overturned the High Court's decision. It held that time was of the essence of the contract, the suit was time-barred, and the Petitioner was not entitled to specific performance. It only ordered the Vendors to refund the money paid.

• Supreme Court - Review Petition (This Judgment): The Petitioner asked the Supreme Court to review its own 2022 judgment.

C. Core Legal Principles & The Supreme Court's Review

The Review Bench found "errors apparent on the face of the record" in the 2022 judgment, which is a valid ground for review.

I. Error 1: Misinterpretation of Clause 3 - Was Time of the Essence?

• What the 2022 Court Said: It interpreted Clause 3 to mean that only the buyer (Petitioner) had to meet the 3-month deadline, failing which their advance would be forfeited. It concluded that this made time of the essence.

• What the Review Court Found: This was a clear error. The Review Court pointed out that Clause 3 also stated that the "agreement of sale will be cancelled" if the Vendors failed to provide the certificates within three months. The 2022 judgment had completely missed this part.

• Conclusion: Since both parties had obligations with consequences for failure, the contract could not be interpreted to make time of the essence only for the buyer. Time was not of the essence.

II. Error 2: Misunderstanding the 1994 Agreement

• What the 2022 Court Said: It wrongly assumed that the 1994 agreement mentioned in Clause 21 was an earlier failed agreement between the Petitioner and the Vendors, making the 1997 agreement a "last opportunity."

• What the Review Court Found: This was a factual error. The 1994 agreement was between the original owners and the Vendors. The Petitioner was not a party to it. Using this wrong fact to interpret the contract was a serious mistake.

III. Impact on Limitation (The Time Limit)

• Law (Article 54, Limitation Act):
  First Part: If a date for performance is fixed, the 3-year limit starts from that date.
  Second Part: If no date is fixed, the limit starts from when the plaintiff is refused performance.

• Application: Since the Court now held that no date was fixed for the overall performance (execution of the sale deed), the second part applied. The refusal happened when the Vendors replied to the legal notice in April 2000. The suit, filed in 2002, was within the 3-year limit.

IV. Error 3: Readiness and Willingness of the Petitioner

• What the 2022 Court Said: It held that the Vendors had produced the necessary documents and the Petitioner was not ready and willing.

• What the Review Court Found: This ignored the findings of the Trial Court and High Court. The evidence, especially the cross-examination of the Vendors' witnesses, clearly showed that the Vendors never obtained or provided the required certificates. This finding was never challenged by the Vendors in the High Court. The Petitioner, having paid 90% of the price, had clearly shown its readiness and willingness.

D. The Issue of Lis Pendens (Transfer During Litigation)

The Respondents argued that after the 2022 judgment, they had sold the property to a third party before the Review Petition was formally registered by the Court.

• The Law (Section 52, Transfer of Property Act): The doctrine of Lis Pendens states that once a lawsuit involving a property right is filed, that property cannot be transferred by any party in a way that affects the outcome of the case.

• The Court's Ruling: The "pendency" of a case starts from the day it is instituted (filed), not when the court registers it or issues a notice. Since the review petition was filed within the 30-day limit, the subsequent sale of the property was illegal and void as per the lis pendens doctrine. The third-party buyer is bound by the final outcome of this case.

6. Conclusion & Final Decision

• The Supreme Court allowed the Review Petition.

• It found that the 2022 judgment suffered from grave errors apparent on the face of the record in interpreting the contract and assessing the facts.

• The Court recalled and set aside its own 2022 judgment.

• The High Court's 2021 judgment was restored. This means:
  The suit for specific performance is decreed.
  The Petitioner is entitled to get 90% of the suit property registered in its name, proportionate to the 90% of the sale price it had already paid.

Core Principle and Rule of Law Established

This judgment reinforces several key legal principles:

1. Strict Grounds for Review: A review of a Supreme Court judgment is not a second appeal. It is only allowed in cases of a clear error apparent on the face of the record, which strikes the court upon a simple reading, without lengthy debate.

2. Interpretation of Contracts: Courts must read contract clauses in their entirety and context. Ignoring a key phrase can lead to a fundamental misinterpretation, as happened with Clause 3 in this case.

3. Limitation for Specific Performance: Whether a contract fixes a date for performance depends on a holistic reading of its terms. The consequences for both parties are crucial in determining if time was of the essence.

4. Doctrine of Lis Pendens: This doctrine is crucial for preventing parties from making a court's judgment meaningless by transferring the property during the case. Pendency begins the moment a case is filed in court, protecting the subject matter of the litigation from such transfers.

A RAJA VS D KUMAR 2025 INSC 629

(May 06, 2025)

1. Case Heading

A. Raja vs. D. Kumar

2. Citation

2025 INSC 629
Civil Appeal No. 2758 of 2023
Supreme Court of India

3. Subject of the Judgment

This judgment deals with whether a candidate's Caste Certificate can be challenged and invalidated directly through an Election Petition, or if there is a separate, dedicated legal process for it.

4. Key Details of the Judgment

• Date of Judgment: May 06, 2025

• Constitutional Bench: A 3-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court of India.

• Judges: Justice Abhay S. Oka, Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah, and Justice Augustine George Masih.

• Laws & Sections Discussed:
  The Representation of the People Act, 1951: Sections 100, 116-A.
  The Constitution of India: Article 341 (Power of President to specify Scheduled Castes).
  The Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950: The Presidential Order that lists Scheduled Castes state-wise.
  The Kerala (Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes) Regulation of Issue of Community Certificates Act, 1996 (Kerala Act): Specifically, Section 10 which talks about the "Burden of proof".
  The Indian Evidence Act, 1872: Sections 106 and 114.

5. Explanation of the Judgment

A. Background: What was the Case About?

• The Election: In the 2021 Kerala Assembly elections, A. Raja (the Appellant) contested and won from the Devikulam constituency, a seat reserved for Scheduled Castes (SCs).

• The Challenge: His defeated opponent, D. Kumar (the Respondent), filed an Election Petition in the High Court.

• The Allegation: Kumar claimed that Raja was not a member of the 'Hindu Parayan' caste of Kerala and was, in fact, a Christian who had been baptized. He argued that since Raja was not a Hindu from a Kerala SC community, his election nomination should have been rejected, and his victory was void.

• High Court's Decision: The Kerala High Court agreed with Kumar and declared Raja's election void.

• Appeal to Supreme Court: Raja appealed to the Supreme Court against this decision.

B. The Core Legal Questions Before the Supreme Court

1. Can an Election Petition be used as a direct route to challenge the validity of a Caste Certificate issued by a competent government authority?

2. Who has the burden of proof in such a case – the candidate (Raja) to prove his caste, or the challenger (Kumar) to prove his allegations?

3. Did Raja's family "profess" Christianity, thereby losing their SC status?

C. The Supreme Court's Step-by-Step Reasoning and Decision

Step 1: The Standard of Proof in an Election Petition is Very High

• The Court reiterated that an Election Petition is akin to a criminal case. The person challenging the election (Kumar) must prove his allegations "beyond reasonable doubt", not just by a "preponderance of probability". This sets a very high bar.

Step 2: A Caste Certificate Cannot Be Challenged Directly in an Election Petition

• This is the most significant legal principle established by this judgment.

• The Court examined the Kerala Act of 1996, which creates a complete system for issuing, verifying, and cancelling caste certificates. It involves a Competent Authority, a Scrutiny Committee, and even Special Courts.

• The Court ruled that this law is a "complete code" in itself. If someone wants to challenge a caste certificate, they must follow the process under this specific law (i.e., approach the Scrutiny Committee).

• An Election Petition under the Representation of the People Act is not the correct forum to mount such a challenge. The phrase "in any trial" in Section 10 of the Kerala Act refers only to trials for offences under that Act, not to election petitions.

Step 3: The Burden of Proof was Wrongly Placed on Raja

• The High Court had placed the burden on Raja to prove that he was a Hindu and belonged to the SC community.

• The Supreme Court overturned this. It held that since Kumar was the one making the allegation, the burden was on him to prove it beyond reasonable doubt. Raja's valid caste certificate was presumed to be correct unless conclusively disproved.

Step 4: The Evidence of Religious Conversion was Weak and Unreliable

• The Court found the evidence presented by Kumar to prove Raja's conversion to Christianity was flawed and unbelievable.
  The key witness, Pastor Ebenezer Mani (PW8), claimed to have baptized Raja's parents in 1982. However, his own testimony revealed he was only 14 years old at that time and not qualified to perform baptisms.
  The Church registers presented as evidence had overwritings, edits, and deletions. The details like names and dates of birth did not match Raja's family's official records.

• The Court clarified that merely performing some rituals of another religion (like a Christian marriage) does not automatically mean a person has stopped "professing" their original religion. "Professing" a religion requires a public declaration and conscious adoption of that faith as one's own.

Step 5: The Challenger Did Not Follow the Proper Procedure

• Kumar never attempted to get Raja's caste certificate cancelled by the Scrutiny Committee, which was the proper authority. He also did not examine the official who issued the certificate to prove any malpractice.

6. Conclusion of the Judgment

The Supreme Court allowed A. Raja's appeal and set aside the High Court's order. The Election Petition filed by D. Kumar was dismissed. Raja's election was declared valid, and he was entitled to all benefits as a Member of the Legislative Assembly.

Core Principle and Rule of Law Established

This judgment establishes a crucial rule of law to prevent the misuse of election petitions and to protect the validity of official documents:

A duly issued Caste Certificate is a valid document until it is cancelled by the competent authority under the specific law made for that purpose (like a State's Community Certificate Act). It cannot be directly challenged and declared invalid in an Election Petition.

What it establishes:

1. Separation of Forums: It clearly separates the process of challenging a candidate's caste status from the process of challenging their election. The former has a dedicated legal channel (Scrutiny Committee), while the latter deals with electoral malpractices.

2. Sanctity of Official Documents: It upholds the validity of certificates issued by government authorities, preventing them from being casually overturned during election disputes.

3. High Evidentiary Standard: It reinforces that allegations in an election petition must be proven to the high standard of "beyond reasonable doubt".

4. Clarity on Religious Identity: It clarifies that "professing" a religion is a matter of conscious belief and public declaration, not just the occasional observance of rituals.

In essence, the Supreme Court has streamlined the legal process, ensuring that caste certificates are scrutinized by experts in the field through a dedicated procedure, rather than in the politically charged arena of an election dispute.

UNION OF INDIA AND M/S BHARAT ENTERPRISE Civil Appeal No 3441-3442 of 2015 (March 23, 2023)

1. Case Heading

Union of India & Ors. vs. M/s. Bharat Enterprise

2. Citation

Civil Appeal Nos. 3441-3442 of 2015
Supreme Court of India

3. Subject of the Judgment in Short

This judgment deals with whether a contractor can raise new claims after submitting a "Final Bill" accompanied by a "No Claims Certificate," and what is the power of an arbitrator to decide on such claims when the contract explicitly prohibits them.

4. Key Details of the Judgment

• Date of Judgment: March 23, 2023

• Constitutional Bench: The judgment was delivered by a bench of three Hon'ble Judges:
  Justice K.M. Joseph
  Justice Krishna Murari
  Justice B.V. Nagarathna

• Related Laws, Sections, and Acts:
  The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996: Sections 11(6) (Appointment of arbitrators), 16 (Arbitral tribunal's competence to rule on its jurisdiction), 34 (Setting aside an arbitral award), and 37 (Appeals).
  The Indian Contract Act, 1872: General principles of contract, specifically the concepts of "accord and satisfaction" and vitiating factors like coercion, fraud, and undue influence (Sections 15-18).
  Key Contractual Clauses: Clauses 65 and 65-A of the contract between the parties.

5. Explanation of the Judgment

Here is a step-by-step breakdown of the case and the Supreme Court's reasoning.

A. Background of the Dispute

• The Contract: A contract was awarded to M/s Bharat Enterprise (the Contractor) in 2001 for repair works.

• Final Bill and 'No Claims' Certificate: The contractor submitted the Final Bill on February 13, 2002, which included a "No Claims Certificate," meaning the contractor certified that it had no further claims against the Union of India (the Employer).

• Delay and New Claims: The employer did not pay the bill for over a year. During this delay, the contractor sent a letter in February 2003, stating that the Final Bill should be considered as "under protest." The contractor also signed an affidavit and undertaking, later revoking them due to non-payment.

• Payment and Arbitration: The employer finally paid the original Final Bill amount in November 2003. The contractor, however, invoked arbitration, seeking additional claims that were not part of the original Final Bill.

• The Arbitral Award: The arbitrator allowed some of these additional claims, ignoring the employer's objection based on Clauses 65 and 65-A of the contract.

• Journey Through Courts: The District Court set aside the arbitrator's award. The High Court then overturned the District Court's decision and restored the award. The Union of India appealed to the Supreme Court.

B. The Core Legal Issue

The main question before the Supreme Court was: Could the arbitrator legally award claims that were raised by the contractor after the submission of a Final Bill with a "No Claims Certificate," especially when the contract's Clauses 65 and 65-A explicitly prohibited such further claims?

C. Analysis of the Contract Clauses

The entire case revolved around the interpretation of Clauses 65 and 65-A of the contract, which stated:

"No further claims shall be made by the Contractor after submission of the Final Bill and these shall be deemed to have been waived and extinguished."

The Supreme Court emphasized that this language was clear and unambiguous. It created a legal prohibition against raising any new claims after the Final Bill was submitted.

D. The Supreme Court's Reasoning and Decision

The Supreme Court allowed the Union of India's appeal and set aside the High Court's order. Its reasoning was based on the following key principles:

1. An Arbitrator is Bound by the Contract:

• The Court firmly established that an arbitrator is a "creature of the contract." His authority comes from the agreement between the parties.

• He cannot travel outside the boundaries of the contract or ignore its specific, clear clauses. An award that disregards the express terms of a contract is illegal and can be set aside.

2. The Only Exception: Vitiating Factors

• The Supreme Court clarified that the prohibition in Clauses 65 & 65-A is not absolute.

• If the "No Claims Certificate" or the Final Bill was signed under coercion, fraud, duress, or undue influence, the contractor can challenge it.

• In such a scenario, it is the contractor's burden to prove the existence of these vitiating factors before the arbitrator.

• If proven, the "No Claims Certificate" becomes void, and the arbitrator can then examine the new claims on their merits.

3. Application to the Present Case:

• The Supreme Court found that in this case, the arbitrator had made no finding that the Final Bill or the "No Claims Certificate" was given under coercion or duress.

• Since the contractor failed to prove this crucial point, the clauses remained fully operative and binding.

• Therefore, the arbitrator acted illegally and beyond his jurisdiction by awarding claims that were explicitly prohibited by the contract.

4. Equitable Settlement:

• While the Supreme Court sided with the Union of India on the strict legal principle, it used its extraordinary power under Article 136 of the Constitution to do complete justice.

• The Court noted that the employer's long delay of over a year in making the payment had led to the dispute and that the amounts involved were meagre.

• Therefore, as a fair settlement, the Court directed the Union of India to pay a lump sum of ₹3 Lakhs to the contractor in full and final settlement of all claims.

Core Principle and Rule of Law Established

This judgment establishes two critical principles of Indian arbitration and contract law:

1. Sanctity of Contract in Arbitration: An arbitral tribunal is bound by the explicit terms of the contract between the parties. It does not have the power to rewrite the contract or ignore its clear prohibitions. An award that does so is "patently illegal" and can be set aside by a court.

2. Finality of "No Claims" Certificates: A "No Claims Certificate" or a Final Bill that states no further claims can be made is legally binding and results in "accord and satisfaction" (the contract is considered fully settled). The only way to avoid this consequence is by proving through evidence that the certificate was obtained by coercion, fraud, or undue influence.

Conclusion

In simple terms, the Supreme Court ruled that:

• A contractor generally cannot raise new claims after submitting a Final Bill with a "No Claims Certificate," if the contract prohibits it.

• The arbitrator must respect this contractual prohibition. Ignoring it makes the award illegal.

• The only way for a contractor to get around such a clause is to prove that they were forced to sign the "No Claims Certificate" under pressure.

• Since the contractor in this case failed to prove any coercion, the arbitrator's award allowing new claims was wrong and was set aside.

• However, considering the employer's delay, the Supreme Court, in the interest of justice, granted the contractor a lump sum payment as a final settlement.

SEAMEC LTD AND OIL INDIA LIMITED Civil Appeal No 673 of 2012

(May 11, 2020)

1. Case Heading

South East Asia Marine Engineering and Constructions Ltd. (SEAMEC Ltd.) vs. Oil India Limited

2. Citation

Civil Appeal No. 673 of 2012 (Along with Civil Appeal No. 900 of 2012)
Supreme Court of India

3. Subject of the Judgment in Short

This judgment deals with whether a sudden increase in the price of High-Speed Diesel (HSD) due to a government circular qualifies as a "change in law" under a contract, making one party liable to reimburse the other. The Supreme Court also clarified the limited grounds on which a court can interfere with and set aside an decision made by an arbitration tribunal.

4. Key Details of the Judgment

• Date of Judgment: May 11, 2020

• Constitutional Bench: The judgment was delivered by a bench of three Hon'ble Judges:
  Justice N.V. Ramana
  Justice Mohan M. Shantanagoudar
  Justice Ajay Rastogi

• Related Laws, Sections, and Acts:
  The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996: Sections 34 and 37 (dealing with challenging an arbitration award).
  The Indian Contract Act, 1872: Section 56 (Doctrine of Frustration).
  Key Contractual Clause: Clause 23 of the contract between SEAMEC and OIL, titled "Subsequently Enacted Laws".

5. Explanation of the Judgment

Here is a step-by-step breakdown of the case and the Supreme Court's reasoning.

A. Background of the Dispute

• The Contract: Oil India Limited (OIL) awarded a contract to SEAMEC Ltd. in 1995 for drilling oil wells. This was a fixed-price contract, meaning the agreed-upon rates were to remain valid for the contract's duration.

• The Problem: During the contract, the price of High-Speed Diesel (HSD), a crucial fuel for the drilling operations, increased significantly due to a circular issued by the Government of India.

• SEAMEC's Claim: SEAMEC argued that this price increase was a "change in law" as per Clause 23 of their contract. This clause stated that if a new law or a change in an existing law leads to additional costs, the other party must reimburse them. SEAMEC claimed that the government circular had the "force of law" and demanded reimbursement from OIL.

• OIL's Rejection: OIL refused to pay, stating that a price change via a circular was not a "law" and that the risk of price fluctuations was already factored into the fixed contract price.

B. The Journey Through Arbitration and Courts

• Arbitration Tribunal (Majority View): The tribunal ruled in favor of SEAMEC. It used a "liberal interpretation" of Clause 23, stating that a government circular has the "force of law" and thus, OIL should reimburse SEAMEC.

• District Court: OIL challenged this award. The District Court upheld the tribunal's decision, stating it was not illegal or against public policy.

• High Court: OIL appealed again. The High Court set aside the arbitral award. It held that the tribunal's interpretation was erroneous and that Clause 23 was more like a force majeure clause, not meant for routine price revisions.

C. The Core Issue Before the Supreme Court

The main question for the Supreme Court was: Was the High Court right in interfering with and setting aside the arbitral award?

D. The Supreme Court's Analysis and Decision

The Supreme Court dismissed SEAMEC's appeal and upheld the High Court's decision to set aside the arbitral award. Its reasoning was based on two key pillars:

Pillar 1: The Limited Scope of Judicial Interference in Arbitration

• The Court strongly reiterated that a judge cannot act as an appellate authority over an arbitration award.

• Under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, a court can set aside an award only on very specific grounds, such as:
  Corruption or fraud.
  A party being unable to present its case.
  The award being in conflict with the "public policy of India" (which includes an award that is "patently illegal").

• The Court emphasized that if an arbitrator's interpretation of a contract is one possible and plausible view, even if the judge would have decided differently, the award must be respected. Interfering casually defeats the very purpose of arbitration, which is speedy and final resolution.

Pillar 2: The Arbitral Tribunal's Interpretation Was Not Plausible

Despite the limited scope for interference, the Supreme Court found that the arbitral tribunal's interpretation of Clause 23 was so flawed that it crossed the line into "perversity" and "patent illegality". Here's why:

• Contract Must Be Read as a Whole: The tribunal failed to read the entire contract together. Other clauses, specifically in Exhibit C, clearly stated that fuel was to be supplied by the contractor (SEAMEC) at its own expense. Allowing a claim for fuel price escalation directly contradicted this explicit term.

• Fixed-Price Contract: The contract was based on fixed rates. A prudent contractor is expected to account for normal market price fluctuations while bidding. Allowing such claims under Clause 23 would destroy the fundamental nature of a fixed-price tender.

• Clause 23 vs. Force Majeure: The Court disagreed with the High Court's view that Clause 23 was a force majeure clause. However, it also rejected the tribunal's overly broad "liberal interpretation." The Court stated that for a price change to fall under Clause 23, the contract language must specifically point to it. In this case, it did not.

• Not a Possible View: The Supreme Court concluded that interpreting a routine government price circular as a "change in law" to shift the burden of a fixed-price contract was not a legally possible or reasonable interpretation. By doing so, the tribunal had effectively re-written the contract for the parties, which is not permitted.

Core Principle and Rule of Law Established

This judgment establishes two critical principles of Indian law:

1. Finality of Arbitral Awards: Courts must show great deference to arbitration awards. They cannot interfere merely because they disagree with the arbitrator's view on facts or law. Interference is permitted only in rare cases where the award is patently illegal, perverse, or shocks the conscience.

2. Interpretation of Contracts: An arbitrator's power to interpret a contract is not unlimited. The interpretation must be a possible and plausible one that can be reasonably deduced from the contract's text. An arbitrator cannot ignore the clear language of a contract or re-write it under the guise of interpretation. A contract must be read as a whole, and all its clauses must be considered together.

Conclusion

In simple terms, the Supreme Court ruled that:

• While courts should generally not disturb arbitration awards, they have a duty to step in when an award is based on an interpretation that is simply not possible or legally justified.

• In this case, the arbitral tribunal made an error by twisting the meaning of "change in law" to cover a routine diesel price increase, which went against the clear terms of the fixed-price contract.

• Therefore, the High Court was correct in setting aside the award, and the Supreme Court saw no reason to overturn that decision. OIL was not required to reimburse SEAMEC for the increased cost of diesel.

REJANISH KV vs K DEEPA & OTHERS 2025 INSC 1208

 (October 09, 2025)

1. Heading

Landmark Judgment on Eligibility of Judicial Officers for Direct Recruitment as District Judges

2. Citation

2025 INSC 1208
Civil Appeal No. 3947 of 2020 (and a batch of connected matters)

3. Subject of the Judgment in Short

This judgment decides whether a serving judicial officer (like a Civil Judge) can apply for the post of District Judge through direct recruitment, a channel traditionally reserved for practicing advocates.

The Supreme Court, in a historic decision, ruled that yes, serving judicial officers are eligible to compete with advocates for directly recruited posts of District Judges, provided they meet certain experience criteria.

4. Case Details & Related Laws

• Date of Judgment: October 09, 2025

• Constitutional Bench: A 5-Judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court of India.

• Judges: Chief Justice B.R. Gavai, Justice Aravind Kumar, Justice Satish Chandra Sharma, Justice K. Vinod Chandran, and Justice M.M. Sundresh.

• Key Constitutional Provision:
  Article 233 of the Indian Constitution: Deals with the appointment of District Judges.

• Overruled Judgments: The Court overruled its own earlier decisions in Satya Narain Singh v. High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (1985) and Dheeraj Mor v. High Court of Delhi (2020), which had barred judicial officers from such recruitment.

5. Explanation of the Judgment

A. The Core Issue & The Legal Puzzle

For decades, the understanding was that the post of District Judge could be filled in two ways:

1. Promotion: From serving judicial officers (Civil Judges) within the state judiciary.

2. Direct Recruitment: From practicing advocates with at least 7 years of experience.

The legal dispute centered on the interpretation of Article 233(2) of the Constitution, which states:

"A person not already in the service of the Union or of the State shall only be eligible to be appointed a district judge if he has been for not less than seven years an advocate or a pleader..."

Earlier judgments interpreted this to mean that the "direct recruitment" stream was exclusively for those "not in service" (i.e., advocates). Serving judicial officers, being "in service," were considered ineligible for this channel and could only be promoted.

B. The Supreme Court's New Interpretation & Reasoning

The Constitution Bench disagreed with the old interpretation and laid down a new, clear principle.

Core Principle Established:
Article 233 of the Constitution does not bar serving judicial officers from applying for the post of District Judge through direct recruitment. The "direct recruitment" channel is open to both advocates and judicial officers, and selection should be based purely on merit.

Here is the step-by-step reasoning of the Court:

Step 1: Correcting a Misreading of the Constitution

• The Court held that the previous judgments had misread Article 233.

• The phrase "a person not already in the service" in Clause (2) was not meant to reserve direct recruitment for advocates. Instead, it was meant to set a qualification only for those who are not already in service.

• For a person already in the judicial service, Article 233 does not prescribe any separate eligibility criteria for direct recruitment.

Step 2: Preventing Redundancy

• If Clause (2) is interpreted to mean that only advocates can be directly recruited, then the words "a person not already in the service" become redundant and meaningless.

• The Court emphasized that every word in the Constitution must be given effect. The presence of these words implies that there are two categories: (i) those in service, and (ii) those not in service (advocates), and the 7-year rule applies only to the second category.

Step 3: Promoting Merit and Broad-Based Competition

• The Court stated that the goal of recruitment is to get the "best and most suitable person for the job."

• Excluding experienced judicial officers from competition artificially restricts the talent pool.

• A judicial officer who has both advocacy experience and hands-on judicial experience is likely to be highly suitable for the role of a District Judge.

• Allowing them to compete with advocates ensures a broader and more meritorious selection.

Step 4: Ensuring a Level Playing Field - The New Eligibility Criteria
To ensure fairness and a level playing field between advocates and judicial officers, the Court laid down specific eligibility rules for direct recruitment:

• For Judicial Officers: They must have a combined experience of 7 years as an advocate and a judicial officer.

• For Advocates: If an advocate was previously a judicial officer, their combined experience will be counted.

• Minimum Age: The minimum age for application for both categories is 35 years.

• Continuous Practice: The 7-year experience must be continuous, without significant breaks that disconnect the candidate from the legal profession.

Step 5: Rejecting the Argument of "Heartburn" and "Stare Decisis"

• The Court rejected the argument that allowing junior judicial officers to become District Judges before their seniors would cause "heartburn," stating that merit alone should matter in direct recruitment.

• It also set aside the doctrine of stare decisis (standing by past decisions), stating that when a previous decision is erroneous and causes injustice, it is the Court's duty to correct it.

Conclusion

In a transformative ruling, the Supreme Court has dismantled a long-standing barrier in the judicial services. By opening the direct recruitment channel for District Judges to serving judicial officers, the Court has:

1. Upheld a Correct Constitutional Interpretation: It restored the true meaning of Article 233, ensuring that no part of the Constitution is rendered redundant.

2. Championed Meritocracy: The judgment prioritizes merit over artificial channels of entry, ensuring that the most capable candidates, whether from the Bar or the Bench, can lead the district judiciary.

3. Boosted Morale: It provides a new career path and incentive for talented judicial officers to compete and advance based on their merit.

4. Strengthened the Judiciary: By fostering greater competition, the judgment aims to improve the overall quality and efficiency of the district judiciary, which is the foundation of the Indian justice system.

This decision is expected to have a profound impact on the recruitment policies of all states, making the process more inclusive and competitive.

ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR INDIA VS. SATISH & ANOTHER Criminal Appeal No. 1410-1414 of 2021 (November 18, 2021)

1. Heading

Landmark Judgment: Rejecting the "Skin-to-Skin" Test for Sexual Assault under POCSO Act

2. Citation

Attorney General for India vs. Satish & Another
Criminal Appeal Nos. 1410-1414 of 2021 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos. 925, 1339, 1159, 5071 & 7472 of 2021)
Date of Judgment: November 18, 2021

3. Subject of the Judgment in Short

The Supreme Court overturned a controversial High Court judgment that had acquitted an accused of sexual assault because there was no direct "skin-to-skin" contact with a minor victim. The Supreme Court ruled that the most important ingredient for the offence of "sexual assault" under the POCSO Act is "sexual intent" and not direct physical contact. Any narrow interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the law designed to protect children.

4. Key Details of the Case

• Constitutional Bench: A Supreme Court Bench of Two Judges: Justice Uday Umesh Lalit, Justice Bela M. Trivedi, and Justice S. Ravindra Bhat.

• Related Laws & Sections:
  The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012:
  Section 7: Defines "Sexual Assault".
  Section 8: Punishment for Sexual Assault.
  Section 9(m): Defines "Aggravated Sexual Assault" when committed on a child below 12 years.
  Section 10: Punishment for Aggravated Sexual Assault.
  Section 29 & 30: Presumption of guilt and culpable mental state (reverse burden of proof).
  Indian Penal Code (IPC):
  Section 354: Assault or criminal force to a woman with intent to outrage her modesty.
  Section 342: Wrongful confinement.
  Section 363: Kidnapping.

5. Explanation of the Judgment

A. Background: What Was the Controversy?

The case involved two separate incidents of sexual offences against children:

1. Satish Case: A 12-year-old girl was lured by the accused, Satish, to his house on the pretext of giving her a guava. There, he pressed her breast, attempted to remove her salwar (lower garment), and bolted her in a room when she cried.

2. Libnus Case: A 5-year-old girl was accosted in her home by the accused, Libnus, who held her hands, moved her frock up, lowered her pant, and unzipped his own pants.

The Bombay High Court (Nagpur Bench), in its judgment, made a controversial interpretation. It acquitted Satish of "sexual assault" under the POCSO Act, stating that since he had pressed the girl's breast over her clothes without "skin-to-skin" contact, the act did not fall under the POCSO Act's definition of sexual assault. Instead, the High Court convicted him under the lesser offence of Section 354 of the IPC (outraging modesty).

Similarly, in the Libnus case, the High Court held that acts like "holding hands" or "opening the zip of a pant" did not fit the definition of "sexual assault."

This "skin-to-skin" interpretation sparked nationwide outrage and was challenged in the Supreme Court by the Attorney General of India, the National Commission for Women, and the State of Maharashtra.

B. The Core Legal Question Before the Supreme Court

The central issue was the correct interpretation of Section 7 of the POCSO Act. Does the act of "touching" or "physical contact" require direct "skin-to-skin" contact, or is the presence of sexual intent sufficient?

C. The Supreme Court's Analysis and Reasoning (Step-by-Step)

Step 1: The "Mischief Rule" and the Purpose of the POCSO Act
The Court emphasized that laws must be interpreted in a way that promotes their purpose. The POCSO Act was enacted because existing laws failed to adequately protect children from sexual abuse. The Court stated that accepting a "skin-to-skin" test would defeat the very object of the law, which is to protect children's dignity and autonomy.

Step 2: Interpreting the Words "Touch" and "Physical Contact"

• The Court examined the dictionary meanings of "touch" and "physical contact" and concluded that they are broad terms.

• It held that the legislature used the word "touch" for specific body parts (vagina, penis, anus, breast) and the phrase "physical contact" for "any other act" in Section 7. These terms are interchangeable and broad.

• The Court reasoned that if "skin-to-skin" contact was required, it would lead to absurd and dangerous consequences. For example, an offender could touch a child's private parts using gloves, condoms, or through clothing and escape the stringent punishment of the POCSO Act. This could not have been the intention of Parliament.

Step 3: "Sexual Intent" is the Key Ingredient

• The Supreme Court firmly established that the most crucial element for proving sexual assault under Section 7 of POCSO is the presence of "sexual intent".

• The "skin-to-skin" requirement is irrelevant. The focus should be on whether the act was done with a sexual motive. The Court stated that the act of touching any sexual part of a child's body with sexual intent cannot be trivialized.

Step 4: Rejection of the "Rule of Lenity" and "Ejusdem Generis"

• The accused argued that any ambiguity in a penal law should be interpreted in their favour (Rule of Lenity). The Court rejected this, stating that there was no ambiguity in Section 7. The words were clear, and creating an ambiguity to let an offender escape would be wrong.

• The Court also rejected the High Court's use of the "ejusdem generis" principle (which means general words following specific words are limited to the same kind), stating that its application in this case would defeat the legislative intent.

Step 5: Role of Presumptions (Sections 29 & 30 of POCSO)

• The Court highlighted that the POCSO Act contains special provisions (Sections 29 and 30) that place a reverse burden of proof on the accused in certain situations.

• Once the prosecution proves the basic facts of the act, the court can presume the accused's guilty mind (mens rea or sexual intent). It is then for the accused to prove that they did not have such intent.

6. Conclusion of the Judgment

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgments and restored the convictions and sentences given by the trial courts.

• Accused Satish was convicted under Section 8 of the POCSO Act (punishment for sexual assault) and sentenced to three years of rigorous imprisonment.

• Accused Libnus was convicted under Section 10 of the POCSO Act (punishment for aggravated sexual assault, as the victim was below 12 years) and sentenced to five years of rigorous imprisonment.

Core Principle and Rule of Law Established

This judgment establishes a victim-centric and protective interpretation of the POCSO Act. The core principles are:

1. "Sexual Intent" Over "Physical Contact": The essence of the offence of sexual assault under Section 7 of the POCSO Act is the presence of sexual intent, not the nature or degree of physical contact.

2. Rejection of the "Skin-to-Skin" Test: The Court decisively rejected the argument that direct skin-to-skin contact is necessary to constitute sexual assault. Any physical contact, including through clothing, if done with sexual intent, amounts to sexual assault.

3. Purposive Interpretation: Courts must interpret laws, especially beneficial and social welfare legislation like the POCSO Act, in a manner that advances its purpose and suppresses the mischief it was designed to prevent. Narrow, literal, and pedantic interpretations that allow offenders to escape are unacceptable.

4. Protection of Child Dignity: The judgment reaffirms the constitutional commitment to protecting the dignity, autonomy, and best interests of the child, as envisioned under Article 15 of the Constitution and the POCSO Act.

This landmark judgment ensures that the POCSO Act remains a robust shield for children against sexual abuse, closing a legal loophole that could have had devastating consequences for child protection in India.

IN RE THE WAQF AMENDMENT ACT, 2025 2025 INSC 1116

(DELIVERED IN 2025)

1. Heading

Supreme Court's Interim Ruling on the Waqf Amendment Act, 2025

2. Citation

IN RE: THE WAQF AMENDMENT ACT, 2025 (2025 INSC 1116)

3. Subject of the Judgment 

This judgment deals with the Supreme Court's decision on whether to temporarily suspend (put on hold) the operation of the new Waqf Amendment Act, 2025 while the final challenge to its legality is pending. The petitioners argued the Act was unconstitutional and harmful, while the government defended it as a necessary reform.

4. Case Details

• Date of Judgment: The judgment was delivered in 2025 (specific date not mentioned in the excerpt).

• Bench: The judgment was delivered by a Constitution Bench comprising:
  Chief Justice of India B.R. Gavai
  Justice Augustine George Masih

• Laws & Sections Discussed:
  Primary Law: The Waqf Amendment Act, 2025, which amended the Waqf Act, 1995.
  Key Amended Sections Challenged:
  Section 3(r): New definition of "Waqf" and removal of "Waqf by user".
  Sections 3C, 3D, 3E: New provisions on Government properties, protected monuments, and tribal land.
  Sections 9 & 14: Changes in the composition of the Central Waqf Council and State Waqf Boards.
  Section 23: Appointment of the Chief Executive Officer.
  Section 36: Mandatory registration of Waqfs and its consequences.
  Sections 104, 107, 108: Deletion of provisions related to donations by non-Muslims, application of the Limitation Act, and evacuee properties.
  Constitutional Provisions Cited: Articles 14 (Equality), 15 (Non-discrimination), 25 & 26 (Freedom of Religion), 19 (Freedom), 21 (Life and Liberty), 29 (Protection of Minorities' Interests), 30 (Right of Minorities to Establish Institutions), and 300A (Right to Property).
  Other Referenced Laws: Mussalman Wakf Act, 1923; Waqf Act, 1954; Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, 1958; Limitation Act, 1963.

5. Explanation of the Judgment

The Supreme Court heard arguments from both sides on whether to grant an interim stay (a temporary pause) on the implementation of the 2025 Amendment Act. The Court's analysis followed a step-by-step process.

A. The Core Legal Principle for Staying a Law

The Court began by explaining the high standard required to stop a law passed by Parliament. The key principles are:

• There is a strong presumption that a law is constitutional.

• The Court should be very slow to interfere and can only stay a law in rare cases where:
  The Parliament had no power to make the law.
  The law clearly and flagrantly violates Fundamental Rights.
  The law is manifestly arbitrary (obviously unfair and without reason).

B. Background: Why was the Waqf Law Amended?

The Court looked at the history of Waqf laws since 1923. It noted that for over a century, legislatures have been trying to curb the misuse and mismanagement of Waqf properties. The 2025 Amendment was presented as a measure to:

• Prevent the wrongful declaration of government and private properties as Waqf.

• Ensure proper registration and accountability.

• Protect culturally significant monuments and the land rights of tribal communities.

C. Court's Analysis of Key Challenged Provisions

The Court examined each controversial amendment to see if it was prima facie (on the face of it) unconstitutional or arbitrary.

1. New Definition of Waqf & End of "Waqf by User" (Sections 3(r) and 4(ix))

• Petitioners' Argument: Requiring a person to prove they have practiced Islam for 5 years to create a Waqf is discriminatory. Removing "Waqf by user" (where long-term use of land for religious purpose makes it a Waqf) violates Islamic law.

• Government's Defense: The 5-year rule prevents fake conversions to misuse the Act. "Waqf by user" was being used to encroach on government lands.

• Court's Interim Decision:
  The 5-year practice rule has a logical purpose but cannot be enforced until the government frames rules on how to prove it. This part is stayed until then.
  The abolition of "Waqf by user" is not stayed. The Court found the government's concern about land encroachment valid, and the change is only for the future, not the past.

2. Government Properties (New Section 3C)

• Petitioners' Argument: This allows a government officer to quickly take away property declared as Waqf, leaving the Waqf with no possession even before a legal challenge.

• Government's Defense: It's a mechanism to reclaim public property wrongly taken over.

• Court's Interim Decision: The Court partially agreed with the petitioners. It stayed the following parts:
  The rule that property stops being treated as Waqf as soon as an inquiry begins.
  The power of a revenue officer to change land records. The Court said only a judicial body like the Waqf Tribunal should decide ownership.
  Safeguard Added: Until the Tribunal decides, the Waqf cannot be dispossessed, but it cannot sell or create new rights on the disputed property.

3. Protected Monuments & Tribal Land (New Sections 3D & 3E)

• Petitioners' Argument: These provisions target only Muslim properties and restrict religious freedom.

• Government's Defense: Section 3D protects national heritage monuments from unauthorized changes. Section 3E protects vulnerable tribal communities from exploitation.

• Court's Interim Decision: The Court refused to stay these sections. It found that existing laws already protect religious practices at monuments, and safeguarding tribal land is a valid constitutional goal.

4. Composition of Waqf Councils and Boards (Sections 9 & 14)

• Petitioners' Argument: The new rules allow a majority of non-Muslims in the management bodies, which is interference in the religious affairs of the Muslim community.

• Government's Defense: The roles are largely administrative (financial, audit), not religious. The number of non-Muslims would be small (max 4 in Council, 3 in Board).

• Court's Interim Decision: The Court did not fully stay the provisions but issued a directive based on the government's assurance: The Central Waqf Council cannot have more than 4 non-Muslim members, and a State Board cannot have more than 3.

5. Mandatory Registration and Legal Bar (Section 36)

• Petitioners' Argument: Making registration mandatory and barring unregistered Waqfs from approaching courts is harsh and unfair.

• Government's Defense: Mandatory registration has been recommended since 1923 to prevent fraud and concealment of Waqf properties.

• Court's Interim Decision: The Court refused to stay this provision, noting that the law gives a 6-month period to register and the court can allow cases later for valid reasons.

6. Core Principle and Rule of Law Established

This judgment establishes and reinforces several key legal principles:

1. Judicial Restraint in Legislative Matters: Courts must respect the wisdom of the legislature and will not interfere with a new law unless a very strong, clear case of unconstitutionality is made out.

2. Balance between Reform and Rights: The Court acknowledged the state's legitimate interest in reforming laws to prevent misuse and protect public property. However, it also stepped in to ensure that the methods used are fair and do not arbitrarily take away existing rights without due process.

3. Due Process is Fundamental: The most significant part of the ruling was protecting the principle of natural justice. The Court halted provisions that allowed the government to unilaterally take away property status without a proper judicial hearing. It reinforced that title disputes must be decided by judicial tribunals, not executive officers.

4. Secular Management vs. Religious Autonomy: The Court leaned towards the view that the management of Waqf properties involves significant secular activities (finance, administration). Therefore, some level of external regulation is permissible, but the core religious functions must be protected.

7. Conclusion

The Supreme Court largely refused to stop the implementation of the Waqf Amendment Act, 2025. It found that the petitioners did not present a strong enough case to overcome the presumption of the law's validity.

However, the Court did not give the government a complete free hand. It temporarily suspended specific provisions that were found to be prima facie unfair or violative of due process, namely:

• The 5-year practice rule (until procedures are framed).

• Parts of the government property takeover process that were unfair.

The final decision on whether the Act is constitutional or not will be made after a full trial. This interim order simply ensures that until then, the law is implemented in a balanced manner that protects both the government's reform goals and the rights of the Waqfs.

NITIN AHLUWALIA VS STATE OF PUNJAB 2025 INSC 1128

(September 18, 2025)

1. Heading

Supreme Court Quashes FIR in Matrimonial Dispute, Citing Abuse of Process and Retaliatory Litigation

2. Citation

Nitin Ahluwalia vs. State of Punjab & Anr.
Criminal Appeal No. 187 of 2020
Decided on: September 18, 2025
2025 INSC 1128

3. Subject of the Judgment 

The Supreme Court quashed an FIR filed under Section 498-A IPC (dowry cruelty) by a wife against her husband, ruling that it was a malicious and retaliatory legal action filed to harass the husband after he had succeeded in foreign court proceedings related to divorce and child custody.

4. Case Details

• Laws & Sections Involved:
  Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC): Deals with cruelty by a husband or his relatives towards a wife.
  Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.): Grants inherent powers to the High Court to quash FIRs or proceedings to prevent abuse of the legal process or to secure the ends of justice.

• Date of Judgment: September 18, 2025.

• Constitutional Bench: The judgment was delivered by a Division Bench consisting of:
  Justice Sanjay Karol
  Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra

• Key Case Referenced: State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal (1992) - This is a landmark case that laid down specific guidelines for when courts can quash an FIR.

5. Explanation of the Judgment

Background and Facts of the Case

1. The Parties: The appellant, Nitin Ahluwalia, is an Australian citizen of Indian origin. The respondent, his former wife (Tina Khanna), is an Austrian citizen.

2. Marriage and Separation: They married in India in November 2010 and lived in Australia. A daughter was born in 2012. In June 2013, the wife left Australia with their daughter and went to Austria without the husband's consent.

3. International Child Abduction Case: The husband filed a case in Austria under the Hague Convention on International Child Abduction (1980), arguing the child was wrongfully taken. Austrian courts at multiple levels (District Court, Vienna Civil Court, and the Supreme Court of Austria) ruled in his favour. They ordered that the child must be returned to Australia, noting that the mother could accompany her.

4. Divorce Decree: The husband obtained a divorce from an Australian court in April 2016 on the grounds of an irretrievable breakdown of marriage.

5. The FIR in India: A month after the divorce was granted (May 2016), the wife filed a complaint in Punjab, India, which led to an FIR under Section 498-A IPC in December 2016. She alleged cruelty and dowry demands from the time of marriage (2010) until 2016.

Legal Journey to the Supreme Court

• The husband approached the Punjab & Haryana High Court to quash this FIR, arguing it was false and filed with a malicious intent.

• The High Court refused to quash the FIR, stating that since the investigation was at an initial stage and specific allegations were made, it was "too premature" to intervene.

• Aggrieved by this order, the husband appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court's Analysis and Reasoning

The Supreme Court criticized the High Court's "mechanical approach" and looked at the broader context. Here is the Court's step-wise reasoning:

1. Timing of the FIR is Suspicious: The Court found it highly questionable that the wife filed the criminal complaint only after the husband had won the child custody case in Austria and obtained a divorce decree from Australia. There was a gap of almost three years between her leaving the matrimonial home and filing the FIR.

2. Contradictory Conduct of the Wife: The Court noted several inconsistencies:
   The wife argued in Austrian courts that she and the child were socially integrated in Austria. However, when the husband initiated divorce proceedings, she was served the legal notices in India, where she was staying with her parents. This cast doubt on her earlier claims.
   Despite clear orders from Austrian courts to return the child to Australia, she failed to comply.

3. FIR as a Retaliatory Measure (Counterblast): The Supreme Court concluded that the FIR was not a genuine complaint but a "counterblast" or retaliatory action. It was filed to harass the husband and settle scores after he had succeeded in the foreign courts.

4. Allegations Do Not Prima Facie Disclose an Offense: The Court referred to its own judgment in Digambar vs. State of Maharashtra, which stated that 'cruelty' under Section 498-A must be of a nature that is intended to cause grave injury or drive the woman to suicide. The allegations in this FIR, when read in the context of the overall facts, did not reveal such grave intent.

5. Application of the 'Bhajan Lal' Guidelines: The Court held that this case fell under one of the categories from the State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal case, where a criminal proceeding can be quashed if it is manifestly attended with mala fide and is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive. Allowing such a case to continue would be an abuse of the process of law.

The Decision (Conclusion)

The Supreme Court allowed the husband's appeal. It set aside the order of the High Court and quashed the FIR registered against the appellant-husband.

Core Principle and Rule of Law Established

This judgment reinforces a crucial legal principle:

Courts must look beyond the mere text of an FIR and examine the overall context and conduct of the parties to determine if the legal process is being misused. A criminal complaint, especially in matrimonial disputes, can be quashed if it is found to be a malicious and retaliatory measure aimed at harassment rather than a bona fide seeking of justice.

The Supreme Court established that:

• Timing and Context Matter: Filing a criminal case immediately after losing in related civil or foreign proceedings is a strong indicator of a retaliatory motive.

• Inherent Powers are a Safety Valve: The powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are meant to prevent injustice and should be used proactively to stop the abuse of the legal system.

• International Decree Can Be Considered: While India is not a signatory to the Hague Convention, the findings of competent foreign courts can be considered to understand the background and conduct of the parties, especially when their actions contradict their claims.

In essence, the judgment protects individuals from being subjected to criminal trials when the complaint is not genuine but is a weapon for vengeance.

MAMMAN KHAN VS STATE OF HARYANA 2025 INSC 1113 

(September 12, 2025)

1. Heading

Supreme Court's Judgment on Fair Trial and Equality: Mamman Khan vs State of Haryana

2. Citation

2025 INSC 1113
Criminal Appeal No. 4002 of 2025 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 1829 of 2025)

3. Subject of the Judgment

The Supreme Court ruled that a sitting Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) cannot be given a separate trial just because of his political status. The Court held that separating his trial from his co-accused, when the charges arise from the same event, is illegal, unfair, and violates the fundamental rights to equality and a fair trial.

4. Case Details

• Date of Judgment: September 12, 2025

• Bench: Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan (A Division Bench of the Supreme Court of India)

• Laws and Sections Highlighted:
  The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC): Sections 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, and most importantly, Section 223.
  The Constitution of India:
  Article 14: Right to Equality (everyone is equal before the law).
  Article 21: Right to Life and Personal Liberty, which includes the right to a fair trial.
  Article 20(2): Protection against double jeopardy (being punished twice for the same offence).

• Referred Case: Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India (2024) - which calls for speedy trials for MPs/MLAs but does not allow bypassing standard legal procedures.

5. Explanation of the Judgment

A. Background of the Case

• The Incident: Large-scale communal violence occurred in Nuh district, Haryana, on July 31, 2023.

• The FIRs: Two FIRs (No. 149 and 150 of 2023) were registered, naming many accused persons, including Mamman Khan, a sitting MLA.

• The Prosecution's Case: The case was based on a single conspiracy. The evidence (like call records, videos, witness statements) was common against all accused, linking them to the same transaction (the violent event).

B. The Problem: Separate Trial Ordered for the MLA

• The trial court, on August 28 and September 2, 2024, ordered that a separate charge sheet be filed against Mamman Khan and that his trial be separated from the other accused.

• Reason Given: The court said that because Mamman Khan is an MLA, his case should be fast-tracked as per the Supreme Court's directions in the Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay case. It also cited delays due to the non-appearance of some co-accused.

• The MLA's Challenge: Mamman Khan appealed to the High Court, arguing this separation was wrong. The High Court upheld the trial court's order. He then appealed to the Supreme Court.

C. Arguments in the Supreme Court

• Mamman Khan's Arguments (The Appellant):
  Same Transaction: The charges against him and the others are part of the same event (the violence). Section 223(d) of the CrPC says that persons accused of different offences committed in the same transaction should be tried together.
  No Legal Ground: Separating a trial just because someone is an MLA is arbitrary and has no basis in law.
  Causes Prejudice: A separate trial would force the same witnesses to testify twice, allowing the prosecution to change its story based on the first trial, which is unfair.
  Violates Rights: It violates his right to equality (Article 14) and a fair trial (Article 21).

• State of Haryana's Arguments (The Respondent):
  Efficiency: A joint trial with 40+ accused was logistically difficult and caused delays.
  Speedy Trial: The separation was meant to ensure a speedy trial for the MLA, which is also a fundamental right.
  Discretionary Power: The CrPC gives courts the discretion to order separate trials when needed.

D. Supreme Court's Analysis and Reasoning (The Core Principle)

The Supreme Court carefully analyzed the law and set aside the orders for a separate trial. Here’s the step-wise reasoning:

Step 1: The Law Prefers Joint Trials for the Same Transaction

• The Court explained that while Section 218 CrPC generally says each offence should have a separate trial, Sections 219 to 223 are exceptions.

• Section 223(d) specifically allows a joint trial for people accused of different offences if they were committed in the "same transaction." The goal is to avoid multiple trials on the same evidence, which saves time, money, and prevents conflicting judgments.

Step 2: The Real Reason for Separation Was Illegal

• The Supreme Court found that the only reason the trial court gave for the separation was that Mamman Khan is an MLA.

• The Court clarified that the directions in the Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay case are for speedy trials, not for creating special procedures that disadvantage an accused. Speedy justice cannot come at the cost of a fair trial.

Step 3: The Procedure Was Unfair

• The trial court passed the separation order on its own (suo motu) without giving Mamman Khan any prior notice or a chance to argue against it. This violates the principles of natural justice and fair procedure, which are part of the right to life under Article 21.

Step 4: Separation Would Cause Injustice

• Since the evidence is common, a separate trial would mean:
  Duplication: The same witnesses would be called again.
  Delay: It would actually slow down the overall process.
  Risk of Inconsistency: Two different courts could reach different conclusions on the same facts.

• The Court stated that if there was a delay due to absconding accused, the trial of those accused should be separated, not the trial of an accused who is regularly appearing in court.

Step 5: Equality Before Law is Paramount

• The Supreme Court strongly emphasized Article 14 (Right to Equality). An MLA or any public figure cannot be given special treatment—whether favourable or unfavourable—in the justice system. The law must be applied equally to all.

6. Conclusion of the Judgment

The Supreme Court allowed Mamman Khan's appeal and set aside the orders of the High Court and the trial court. It gave the following final directions:

1. Quashed: The order for a separate charge sheet and the separate trial of Mamman Khan were cancelled.

2. Joint Trial Ordered: The case was sent back to the trial court with a direction to hold a joint trial for Mamman Khan and all his co-accused.

3. Speed with Fairness: The trial court can still take steps to ensure a speedy trial, but it must do so without compromising the legal rights of any accused and after hearing all parties.

Core Principle and Rule of Law Established

This judgment establishes a vital rule of law: The pursuit of a speedy trial cannot override the fundamental principles of fairness, equality, and established criminal procedure.

• What it is establishing: The Supreme Court reinforced that procedural fairness is non-negotiable. A person's high-status job (like being an MLA) cannot be used to bend the rules of a criminal trial. The constitutional guarantees of Equality (Article 14) and a Fair Trial (Article 21) are paramount and apply equally to every citizen.

• The Rule of Law: The judgment confirms that the Code of Criminal Procedure provides a balanced framework. Courts must follow this framework and cannot invent new procedures based on administrative convenience or a person's status. Justice must not only be done but must be seen to be done through fair and uniform procedures for everyone.

THE ANIMAL WELFARE BOARD OF INDIA V. UNION OF INDIA
2023 INSC 548 (18 May 2023)

1. Citation

Case Name: Animal Welfare Board of India & Ors. v. Union of India & Anr.
Citation: WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 23 OF 2016 (Supreme Court of India)
Date of Judgment: May 18, 2023
Constitutional Bench:

• Justice K.M. Joseph

• Justice Ajay Rastogi

• Justice Aniruddha Bose

• Justice Hrishikesh Roy

• Justice C.T. Ravikumar

2. Subject of the Judgment

The Supreme Court examined the validity of state amendments (Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, and Karnataka) that allowed traditional bull-taming sports like Jallikattu, Bullock Cart Races, and Kambala, despite a previous ban under the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 (PCA Act). The Court assessed whether these amendments violated animal rights, constitutional principles, and the earlier judgment in A. Nagaraja v. Animal Welfare Board of India (2014).

3. Related Laws & Sections

• Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 (PCA Act):
  Section 3: Duty to prevent unnecessary pain/suffering to animals.
  Section 11(1)(a) & (m): Prohibits cruelty like beating, torturing, or using animals for entertainment causing harm.
  Section 22: Restricts training/exhibition of performing animals.

• Constitutional Provisions:
  Article 48: State’s duty to protect cows, calves, and improve animal breeds.
  Article 51-A(g) & (h): Fundamental Duty to show compassion for living creatures and preserve culture.
  Article 254(2): Allows state laws to override central laws with Presidential assent.

• State Amendments:
  Tamil Nadu (2017), Maharashtra (2017), Karnataka (2017) amended PCA Act to permit Jallikattu, Bullock Cart Races, and Kambala as cultural traditions.

4. Key Issues & Supreme Court’s Decision

Issue 1: Are the State Amendments valid or "colourable legislation"?

• Petitioners’ Argument: The amendments bypass the 2014 ban in A. Nagaraja by reintroducing cruel sports without addressing animal suffering.

• Court’s View:
  The amendments are not colourable legislation as they regulate the sports via strict rules (e.g., isolation of bulls, medical checks).
  The laws fall under Entry 17 (Prevention of Cruelty to Animals) in the Concurrent List, making them valid after Presidential assent.

Issue 2: Do animals have Fundamental Rights under Article 21?

• Petitioners’ Argument: Animals deserve rights against cruelty under Articles 14, 21, and 51-A(g).

• Court’s View:
  Animals do not have Fundamental Rights, but statutory protections under PCA Act must be enforced.
  Courts cannot expand Article 21 to animals; it’s a matter for Parliament.

Issue 3: Are Jallikattu/Kambala part of cultural heritage?

• Petitioners’ Argument: These sports are not genuine traditions but exploitative.

• Court’s View:
  The legislature’s view (that they are cultural) is not for courts to overrule unless proven arbitrary.
  Rules now minimize cruelty (e.g., banning sharp objects, ensuring vet checks).

Issue 4: Do the amendments violate PCA Act and earlier judgments?

• Court’s View:
  The 2014 ban in A. Nagaraja was based on unregulated cruelty.
  Post-amendment, new rules reduce suffering, so the sports no longer violate Sections 3/11 of PCA Act.

Issue 5: Are the amendments arbitrary under Article 14?

• Court’s View:
  The laws are not arbitrary as they balance tradition and animal welfare via regulations.

5. Conclusion & Directions

• Judgment: The Supreme Court upheld the state amendments but emphasized strict enforcement of animal welfare rules.

• Key Directives:
  Authorities must ensure no unnecessary pain is inflicted during events.
  District Magistrates must monitor compliance with PCA Act and state rules.
  Violations will attract penalties under the amended laws.

Final Outcome: All petitions challenging Jallikattu, Bullock Cart Races, and Kambala were dismissed, and the amendments were declared valid.

Significance of the Judgment

This case balances cultural rights and animal welfare, allowing traditional sports but mandating humane practices. It clarifies that while animals lack Fundamental Rights, laws must prevent cruelty, and courts defer to legislatures on cultural issues.

DR. JAYA THAKUR V. UNION OF INDIA
2023 INSC 616 (11 July 2023)

1. Heading

Case Name: Dr. Jaya Thakur v. Union of India & Ors.
Court: Supreme Court of India
Judgment Date: 2023
Constitutional Bench: 3-Judge Bench (Justices B.R. Gavai, Vikram Nath, Sanjay Karol)

2. Citation

Citation: 2023 INSC 616

3. Subject of the Judgment (Brief)

The case challenged:

• The extensions granted to Sanjay Kumar Mishra as Director of Enforcement (ED).

• The constitutional validity of amendments to:
  Central Vigilance Commission (Amendment) Act, 2021
  Delhi Special Police Establishment (Amendment) Act, 2021
  Fundamental (Amendment) Rules, 2021

The Supreme Court examined whether these amendments undermined the independence of investigative agencies (ED/CBI) by allowing extensions to their Directors.

4. Related Laws & Sections

• Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003 (CVC Act):
  Section 25(d): Initially mandated a minimum 2-year tenure for ED Director. The 2021 amendment allowed 1-year extensions (max 5 years total).

• DSPE Act, 1946 (CBI Act):
  Section 4B(1): Similar amendment for CBI Director’s tenure.

• Fundamental Rules, 1922:
  Rule 56(d): Amended to permit extensions for ED/CBI Directors.

• Constitutional Provisions:
  Article 14 (Equality): Alleged arbitrariness in extensions.
  Separation of Powers: Judicial vs. legislative authority.

5. Step-wise Explanation of the Judgment

A. Background

• Sanjay Kumar Mishra was appointed ED Director in 2018 for 2 years.

• His tenure was extended multiple times (2020, 2021, 2022) via amendments.

• Petitioners argued:
  Extensions violated the Supreme Court’s 2021 judgment (Common Cause v. UoI), which barred further extensions.
  Amendments allowed the government to influence ED/CBI by granting extensions, compromising independence.

B. Key Issues

1. Validity of Amendments:
   Whether the amendments to CVC Act, DSPE Act, and Fundamental Rules were unconstitutional.

2. Legality of Extensions:
   Whether extensions granted to Mishra were valid despite the 2021 court order.

C. Supreme Court’s Analysis

1. On Amendments:
   The Court upheld the amendments, stating:
   Parliament has the power to legislate on tenure rules.
   Extensions require recommendations from high-level committees (including CVC, PM, CJI for CBI), ensuring checks and balances.
   No violation of fundamental rights or constitutional principles.

2. On Extensions to Mishra:
   The Court struck down the extensions (2021 & 2022) as illegal because:
   They violated the 2021 judgment (Common Cause), which explicitly barred further extensions to Mishra.
   A mandamus (court order) cannot be nullified by legislative amendments for specific individuals.

3. Transitional Relief:
   Allowed Mishra to continue till 31 July 2023 for public interest (ongoing FATF review).

D. Key Legal Principles Affirmed

• Legislative Override:
  Parliament can amend laws to change the basis of a judgment (e.g., tenure rules).
  However, it cannot nullify a specific court order (e.g., Mishra’s extensions).

• Independence of Agencies:
  ED/CBI Directors must be insulated from political influence. Extensions should be rare and justified.

6. Conclusion

• Amendments Valid: The 2021 amendments were upheld as constitutional.

• Extensions Illegal: Mishra’s post-2021 extensions were quashed for violating judicial orders.

• Significance: The judgment balances legislative power with judicial authority, ensuring investigative agencies remain independent while allowing reasonable tenure extensions.

Final Order:

• Petitions partly allowed (extensions quashed but amendments upheld).

• Mishra’s tenure extended till 31 July 2023 for smooth transition.

Key Takeaways

• The government can amend laws to modify tenure rules for ED/CBI Directors.

• However, it cannot bypass specific court orders (like a mandamus).

• Judicial review ensures accountability in appointments to maintain institutional integrity.

REVANASIDDAPPA V. MALLIKARJUN
2023 INSC 783 (1 September 2023)

1. Heading

Legitimacy and Inheritance Rights of Children Born from Void/Voidable Marriages under Hindu Law

2. Citation

2023 INSC 783
Civil Appeal No. 2844 of 2011
Supreme Court of India

3. Subject of the Judgment

The Supreme Court clarified whether children born from void or voidable marriages (under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955) have inheritance rights in their parents' ancestral/coparcenary property or only in self-acquired property.

4. Key Details

• Date of Judgment: September 1, 2023

• Constitutional Bench: 3-Judge Bench (CJI D.Y. Chandrachud, J.B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra)

• Related Laws:
  Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (HMA):
  Section 16: Legitimacy of children from void/voidable marriages.
  Section 11: Defines void marriages (e.g., bigamy).
  Section 12: Defines voidable marriages (e.g., impotence, fraud).
  Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (HSA):
  Section 6: Devolution of coparcenary property (amended in 2005 to include daughters).
  Section 8 & 10: Rules for intestate succession.

• Overruled Cases:
  Jinia Keotin v. Kumar Sitaram Manjhi (2003)
  Neelamma v. Sarojamma (2006)
  Bharatha Matha v. R. Vijaya Renganathan (2010)

5. Step-by-Step Explanation of the Judgment

A. Background

• The case addressed whether children born from void/voidable marriages (e.g., bigamous marriages) could inherit ancestral/coparcenary property or only self-acquired property of their parents.

• Earlier judgments (Jinia Keotin) denied such children rights in ancestral property, limiting them to self-acquired assets.

B. Key Legal Questions

1. Does Section 16(3) of HMA restrict inheritance to only self-acquired property?

2. Can such children claim a share in coparcenary property after the parent’s death?

3. How does the Hindu Succession Act (HSA) apply to these children?

C. Supreme Court’s Ruling

1. Legitimacy under Section 16(1) & 16(2):
   Children from void/voidable marriages are legitimate but only for their parents’ property (not extended family).

2. Property Rights under Section 16(3):
   They cannot demand partition during the parent’s lifetime.
   After the parent’s death, they inherit a share in the parent’s portion of ancestral property (treated as self-acquired post-partition).

3. Coparcenary Rights:
   They do not become coparceners by birth (unlike children from valid marriages).
   Their share is limited to the parent’s share in the joint family property.

4. Harmonizing HMA & HSA:
   The notional partition concept (under HSA Section 6) applies:
   The deceased parent’s share is calculated as if a partition occurred before death.
   The child gets a share in this separated property, not the undivided coparcenary.

5. No Discrimination:
   Such children are Class I heirs under HSA but cannot claim rights beyond the parent’s property.

D. Examples for Clarity

• Scenario: A father (F) has 2 sons (S1 from a valid marriage, S2 from a void marriage).
  During F’s lifetime: S2 cannot demand partition.
  After F’s death:
  F’s share in ancestral property is calculated via notional partition.
  S2 inherits equally with S1 only from F’s share, not the entire coparcenary.

6. Conclusion

• Children from void/voidable marriages:
  Are legitimate but only for parental property.
  Can inherit a share in ancestral property after the parent’s death (treated as self-acquired post-partition).
  Cannot claim coparcenary rights or demand partition during the parent’s lifetime.

• Balanced Approach: The judgment protects children’s rights while respecting Hindu joint family traditions.

Final Note: This ruling ensures social justice for innocent children while maintaining the integrity of Hindu coparcenary systems.

Key Takeaway:

"Legitimacy under Section 16 grants inheritance rights, but only in the parent’s property—not the wider joint family."

C.B.I. V. DR. R.R. KISHORE
2023 INSC 817 (11 September 2023)

1. Heading

Case Name: Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) v. Dr. R.R. Kishore
Citation: 2023 INSC 817
Court: Supreme Court of India
Constitutional Bench: 5-Judge Bench (Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Sanjiv Khanna, Abhay S. Oka, Vikram Nath, J.K. Maheshwari)
Date of Judgment: September 11, 2023

2. Subject of the Judgment

The judgment dealt with whether the declaration of Section 6A of the Delhi Special Police Establishment (DSPE) Act, 1942 as unconstitutional (violating Article 14) in the Subramanian Swamy case (2014) applies retrospectively or prospectively, and its impact on pending investigations under Article 20(1) of the Constitution.

3. Related Laws & Sections

• Section 6A, DSPE Act, 1942 (Mandated prior approval for investigating corruption cases against senior officials).

• Article 14 (Right to Equality) – Struck down Section 6A for creating arbitrary classification.

• Article 20(1) (Protection against ex-post-facto laws) – Examined whether Section 6A provided immunity.

• Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act) – Under which the accused was charged.

• Subramanian Swamy v. CBI (2014) (Constitution Bench) – Declared Section 6A unconstitutional.

4. Explanation of the Judgment (Step-wise)

Background of the Case

• The CBI registered an FIR against Dr. R.R. Kishore (a senior official) under the PC Act, 1988 for corruption in 2004.

• Kishore argued that the investigation was illegal because Section 6A of the DSPE Act required prior approval from the Central Government, which was not obtained.

• The Delhi High Court (2006) ruled in Kishore’s favor, stating that investigation without approval was illegal.

• The Supreme Court (2014, Subramanian Swamy case) struck down Section 6A as unconstitutional for violating Article 14 (equality before law).

• The key question now was: Does this declaration apply retrospectively (void from inception) or prospectively (only after 2014)?

Key Legal Issues

1. Is Section 6A procedural or substantive?
   The Court held it was procedural (only a safeguard for investigation, not immunity from conviction).
   Article 20(1) only protects against retrospective conviction or enhanced punishment, not procedural changes.

2. Does Article 20(1) protect Section 6A?
   No, because:
   Article 20(1) bars new offences or increased penalties retrospectively.
   Section 6A did not decriminalize corruption; it only regulated investigation.

3. Retrospective or Prospective Effect?
   The Court ruled that unconstitutional laws are void ab initio (from the beginning).
   Since Section 6A was struck down in 2014, it was never valid from its insertion in 2003.

4. Impact on Pending Cases
   Investigations conducted without prior approval before 2014 were not illegal because Section 6A was non-existent from inception.
   The High Court’s 2006 order (quashing investigation) was overturned.

Conclusion of the Judgment

• Section 6A was always unconstitutional and unenforceable from 2003.

• No protection under Article 20(1) because it was a procedural rule, not a substantive right.

• Investigations before 2014 without approval remain valid (no retrospective penalty).

• The case was sent back to a regular bench for final disposal.

5. Significance of the Judgment

• Clarifies that unconstitutional laws are void from inception, not just from the date of judgment.

• Reinforces that Article 20(1) does not protect procedural safeguards, only penal consequences.

• Ensures corruption investigations are not derailed due to procedural technicalities.

THE STATE OF PUNJAB V. PRINCIPAL SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNOR OF PUNJAB
2023 INSC 1017 (10 November 2023)

1. Heading

Case Name: The State of Punjab v. Principal Secretary to the Governor of Punjab & Anr.
Court: Supreme Court of India
Jurisdiction: Civil Original Jurisdiction (Writ Petition under Article 32)

2. Citation

Citation: 2023 INSC 1017 (Reportable)
Writ Petition No.: Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1224 of 2023
Date of Judgment: November 10, 2023
Constitutional Bench: No (Decided by a 3-judge bench)

3. Subject of the Judgment in Short

The Supreme Court ruled on two key issues:

1. Governor’s Role in Withholding Bills: The Governor cannot indefinitely delay action on Bills passed by the State Legislature and must act as per Article 200 of the Constitution.

2. Speaker’s Power to Reconvene Assembly: The Speaker has the exclusive authority to reconvene a session of the Vidhan Sabha if it was adjourned but not prorogued.

4. Related Laws, Sections, and Acts

The judgment primarily interprets:

• Article 200 of the Constitution: Governor’s powers regarding assent to Bills.

• Article 174: Governor’s power to summon, prorogue, and dissolve the State Legislature.

• Article 207: Special provisions for Money Bills.

• Article 208: Rules of procedure for State Legislatures.

• Article 212: Immunity of legislative proceedings from judicial scrutiny.

• Rules of Procedure of Punjab Vidhan Sabha (Rule 16): Speaker’s power to adjourn and reconvene sessions.

5. Explanation of the Judgment (Step-wise)

Background of the Case

• The Punjab Government passed four Bills in the Vidhan Sabha, but the Governor refused to take any action (neither assenting nor returning them).

• The Governor claimed that the session where these Bills were passed was "illegal" because the Speaker had reconvened it after an adjournment without prorogation.

• The State of Punjab approached the Supreme Court under Article 32, seeking a declaration that the sessions were valid and a direction to the Governor to act on the pending Bills.

Key Issues Decided by the Supreme Court

A. Governor’s Role in Withholding Bills (Article 200)

• The Court held that the Governor is a constitutional head and must act on the advice of the Council of Ministers (as established in Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab).

• Under Article 200, the Governor has three options when a Bill is presented:
  Assent to the Bill
  Withhold assent (but must return it for reconsideration as per the first proviso)
  Reserve the Bill for President’s consideration (only in specific cases).

• The Governor cannot indefinitely delay action on Bills. If he withholds assent, he must return the Bill "as soon as possible" with reasons for reconsideration.

• The Court criticized the Governor for not following constitutional procedure and keeping Bills pending without any valid justification.

B. Speaker’s Power to Reconvene the Assembly

• The Vidhan Sabha was adjourned sine die (indefinitely) on March 22, 2023, but not prorogued.

• The Speaker later reconvened the session in June 2023 under Rule 16 of Punjab Vidhan Sabha Rules, which allows the Speaker to recall an adjourned House in public interest.

• The Court ruled that:
  Adjournment ≠ Prorogation: An adjourned session can be recalled, but a prorogued session ends the term.
  Speaker has exclusive power to regulate House proceedings (as per Ramdas Athawale v. Union of India).
  The Governor cannot question the validity of a session once the Speaker reconvenes it.

Conclusion of the Judgment

• The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Punjab Vidhan Sabha sessions held in June and October 2023.

• The Governor was directed to act on the pending Bills as per Article 200 without further delay.

• The Court emphasized constitutional democracy, stating that unelected officials (like Governors) must not obstruct elected legislatures.

Final Takeaways

1. Governor’s Role is Limited – Must act promptly on Bills and cannot veto legislative decisions.

2. Speaker’s Authority is Supreme – Only the Speaker can decide on adjournment and reconvening of sessions.

3. Judicial Safeguard for Democracy – Courts will intervene if constitutional functionaries misuse power.

COX AND KINGS LTD. V. SAP INDIA PVT. LTD.
2023 INSC 1051 (6 December 2023)

1. Citation

Case Name: Cox and Kings Ltd. v. SAP India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.
Citation: 2023 INSC 1051
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Constitution Bench (5 Judges)
Date of Judgment: December 6, 2023

2. Subject of the Judgment

The Supreme Court examined the validity and applicability of the "Group of Companies Doctrine" in Indian arbitration law. The doctrine allows non-signatory companies within a corporate group to be bound by an arbitration agreement if their involvement in the transaction shows mutual intent to arbitrate.

3. Related Laws & Sections

• Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996:
  Section 2(1)(h): Definition of "party" to an arbitration agreement.
  Section 7: Requirements of a valid arbitration agreement (written form, consent).
  Section 8: Power of judicial authority to refer parties to arbitration.
  Section 11: Appointment of arbitrators.
  Section 45: Enforcement of foreign arbitration agreements.

• Indian Contract Act, 1872: Principles of consent and privity of contract.

• Companies Act, 2013: Separate legal identity of companies.

4. Key Issues Decided by the Court

The Supreme Court addressed two main questions:

1. Can the phrase "claiming through or under" (Sections 8 & 45) include the Group of Companies Doctrine?

2. Is the Group of Companies Doctrine valid in Indian law?

5. Explanation of the Judgment (Step-wise)

A. What is the Group of Companies Doctrine?

• The doctrine allows a non-signatory company (part of the same corporate group) to be bound by an arbitration agreement if:
  It was actively involved in negotiations, performance, or termination of the contract.
  There is a clear mutual intention to include it in arbitration.

• Example: If Company A (signatory) and Company B (non-signatory, but part of the same group) work together on a project, Company B can be compelled to arbitrate if its role shows consent.

B. Supreme Court’s Ruling

1. Doctrine is Valid but Consent is Key
   The doctrine is part of Indian arbitration law but must be applied carefully.
   Consent (express or implied) of the non-signatory is essential.
   Mere membership in a group is not enough—active participation in the contract is required.

2. No Link to "Claiming Through or Under"
   The phrase "claiming through or under" (Sections 8 & 45) applies only to legal heirs, assignees, or successors, not group companies.
   The doctrine is independent and based on mutual intent, not statutory interpretation.

3. Factors to Determine Applicability
   Direct involvement in contract performance.
   Common business purpose between signatory and non-signatory.
   Composite nature of transactions (multiple agreements linked to one deal).
   No strict reliance on "single economic unit" theory—separate legal identity must be respected.

4. Referral Court’s Role
   Courts should only check prima facie if an arbitration agreement exists.
   The arbitral tribunal must decide whether a non-signatory is bound.

C. Rejection of Misuse of the Doctrine

• The Court warned against misapplying the doctrine to force unrelated companies into arbitration.

• Piercing the corporate veil (ignoring legal separation of companies) cannot be used unless fraud is proven.

6. Conclusion

• The Group of Companies Doctrine is valid in India but must be applied cautiously.

• Consent and conduct of the non-signatory are crucial—not just corporate affiliation.

• Courts should not expand arbitration unnecessarily; tribunals must decide disputes fairly.

• The judgment balances corporate realities with legal principles, ensuring arbitration remains consensual and fair.

IN RE INTERPLAY BETWEEN ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS UNDER THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT 1996 AND THE INDIAN STAMP ACT 1899. V.
2023 INSC 1066 (13 December 2023)

Citation

Case Name: In Re: Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements Under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 and the Indian Stamp Act 1899
Citation: 2023 INSC 1066
Date of Judgment: 25 April 2023 (Constitution Bench of 7 Judges)

Subject 

The Supreme Court examined whether an unstamped or insufficiently stamped contract containing an arbitration clause is enforceable under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) and the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (Stamp Act). The Court overruled its earlier judgments (SMS Tea Estates and Garware Wall Ropes) and held that:

• Non-payment of stamp duty does not invalidate an arbitration agreement.

• Courts cannot refuse to appoint an arbitrator merely because the underlying contract is unstamped.

• The arbitral tribunal (not courts) has the authority to examine stamping issues.

Related Laws & Sections

A. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

• Section 5 – Limits judicial intervention in arbitration.

• Section 7 – Defines an arbitration agreement.

• Section 11(6A) – Courts must only examine the existence (not validity) of an arbitration agreement.

• Section 16 – Arbitral tribunal can rule on its own jurisdiction (including stamping issues).

B. Indian Stamp Act, 1899

• Section 33 – Duty to impound unstamped documents.

• Section 35 – Unstamped documents are inadmissible in evidence but not void.

C. Indian Contract Act, 1872

• Section 2(g) & (j) – Defines void agreements but does not apply to stamping defects.

Key Issues & Supreme Court’s Decision (Step-by-Step Explanation)

Issue 1: Does non-stamping make an arbitration agreement invalid?

• Earlier View (Overruled):
  SMS Tea Estates (2011) & Garware Wall Ropes (2019) held that an unstamped contract is void, so the arbitration clause inside it cannot be enforced.
  Courts had to impound unstamped contracts before appointing arbitrators.

• New Ruling (2023):
  Non-stamping is a curable defect (not fatal to arbitration).
  Section 35 (Stamp Act) only makes unstamped documents inadmissible in evidence, not void.
  Arbitration agreement is separate from the main contract (doctrine of separability).

Issue 2: Who should decide stamping issues—Courts or Arbitrators?

• Earlier View (Overruled):
  Courts had to examine stamping at the appointment stage (Section 11).

• New Ruling (2023):
  Arbitral tribunal (not courts) must decide stamping issues under Section 16 (competence-competence principle).
  Courts should only check prima facie existence of arbitration agreement (not stamping).

Issue 3: Does the Stamp Act override the Arbitration Act?

• Earlier View (Overruled):
  Courts applied Stamp Act strictly, delaying arbitration.

• New Ruling (2023):
  Arbitration Act is a special law and prevails over the Stamp Act.
  Section 5 (Arbitration Act) restricts judicial interference in arbitration.

Conclusion 

1. Unstamped contracts do not invalidate arbitration clauses.

2. Courts must appoint arbitrators without examining stamping issues.

3. Arbitral tribunal (not courts) will decide stamp duty disputes.

4. Overrules SMS Tea Estates & Garware Wall Ropes.

5. Promotes faster arbitration by reducing court interference.

VISHAL TIWARI VS. UNION OF INDIA

2024 INSC 3 (3 January 2024)

Analysis of Vishal Tiwari vs. Union of India (2024 INSC 3)

1. Heading

Case Name: Vishal Tiwari vs. Union of India & Ors.
Court: Supreme Court of India
Citation: 2024 INSC 3

2. Subject 

The Supreme Court addressed concerns regarding market volatility, investor protection, and allegations of regulatory failure by SEBI in relation to the Adani Group following the Hindenburg Research report. The Court examined SEBI's regulatory framework, investigations, and recommendations by an Expert Committee, ultimately upholding SEBI's authority and dismissing petitions seeking a transfer of investigations.

3. Related Laws, Sections, and Acts

• Constitutional Provisions:
  Article 32 (Right to Constitutional Remedies)
  Article 142 (Supreme Court’s Power to Ensure Justice)

• Statutory Laws:
  SEBI Act, 1992 (Sections 11, 30)
  Securities Contracts (Regulation) Rules, 1957 (Rule 19A)
  SEBI (Foreign Portfolio Investors) Regulations, 2014
  SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015
  Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), 2002

• Judicial Precedents:
  IFB Agro Industries Ltd v. SICGIL India Ltd (2023)
  Prakash Gupta v. SEBI (2021)
  Himanshu Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh (2022)

• Date of Judgment: January 3, 2024

• Constitutional Bench:
  Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud (CJI)
  J.B. Pardiwala (J.)
  Manoj Misra (J.)

4. Explanation of the Judgment (Step-wise)

A. Background

• Petitions were filed under Article 32 alleging market manipulation by the Adani Group after the Hindenburg Report (January 2023), which accused the group of financial irregularities and stock price manipulation.

• The report led to a sharp decline in Adani Group’s stock prices, causing investor losses.

• Petitioners sought:
  Court-monitored investigation by an SIT/CBI.
  Revocation of SEBI’s amendments to FPI and LODR Regulations.
  Action against Hindenburg for short-selling.

B. Key Issues

1. Regulatory Failure by SEBI:
   Petitioners argued SEBI’s amendments to FPI and LODR Regulations diluted disclosure norms, aiding Adani Group.
   Court’s View: SEBI’s amendments were tightened (not diluted) to mandate upfront disclosures. No evidence of regulatory failure.

2. Transfer of Investigation to SIT/CBI:
   Petitioners claimed SEBI’s investigation was inadequate.
   Court’s View: SEBI had completed 22 out of 24 investigations. No proof of bias or inaction. Transfer of probe is rare and requires extraordinary circumstances.

3. Conflict of Interest in Expert Committee:
   Petitioners alleged bias in committee members.
   Court’s View: Allegations were unsubstantiated and raised belatedly.

4. Short-Selling by Hindenburg:
   SEBI stated short-selling is legal but agreed to probe if Hindenburg violated laws.

C. Court’s Findings

1. Limited Judicial Review Over SEBI:
   Courts cannot interfere with SEBI’s policy decisions unless they violate fundamental rights or are arbitrary.
   SEBI’s expertise in market regulation is final unless proven mala fide.

2. No Regulatory Failure:
   SEBI’s amendments to FPI/LODR Regulations were valid and aimed at stricter compliance.

3. No Grounds for SIT/CBI Probe:
   SEBI’s investigation was comprehensive. No evidence of deliberate delay.

4. Expert Committee’s Recommendations Accepted:
   Suggestions on investor awareness, market surveillance, and unclaimed assets were directed for implementation.

5. Conclusion

• The Supreme Court dismissed petitions seeking SIT probe and revocation of SEBI’s regulations.

• SEBI was directed to complete pending investigations within 3 months.

• Government and SEBI must consider Expert Committee’s recommendations to strengthen investor protection.

• The judgment reaffirmed SEBI’s autonomy and emphasized that unverified petitions harm public interest litigation.

Final Outcome: Petitions disposed of; SEBI’s authority upheld.

THE STATE OF PUNJAB VS. PRINCIPAL SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNOR OF PUNJAB

2023 INSC 1017 (10 November 2023)

Analysis of The State Of Punjab Vs. Principal Secretary To The Governor Of Punjab

1. Heading

Case Title: The State of Punjab vs. Principal Secretary to the Governor of Punjab
Court: Supreme Court of India
Jurisdiction: Civil Original Jurisdiction (Writ Petition under Article 32)

2. Citation

Citation: 2023 INSC 1017
Date of Judgment: November 10, 2023
Constitutional Bench: No (Decided by a 3-judge bench)
Judges:

• Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud (Chief Justice of India)

• Justice J.B. Pardiwala

• Justice Manoj Misra

3. Subject 

The case dealt with two key issues:

1. Whether the Governor can indefinitely withhold assent to Bills passed by the State Legislature.

2. Whether the Speaker of the Vidhan Sabha has the authority to reconvene a session that was adjourned but not prorogued.

The Supreme Court ruled that:

• The Governor cannot delay or refuse action on Bills passed by the legislature and must act as per Article 200.

• The Speaker has exclusive power to reconvene an adjourned session if prorogation has not occurred.

4. Related Laws and Constitutional Provisions

The judgment primarily interprets the following:

• Article 200 of the Constitution: Governor’s powers regarding assent to Bills.

• Article 174: Governor’s power to summon, prorogue, and dissolve the State Legislature.

• Article 207: Special provisions for Money Bills.

• Article 208: Rules of procedure for State Legislatures.

• Article 212: Immunity of legislative proceedings from judicial review.

• Punjab Vidhan Sabha Rules of Procedure (Rule 16): Speaker’s power to adjourn and reconvene the House.

5. Explanation of the Judgment (Step-wise)

A. Governor’s Role in Assenting to Bills (Article 200)

• The Governor has three options when a Bill is presented:
  Assent to the Bill.
  Withhold assent (but must return it for reconsideration as per the first proviso).
  Reserve the Bill for the President’s consideration (only in specific cases).

• Key Observations:
  The Governor cannot indefinitely withhold assent without following constitutional procedure.
  If the Governor withholds assent, he must return the Bill to the legislature for reconsideration "as soon as possible."
  Failure to act violates constitutional principles of democratic governance.

B. Speaker’s Power to Reconvene an Adjourned Session

• Difference between Adjournment and Prorogation:
  Adjournment (sine die) = Temporary break; session continues.
  Prorogation = Formal end of a session; all pending business lapses.

• Speaker’s Authority:
  Under Rule 16 of Punjab Vidhan Sabha Rules, the Speaker can reconvene an adjourned session if it has not been prorogued.
  The Governor cannot question the legality of a reconvened session—this falls under the Speaker’s exclusive domain.

C. Supreme Court’s Ruling

1. Governor’s Inaction Unconstitutional:
   The Governor must act on Bills promptly and cannot refuse assent without following Article 200.
   Keeping Bills pending indefinitely undermines democracy and legislative authority.

2. Speaker’s Decision is Final:
   The Speaker acted within his powers by reconvening the adjourned session.
   Courts cannot interfere in legislative proceedings under Article 212.

3. Validity of Sessions Upheld:
   The sessions held on June 19-20, 2023, and October 20, 2023, were constitutionally valid.

6. Conclusion

• The Supreme Court reaffirmed democratic principles, emphasizing that:
  The Governor must act on Bills without delay.
  The Speaker has full authority over House proceedings.

• The judgment ensures that elected legislatures function smoothly without undue interference from the Governor.

• The ruling strengthens parliamentary democracy and federalism, key features of India’s Constitution.

Final Order

• The Governor must process the pending Bills as per Article 200.

• The sessions reconvened by the Speaker are declared valid.

• The petition was disposed of with these directions.

V. SENTHIL BALAJI VS THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

2024 INSC 739 (26 September 2024)

Heading

Case Name: V. Senthil Balaji vs The Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement
Court: Supreme Court of India
Judgment Date: September 26, 2024

Citation

Citation: 2024 INSC 739
Criminal Appeal No.: 4011 of 2024 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 3986 of 2024)

Subject

The Supreme Court granted bail to V. Senthil Balaji, a former Tamil Nadu Transport Minister, in a money laundering case under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), 2002. The Court held that prolonged incarceration without a speedy trial violates the fundamental right to liberty (Article 21 of the Constitution).

Related Laws, Sections, and Acts

• Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), 2002
  Section 3: Defines the offence of money laundering.
  Section 4: Prescribes punishment (3 to 7 years imprisonment).
  Section 45: Stringent bail conditions under PMLA.

• Indian Penal Code (IPC)
  Sections 120B, 419, 420, 467, 471 (cheating, forgery, criminal conspiracy).

• Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
  Sections 7, 12, 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) (bribery, corruption).

• Constitutional Provisions
  Article 21: Right to life and personal liberty (includes right to speedy trial).

Bench: Justices Abhay S. Oka and Augustine George Masih

Explanation of the Judgment (Step-by-Step)

Background of the Case

• V. Senthil Balaji, a former Tamil Nadu Transport Minister, was accused of money laundering and corruption.

• Allegations: He took bribes in exchange for government jobs in the Transport Department (2011-2016).

• Three FIRs were registered against him under IPC, Prevention of Corruption Act, and PMLA.

• He was arrested on June 14, 2023, and remained in jail for over 15 months without trial.

Key Issues Before the Supreme Court

1. Whether the delay in trial (due to a large number of accused and witnesses) violates Article 21 (Right to Speedy Trial)?

2. Whether strict PMLA bail conditions (Section 45) can deny bail when trial is unlikely to conclude soon?

3. Whether prolonged pre-trial detention amounts to punishment without conviction?

Supreme Court’s Observations & Ruling

1. Right to Speedy Trial (Article 21)
   The Court held that keeping an accused in jail for years without trial is unfair and violates constitutional rights.
   Cited Manish Sisodia (2024) and K.A. Najeeb (2021) cases, where bail was granted due to trial delays.

2. Huge Number of Accused & Witnesses
   Over 2000 accused and 600+ witnesses in related cases.
   Trial would take years, making continued detention unjust.

3. PMLA Bail Conditions (Section 45) Not Absolute
   While PMLA has strict bail conditions, courts can grant bail if:
   Trial is delayed unreasonably.
   Accused has already served a substantial part of the maximum sentence (7 years in PMLA).

4. Risk of Witness Tampering
   The Court acknowledged Balaji’s political influence but imposed strict bail conditions to prevent witness tampering.

Bail Conditions Imposed

• Rs. 25 lakh bail bond with two sureties.

• No contact with witnesses or victims.

• Surrender passport and regular court appearances.

• Mark attendance twice a week at ED office.

• Bail can be cancelled if conditions are violated.

Conclusion

• The Supreme Court prioritized personal liberty over strict PMLA bail conditions.

• Key Takeaway: Courts can grant bail in PMLA cases if trial delays violate Article 21.

• This judgment balances anti-money laundering laws with fundamental rights, ensuring justice is not delayed indefinitely.

Significance of the Judgment

• Reinforces that "bail is the rule, jail is the exception."

• Protects undertrials from unnecessary long detention without trial.

• Sets a precedent for similar PMLA cases where trials are delayed due to complexity.

Final Note: This ruling ensures that strict laws like PMLA do not become tools for indefinite detention without trial, upholding constitutional rights while maintaining legal safeguards.

ALLEGED RAPE AND MURDER INCIDENT OF A TRAINEE DOCTOR IN R.G. KAR MEDICAL COLLEGE AND HOSPITAL, KOLKATA AND RELATED ISSUES

2024 INSC 613 (20 August 2024)

Heading

In Re: Alleged Rape and Murder Incident of a Trainee Doctor in R.G. Kar Medical College and Hospital, Kolkata and Related Issues

Citation

2024 INSC 613

Subject 

The Supreme Court addressed the brutal rape and murder of a female doctor at R.G. Kar Medical College, Kolkata, and broader issues concerning the safety of medical professionals in healthcare institutions. The Court emphasized the urgent need for systemic reforms to protect doctors, nurses, and paramedical staff from violence, especially gender-based violence.

Related Laws, Sections, and Acts

• State-Specific Laws on Violence Against Medical Professionals:
  Maharashtra Medicare Service Persons and Medicare Service Institutions Act, 2010
  Kerala Healthcare Service Persons and Healthcare Service Institutions Act, 2012
  Karnataka Prohibition of Violence Against Medicare Service Personnel Act, 2009
  Telangana Medicare Service Persons and Medicare Service Institutions Act, 2008
  West Bengal Medicare Service Persons and Medicare Service Institutions Act, 2009
  Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu have similar laws.

• Sexual Harassment at Workplace:
  Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition, and Redressal) Act, 2013 (Sections 2(o)(ii), 2(o)(iii), and 19).

• Date of Judgment: August 20, 2024

• Constitutional Bench:
  Chief Justice of India (CJI) Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud
  Justice J.B. Pardiwala
  Justice Manoj Misra

Explanation of the Judgment (Step-Wise)

Background of the Case

• A 31-year-old female postgraduate doctor at R.G. Kar Medical College, Kolkata, was raped and murdered inside the hospital seminar room while on a 36-hour duty shift.

• The crime shocked the nation, leading to nationwide protests by doctors and civil society.

• The Calcutta High Court transferred the case to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI).

• Violent protests erupted, resulting in vandalism at the hospital, prompting the Indian Medical Association (IMA) to call for a nationwide strike.

Key Issues Highlighted by the Supreme Court

1. Lack of Institutional Safety for Medical Professionals
   Doctors, nurses, and paramedics face violence from patients’ relatives due to unrestricted hospital access.
   Women doctors are at higher risk of sexual harassment and violence.
   No proper security, CCTV surveillance, or separate resting rooms for female staff.

2. Failure of State Machinery
   The West Bengal government failed to prevent vandalism despite prior protests.
   Delay in registering the FIR and misleading the victim’s family initially.

3. Inadequate Laws and Enforcement
   Existing state laws criminalize violence against doctors but lack systemic safety measures.

Supreme Court’s Directives

A. Formation of a National Task Force (NTF)

The Court constituted a National Task Force (NTF) to recommend reforms, including:

1. Preventing Violence Against Medical Professionals
   Security Measures:
   Baggage and person screening at hospital entrances.
   Increased security in high-risk areas like Emergency and ICU.
   Training for security personnel to handle aggressive behavior.
   Infrastructure Improvements:
   Separate resting rooms for male and female staff.
   Better lighting, CCTV cameras, and restricted access to sensitive areas.
   Transport facilities for night-shift workers.
   Grievance Handling:
   Social workers for grief counseling.
   Workshops on crisis management for hospital staff.

2. Preventing Sexual Harassment
   Strict enforcement of the Sexual Harassment at Workplace Act, 2013.
   Mandatory Internal Complaints Committees (ICC) in all hospitals.
   24/7 helpline for medical professionals.

B. Data Collection from All Hospitals

• State and Central governments must submit reports on:
  Number of security personnel.
  Availability of CCTV cameras, duty rooms, and screening systems.
  Compliance with sexual harassment laws.

C. Investigation Updates

• CBI must submit a status report on the Kolkata case by August 22, 2024.

• West Bengal government must file a report on the vandalism incident.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s judgment is a landmark step towards ensuring the safety of medical professionals in India. It highlights:

• The urgent need for systemic reforms in hospitals to prevent violence.

• The failure of existing laws to provide real protection.

• The importance of gender-sensitive policies to safeguard women doctors.

• The role of the National Task Force (NTF) in creating enforceable safety protocols.

This case serves as a wake-up call for governments and institutions to prioritize the safety and dignity of healthcare workers, who are essential to the nation’s well-being. The Court’s proactive measures aim to prevent such tragedies in the future and ensure a safe, respectful, and secure working environment for all medical professionals.

Final Note

The next hearing is scheduled for August 22, 2024, where further updates on the investigation and reforms will be reviewed.

MANISH SISODIA VS. DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT

2024 INSC 595 (9 August 2024)

Heading

Case Name: Manish Sisodia vs. Directorate of Enforcement
Court: Supreme Court of India
Judgment Date: August 9, 2024

Citation

Citation: 2024 INSC 595

Subject 

The Supreme Court granted bail to Manish Sisodia, former Deputy Chief Minister of Delhi, in cases filed by the Enforcement Directorate (ED) and Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) related to alleged irregularities in Delhi’s Excise Policy (2021-22). The Court emphasized the right to speedy trial and liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution, ruling that prolonged incarceration without trial violates fundamental rights.

Relevant Laws & Key Details

• Acts Involved:
  Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), 2002 (Section 45 – Bail Conditions)
  Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (Sections 7, 7A, 8, 12)
  Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860 (Sections 420, 201, 120B)
  Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), 1973 (Sections 207, 439, 436A – Speedy Trial & Bail Provisions)

• Constitutional Provisions:
  Article 21 (Right to Life & Personal Liberty)

• Bench:
  Justice B.R. Gavai & Justice K.V. Viswanathan (Division Bench)

• Key Precedents Cited:
  Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India (2022) – PMLA Bail Conditions
  P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement (2020) – Economic Offences & Bail
  Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI (2022) – Right to Speedy Trial

Step-by-Step Explanation of the Judgment

Background of the Case

• Manish Sisodia was arrested by the CBI (August 2022) and ED (March 2023) in connection with alleged corruption and money laundering in Delhi’s Excise Policy.

• The trial was delayed due to voluminous evidence (69,000+ pages, 493 witnesses), and Sisodia remained in jail for 17 months without trial.

Key Issues Before the Court

1. Whether prolonged incarceration without trial violates Article 21 (Right to Speedy Trial)?

2. Whether Section 45 of PMLA (strict bail conditions) can deny bail if trial is excessively delayed?

3. Whether the accused was responsible for delaying the trial?

Supreme Court’s Observations & Ruling

(A) Right to Speedy Trial (Article 21)

• The Court held that undue delay in trial (over 17 months) violates the accused’s fundamental right to liberty.

• Legal Principle:
  "Bail is the rule, jail is the exception."
  Courts must balance the seriousness of charges with the right to liberty.

(B) Section 45 PMLA & Bail Conditions

• Section 45 PMLA imposes strict bail conditions (court must be satisfied that accused is "not guilty").

• However, the Court ruled that prolonged incarceration without trial justifies relaxation of PMLA conditions.

• Precedent Followed: Ramkripal Meena v. ED (2024) – Bail granted despite PMLA restrictions due to delayed trial.

(C) Delay in Trial – Who is Responsible?

• Prosecution argued that Sisodia filed multiple applications (under CrPC Section 207) to delay proceedings.

• Court’s Finding:
  Only 27 applications were filed (not "hundreds" as claimed).
  Most applications were for fair trial rights (inspection of documents).
  Real Reason for Delay: Investigation was incomplete even after 8 months (contrary to ED’s assurance).

(D) Influencing Witnesses & Tampering Evidence

• The Court dismissed ED’s concerns, stating:
  Evidence was documentary (already seized).
  Sisodia had deep roots in society (no flight risk).
  Conditions imposed (surrender passport, regular reporting) to prevent misuse.

Conclusion & Final Order

The Supreme Court granted bail to Manish Sisodia, holding:

1. Right to Speedy Trial prevails over strict PMLA bail conditions.

2. 17-month incarceration without trial was unjustified.

3. Conditions for Bail:
   Rs. 10 lakh bail bond with two sureties.
   Surrender passport.
   Report to IO twice a week.
   No witness tampering.

Significance of the Judgment

• Reinforces Article 21 (liberty over prolonged detention).

• Clarifies that Section 45 PMLA cannot override constitutional rights.

• Sets a precedent for bail in economic offences where trial is delayed.

JUST RIGHTS FOR CHILDREN ALLIANCE vs. S. HARISH

2024 INSC 716

Citation

2024 INSC 716
Supreme Court of India
Criminal Appeal Nos. 2161-2162 of 2024

Subject

The Supreme Court clarified the scope of Section 15 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012, and Section 67B of the Information Technology (IT) Act, 2000, regarding the possession, storage, and transmission of child pornography. The Court emphasized that mere possession or viewing of child pornographic material is an offence, even if not shared or transmitted.

Related Laws & Sections

• POCSO Act, 2012
  Section 15 – Punishment for storage of pornographic material involving a child.
  Section 30 – Presumption of culpable mental state (intention to commit the offence).

• IT Act, 2000
  Section 67B – Punishment for publishing/transmitting child pornography in electronic form.

• Constitutional Provisions
  Article 15(3) – Special provisions for children.
  Article 39(f) – Protection of children from exploitation.

Date of Judgment: Not explicitly mentioned in the extract, but the case was decided in 2024.
Constitutional Bench: Not a Constitution Bench; decided by a Division Bench (Justice J.B. Pardiwala).

Explanation of the Judgment (Step-wise)

A. Background of the Case

• The accused, S. Harish, was found with child pornographic videos on his mobile phone.

• The Madras High Court quashed the case, stating that mere possession or viewing of such material is not an offence unless it is shared or transmitted.

• NGOs and the National Commission for Protection of Child Rights (NCPCR) appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that possession itself is a crime under POCSO and IT Act.

B. Key Issues Before the Supreme Court

1. Does mere possession of child pornography amount to an offence under POCSO?

2. What is the scope of Section 67B of the IT Act?

3. Can the presumption of guilt under Section 30 of POCSO be applied in quashing proceedings?

C. Supreme Court’s Ruling

(i) Section 15 of POCSO – Storage & Possession of Child Pornography

• The Court held that Section 15 criminalizes three types of offences:
  Possession with intent to share (Sub-section 1) – Punishable with fine.
  Possession for transmission/distribution (Sub-section 2) – Punishable with jail (up to 3 years).
  Possession for commercial purposes (Sub-section 3) – Punishable with stricter jail terms (3-7 years).

• Mere possession is enough to attract punishment if the accused fails to delete/destroy/report the material.

(ii) Section 67B of IT Act – Electronic Child Pornography

• The Court clarified that downloading, browsing, or storing child pornography is an offence, even if not shared.

• Automatic downloads (e.g., WhatsApp forwards) are no excuse if the accused does not delete/report them.

(iii) Presumption of Guilt (Section 30 of POCSO)

• The Court ruled that once child porn material is found in possession, the accused is presumed guilty unless he proves otherwise.

• The burden shifts to the accused to show he had no intention to commit the crime.

D. High Court’s Error

• The Madras High Court wrongly interpreted that only transmission/publication is punishable.

• The Supreme Court overruled this, stating that possession itself is a crime under POCSO and IT Act.

Conclusion

• The Supreme Court strengthened child protection laws by clarifying that mere possession of child pornography is a crime.

• The judgment ensures strict punishment for offenders, even if they only download or store such material.

• The ruling aligns with international standards (UN Convention on Child Rights) and deters child exploitation.

Final Order

• The Supreme Court set aside the Madras High Court’s order and revived criminal proceedings against the accused.

• The case was sent back to the trial court for further proceedings.

HIGH COURT BAR ASSOCIATION ALLAHABAD V. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.

2024 INSC 150 (29 February 2024)

                     

Heading

Automatic Vacation of Stay Orders: Supreme Court Overrules Asian Resurfacing

Citation

2024 INSC 150
Criminal Appeal No. 3589 of 2023
Decided on: February 29, 2024

Subject                   

The Supreme Court overruled its earlier decision in Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency Pvt. Ltd. v. CBI (2018), which mandated that all interim stay orders in civil/criminal cases would automatically expire after six months unless extended by a speaking order. The Court held that such automatic vacation of stays violates principles of natural justice and exceeds judicial power under Article 142 of the Constitution.

Key Legal Provisions & Bench

• Constitutional Provisions:
  Article 142 (Supreme Court’s power to do complete justice).
  Article 226(3) (Automatic vacation of ex-parte interim orders in writ petitions if not heard within 2 weeks).

• Related Laws:
  Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act).
  Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), 1973 (Sections 397, 482).
  Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908.

• Constitutional Bench:
  5-Judge Bench comprising CJI Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, Justices Abhay S. Oka, J.B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, and Pankaj Mithal.

• Overruled Case:
  Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency Pvt. Ltd. v. CBI (2018) 16 SCC 299.

Explanation of the Judgment (Step-wise)

A. Background

• In Asian Resurfacing (2018), the SC directed that all stay orders in civil/criminal trials would lapse automatically after six months unless extended by a reasoned order.

• This was done to prevent indefinite delays in trials.

• However, many High Courts and litigants protested, arguing that automatic vacation of stays without hearing affected parties was unfair.

B. Issues Before the Court

1. Can the Supreme Court, under Article 142, order automatic vacation of all High Court stay orders after six months?

2. Can the SC direct High Courts to decide stayed cases within a fixed time (e.g., day-to-day hearings)?

C. Supreme Court’s Analysis & Decision

(i) Against Automatic Vacation of Stay Orders

• Violates Natural Justice: Stays are granted after hearing both sides; they cannot be vacated without hearing the beneficiary.

• No Judicial Mind Applied: Automatic vacation means no application of judicial reasoning, which is arbitrary.

• Manifestly Arbitrary: Similar provisions in Income Tax Act (Section 254(2A)) were struck down in Pepsi Foods Ltd. (2021) for being unfair.

• Article 142 Not Unlimited: SC cannot use this power to override substantive rights or ignore natural justice.

(ii) High Courts’ Independence & Judicial Hierarchy

• High Courts are constitutional courts, not subordinate to the Supreme Court.

• Article 227 gives High Courts superintendence over lower courts; SC cannot restrict this power.

• Blanket timelines impractical: Due to heavy caseloads, High Courts cannot prioritize stayed cases over other urgent matters.

(iii) Proper Procedure for Stay Orders

• Ad-interim stays (ex-parte orders) should be short-term and confirmed only after hearing.

• Final stay orders can be vacated only after hearing the affected party.

• No fixed timelines: Courts should decide cases based on merits, not rigid deadlines.

D. Conclusion & Key Takeaways

1. Asian Resurfacing Overruled: No automatic vacation of stays after six months.

2. Stays can only be vacated judicially (after hearing both sides).

3. Article 142 cannot be used to bypass natural justice or override High Courts’ powers.

4. High Courts must decide stay applications promptly, but no fixed deadlines can be imposed.

Final Remarks

This judgment restores judicial fairness by ensuring that no litigant loses protection due to court delays. It balances speedy justice with due process, ensuring that stays are not mechanically lifted without proper hearings. The ruling reaffirms High Courts’ autonomy and limits the SC’s Article 142 powers to exceptional cases only.

Significance:

• Protects litigants from arbitrary loss of legal protection.

• Prevents judicial overreach under Article 142.

• Respects separation of powers between SC and High Courts.

BILKIS YAKUB RASOOL VS. UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS

2024 INSC 24 

Citation

Case Name: Bilkis Yakub Rasool vs. Union of India & Others
Citation: 2024 INSC 24
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Justice Nagarathna (Constitutional Bench)
Date of Judgment: [Date not specified in the document]

Subject 

The case pertains to the remission granted to 11 convicts involved in the heinous crimes committed during the 2002 Gujarat riots, including gang rape and mass murder. The convicts were released prematurely by the Gujarat government in August 2022. The victim, Bilkis Bano, along with other petitioners, challenged the remission orders, arguing that:

• The Gujarat government was not the "appropriate government" to grant remission.

• The remission was granted without proper consideration of legal procedures and victim rights.

• The nature of the crime was too grave to justify early release.

The Supreme Court examined:

1. Maintainability of the victim's petition under Article 32.

2. Whether PILs challenging remission are maintainable.

3. Whether Gujarat was the "appropriate government" to grant remission.

4. Whether the remission orders were legally valid.

Related Laws & Legal Provisions

The judgment revolves around the following legal provisions:

A. Constitutional Provisions

• Article 32 (Right to Constitutional Remedies) – Victim’s petition for enforcement of fundamental rights.

• Article 14 (Right to Equality) – Arbitrary remission violates equality before law.

• Article 21 (Right to Life & Personal Liberty) – Victim’s right to justice and fair treatment.

B. Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC), 1973

• Section 432 – Power of the "appropriate government" to suspend or remit sentences.
  Section 432(7) – Defines "appropriate government" (State where trial & conviction occurred).

• Section 433A – Restriction on remission for life imprisonment (minimum 14 years).

• Section 435 – State must consult Central Govt. in cases investigated by CBI.

C. Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860

• Sections 143, 147, 148, 302 (murder), 376(2)(e) & (g) (gang rape) – Convicts were sentenced for these offences.

D. Other Relevant Judgments Cited

• Maru Ram vs. Union of India (1980) – Remission policies must consider reformation & victim rights.

• Epuru Sudhakar vs. State of A.P. (2006) – Judicial review of remission orders is permissible.

• V. Sriharan vs. Union of India (2016) – Only the convicting State can grant remission.

Step-by-Step Explanation of the Judgment

Step 1: Maintainability of Victim’s Petition (Article 32)

• The Supreme Court held that Bilkis Bano (victim) had the right to file a petition under Article 32 because:
  Her fundamental rights (Articles 14 & 21) were violated.
  The Gujarat High Court could not have overturned the Supreme Court’s earlier order (which directed Gujarat to consider remission).
  Alternative remedy under Article 226 was not a bar when fundamental rights were at stake.

Step 2: Maintainability of PILs Against Remission

• The Court did not decide whether PILs were maintainable because the victim’s petition itself was valid.

• However, it noted that third-party interference in criminal matters is generally discouraged unless public interest is involved.

Step 3: Was Gujarat the "Appropriate Government"?

• No. The Supreme Court held that only Maharashtra (where trial & conviction happened) had the power to grant remission under Section 432(7)(b) CrPC.

• Key reasoning:
  The crime occurred in Gujarat, but trial was transferred to Mumbai (Maharashtra) for fairness.
  Conviction happened in Maharashtra, so Gujarat had no jurisdiction to remit sentences.
  Precedents (Ratan Singh, V. Sriharan) support that remission must be granted by the convicting State.

Step 4: Were the Remission Orders Valid?

• No. The remission orders were illegal because:
  Gujarat lacked jurisdiction (as per Step 3).
  No proper consultation with the Presiding Judge (Section 432(2)) – The Mumbai court had opposed remission, but Gujarat ignored it.
  CBI’s negative opinion was disregarded (required under Section 435 since CBI investigated the case).
  No consideration of crime severity – The convicts committed gang rape & mass murder, making remission unjustifiable.
  Non-payment of fines – The convicts had not paid fines, meaning they still owed additional imprisonment.

Step 5: Supreme Court’s Final Decision

• The remission orders were quashed (cancelled).

• The convicts must surrender to jail authorities within 2 weeks.

• The State of Maharashtra (not Gujarat) is the appropriate government to reconsider remission (if any).

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s judgment reinforces the rule of law by:

1. Upholding victim rights – Bilkis Bano’s petition was valid under Article 32.

2. Clarifying jurisdiction – Only the convicting State (Maharashtra) can grant remission.

3. Ensuring due process – Remission cannot be granted without judicial consultation and victim consideration.

4. Preventing misuse of power – Gujarat’s remission was arbitrary and illegal.

ARVIND KEJRIWAL VS. DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT (2024)

2024 INSC 512 (12 July 2024)

Heading

Supreme Court's Ruling on the Legality of Arrest Under PMLA: Arvind Kejriwal vs. Directorate of Enforcement

Citation

2024 INSC 512
Criminal Appeal No. 2493 of 2024
Decided on: July 12, 2024
Bench: Justice Sanjiv Khanna & Justice Dipankar Datta

Subject

The Supreme Court examined whether the arrest of Delhi Chief Minister Arvind Kejriwal by the Enforcement Directorate (ED) under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), 2002, was lawful. The Court also discussed the scope of judicial review in arrests under PMLA and referred key legal questions to a larger Constitutional Bench.

Key Laws, Sections, and Acts Involved

• Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), 2002
  Section 19: Power to arrest (conditions for arrest, "reasons to believe," and material evidence).
  Section 45: Conditions for granting bail (twin conditions).
  Section 50: Power to summon persons for investigation.

• Constitution of India
  Article 21: Right to life and personal liberty.
  Article 22(1): Right to be informed of grounds of arrest.

• Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), 1973
  Section 167: Magistrate’s power to remand.
  Section 437: Bail in non-bailable offences.

• Related Cases Cited:
  Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India (2023) – Grounds of arrest must be communicated.
  Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India (2022) – PMLA’s constitutional validity upheld.
  V. Senthil Balaji v. State (2024) – Arrest must comply with PMLA safeguards.

Step-by-Step Explanation of the Judgment

A. Background of the Case

• The ED arrested Arvind Kejriwal on March 21, 2024, alleging his involvement in the Delhi Liquor Policy Scam under PMLA.

• Kejriwal challenged his arrest, claiming violation of Section 19 of PMLA (no valid "reasons to believe" recorded).

• The Delhi High Court rejected his plea, leading to this appeal in the Supreme Court.

B. Key Legal Issues

1. Was Kejriwal’s arrest under PMLA Section 19 valid?
   Did the ED have sufficient material to form a "reason to believe" he was guilty?
   Were the grounds of arrest properly communicated to him?

2. Can courts review the legality of an arrest under PMLA?
   The ED argued that judicial review should not interfere with investigations.
   The Supreme Court held that courts can examine whether arrest conditions under PMLA were met.

3. Is "necessity to arrest" a requirement under PMLA?
   The Court referred this question to a larger bench, as previous judgments (like Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar) require arrest only when absolutely necessary.

C. Supreme Court’s Observations

1. On Validity of Arrest
   The ED must record "reasons to believe" in writing before arrest (Section 19).
   The accused must be given a copy of these reasons to challenge arrest.
   The Court found that Kejriwal was given grounds of arrest, but did not conclusively rule on whether the arrest was justified.

2. On Judicial Review of Arrests
   Courts can examine whether the ED followed PMLA safeguards.
   However, they cannot conduct a mini-trial or assess evidence at this stage.

3. On "Necessity to Arrest"
   The Court referred this issue to a larger bench, as PMLA does not explicitly mention "necessity to arrest."
   The question is whether arrest should be last resort (as in Joginder Kumar v. State of UP).

4. Interim Bail Granted
   Since Kejriwal had been in jail for over 90 days, the Court granted him interim bail with conditions:
   He cannot sign official files without LG’s approval.
   He cannot comment on the case or interact with witnesses.

Conclusion

• The Supreme Court upheld the importance of procedural safeguards under PMLA but left key questions (like "necessity to arrest") for a larger bench.

• The judgment reinforces constitutional rights (Article 21 & 22) by ensuring arrests are not arbitrary.

• Kejriwal’s interim bail reflects the Court’s balancing act between personal liberty and investigation needs.

ARVIND KEJRIWAL VS. CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (CBI)

2024 INSC 687 (13 September 2024)

Citation

• Case Name: Arvind Kejriwal vs. Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI)

• Citation: 2024 INSC 687

• Court: Supreme Court of India

• Bench: Justice Surya Kant and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan

• Date of Judgment: 13th September 2024

Subject

The Supreme Court examined two key issues:

1. Legality of Arvind Kejriwal’s arrest by the CBI in a corruption case related to the Delhi Excise Policy 2021-22.

2. Whether Kejriwal should be granted bail in the CBI case, considering he was already granted bail in a related ED (Enforcement Directorate) case.

The Court upheld the legality of his arrest but granted him bail, citing prolonged incarceration and lack of immediate trial prospects.

Relevant Laws & Sections

The judgment dealt with the following legal provisions:

• Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC):
  Section 41(1)(b)(ii) – Conditions for arrest without a warrant.
  Section 41A – Notice before arrest in non-serious offences.
  Section 439 – Powers of High Court/Sessions Court to grant bail.

• Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act):
  Section 7 – Offence of bribery by a public servant.

• Indian Penal Code (IPC):
  Section 120B – Criminal conspiracy.
  Section 477A – Falsification of accounts.

• Constitutional Provisions:
  Article 20(3) – Right against self-incrimination.
  Article 21 – Right to life and personal liberty.

Step-by-Step Explanation of the Judgment

A. Background of the Case

• The CBI registered an FIR (No. RC0032022A0053) on 17th August 2022 alleging corruption in Delhi’s Excise Policy.

• Kejriwal was not initially named in the FIR or the first four charge sheets.

• The ED arrested him on 21st March 2024 in a related money laundering case.

• On 26th June 2024, the CBI arrested Kejriwal after obtaining court permission.

B. Key Issues Before the Supreme Court

1. Was Kejriwal’s arrest by the CBI legal?
   The Court examined whether the CBI followed Sections 41(1)(b)(ii) and 41A CrPC (which require valid reasons for arrest).
   The Court held that since the Trial Court approved the arrest, the CBI complied with the law.

2. Should Kejriwal be granted bail?
   The Court noted that:
   The trial would take a long time (224 witnesses, lakhs of documents).
   Kejriwal had no criminal history and was not a flight risk.
   He was already granted bail in the ED case.
   The Court ruled that continued jail without trial violates Article 21 (Right to Liberty).

3. Should Kejriwal be sent back to the Trial Court for bail?
   The High Court had earlier refused bail, asking him to approach the Trial Court first.
   The Supreme Court rejected this, saying it would cause unnecessary delay.

C. Supreme Court’s Decision

• Arrest upheld (No procedural illegality found).

• Bail granted with strict conditions:
  ₹10 lakh bail bond.
  No public statements on the case.
  Must attend all court hearings.

D. Justice Ujjal Bhuyan’s Separate Opinion

• Criticized the timing of arrest (after 22 months, only when Kejriwal got bail in the ED case).

• Stressed that investigating agencies must act fairly and not misuse arrest powers.

• Agreed with bail but disagreed with some conditions imposed by Justice Surya Kant.

Conclusion

• The Supreme Court balanced investigative powers and personal liberty.

• While the arrest was legally valid, bail was granted due to trial delays and Kejriwal’s clean record.

• The judgment reinforces:
  Bail is the rule, jail is the exception.
  Investigations must be fair and not politically motivated.

SUKDEB SAHA V. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH & ORS

2025 INSC 893 (25 July 2025)

Heading:
Landmark Judgment on Student Suicide Investigation & National Mental Health Safeguards in Educational Institutions

Citation:
Sukdeb Saha vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.
Criminal Appeal No(s). 3177 of 2025 (Arising out of SLP (Cri.) No. 6378 of 2024)
Decided on: 25th July 2025
2025 INSC 893 (Reportable)

Subject of the Judgment:

• Part A: Ordered transfer of investigation into a student's unnatural death from local police to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) due to serious lapses and bias.

• Part B: Issued mandatory national guidelines for all educational institutions (including coaching centers) to prevent student suicides and safeguard mental health.

Key Laws, Sections & Constitutional Basis:

• Constitutional Provisions:
  Article 21: Right to Life (includes right to mental health, dignity, and protection from degrading treatment).
  Article 32: Power of Supreme Court to enforce fundamental rights (basis for issuing guidelines).
  Article 141: Supreme Court judgments are binding law on all courts.
  Article 226: Power of High Courts to issue writs (original petitions filed in High Court).

• Criminal Laws:
  Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC): Sections 302 (Murder), 304 Part-II (Culpable Homicide not amounting to Murder), 120 (Criminal Conspiracy).
  Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS): Section 194 (Inquiry by Magistrate into cause of death - formerly S. 174 CrPC), Section 193(2) (Report by police on completion of investigation - formerly S. 173(2) CrPC).

• Other Relevant Laws:
  Mental Healthcare Act, 2017 (MH Act): Section 18 (Right to access mental healthcare), Section 115 (Decriminalization of attempted suicide).

• Bench:
  Constitutional Bench? No.
  Judges: Justice Vikram Nath & Justice Sandeep Mehta.

• Related Case Cited:
  Amit Kumar v. Union of India (2025 SCC OnLine SC 631) - Recognized the "suicide epidemic" among students.

Explanation of the Judgment (Step-wise):

Part A: Transfer of Investigation to CBI (Sukdeb Saha's Case)

1. The Tragedy: Sukdeb Saha's 17-year-old daughter, Ms. X, died in July 2023 while preparing for NEET at Aakash Byju's Institute in Vishakhapatnam, AP. She fell from her hostel building. Initial police investigation classified it as suicide under Section 174 BNSS (CrPC).

2. Father's Allegations: Mr. Saha alleged:
   Unnatural death/murder, not suicide.
   Gross medical negligence by Venkataramana Hospital (e.g., ventilator use without consent, failure to treat).
   Biased & shoddy police investigation (ignoring leads, hastily concluding suicide, failing to secure evidence).
   Suspicious destruction of forensic evidence (viscera).
   Conflict of interest in medical investigations (same doctor involved in autopsy, chemical analysis, and inquiry committee).

3. High Court Proceedings: Mr. Saha filed writ petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court seeking CBI investigation. The High Court rejected the transfer request, citing jurisdiction issues due to parallel FIRs in AP and West Bengal.

4. Supreme Court's Findings on Investigation: The SC found compelling reasons to transfer the case to CBI:
   Ineffective & Biased Local Probe: Police ignored vital leads, rushed to suicide conclusion without evidence (no note, no history), failed to properly analyze conflicting CCTV footage (different clothing on girl seen going upstairs vs. found fallen).
   Medical Negligence Indicators: Hospital records showed Ms. X was conscious upon admission (GCS score 10/15), contradicting claims she was unconscious. Ventilator use without consent. Autopsy found semi-digested food with "suspicious smell" incompatible with claimed prolonged ventilator use.
   Evidence Suppression: Critical forensic reports (Chemical Analysis, Final Cause of Death) were withheld. Viscera (key for DNA/poisoning) was destroyed prematurely despite court orders.
   Conflict of Interest: Dr. P. Venkata Ramana Rao acted as autopsy surgeon, chemical analyst, and inquiry committee member.
   Contradictory Narratives: Police press statements contradicted facts.

5. Legal Principle Applied: The SC reiterated that transferring investigation to CBI is an "extraordinary power" used sparingly only in rare and exceptional cases where the local investigation is ineffective, biased, or compromised, undermining justice and public confidence (State of W.B. v. CPDR, Arnab Goswami followed).

6. Decision (Part A): The SC set aside the High Court order. Directed immediate transfer of the investigation into Ms. X's death to the CBI. CBI must register a case, investigate thoroughly, and submit a report within 4 months. Local police must hand over all records.

Part B: National Guidelines for Mental Health & Suicide Prevention

1. Context: The SC emphasized the national crisis of student suicides (NCRB 2022: 13,044 student suicides, 2,248 due to exam failure), driven by academic pressure, lack of support, stigma, and institutional failures. Recognized mental health as integral to the Right to Life (Art 21) and cited India's obligations under international law (ICESCR, CRPD).

2. Need for Guidelines: Acknowledged existing government initiatives (UMMEED, MANODARPAN, National Suicide Prevention Strategy, National Task Force under Justice R. Bhat) but stressed the urgent need for immediately enforceable interim safeguards due to the ongoing crisis, especially in coaching hubs (Kota, Hyderabad, etc.).

3. The Guidelines (Binding until Legislation): Issued under Articles 32/141, applicable to all educational institutions (schools, colleges, universities, coaching centers, hostels):
   Mental Health Policy: Adopt/implement uniform policy based on govt. initiatives, review annually.
   Counsellors: Appoint qualified counsellors (1 per 100+ students); smaller institutions must have referral links.
   Student Support: Ensure optimal counsellor-student ratios; assign mentors, especially during exams/transitions.
   No Harmful Practices: Avoid batch segregation by rank, public shaming, unrealistic targets.
   Crisis Protocols: Establish clear referral protocols to mental health services/hospitals; display suicide helpline numbers (e.g., Tele-MANAS) prominently.
   Staff Training: Mandatory biannual training for all staff on mental health first aid, warning signs, referral.
   Inclusivity: Train staff to support vulnerable students (SC/ST/OBC/EWS/LGBTQ+/Disabled/trauma-affected).
   Anti-Harassment Mechanisms: Establish robust, confidential systems for reporting/redressing sexual assault, harassment, ragging, bullying (caste, gender, etc.). Zero tolerance for retaliation. Institutional liability for neglect leading to harm.
   Parental Sensitization: Regular programs to educate parents on mental health, avoiding undue pressure.
   Student Well-being: Integrate mental health literacy, life skills, awareness into curriculum/activities.
   Record Keeping & Reporting: Maintain anonymized records; submit annual mental health activity reports to regulators (UGC, CBSE, State Ed Dept etc.).
   Holistic Development: Prioritize sports/arts; review exam patterns to reduce burden.
   Career Counselling: Provide regular, structured, inclusive career counselling to reduce pressure.
   Safe Hostels: Ensure drug-free, harassment-free environments in hostels/residential institutions.
   Infrastructure Safety: Install tamper-proof fans, restrict roof/balcony access to prevent impulsive acts.
   Special Focus on Coaching Hubs: Cities like Kota, Jaipur, Hyderabad must implement heightened protections (counselling, regulated pressure, monitoring).

4. Implementation Directions:
   States/UTs: Notify rules within 2 months regulating coaching centers (registration, student protection norms, grievance redressal) incorporating these guidelines.
   District Committees: Form District-Level Monitoring Committees (Chair: District Magistrate) with Education, Health, Child Protection reps to oversee implementation, inspect, handle complaints.
   Union of India: File a compliance affidavit within 90 days detailing steps taken, coordination with States, coaching center rules status, monitoring systems, and National Task Force timeline.
   Circulation: Judgment copy sent to relevant Ministries (Education, Health, Law), UGC, NCERT, CBSE, AICTE, and all State/UT Chief Secretaries for compliance.

Conclusion:

1. Justice for Ms. X: The Supreme Court found the Andhra Pradesh police investigation into the death of Sukdeb Saha's daughter deeply flawed, biased, and ineffective. To ensure a fair, impartial, and credible investigation, it transferred the case to the CBI.

2. National Mental Health Mandate: Recognizing the alarming epidemic of student suicides as a violation of the fundamental right to life (Article 21), the Court issued comprehensive, binding guidelines under its constitutional powers (Articles 32 & 141). These guidelines mandate all educational institutions nationwide to implement concrete measures for mental health support, suicide prevention, creating safe environments, and ensuring accountability.

3. Systemic Reform: The judgment goes beyond one case, addressing a national crisis. It imposes immediate obligations on educational institutions, State Governments, District Administrations, and the Central Government to work together to protect student well-being, prevent suicides, and create a more humane and supportive educational environment. The success of this landmark decision hinges on effective implementation and monitoring.

SHIVANGI BANSAL VS SAHIB BANSAL

2025 INSC 883 (22July 2025)

Bansal Matrimonial Settlement & Article 142 Powers

Heading:
Supreme Court Resolves Protracted Matrimonial Litigation via Settlement & Invokes Article 142 for Complete Justice

Citation:

• Case Name: Shivangi Bansal vs Sahib Bansal

• Transfer Petition (C) No.: 2367 of 2023

• Connected Cases: T.P. (Crl.) No(s). 631-633/2023, SLP (Crl.) No. 7869/2022, SLP (Crl.) No. 11848/2022, SLP (Crl.) No. 2282/2023

• Court: Supreme Court of India

• Judges: Hon'ble Mr. Justice B.R. Gavai & Hon'ble Mr. Justice Augustine George Masih

• Date of Judgment: July 22, 2025

• Citation: 2025 INSC 883 (Non-Reportable)

Subject of the Judgment:
The Supreme Court, acting upon a settlement agreement between warring spouses (Shivangi Bansal/Shivangi Goel and Sahib Bansal), resolved all pending litigation (over 25 cases across multiple courts), settled child custody, maintenance, and property disputes, and invoked its extraordinary power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to dissolve their marriage and quash all related criminal and civil proceedings to ensure "complete justice" and end the bitter legal battle.

Related Laws, Sections, and Acts:

• Constitution of India:
  Article 142: Power of the Supreme Court to pass any order necessary for doing "complete justice" in any matter before it.

• Family & Matrimonial Laws:
  Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (Sections 13(1) - Divorce)
  Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 (Sections 7 & 25 - Guardianship)
  Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Section 125 - Maintenance for wife/children)
  Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (Section 12 - Application to Magistrate)

• Criminal Laws:
  Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC Sections invoked in various FIRs: 498A, 323, 504, 506, 307, 376, 511, 120B, 377, 313, 342, 406, 365, 341, 34, 354, 385, 509, 500, 501, 294)
  Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (Sections 3 & 4)
  Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (Section 3(1)(10))

• Procedural Laws:
  Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Sections 200/156 - Complaint to Magistrate, Transfer Petitions)
  Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Implicitly for civil suits mentioned)

• Other:
  Income Tax Act, 1961 (Notices issued under investigation provisions)

Step-Wise Explanation of the Judgment:

• Step 1: Background of the Dispute (Paras 1-4):
  Shivangi Bansal (wife, an IPS officer) and Sahib Bansal (husband) married in December 2015 and have an 8-year-old daughter, Raina.
  They separated in October 2018 due to severe matrimonial discord involving their extended families.
  This led to an avalanche of litigation – over 25 criminal cases (FIRs under IPC including serious charges like 498A, 307, 376, 406, defamation), civil suits (divorce, guardianship, land disputes), domestic violence cases, maintenance petitions, and transfer petitions filed by both parties and their families against each other across courts in Delhi (Rohini) and Uttar Pradesh (Hapur, Allahabad, Aligarh).
  Both parties approached the Supreme Court seeking transfers of specific cases to courts convenient to them.

• Step 2: Settlement Agreement & Key Terms (Paras 5-10, 14-20):
  During Supreme Court proceedings, the parties agreed to settle all disputes comprehensively.
  Child Custody & Visitation (Para 8): Mother (Shivangi) retains custody. Father (Sahib) and his family get supervised visitation initially, then monthly visits (1st Sunday) at the child's school and half of all school vacations. Cooperation for the child's well-being is mandated. Lawyers are authorized as mediators for visitation issues.
  Maintenance (Paras 9-10): Wife voluntarily gives up all claims to alimony/maintenance for herself and waives any claim on husband's/family's property (present or future). She also agrees to bear all expenses for the daughter, relinquishing the existing Allahabad High Court order directing the husband to pay Rs. 1,50,000/- per month child maintenance (which is quashed).
  Withdrawal/Quashing of Litigation (Paras 11-13): All pending criminal and civil cases filed by either party against the other or their families (specifically listed in the judgment - Paras 4A, 4B, 4C(i-iii)) are quashed by the Supreme Court order. This includes serious criminal cases. Courts are directed to treat these as terminated. Any unknown cases also stand quashed.
  Future Litigation Bar (Para 14): Both parties and their families undertake never to file any future litigation arising from these matters in any forum. They also agree to unconditionally withdraw all allegations made in past filings.
  Non-Interference (Para 15): Both undertake not to interfere in each other's personal lives, professions, or businesses, or collaborate with rivals to harm each other.
  Property Settlement (Para 17): Wife's mother (Sandhya Goel) agrees to transfer specific agricultural land in Aligarh (approx. 0.975 hectares) to the husband via a gift deed. Husband bears all transfer and related litigation costs. Wife's family gives up all future claims on this land.
  Apology (Paras 16, 20-21): The wife and her parents tender an unconditional written apology to the husband and his family (Mukesh, Manju, Sahib, Chirag, Shipra). This apology must be published in one leading English and one Hindi national newspaper, and on major social media platforms (Facebook, Instagram, YouTube) within 3 days. Crucially, the Court states this apology is NOT an admission of liability and cannot be used against the wife in any future legal proceedings.
  Police Protection (Para 18): The Court directs police protection for the husband and his family.
  Restraint on Official Power (Para 19): Wife (as an IPS officer) undertakes never to misuse her official position or influence colleagues against the husband or his family.
  Social Media Cleanup (Para 22): Both parties agree to delete all social media posts, interviews, or statements alleging wrongdoing against each other or their families.

• Step 3: Invocation of Article 142 (Para 25):
  This is the core landmark aspect. Recognizing the unprecedented scale of litigation and the parties' mutual settlement covering all aspects (custody, maintenance, property, criminal/civil cases, future conduct), the Supreme Court holds that normal legal procedures are insufficient to achieve "complete justice."
  Invoking its extraordinary power under Article 142 of the Constitution, the Court:
  Dissolves the Marriage: Grants a decree of divorce between Shivangi Bansal and Sahib Bansal.
  Quashes All Litigation: Makes the earlier direction to quash/terminate all listed cases (Para 11) a binding order under Article 142, overriding potential procedural hurdles in lower courts.
  Enforces the Settlement: Elevates the entire settlement agreement (custody, maintenance waiver, property transfer, apology, non-interference clauses, litigation bar) to the status of a Supreme Court order under Article 142, making it enforceable as law and breach punishable as contempt.

• Step 4: Enforcement & Consequences (Paras 12-13, 21, 23-24):
  Both parties and their families undertake to abide by all terms. Breach by any party will amount to Contempt of the Supreme Court, allowing the aggrieved party to approach the Court directly.
  The apology clause has specific safeguards preventing its misuse against the wife.
  Parties are barred from disparaging the settlement or each other in the future.
  The husband is permitted to use the fact of this settlement/divorce for his future marriage purposes.

• Step 5: Disposal & Other Directions (Paras 26-27):
  All the transfer petitions and special leave petitions before the Supreme Court are disposed of in terms of this comprehensive settlement order.
  The judgment clarifies that certain guidelines issued by the Allahabad High Court regarding safeguards against misuse of IPC Section 498A (through Family Welfare Committees) remain valid and should be implemented.

Conclusion:

This judgment is a landmark example of the Supreme Court utilizing its Article 142 powers to achieve "complete justice" in an exceptionally complex and acrimonious matrimonial dispute. Faced with over 25 interlinked cases spanning multiple jurisdictions and involving serious allegations, the Court:

1. Facilitated a Comprehensive Settlement: It acted as a super mediator, incorporating terms covering custody, maintenance, property division, mutual withdrawal of all litigation (criminal and civil), a public apology (with safeguards), and promises of future non-interference.

2. Ended Litigation Permanently: By quashing all pending cases and barring future litigation under its Article 142 authority, the Court provided finality and closure impossible through normal legal channels.

3. Dissolved the Marriage: It directly granted a divorce decree under Article 142, bypassing the need for a separate proceeding.

4. Enforced the Settlement as Law: The entire agreement was transformed into a binding Supreme Court order, enforceable through contempt powers.

5. Addressed Unique Aspects: The judgment tackled sensitive issues like an IPS officer's undertaking against misuse of power and the enforced apology (with non-liability clause).

The Court prioritized ending the destructive legal battle for the sake of the child's welfare and the families' peace, demonstrating the expansive and exceptional nature of Article 142 as a tool to resolve intractable disputes when conventional legal processes prove inadequate. It underscores the Court's role not just as an adjudicator, but as an instrument for holistic resolution in extraordinary circumstances.

DHARANI SUGARS AND CHEMICALS LTD. VS. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

480 of 2019 (6 March 2019)

Landmark judgment on Dharani Sugars and Chemicals Ltd. vs. Union of India & Ors. significantly impacted the framework for resolving stressed assets in India.

Heading

Dharani Sugars and Chemicals Ltd. vs. Union of India & Ors.

2. Citation

(2019) 5 SCC 480; (2019) 64 SC

3. Subject of the Judgment

This judgment primarily dealt with the constitutional validity of Sections 35AA and 35AB of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, and struck down the Reserve Bank of India's (RBI) Circular dated February 12, 2018, which provided a revised framework for the resolution of stressed assets.

4. Related and Highlighted Laws, Sections, Acts, Date of Judgment, and Constitutional Bench

• Related Laws and Acts:
  Banking Regulation Act, 1949 (specifically Sections 35A, 35AA, and 35AB)
  Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 (Section 45L)
  Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC)

• Date of Judgment: March 6, 2019

• Bench: Justice R.F. Nariman and Justice Vineet Saran

5. Explanation of the Judgment in Step-wise Manner

Background of the Case: On February 12, 2018, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) issued a comprehensive circular replacing all previous frameworks for resolving stressed assets. This circular mandated specific resolution plans within 180 days for large stressed accounts (₹2000 crore and above). If a resolution plan was not implemented within this period, lenders were required to initiate insolvency proceedings under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC). This strict timeframe and mandatory IBC referral were seen as highly stringent.

The Challenge: Numerous companies, particularly from the power sector, and various associations challenged this circular before different High Courts, arguing that it was arbitrary, unconstitutional, and exceeded the RBI's powers. These petitions were later transferred to the Supreme Court of India. The petitioners contended that the circular imposed an unrealistic timeline and failed to consider sector-specific issues. They also argued that the circular was ultra vires (beyond the legal power or authority) the provisions of the Banking Regulation Act.

Legal Provisions Under Scrutiny: The core of the legal debate revolved around Sections 35AA and 35AB of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949.

• Section 35AA: Empowered the Central Government to authorize the RBI to issue directions to banking companies to initiate insolvency resolution processes in respect of "specific defaults."

• Section 35AB: Dealt with the RBI's power to issue directions for resolution of stressed assets outside the IBC.

The Supreme Court's Reasoning:

1. Validity of Sections 35AA and 35AB: The Supreme Court first examined the constitutional validity of Sections 35AA and 35AB themselves. The Court upheld these sections, stating that they were not "manifestly arbitrary" and fell within the legislative competence.

2. Invalidation of the RBI Circular: Despite upholding the parent sections, the Court found the RBI Circular of February 12, 2018, to be ultra vires Section 35AA of the Banking Regulation Act.

3. Specific vs. General Directions: The Court's reasoning was that Section 35AA specifically allowed the Central Government to authorize the RBI to issue directions for initiating insolvency proceedings for specific defaults by specific debtors. However, the RBI circular issued a general direction that applied uniformly to all defaults above a certain threshold (₹2000 crore) without requiring specific authorization for each case from the Central Government. The Court emphasized that specific provisions must be followed rigorously.

4. No Power for General Directions: The Court concluded that the RBI did not have the power under Section 35AA to issue such a sweeping, general circular forcing all lenders to initiate insolvency proceedings without explicit, case-by-case authorization from the Central Government.

Impact of the Judgment: As a result of this judgment, all actions taken under the RBI's February 12, 2018, circular, including insolvency proceedings that were triggered solely due to its operation, were declared "non-est" (non-existent in law). This meant that many ongoing insolvency cases initiated based on this circular were rendered invalid.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court's decision in Dharani Sugars reaffirmed the principle that regulatory bodies, while having significant powers, must operate strictly within the bounds of the statutes that grant them such powers. The judgment clarified the scope of RBI's authority in issuing directions for stressed asset resolution, emphasizing the need for specific authorization from the Central Government for mandatory insolvency proceedings. This ruling necessitated the RBI to issue a revised framework for stressed asset resolution that adheres to the legal requirements and principles laid down by the Supreme Court.

SUPREME COURT ADVOCATES-ON-RECORD ASSOCIATION VS UNION OF INDIA (NJAC CASE)

971 of 2015 (16 October 2015)

Citation:

• Case Name: Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association & Anr. vs Union of India

• Writ Petition (Civil) No.: 13 of 2015 (Along with several connected petitions: WP(C) Nos. 14, 23, 70, 83, 108, 124, 209, 310, 341 of 2015; TP(C) No. 971 of 2015; etc.)

• Court: Supreme Court of India

• Date of Judgment: October 16, 2015

• Judges (Constitutional Bench): Jagdish Singh Khehar, J. Chelameswar, Madan B. Lokur, Kurian Joseph, Adarsh Kumar Goel, JJ. (5-Judge Bench)

Subject of the Judgment 
This case primarily challenged the constitutional validity of the Constitution (Ninety-Ninth Amendment) Act, 2014 and the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) Act, 2014. The petitioners argued that these laws, which replaced the existing "Collegium system" for appointing judges to the Supreme Court and High Courts with a new commission (NJAC), damaged the "independence of the judiciary," a core feature of India's Constitution ("basic structure doctrine"). The Court had to decide whether the NJAC system was valid or if it violated the Constitution.

Related Laws, Sections, and Acts:

• Constitution of India:
  Article 124: (Original) Deals with the establishment of the Supreme Court and the appointment of its Judges (President appoints after consultation with CJI and other Judges as deemed necessary).
  Article 217: (Original) Deals with the appointment of High Court Judges (President appoints after consultation with CJI, Governor, and Chief Justice of the High Court).
  Article 222: Transfer of Judges between High Courts.
  Article 368: Power of Parliament to amend the Constitution (Subject to Basic Structure limitation - Kesavananda Bharati case).
  Articles 124A, 124B, 124C: Inserted by the 99th Amendment, establishing the NJAC, its functions, and Parliament's power to regulate the appointment process.
  Basic Structure Doctrine: (Established in Kesavananda Bharati vs State of Kerala) - Parliament cannot amend the Constitution in a way that destroys its fundamental features, like Judicial Independence, Democracy, Rule of Law, etc.

• Statutes:
  Constitution (Ninety-Ninth Amendment) Act, 2014: Amended Articles 124 and 217 and inserted Articles 124A, 124B, 124C to create the NJAC framework.
  National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014 (NJAC Act): Provided the operational details for the NJAC's functioning (Composition, Procedure, etc.).

• Landmark Precedents Referenced:
  S.P. Gupta vs UoI (First Judges Case - 1981): Held that the President (Executive) had primacy in judicial appointments; "consultation" did not mean "concurrence".
  Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association vs UoI (Second Judges Case - 1993): Overruled the First Judges Case. Held that the Chief Justice of India (CJI) has primacy, and "consultation" meant consultation within a Collegium (CJI + 2 senior-most SC judges for SC appointments; CJI + 2 senior-most SC judges for HC appointments). Executive's role became formal.
  In re: Special Reference No. 1 of 1998 (Third Judges Case - 1998): Clarified the Collegium system. Expanded it to CJI + 4 senior-most SC judges for SC appointments and CJI + 2 senior-most SC judges for HC appointments. Unanimously reaffirmed the Collegium system's primacy.
  Kesavananda Bharati vs State of Kerala (1973): Established the Basic Structure Doctrine.

Explanation of the Judgment (Step-Wise):

(Based on the provided portions: Recusal Order & Reference Order)

1. The Challenge & Context: Multiple petitions were filed challenging the 99th Amendment and NJAC Act immediately after they were passed and notified (April 13, 2015). The core argument was that shifting the primary responsibility for judicial appointments from the judiciary (Collegium) to a body (NJAC) including the Executive (Law Minister) and "eminent persons" fatally compromised judicial independence, a basic feature of the Constitution. The petitioners relied heavily on the Second and Third Judges Cases.

2. Initial Hearing & Bench Composition: The case was first heard by a 3-Judge Bench (Dave, Chelameswar, Lokur JJ.). On April 7, 2015, this Bench referred the case to a larger 5-Judge Bench under Article 145(3) as it involved substantial questions of constitutional interpretation.

3. The Recusal Issue:
   The initial 5-Judge Bench included Justice Anil R. Dave. However, upon the NJAC coming into force on April 13, 2015, Justice Dave automatically became an ex-officio member of the NJAC (as the 2nd senior-most SC Judge after CJI under Article 124A(1)(b)).
   On the first hearing day (April 15, 2015), this Bench itself ordered the matter be placed before a Bench without Justice Dave due to his new NJAC role.
   The CJI then constituted a new 5-Judge Bench (Khehar, Chelameswar, Lokur, Joseph, Goel JJ.).
   When this new Bench convened (April 21, 2015), Senior Advocates Fali Nariman and Mathews Nedumpara requested Justice J.S. Khehar (the presiding Judge) to recuse (step down) because he was a member of the existing SC Collegium (1+4 collegium). They argued a member of the Collegium (which the NJAC sought to replace) deciding the NJAC's validity created a conflict of interest or perception of bias ("a fox on the jury at a goose's trial").
   Justice Khehar initially expressed no personal desire to hear the case. However, after hearing arguments from both sides (including strong opposition to recusal from other senior lawyers and discussions with his colleagues), the Bench unanimously held (April 22, 2015) there was no legal reason for Justice Khehar to recuse. The order was pronounced by Justice Chelameswar.
   Justice Khehar later penned a detailed "Recusal Order" explaining his reasoning for staying on the Bench:
   Justice Dave had heard the case earlier while being a Collegium member; no recusal was sought then.
   Four of the five current Bench members (Khehar, Chelameswar, Lokur, Joseph JJ.) would eventually be part of either the Collegium (if NJAC struck down) or the NJAC (if upheld). The conflict argument, if valid, applied to them all, not just him.
   The request for recusal was not well-founded in law. Acceding to an unjustified recusal request would set a wrong precedent and imply the judge was "scared out of the case," breaching the judicial oath to act without fear or favour.
   His decision to continue was based on his oath and duty to uphold the Constitution.

4. The Reference Order & Motion for Review:
   During arguments on the merits of the NJAC challenge, the Respondents (Union of India) heavily relied on the First Judges Case (which gave primacy to the Executive). The Petitioners relied on the Second and Third Judges Cases (which gave primacy to the Judiciary/Collegium).
   The Court noted that the First Judges Case had been overruled by the Second Judges Case, which was reaffirmed by the Third Judges Case. Therefore, relying on the First Judges Case was legally impermissible for the Respondents.
   Faced with this, the Attorney General and other counsel for the Respondents requested the Court to review and reconsider the judgments in the Second and Third Judges Cases. They argued:
   Vital aspects were not considered when those cases were decided.
   The interpretation in those cases (especially equating "consultation" with "concurrence" of the Collegium) was incorrect and went against the plain text of Articles 124 and 217 as originally framed.
   It amounted to judicial legislation, rewriting the Constitution, and encroaching on the Executive's domain.
   They extensively cited Constituent Assembly Debates to show the framers intended Executive primacy with mandatory consultation, not judicial concurrence.
   Judicial independence is secured by post-appointment safeguards (tenure, salary protection), not the method of appointment.
   They cited other constitutional appointments (CAG, CEC) made by the Executive functioning independently.
   They argued the Collegium system lacked transparency and excluded stakeholders (Bar, public).
   The Court acknowledged that the Union of India had accepted the Second Judges Case as binding during the Third Judges Case reference. However, given the importance of the issue and the vehemence of the request, the Court allowed the Respondents to argue why a review/reconsideration was needed.
   The Court framed the key question: Should the Second and Third Judges Cases be referred to a larger Bench (9 Judges) for reconsideration?
   The Court outlined the path forward:
   First, determine if there was a prima facie case for reconsideration based on legal parameters and the importance of the issue.
   If reconsideration was warranted and the Court ultimately struck down the NJAC (reviving the Collegium), then the matter must be referred to a 9-Judge Bench to re-examine the Second and Third Judges Cases.
   If the NJAC was upheld, the old Collegium system would end, making the reconsideration question academic.
   If the NJAC was struck down without accepting the need for reconsideration, the existing Collegium system (based on Second & Third Judges Cases) would continue.

(Note: The provided PDF excerpt ends with the arguments for reconsideration within the Reference Order. The final merits judgment striking down the NJAC and the decision not to refer the Collegium judgments to a larger Bench came later, but the stage was set here).

Conclusion (of the Provided Proceedings):

1. Recusal: The 5-Judge Bench unanimously rejected the request for Justice Khehar's recusal. He remained on the Bench, emphasizing that a judge should not recuse unless legally justified, as it would undermine judicial independence and the oath of office.

2. Core Dispute: The central legal battle became whether the precedents establishing the Collegium system (Second and Third Judges Cases) needed to be overturned to uphold the NJAC system.

3. Respondents' Stance: The Union of India vigorously argued for a review of the Second and Third Judges Cases, contending they misinterpreted the Constitution, encroached on executive power, and that the original text (Articles 124/217) envisaged executive primacy with consultation.

4. Court's Stance at this Stage: The Court acknowledged the gravity of the request to review landmark constitutional precedents. It decided to first assess whether there was a prima facie case made out for such a reconsideration. The outcome of this assessment would crucially determine:

• Whether the NJAC challenge could be decided purely based on existing Collegium jurisprudence (Second & Third Judges Cases), or

• Whether the validity of the Collegium system itself needed to be re-examined by an even larger Bench before finally deciding the NJAC's fate.

The Final Outcome 
In its final judgment (October/December 2015), the 5-Judge Bench:

• Struck down the Constitution (99th Amendment) Act, 2014 and the NJAC Act, 2014 as unconstitutional.

• Held that the NJAC violated the Basic Structure of the Constitution, primarily by compromising the "Independence of the Judiciary".

• Rejected the request to refer the Second and Third Judges Cases to a larger Bench for reconsideration. The Collegium system, as established and clarified by those judgments, was revived.

• However, the Court acknowledged the need for improvements in the Collegium system and laid down guidelines for greater transparency within that framework.

NATIONAL LEGAL SERVICES AUTHORITY V. UNION OF INDIA

604 of 2013 (15 April 2014)

Landmark Judgment on Transgender Rights

Heading

National Legal Services Authority (NALSA) v. Union of India and others

Citation

Writ Petition (Civil) No. 400 of 2012 with Writ Petition (Civil) No. 604 of 2013

Subject of the Judgment in Short

This landmark judgment by the Supreme Court of India officially recognized transgender persons as a 'third gender,' affirming their fundamental rights under the Indian Constitution. It addressed the non-recognition of their gender identity, which violates Articles 14, 15, 16, 19, and 21 of the Constitution, thereby ensuring their right to equality, dignity, freedom of expression, and protection from discrimination.

Related and Highlighted Laws, Sections, Acts, Date of Judgment, Constitutional Bench, and Citation of the Case

• Date of Judgment: April 15, 2014

• Constitutional Bench: The judgment was delivered by a bench including K.S. Radhakrishnan, J. and A.K. Sikri, J.

• Related Laws and Constitutional Articles:
  Articles 14, 15, 16, 19, and 21 of the Constitution of India: These articles are central to the judgment, ensuring rights to equality before the law, non-discrimination, freedom of speech and expression, and protection of life and personal liberty, respectively. The court held that discrimination on the ground of 'sex' under Articles 15 and 16 includes discrimination based on gender identity.
  Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987: Under which the National Legal Services Authority (NALSA) was constituted.
  Criminal Tribes Act, 1871 (Repealed): This Act historically deemed the entire community of Hijras as innately 'criminal,' leading to severe harassment and abuse. Its repeal in August 1949 was noted.
  Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860: While associated with specific sexual acts, it was historically used as an instrument of harassment against Hijras and transgender persons. The court, however, clarified that it was not expressing an opinion on its constitutionality as the case focused on broader constitutional rights of the transgender community.
  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 (UDHR): Article 6 and Article 12 recognize the inherent right to life and protection from arbitrary interference with privacy.
  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 (ICCPR): Article 16 recognizes the right to recognition as a person before the law, and Article 17 prohibits arbitrary interference with privacy.
  Yogyakarta Principles: These principles, developed by human rights experts, provide guidance on the application of international human rights law in relation to sexual orientation and gender identity. The judgment extensively referred to these principles, particularly Principle 1 (universal enjoyment of human rights), Principle 2 (equality and non-discrimination), Principle 3 (right to recognition before the law), Principle 4 (right to life), Principle 6 (right to privacy), Principle 9 (right to treatment with humanity while in detention), Principle 18 (protection from medical abuses), and Principle 19 (right to freedom of opinion and expression).
  Article 253 of the Constitution of India: States that Parliament has the power to make laws for implementing any treaty, agreement, or convention.
  Article 51 of the Directive Principles of State Policy: Encourages the State to foster respect for international law and treaty obligations.

Explanation of the Judgment in Step-Wise

1. Background of the Petitions: The case originated from two writ petitions, one filed by the National Legal Services Authority (NALSA) and another by the Poojaya Mata Nasib Kaur Ji Women Welfare Society, seeking legal declaration of gender identity for the transgender community. Laxmi Narayan Tripathy, a Hijra, also intervened to advocate for the recognition of their identity as a third gender.

2. Recognition of Gender Identity: The Supreme Court recognized that "gender identity" is one of the most fundamental aspects of life, referring to a person's intrinsic sense of being male, female, or transgender. It clarified that gender identity may or may not correspond with the sex assigned at birth.

3. Third Gender Status: The court legally recognized Hijras/Eunuchs and other transgender persons as a 'third gender,' stating that non-recognition of their gender identity violates fundamental rights. It emphasized that forcing transgender persons to identify as either male or female is improper and undignified, violating their human rights.

4. Violation of Fundamental Rights:
   Article 14 (Equality before Law): The Court held that discrimination on the basis of gender identity is a violation of Article 14. It stressed that the term 'sex' in Articles 15 and 16 is not limited to biological sex but includes gender identity.
   Article 15 (Non-discrimination): Transgender persons have been systematically denied rights under Article 15(2) (access to public places) and Article 15(4) (special provisions for socially and educationally backward classes). The court stated that the State is bound to take affirmative action for their advancement.
   Article 16 (Equality in Public Employment): The judgment affirmed that transgender individuals are entitled to rights under Article 16(2) and reservation benefits under Article 16(4) in public employment.
   Article 19(1)(a) (Freedom of Speech and Expression): The Court held that freedom of expression includes one's right to express their self-identified gender through dress, words, action, or behavior. It recognized values of privacy, self-identity, autonomy, and personal integrity as fundamental rights under this article for the transgender community.
   Article 21 (Protection of Life and Personal Liberty): The judgment declared that recognition of one’s gender identity is central to the fundamental right to dignity and personal autonomy under Article 21.

5. International Human Rights Instruments: The Court extensively referred to international instruments like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Yogyakarta Principles to support its conclusions, noting that these instruments aim to protect the human rights of transgender people who often face severe violations.

6. Directives to the Government: The Supreme Court issued several directives to the Central and State Governments to ensure the rights of transgender persons, including:
   Treating them as a 'third gender' for all legal purposes.
   Taking steps to treat the social and educational backwardness of transgenders as a socially and educationally backward class (SEBC) and extending all reservation benefits in education and employment.
   Providing medical care in hospitals and separate public toilets and facilities.
   Framing social welfare schemes for their betterment.
   Creating public awareness to ensure their acceptance and respect in society.
   Reviewing and implementing the recommendations of the Expert Committee within six months, based on the legal declarations made in the judgment.

Conclusion

The NALSA v. Union of India judgment is a monumental decision that brought about a paradigm shift in the recognition and protection of transgender rights in India. By legally recognizing a 'third gender' and affirming their fundamental rights under the Constitution, the Supreme Court aimed to end centuries of discrimination, social stigma, and marginalization faced by the transgender community. The judgment underscores the judiciary's role in upholding human rights for marginalized sections of society, even in the absence of specific legislation. It emphasized that the denial of gender identity is a denial of social, political, and economic justice, urging the government to take affirmative action to ensure a dignified life for transgender people.

INDIAN HOTEL AND RESTAURANT ASSOCIATION VS. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

576 of 2016 (17 January 2019)

Indian Hotel and Restaurant Association (AHAR) & Anr. vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors., Supreme Court of India, W.P. (C) No. 576/2016, decided on January 17, 2019

Citation

Indian Hotel and Restaurant Association (AHAR) & Anr. vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors.
Supreme Court of India, Civil Original Jurisdiction
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 576 of 2016
Date of Judgment: January 17, 2019
Bench: Justice A.K. Sikri and Justice Ashok Bhushan

Related and Highlighted Laws, Sections, and Acts

• Maharashtra Prohibition of Obscene Dance in Hotels, Restaurant and Bar Rooms and Protection of Dignity of Women (Working therein) Act, 2016
  Section 2(8): Definition of "obscene dance"
  Section 3: Requirement for a license
  Section 6(4): Ban on simultaneous licensing for dance bars and orchestras/discotheques
  Section 8(1), 8(2), 8(4): Punishments for violations
  Section 12: Grievance Redressal Committee

• Maharashtra Police Act, 1951 (Earlier amendments for dance bars)

• Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Section 292: Obscenity in books, Section 294: Obscene acts, Section 354A: Sexual harassment)

• Constitution of India, Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(a), 19(1)(g), and 21 (Fundamental Rights)

• Other relevant licensing rules and local acts as referred in the judgment

Date and Bench Details

• Date of Judgment: January 17, 2019

• Bench: Justice A.K. Sikri and Justice Ashok Bhushan

• Case Citation: Writ Petition (Civil) No. 576 of 2016

Explanation of the Judgment (Step-wise)

Step 1: Background

• The State of Maharashtra enacted laws strictly regulating or banning dance performances in bars, citing concerns over obscenity and women's exploitation.

• Previous attempts by the state to ban dance bars (via amendments to the Maharashtra Police Act) were already struck down by the courts as unconstitutional.

• The 2016 Act and its rules were challenged by various associations and unions on the grounds that they effectively ban dance bars and violate fundamental rights.

Step 2: Petitioners’ Arguments

• The Act and its Rules imposed extreme, arbitrary conditions such that no bar could realistically obtain a license.

• Provisions like the vague definition of "obscene dance," restrictions on dance bar locations, prohibition of tipping, and surveillance requirements were argued to infringe upon rights under Articles 14 (equality), 19 (freedom of speech, expression, and profession), and 21 (right to life and dignity).

Step 3: State’s Arguments

• The State claimed the law aimed to protect public morality, decency, and women’s dignity.

• Regulatory measures like prohibiting tipping on stage and mandating CCTV cameras were said to prevent exploitation and maintain order.

Step 4: Court’s Analysis

• The Bench referenced its own precedent (Indian Hotel and Restaurant Association (1), 2013), reiterating that a total ban on dance bars is unconstitutional.

• Dance is recognized as a form of artistic expression protected by the Constitution.

• The judgment analysed individually the challenged provisions:

a. Definition of "Obscene Dance" (Section 2(8))

• Upheld the use of “arousing prurient interest” as not vague, since it aligns with existing definitions of obscenity under IPC Sections 292/294.

• Clarified that only those performances exceeding community standards of decency can be prohibited.

b. Ban on Simultaneous Licensing (Section 6(4))

• Struck down as arbitrary and irrational: No logical reason to forbid a venue from having both a dance bar and an orchestra or discotheque license.

c. Punishments (Section 8(2))

• Upheld: Although IPC Section 294 punishes obscene acts with up to three months jail, the Act's stronger punishment was not found directly conflicting, as both addressed different legal circumstances.

d. Prohibition on Tipping by Showering Money (Section 8(4) and Rules)

• Court agreed to the prohibition of throwing money or articles on stage as a reasonable restriction for maintaining order and dignity.

• However, the absolute restriction against handing tips directly to performers or the requirement to add tips only through the bill was held unreasonable and struck down.

e. Licensing Conditions and Distance from Schools/Religious Places

• The 1 km distance requirement from educational/religious institutions was struck down as unreasonable and impractical, especially in Mumbai.

• Provisions requiring employment of dancers on a fixed monthly salary and contract were partly struck down—contracts and transparency upheld, but mandatory monthly wage was quashed for restricting freedom of both owners and performers.

f. Ban on Serving Alcohol in Dance Rooms

• Struck down: The complete ban on serving alcohol in dance rooms was arbitrary and not justified.

g. CCTV Surveillance

• Struck down: CCTV surveillance inside dance or bar rooms was held to be an invasion of privacy and not justified under the right to privacy.

Court’s Directions and Conclusion

• The Supreme Court struck down or read down many key restrictions while upholding the general regulatory framework of the Act.

• It directed the State not to impose impossible or arbitrary conditions on licensing, and to consider applications objectively.

• The decision reaffirmed that regulation is permissible, but not a disguised total ban.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court declared that the State of Maharashtra cannot impose conditions that effectively ban dance bars under the guise of regulation. Many provisions of the 2016 Act and its rules were struck down as unconstitutional for being arbitrary, vague, or excessive. The judgment strongly reaffirmed the rights to equality, freedom of profession, and personal dignity, while upholding the State's power to regulate (but not ban) dance bar activities within reasonable limits.

COMMON CAUSE VS. UNION OF INDIA (LOKPAL IMPLEMENTATION)

245 of 2014 (27 April 2017)

• Case Title: Common Cause: A Registered Society vs. Union of India

• Writ Petition (Civil) No.: 245 of 2014, with connected cases

• Bench: Justice Ranjan Gogoi and Justice Navin Sinha

• Date of Judgment: April 27, 2017

• Official Citation: Supreme Court of India, 2017

Relevant and Highlighted Laws, Sections, and Acts

• Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013: Sections 1(4), 4(1), 4(2), 4(3), 10, 44(1), and 44(2)

• Search Committee Rules, 2014 (as amended)

• Leader of Opposition Act, 1977: Definition of LOP

• Other Referenced Acts: Right to Information Act, 2005; Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003

Explanation of the Judgment (Step-wise)

1. Petition and Challenge

• A petition was filed to declare certain rules (Rule 10(1) and 10(4)(i)) related to the selection of Lokpal members as ultra vires (invalid), and restrain appointments under these rules.

• The main issue: Despite the Lokpal Act, 2013 being in force from January 16, 2014, the government had not implemented it, allegedly due to the absence of a Leader of Opposition in the Lok Sabha.

2. Arguments from Petitioners

• The petitioners argued that the absence of a formal LOP should not halt the appointment of Lokpal.

• They pointed out that in other laws (like the RTI Act) if no LOP exists, the leader of the single largest opposition party is considered for the committee.

• They referenced the definition of LOP in the Leader of Opposition Act, 1977.

• They also cited Section 4(2) of the Lokpal Act, which says appointments are not invalid due to a vacancy in the Selection Committee.

3. Government's Response

• The government argued that the LOP's absence was due to parliamentary convention (requiring at least 10% of seats to be recognized as LOP).

• The government was considering an amendment to clarify the issue, but the legislative process was pending.

4. Analysis of Proposed Amendments & Parliamentary Committee

• The Court reviewed the 2014 Amendment Bill, which suggested appointing the leader of the single largest opposition party instead of the formal LOP.

• The Bill also proposed that vacancies in the committee should not affect the validity of appointments.

• A Parliamentary Committee approved most changes but suggested filling vacancies before proceeding with major decisions.

5. Supreme Court’s Key Points and Reasoning

• The Court held that Parliament is supreme in making or amending laws and courts should not interfere with pending legislative processes.

• However, the Court examined if the Act, as it stood, was unworkable without the amendment.
  Under Section 4(2), appointments are not invalid due to any vacancy (including the LOP).
  The Act empowered the remaining members of the Selection Committee (Prime Minister, Speaker, Chief Justice or nominee) to proceed and appoint the eminent jurist to fill the Selection Committee.
  There were no legal barriers to constituting the Search Committee or making appointments in the absence of the LOP.

• The Court rejected the idea that absence of LOP should stall the whole process. The need for Lokpal was urgent for a more accountable and transparent government.

6. Conclusion of the Judgment

• The Supreme Court declared that the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013, is a workable law even without the proposed amendments.

• The government and selection authorities should proceed with the appointment of the Lokpal, even if the LOP post is vacant.

• The writ petitions filed by Common Cause and others were thus allowed, and corresponding directions were issued for effective implementation of the Act.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court, in this landmark judgment, ensured that the absence of a formal Leader of Opposition cannot be used as an excuse to delay the appointment of the Lokpal. The judgment clarified that the Lokpal Act is fully enforceable in its current form, and directed the competent authorities to implement it and appoint the Lokpal, thus reinforcing the objective of accountability and good governance in public life.

U. SUDHEERA & ORS. VS C. YASHODA & ORS

2025 INSC 80 (17 January 2025)

Heading:
Landmark Judgment On Validity of Interim Orders in Second Appeals Before Framing Substantial Questions of Law

Citation:
U. Sudheera & Ors. vs C. Yashoda & Ors.
Civil Appeal No. 567 of 2025
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 27761 of 2024)
2025 INSC 80 (Supreme Court of India)

Subject of the Judgment:
Whether a High Court can grant interim relief (like status quo) in a second appeal before framing substantial questions of law under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC).

Key Details:

• Judgment Date: 17 January 2025

• Bench: Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan (Division Bench)

• Relevant Laws/Sections:
  Section 100, CPC (1976 Amendment): Conditions for filing a second appeal (requires "substantial question of law").
  Section 151, CPC: Inherent powers of courts to secure justice.

• Cited Precedents:
  Ram Phal v. Banarasi (2003)
  Bhagyashree Anant Gaonkar v. Narendra (2023)
  Raghavendra Swamy Mutt v. Uttaradi Mutt (2016)

Step-by-Step Explanation of the Judgment:

Background Facts:

• 2011: Respondent 1 (C. Yashoda) sued for a permanent injunction (not declaration of title) over land in Tirupati, claiming ownership via revenue records.

• 2016: Trial Court ruled in her favor.

• 2022: First Appellate Court reversed the decision, stating injunction suits without title declaration are invalid.

• 2023: Yashoda filed a second appeal in the Andhra Pradesh High Court.

• 20.09.2024: High Court ordered status quo (no disturbance of possession) without framing any substantial question of law.

Appellants’ Arguments (U. Sudheera & Ors.):

1. Violation of Section 100 CPC:
   High Court must frame substantial questions of law before granting interim relief (per Ram Phal and Bhagyashree judgments).

2. Faulty Basis for Injunction:
   Revenue records (used by Trial Court) do not confer title (per Bhimabai Mahadeo Kambekar v. Arthur Import).
   Suit for "bare injunction" without title declaration is invalid (per Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy).

Respondent’s Arguments (C. Yashoda):

1. Inherent Powers (Section 151 CPC):
   Courts can issue interim orders to protect property during proceedings (per Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur).

2. Temporary Relief:
   Status quo was a "limited ex parte arrangement," not a final order.

Supreme Court’s Analysis:

1. Mandatory Procedure Under Section 100 CPC:
   High Court cannot hear a second appeal or grant interim relief without first framing substantial questions of law.
   Precedents like Ram Phal and Bhagyashree strictly prohibit bypassing this step.

2. Inherent Powers (Section 151 CPC) Are Subordinate:
   Courts cannot use Section 151 to violate express mandates of other laws (e.g., Section 100 CPC).

3. High Court’s Errors:
   Granted status quo without framing questions of law.
   Extended interim relief despite unserved notices to some respondents.

4. Distinguished Respondent’s Cases:
   Manohar Lal Chopra allowed interim relief in exceptional circumstances, not to override Section 100 CPC.

Conclusion:

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court’s interim order, holding that:

1. Strict Compliance Required:
   High Court must frame substantial questions of law under Section 100 CPC before considering interim relief.

2. No Interim Relief Without Jurisdiction:
   Granting status quo before framing questions was illegal and void.

3. Remedy:
   High Court must first decide if a "substantial question of law" exists. If yes, frame it and proceed. If no, dismiss the appeal.

Key Takeaway:

"The existence of a substantial question of law is the sine qua non [essential condition] for the High Court to exercise jurisdiction in a second appeal. Interim orders passed without this are invalid."

Final Order:

• High Court’s status quo order quashed.

• Second Appeal (No. 518/2023) remanded to High Court for fresh hearing as per Section 100 CPC.

• No costs awarded.

SACHIN JAISWAL VS. M/S HOTEL ALKA RAJE & OTHERS

2025 INSC 275 (27 February 2025)

Heading:
Landmark Judgment On Ownership of Property Contributed to a Partnership Firm

2. Subject of the Judgment:
Whether property contributed by a partner to a partnership firm becomes the firm’s property, and whether such property can be claimed by the partner’s legal heirs after his death.

3. Citation:
Sachin Jaiswal vs. M/s Hotel Alka Raje & Others
Civil Appeal Nos. _____ of 2025
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 18717 of 2022)
2025 INSC 275 (Supreme Court of India)

4. Key Details:

• Judgment Date: 27 February 2025

• Bench: Justices Sudhanshu Dhulia and Ahsanuddin Amanullah (Division Bench)

• Relevant Laws/Sections:
  Section 14, Indian Partnership Act, 1932: Defines "property of the firm".
  Transfer of Property Act, 1882: Modes of property transfer (sale, mortgage, gift, exchange).

• Cited Precedents:
  Addanki Narayanappa v. Bhaskara Krishnappa (1966 SCC OnLine SC 6)
  Chief Controlling Revenue Authority v. Chidambaram (AIR 1970 Mad 5)

5. Step-by-Step Explanation of the Judgment:

Background Facts:

• 1965: Bhairo Prasad Jaiswal (appellant’s father) bought land in Faizabad.

• 1972: He formed a partnership firm, M/s Hotel Alka Raje (Respondent 1), with his brother Hanuman Prasad. They built a hotel on the land.

• 1982–2017: New partners joined; Bhairo relinquished his rights over the property via a registered deed (1983). He later reduced his profit share to 10% (2000). After his death (2005), the firm continued with remaining partners.

• 2018: Respondents sued the appellant (Sachin Jaiswal, Bhairo’s son) for trespassing, claiming he tried to occupy the hotel property.

Legal Dispute:

• Appellant’s Claim:
  The land was his father’s self-acquired property.
  A "relinquishment deed" (1983) cannot transfer ownership; only modes under the Transfer of Property Act (sale, gift, etc.) are valid.
  He should inherit his father’s share in the property.

• Respondents’ Claim:
  Bhairo contributed the land and building to the partnership firm in 1972.
  The property became the firm’s asset under Section 14 of the Partnership Act, 1932.

Courts’ Decisions:

• Trial Court (2020) & High Court (2022):
  Ruled in favor of the firm, citing the 1983 relinquishment deed and Section 14 of the Partnership Act.
  Clarified: Only the firm (M/s Hotel Alka Raje) owns the property; partners (including Bhairo’s heirs) only have profit/loss shares.

• Supreme Court’s Analysis (2025):
  Section 14, Partnership Act Applies:
  Property "brought into the stock of the firm" becomes the firm’s asset.
  Bhairo’s act of constructing the hotel on his land for the partnership business (1972) showed clear intent to contribute it to the firm.
  Relinquishment Deed Not Essential:
  The 1983 deed merely confirmed Bhairo’s earlier contribution. Transfer via Section 14 does not require formal modes under the Transfer of Property Act.
  Precedents Upheld:
  Addanki Narayanappa v. Bhaskara Krishnappa (1966): Property contributed to a partnership ceases to be the partner’s personal asset.
  Chidambaram Case (1970): No formal document is needed; a partner’s intention to contribute property suffices.
  Heirs’ Rights Limited to Partnership Share:
  Bhairo’s legal heirs (appellant) inherit only his 10% share in profits/losses, not the property itself.

6. Conclusion:

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that:

1. The land and building became the firm’s property in 1972 when Bhairo Prasad Jaiswal contributed it to the partnership under Section 14 of the Partnership Act, 1932.

2. The relinquishment deed (1983) was redundant, as ownership had already transferred to the firm in 1972.

3. Legal heirs can only claim the deceased partner’s share in profits/losses, not the property.

Key Takeaway:
Property contributed to a partnership firm with the partner’s intention becomes the firm’s asset. Heirs cannot claim ownership but may inherit the partner’s share in the business.

Final Order:
Appeal dismissed. Respondent firm (M/s Hotel Alka Raje) remains the sole owner

RINA KUMARI VS. DINESH KUMAR MAHTO

2025 INSC 55 (10 January 2025)

Landmark Judgment On Maintenance Rights of Wife Despite Decree for Restitution of Conjugal Rights

Citation:
Rina Kumari @ Rina Devi @ Reena vs. Dinesh Kumar Mahto & Anr., 2025 INSC 55
(Decided on January 10, 2025)

Key Legal Provisions & Details:

• Laws Involved:
  Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Section 125 and Section 125(4))
  Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (Section 9: Restitution of Conjugal Rights)
  Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (Sections 34-37) / Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (Sections 40-43)

• Bench:
  Chief Justice Sanjiv Khanna & Justice Sanjay Kumar (2-Judge Bench, not a Constitutional Bench).

• Referenced Precedents:
  Kirtikant D. Vadodaria vs. State of Gujarat (1996)
  Amrita Singh vs. Ratan Singh (2018)
  Captain Ramesh Chander Kaushal vs. Veena Kaushal (1978)

Step-by-Step Explanation of the Judgment:

A. Background of the Case

• Parties Involved:
  Appellant: Rina Kumari (wife)
  Respondent: Dinesh Kumar (husband)

• Marriage Timeline:
  Married in 2014 → Separated in 2015 → Rina lived with her parents.

• Legal Battles:
  2018: Dinesh filed for restitution of conjugal rights (to force Rina to return).
  2019: Rina filed for maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C.
  2022:
  Family Court granted Rina ₹10,000/month maintenance.
  Family Court also decreed restitution of conjugal rights in Dinesh’s favor.
  2023: Jharkhand High Court cancelled Rina’s maintenance citing Section 125(4) Cr.P.C. (wife’s refusal to live with husband).

B. Core Legal Question

"Does a decree for restitution of conjugal rights automatically bar a wife from claiming maintenance under Section 125(4) Cr.P.C. if she refuses to comply?"

C. Supreme Court’s Analysis

The Court examined three key issues:

1. Purpose of Section 125 Cr.P.C.:
   It is a social welfare law to prevent destitution of wives, children, and parents.
   Precedents cited:
   Chaturbhuj vs. Sita Bai: Aims to prevent "vagrancy and destitution."
   Bhuwan Mohan Singh vs. Meena: Wife entitled to live "with dignity," not merely survive.

2. Section 125(4) Cr.P.C. – Disqualification Conditions:
   A wife loses maintenance rights ONLY if:
   She lives in adultery, OR
   She refuses to live with husband without sufficient reason, OR
   Separation is by mutual consent.
   Key Distinction: "Refusal" ≠ "Failure" (e.g., due to husband’s conduct).

3. Effect of Restitution Decree:
   Not Binding: A civil decree for restitution does NOT override maintenance proceedings.
   Wife’s Grounds Matter: If wife proves sufficient reason to live apart (e.g., cruelty, neglect), maintenance remains valid.
   Precedents cited:
   Kirtikant Vadodaria: Restitution decree ≠ Automatic maintenance denial.
   Amrita Singh: Wife entitled to maintenance if husband’s cruelty forced separation.

D. Application to Rina’s Case

• Evidence of Cruelty:
  Dinesh neglected Rina during her miscarriage (2015).
  Denied her basic facilities: no LPG stove, restricted toilet access.
  Rina filed a criminal case (Section 498A IPC) against Dinesh.

• Husband’s Conduct:
  Dinesh made no effort to reconcile after 2017.
  Secured restitution decree but never enforced it (e.g., via execution).

• High Court’s Error:
  Ignored evidence of cruelty and blindly applied Section 125(4) Cr.P.C.

E. Final Decision

• Allowed Rina’s appeal.

• Restored maintenance of ₹10,000/month from August 2019.

• Arrears to be paid in 3 installments (April/August/December 2025).

Conclusion

The Supreme Court reversed the High Court’s order and upheld Rina’s right to maintenance, emphasizing:

"A restitution decree is not a weapon to deny maintenance. Courts must examine whether the wife has sufficient reason to refuse cohabitation."
This judgment reinforces:

1. Section 125 Cr.P.C. is a social justice tool – not subordinate to civil decrees.

2. Wife’s dignity matters: Valid grounds like cruelty, neglect, or abuse justify living apart.

3. Husband’s conduct is crucial: If he creates unlivable conditions, he cannot use legal technicalities to avoid maintenance.

This decision protects vulnerable women from being forced into abusive marriages or denied financial security due to procedural loopholes.

KIM WANSOO VS. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

2025 INSC 8 (2 January 2025)

Heading:
Quashing of FIR - Lack of Specific Allegations & Abuse of Process

Citation:
Kim Wansoo vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., 2025 INSC 8
(Decided on January 2, 2025)

Key Legal Provisions & Details:

• Laws Involved:
  Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Sections 406, 420, 323, 504, 506, 120-B)
  Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Sections 91, 155(2), 156(1), 157, 173(2), 482)
  Constitution of India (Article 226)

• Bench:
  Justices C.T. Ravikumar & Sanjay Kumar (2-Judge Bench, not a Constitutional Bench).

• Referenced Precedents:
  State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (AIR 1992 SC 604)
  Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate (AIR 1998 SC 128)
  Mohammad Wajid v. State of U.P. (2023 SCC Online SC 951)

Step-by-Step Explanation of the Judgment:

A. Background of the Case

• Parties Involved:
  Appellant: Kim Wansoo (Project Manager of Hyundai Engineering & Construction India LLP).
  Respondents: State of Uttar Pradesh & others (including the complainant, M/s R.T. Construction).

• Contract Chain:
  Hyundai Motor India → HEC India LLP (Kim’s employer) → KOTEC Automotive → YSSS Construction → Complainant (R.T. Construction).

• Allegations:
  The complainant accused YSSS and others of cheating, criminal conspiracy, and defaulting on payment of ₹9 crores for construction labor. Kim was named in the FIR despite no direct role.

B. Proceedings Before High Court

• The complainant filed FIR No. 64/2020 (Meerut) against Kim and others.

• Kim approached the Allahabad High Court to quash the FIR, arguing:
  No specific allegations against him.
  FIR was filed to pressure him for money recovery.

• High Court’s Decision:
  Refused to quash the FIR but directed that Kim cannot be arrested until evidence emerged.

C. Supreme Court’s Analysis

The Court examined two key issues:

1. Power to Quash FIR (Legal Framework):
   High Courts can quash FIRs under Article 226 (Constitutional power) or Section 482 CrPC (to prevent abuse of process).
   Referred to Bhajan Lal’s 7-point test for quashing FIRs. Key grounds include:
   FIR allegations, even if accepted, do not disclose any offence (Point 1).
   Allegations are absurd/improbable (Point 5).
   Proceedings are malicious (Point 7).

2. Application to Kim’s Case:
   No Specific Allegations: The FIR only mentioned Kim as part of "aforementioned persons" but lived details of his involvement.
   Payment Dispute, Not Crime: The FIR explicitly sought police help to "recover money" – indicating a civil dispute, not criminal cheating.
   Vague Accusations: Allegations of conspiracy/forgery were not backed by facts against Kim.
   Contractual Mismatch: The payment default was by YSSS/KOTEC, not HEC India (Kim’s employer).

D. Court’s Conclusion & Decision

• The FIR failed the Bhajan Lal test:
  No prima facie offence disclosed against Kim.
  Continuing proceedings would cause miscarriage of justice.

• Judgment:
  Allowed Kim’s appeal.
  Quashed the FIR and all related proceedings against him.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order and quashed the FIR against Kim Wansoo, emphasizing that:

"Vague allegations without specifics cannot justify criminal proceedings. Allowing such cases would abuse the legal process."
This judgment reinforces that:

1. Courts must scrutinize FIRs to prevent misuse for settling civil disputes.

2. Accused cannot be prosecuted based on generalized accusations without direct evidence.

3. Article 226/Section 482 CrPC are vital safeguards against frivolous prosecutions.

This decision protects individuals from harassment via criminal proceedings when no genuine offence is made out against them

AMLESH KUMAR VS. STATE OF BIHAR (2025)

2025 INSC 810 (9 June 2025)

Landmark Supreme Court Judgment on Narco-Analysis Tests

Citation

2025 INSC 810
Criminal Appeal No. ______ of 2025 (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No. 5392 of 2024)

• Bench:
  Constitutional Bench: 2-Judge Bench (Justices Sanjay Karol & Prasanna B. Varale).

• Judgment Date: 9 June 2025.

Key Legal Provisions & Details

• Laws Involved:
  Article 20(3), Constitution of India: Right against self-incrimination.
  Article 21, Constitution of India: Right to life and personal liberty.
  Section 27, Indian Evidence Act, 1872: Admissibility of information discovered from voluntary disclosures.

• Related Precedents:
  Selvi & Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2010) 7 SCC 263 (landmark case banning involuntary tests).
  Sangitaben Shaileshbhai Datana v. State of Gujarat (2019) 14 SCC 522.

Step-wise Explanation of the Judgment

Background of the Case

• An FIR was filed against Amlesh Kumar (husband) and his family for dowry harassment and the mysterious disappearance of his wife (August 2022).

• The Patna High Court allowed the Investigating Officer’s request to conduct narco-analysis tests on all accused persons (including Amlesh) during bail proceedings (November 2023).

• Amlesh appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing this violated his fundamental rights.

Key Issues Decided by the Supreme Court

1. Can courts order narco-analysis tests without consent?
   Ruling: No. Forced tests violate Articles 20(3) (right against self-incrimination) and Article 21 (right to personal liberty).
   Reasoning: The Selvi case (2010) clearly bans involuntary tests. The High Court’s order was illegal.

2. Can voluntary narco-test results alone convict an accused?
   Ruling: No. Results of even voluntary tests cannot be direct evidence.
   Reasoning: Information discovered because of the test (e.g., recovery of weapons) may be admissible under Section 27, Evidence Act, but only if supported by other evidence.

3. Does an accused have an absolute right to demand a narco-test?
   Ruling: No. An accused can volunteer, but courts must ensure:
   Genuine consent (recorded before a magistrate).
   Legal safeguards (access to a lawyer, medical supervision).
   Stage for Test: Only during trial (when accused leads evidence), not investigation.

Critical Observations

• High Court’s Error: Ordering narco-tests during bail hearings is illegal. Bail decisions must consider only:
  Gravity of the crime.
  Evidence strength.
  Risk of witness tampering.

• Modern Techniques vs. Rights: Investigative tools cannot override constitutional rights (Para 12).

• Guidelines for Voluntary Tests: Courts must follow Selvi’s safeguards (Para 21), including:
  Consent before a judicial magistrate.
  Legal counsel during the test.
  Independent medical supervision.

Final Decision

• The Supreme Court set aside the Patna High Court’s order allowing narco-tests.

• Directed the High Court to decide Amlesh’s bail plea without relying on forced tests.

• Allowed the appeal (Para 25).

Conclusion

This judgment reinforces constitutional protections against coercive investigative methods. Key takeaways:

1. Forced narco-tests are unconstitutional – they breach privacy and liberty (Articles 20-21).

2. Voluntary tests have limited value – results alone cannot prove guilt.

3. Courts must prioritize rights – even during complex investigations.

4. Strict safeguards are mandatory for voluntary tests to prevent abuse.

Impact: This ruling upholds the Selvi precedent, ensuring police/investigators cannot use narco-analysis as a shortcut at the cost of fundamental rights.

 ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY V. NARESH AGARWAL & ORS

 2024 INSC 856 (8 November 2024)

Supreme Court Landmark Judgement Summary of Aligarh Muslim University v. Naresh Agarwal & Ors

1. Heading

Landmark Ruling on Minority Educational Institutions under Article 30

2. Citation

• Case Name: Aligarh Muslim University v. Naresh Agarwal & Ors.

• Citation: (2024) INSC 856

• Court: Supreme Court of India

• Decided On: November 8, 2024

3. Subject of the Judgment

Whether Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) qualifies as a minority educational institution under Article 30(1) of the Constitution, granting religious/linguistic minorities the right to establish and administer educational institutions.

4. Key Legal Framework

Constitutional Provisions & Statutes:

• Article 30(1): Right of religious/linguistic minorities to establish and administer educational institutions.

• Article 29(2): Prohibition against discrimination in educational institutions.

• Entry 63, List I (7th Schedule): Grants Parliament exclusive power over AMU, BHU, and Delhi University as "institutions of national importance."

• Aligarh Muslim University Act, 1920: Established AMU; amended in 1951, 1965, and 1981.

• National Commission for Minority Educational Institutions (NCMEI) Act, 2004: Defines and regulates minority institutions.

Constitutional Bench:

• 7-Judge Bench comprising:
  CJI Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud
  Justices Sanjiv Khanna, J.B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, Surya Kant (and two others).

• Overruled: S. Azeez Basha v. Union of India (1968).

• Relied On: TMA Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka (2002), St. Xavier’s College v. Gujarat (1974).

5. Step-wise Explanation of the Judgment

Background

• AMU was founded as Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College (1877) by Muslim reformer Sir Syed Ahmed Khan.

• The AMU Act, 1920 converted it into a university. Post-independence amendments (1951, 1965) diluted its Muslim character (e.g., removing compulsory Islamic education).

• The 1981 Amendment declared AMU was "established by Muslims," restoring its minority claim.

Core Issues Decided

1. Applicability of Article 30 to Pre-Constitution Institutions:
   Universities established before 1950 (like AMU) can claim minority status.
   Overruled Azeez Basha, which held only post-1950 institutions qualify.

2. Meaning of "Establish" under Article 30(1):
   "Establish" = Found, not merely incorporate by statute.
   Key Tests:
   Ideation: Idea must originate from the minority community.
   Purpose: Primarily for the minority’s educational/cultural advancement.
   Implementation: Steps (funding, land acquisition) taken by the minority.

3. Role of Statutory Recognition:
   Incorporation via law (e.g., AMU Act, 1920) does not erase minority character.
   Compliance with legal formalities (e.g., degree recognition) is not surrender of minority rights.

4. "Administer" under Article 30(1):
   Autonomy in management (e.g., appointments, admissions) is protected.
   State regulations (e.g., syllabus, fees) must not undermine minority character.

5. Institutions of National Importance (Entry 63):
   "National importance" ≠ Non-minority status. AMU can be both minority-run and nationally significant.

6. Burden of Proof:
   Minority community must prove establishment via historical evidence (letters, resolutions, funding records).

6. Conclusion

• AMU’s minority status must be decided by a regular bench applying the new tests:
  Was AMU established by Muslims through ideation, purpose, and implementation?
  Did its statutory incorporation (1920 Act) erase minority character?

• Key Outcomes:
  Universities can be minority institutions.
  Pre-1950 institutions qualify under Article 30.
  Overruled Azeez Basha (1968) for its "narrow" reading of "establish."

• Final Decision: Referred back to a smaller bench to examine AMU’s case-specific facts.

Date of Judgment: November 8, 2024

Impact: Empowers minorities to reclaim institutional identity while balancing state regulation. Ensures Article 30 protects both pre- and post-Constitution institutions.

ANJUM KADARI VS UNION OF INDIA

2024 INSC 831 (25 November 2024)

Supreme Court Landmark Judgment Analysis: Anjum Kadari vs Union of India

1. Heading
Supreme Court Upholds Validity of UP Madarsa Act 2004 (Partly), Reverses Allahabad HC Ruling

2. Citation
Anjum Kadari & Anr. vs Union of India & Ors.
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 8541 of 2024 (with connected petitions)
2024 INSC 831
Decided on November 5, 2024

3. Subject of the Judgment
The Supreme Court overturned the Allahabad High Court's decision that struck down the Uttar Pradesh Board of Madarsa Education Act, 2004 (Madarsa Act) as unconstitutional. The Court upheld the Act as valid except for provisions related to higher education degrees (Fazil/Kamil), which conflict with central law.

4. Key Laws, Sections, Acts & Bench Details

• Constitutional Provisions:
  Articles 14, 15, 16 (Equality)
  Articles 25–30 (Religious/Cultural Rights, Minority Institutions)
  Article 21A (Right to Education)
  Article 246 & Seventh Schedule (Legislative Powers)
  Entry 25, List III (Concurrent List: "Education")
  Entry 66, List I (Union List: "Higher Education Standards")

• Statutes:
  Uttar Pradesh Board of Madarsa Education Act, 2004
  University Grants Commission (UGC) Act, 1956 (Section 22)
  Right to Education (RTE) Act, 2009 (Section 1(5))

• Doctrines: Basic Structure, Severability, Substantive Equality.

• Bench: 3-Judge Bench comprising CJI Dr Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, Justice J.B. Pardiwala, and Justice Manoj Misra.

5. Step-wise Explanation of the Judgment

Step 1: Background of the Case

• The Allahabad High Court (March 22, 2024) declared the UP Madarsa Act, 2004 unconstitutional, claiming it violated:
  (i) Secularism (basic structure of the Constitution),
  (ii) Articles 14 (Equality) and 21A (Right to Education).

• The Act established a Board to regulate Madarsa education (syllabus, teacher qualifications, exams) in Uttar Pradesh.

• The High Court ordered all Madarsa students to be shifted to regular schools.

Step 2: Supreme Court's Key Findings

A. Secularism and the Madarsa Act

• Secularism ≠ Anti-Religion: Indian secularism ensures equal treatment of all religions (Articles 14–16, 25–30). Regulating Madarsas does not violate secularism.

• Minority Rights Protected: Article 30(1) allows minorities to establish/administer educational institutions. The Madarsa Act regulates standards but doesn’t interfere with religious instruction.

• No Basic Structure Violation: Laws can’t be struck down for violating "basic structure" (like secularism) unless they breach specific constitutional provisions (e.g., Part III). The Act passed this test.

B. Legislative Validity (Entry 25, List III)

• State’s Power Upheld: Entry 25 of the Concurrent List empowers states to legislate on "education," including Madarsas. Religious instruction in Madarsas doesn’t exclude them from "education."

• UGC Act Conflict: Provisions for Fazil (bachelor’s) and Kamil (master’s) degrees under the Madarsa Act clash with Section 22 of the UGC Act (only UGC-recognized institutions can grant degrees).
  Outcome: These specific provisions were struck down as ultra vires (beyond state’s power).

C. Severability of Unconstitutional Parts

• Doctrine Applied: The rest of the Madarsa Act remains valid. Removing Fazil/Kamil provisions doesn’t destroy the Act’s core purpose: regulating school-level Madarsa education.

• Test from Chamarbaugwalla Case:
  Would the legislature have enacted the Act without the invalid parts? Yes.
  Is the remaining Act workable? Yes (it still regulates primary/secondary education).

D. Article 21A (Right to Education)

• RTE Act Exemption Valid: Section 1(5) of the RTE Act excludes Madarsas from its scope. This is constitutional under Article 30 (minority rights).

• State’s Duty Ensured: The Board can prescribe modern subjects (math, science) to ensure students receive quality education.

E. Positive Secularism & Substantive Equality

• The Act promotes substantive equality: It ensures Madarsa students gain skills to participate in society (e.g., by prescribing NCERT books for science/math).

• The State has a duty to support minority institutions without eroding their identity.

Step 3: High Court’s Errors Corrected

• The High Court wrongly invalidated the entire Act for violating "secularism" without tracing it to a specific constitutional breach.

• It ignored Article 30 protections and the doctrine of severability.

6. Conclusion
On November 5, 2024, the Supreme Court:

1. Partially upheld the UP Madarsa Act, 2004 as constitutionally valid.

2. Struck down only provisions related to higher education (Fazil/Kamil degrees) for conflicting with the UGC Act.

3. Reversed the Allahabad High Court’s order to shut down Madarsas or transfer students.

4. Reaffirmed:
   States can regulate minority educational institutions to ensure education standards.
   Secularism permits religious instruction alongside secular education.
   The Act promotes inclusivity and substantive equality for Muslim students.

Outcome: Madarsas in Uttar Pradesh continue operating under the regulatory framework of the Madarsa Board, except for higher education courses.

BALRAM SINGH VS UNION OF INDIA

2024 INSC 893 (25 November 2025)

Supreme Court Landmark Judgment Analysis: Balram Singh vs Union of India

1. Heading:
Supreme Court Upholds "Socialist" and "Secular" in the Preamble; Dismisses Challenge to 42nd Amendment

2. Citation:
Dr. Balram Singh and Others vs Union of India and Another
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 645 of 2020 (along with connected matters)
2024 INSC 893
Decided on November 25, 2024

3. Subject of the Judgment:
The Supreme Court dismissed petitions challenging the constitutional validity of inserting the words "socialist" and "secular" into the Preamble of the Indian Constitution via the 42nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1976.

4. Key Laws, Sections, Acts & Bench Details:

• Constitutional Provisions Involved:
  Preamble to the Constitution of India (as amended by the 42nd Amendment).
  Article 368: Power of Parliament to amend the Constitution.
  Articles 14, 15, 16: Right to Equality (embodying secular principles).
  Articles 25, 26, 29, 30: Freedom of Religion and Rights of Minorities.
  Article 19(1)(g): Right to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business.
  Article 44: Directive Principle for a Uniform Civil Code.

• Constitutional Amendment Act Challenged:
  The Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976.

• Doctrine Applied: Basic Structure Doctrine (as established in Kesavananda Bharati).

• Bench: Division Bench comprising Justice Sanjiv Khanna and Justice Sanjay Kumar.

• Key Precedents Cited:
  Kesavananda Bharati vs State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 225 (13 Judges) - Established Basic Structure doctrine.
  S.R. Bommai vs Union of India (1994) 3 SCC 1 (9 Judges) - Affirmed Secularism as a Basic Feature.
  R.C. Poudyal vs Union of India (1994) Supp (1) SCC 324 - Explained Secularism.
  M Ismail Faruqui (Dr) vs Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 360 - Elaborated on Indian Secularism.
  Excel Wear vs Union of India (1978) 4 SCC 224 - Discussed impact of 'Socialist' in Preamble.
  Property Owners Association vs State of Maharashtra (2024 INSC 835) (9 Judges) - Clarified economic policy flexibility under Constitution.

5. Explanation of the Judgment (Step-wise):

1. The Petitioners' Challenge: Petitioners filed writ petitions in 2020 challenging the 42nd Amendment (1976) which added the words "socialist" and "secular" (and "integrity") to the Constitution's Preamble. They argued:
   Adding these words retrospectively to the 1949 adopted Preamble created a "falsity".
   The Constituent Assembly deliberately chose not to include these words originally.
   "Socialist" unfairly restricts the economic policy choices available to democratically elected governments.
   The Amendment was passed during the Emergency period (after the normal Lok Sabha term ended on March 18, 1976) and lacked the true sanction of the people's will.

2. Court's Initial Assessment: The Supreme Court found the petitions lacked merit. It stated the flaws in the arguments were "obvious and manifest" and did not warrant a detailed trial.

3. Parliament's Amending Power (Article 368): The Court reaffirmed that Parliament has the unquestionable power under Article 368 to amend the Constitution, and this power extends to the Preamble. While amendments can be challenged for violating the "basic structure," the mere fact that the Constitution was adopted in 1949 does not restrict this amending power. The "retrospectivity" argument was rejected as it would undermine all constitutional amendments.

4. "Secularism" is a Basic Feature: The Court emphasized:
   Although the Constituent Assembly didn't include the word "secular" in 1949, the core principles of secularism (state neutrality towards religion, equal treatment of all faiths, religious freedom) were always embedded in Articles 14, 15, 16, 25, 26, 29, and 30.
   Indian secularism means the state has no official religion, guarantees equal freedom of conscience and religion to all, and treats citizens equally regardless of faith.
   Numerous judgments (Kesavananda Bharati, S.R. Bommai, R.C. Poudyal, M Ismail Faruqui) have consistently held that secularism is a basic feature of the Constitution. Adding the word in 1976 merely made explicit what was already inherent.

5. "Socialism" in the Indian Context: The Court clarified:
   "Socialism" in the Indian Preamble does not mandate a specific economic policy (like state ownership of all means of production).
   It signifies the State's commitment to being a welfare state and ensuring equality of opportunity and social and economic justice.
   It does not fetter the choice of economic policies (like mixed economy, liberalization) by elected governments. The Indian economy has always involved significant private sector participation (protected under Article 19(1)(g)).
   The recent 9-judge bench decision in Property Owners Association confirmed the Constitution allows elected governments flexibility in economic governance models.

6. Validity of 42nd Amendment During Emergency: The Court noted that concerns about the Amendment being passed during the Emergency and the extended Lok Sabha term were previously debated during the consideration of the 44th Amendment Act (1978). The inclusion of the words was scrutinized but ultimately retained. The circumstances of its passage did not, in itself, invalidate it.

7. Delay in Challenging (44 Years): The Court found it significant that the challenge was filed 44 years after the amendment. By this time, the terms "socialist" and "secular" had achieved widespread acceptance and understanding among the people of India ("We, the people of India"). The additions had demonstrably not restricted legislative or policy actions of elected governments, provided they didn't violate fundamental rights or the basic structure.

6. Conclusion:

The Supreme Court, on November 25, 2024, dismissed the writ petitions challenging the inclusion of "socialist" and "secular" in the Preamble. The Court conclusively held that:

1. Parliament's power to amend the Constitution under Article 368 validly extends to the Preamble.

2. The principles of secularism were always an integral part of the Constitution's basic structure, even before the word was explicitly added in 1976.

3. The term "socialist" signifies India's commitment to being a welfare state ensuring social and economic justice, but it does not impose a rigid economic model or prevent policy choices favoring private enterprise within a mixed economy.

4. The arguments regarding the amendment's passage during the Emergency and alleged retrospectivity were unsustainable.

5. A challenge filed 44 years after the amendment, when the concepts have become fundamental to India's constitutional identity and widely understood by its citizens, lacked legitimate justification.

The dismissal reaffirmed the settled constitutional position that "socialist" and "secular" are valid, integral parts of the Preamble reflecting core features of the Indian Republic.

CENTRAL ORGANISATION FOR RAILWAY ELECTRIFICATION VS. M/S ECI SPIC SMO MCML (JV)

2025 INSC 857 (16 July 2025)

Landmark Supreme Court Judgment on Arbitrator Impartiality in Government Contracts

1. Heading

Central Organisation for Railway Electrification vs. M/s ECI SPIC SMO MCML (JV)

2. Citation

(2025) INSC 857 (Supreme Court of India)

3. Subject of the Judgment

Validity of arbitration clauses allowing government entities to unilaterally appoint arbitrators or curate arbitrator panels in public contracts.

4. Key Details

• Date of Judgment: 16 July 2025

• Constitutional Bench: 5-Judge Bench led by Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, CJI

• Related Laws:
  Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Sections 11, 12(5), 18)
  Seventh Schedule (Arbitrator Ineligibility Criteria)
  Indian Contract Act, 1872 (Section 23: Unlawful Agreements)
  Constitution of India (Article 14: Equality)

• Precedents Referenced:
  Voestalpine Schienen GmbH v. DMRC (2017)
  TRF Ltd. v. Energo Engineering (2017)
  Perkins Eastman v. HSCC (2019)
  CORE v. ECI-SPIC-SMO-MCML (2019)

5. Step-by-Step Explanation of the Judgment

A. Background of the Case

• Disputes arose between Central Organisation for Railway Electrification (CORE) and a private contractor (ECI-SPIC-SMO-MCML JV).

• The arbitration clause in their contract allowed:
  Railways to prepare a panel of 4 retired railway officers.
  Contractor to suggest 2 names from this panel.
  Railways’ General Manager to appoint 1 from these 2 as contractor’s nominee + 2 other arbitrators (including the presiding officer).

• Contractor challenged this as biased and violating equality.

B. Key Issues Decided

1. Whether unilateral arbitrator appointments by government entities are valid.

2. Whether the "equality principle" (Section 18, Arbitration Act) applies at the appointment stage.

3. Whether such clauses violate Article 14 of the Constitution.

C. Court’s Analysis

(I) Equality in Arbitrator Appointments (Section 18)

• Section 18 (equal treatment of parties) applies from the appointment stage, not just during proceedings.

• Unilateral control (e.g., Railways curating panels) violates equality:
  Restricts the contractor’s choice.
  Creates "justifiable doubts" about impartiality (Section 12(5)).

• Counter-Balancing Test:
  Mutual appointments (e.g., both parties picking arbitrators) balance influence.
  Unilateral appointments (like in this case) lack this balance.

(II) Doctrine of Bias

• Nemo Judex Rule: No one can be a judge in their own cause.

• Real Likelihood of Bias Test:
  If a party with a stake in the dispute appoints arbitrators, bias is presumed.
  Example: Railways appointing retired employees risks loyalty conflicts.

• Seventh Schedule:
  Current employees/consultants of a party are automatically disqualified as arbitrators.
  Retired officers not automatically barred unless linked to the dispute.

(III) Public Contracts & Public Policy

• Government entities must follow Article 14 (non-arbitrariness) in contracts.

• Unconscionable Clauses:
  Clauses giving one party exclusive control over appointments are "unfair" and "opposed to public policy" (Indian Contract Act, Section 23).
  US Jurisprudence Cited: Similar clauses struck down for violating "fundamental fairness" (Hooters of America v. Phillips).

D. Overruling of Past Judgments

• CORE (2019) Invalidated:
  Earlier allowed Railways’ panel-based appointments.
  New ruling: Such clauses violate Section 18 and Article 14.

• Voestalpine (2017) Clarified:
  Broad-based panels are acceptable, but parties cannot be forced to choose from them.

E. Conclusion & Directives

1. Unilateral Appointments Void: Clauses letting one party (especially government) appoint sole arbitrators or curate exclusive panels are invalid.

2. Prospective Application:
   New rule applies to future disputes and cases where arbitrator not yet appointed.
   Past awards under such clauses not reopened.

3. Waiver Allowed: Parties may expressly waive impartiality requirements after disputes arise (Proviso to Section 12(5)).

4. Government Advisory: PSUs/Railways must amend arbitration clauses to ensure equal participation in arbitrator appointments.

Key Quote from the Judgment

"Party autonomy cannot override the fundamental principles of impartiality and equality. A clause handing absolute control to one party corrodes the very foundation of arbitration."
– Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, CJI

Impact: This judgment ensures private contractors get a fair voice in arbitrator selection, balancing power dynamics in government contracts. It reinforces arbitration as a neutral forum, free from institutional bias.

M/S BAJAJ ALLIANCE GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. V. RAMBHA DEVI & ORS

2024 INSC 840 (6th November 2024)

Supreme Court Judgment Summary: Driving License Validity for Transport Vehicles

1. Heading

Landmark Ruling on Driving License Validity: LMV License Holders Can Drive Transport Vehicles Under 7500 kg

2. Citation

Case Name:
M/s Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rambha Devi & Ors.
Citation:
2024 INSC 840 (Civil Appeal No. 841 of 2018)
Decided On:
6th November 2024

3. Subject of the Judgment

Whether a person holding a driving license for "Light Motor Vehicles" (LMV) can legally drive a "Transport Vehicle" (e.g., taxis, goods carriers) without a separate endorsement, provided the vehicle’s weight does not exceed 7,500 kg.

4. Key Details

• Constitutional Bench:
  5 Judges:
  CJI Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud
  Justice Hrishikesh Roy (Author)
  Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha
  Justice Pankaj Mithal
  Justice Manoj Misra

• Relevant Laws:
  Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (MV Act):
  Section 2(21): Definition of "Light Motor Vehicle" (LMV) – includes transport vehicles ≤ 7,500 kg.
  Section 3: Necessity of a driving license for transport vehicles.
  Section 10(2)(d) & (e): Classes of vehicles (LMV vs. Transport Vehicle).
  Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 (MV Rules):
  Rules on medical certificates, training, and license validity.

• Previous Judgment Referred:
  Mukund Dewangan v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. (2017) – Held LMV license valid for transport vehicles ≤ 7,500 kg.

5. Step-by-Step Explanation of the Judgment

Background

• Insurance companies denied compensation for accidents involving transport vehicles driven by LMV license holders, arguing a separate "transport vehicle endorsement" was mandatory.

• Conflicting rulings from 8 earlier Supreme Court cases led to this 5-judge bench reference.

Core Issues Decided

1. Definition of LMV (Section 2(21), MV Act):
   LMV includes transport vehicles, omnibuses, motor cars, tractors, or road rollers with weight ≤ 7,500 kg.
   The word "means" in the definition implies transport vehicles are part of LMV, not a separate category.

2. Licensing Requirements (Section 10(2), MV Act):
   LMV license (Section 10(2)(d)): Valid for transport vehicles ≤ 7,500 kg.
   Transport vehicle license (Section 10(2)(e)): Required only for vehicles > 7,500 kg (medium/heavy vehicles).
   No separate endorsement needed for LMV-license holders to drive light transport vehicles.

3. Harmonious Interpretation of MV Act:
   Additional requirements (e.g., age limit, medical tests) under MV Act/Rules for "transport vehicles" apply only to medium/heavy vehicles (>7,500 kg).
   Example: A school bus weighing 7,450 kg can be driven with an LMV license.

4. Validity of Mukund Dewangan (2017):
   The 2017 ruling (allowing LMV licenses for transport vehicles ≤ 7,500 kg) is upheld.
   It is *not per incuriam_ (ignoring the law), as it correctly interpreted the MV Act.

5. Road Safety & Livelihood Concerns:
   No data showed LMV drivers caused more accidents in light transport vehicles.
   Overruling the 2017 judgment would disrupt the livelihood of auto/taxi drivers (protected under Article 19(1)(g), Constitution).

Overruled Judgments

• Prabhu Lal (2008), Roshanben Rahemansha Fakir (2008), and Angad Kol (2009) (required separate endorsements) were overruled.

• Annappa Irappa Nesaria (2008) was partially overruled (post-1994 amendment position corrected).

6. Conclusion

• LMV license holders can drive transport vehicles ≤ 7,500 kg without additional endorsement.

• Exceptions:
  E-rickshaws, e-carts, and hazardous goods vehicles require special compliance.
  Medium/heavy transport vehicles (>7,500 kg) need separate licenses.

• Why this matters:
  Ensures compensation for accident victims (social welfare goal of MV Act).
  Protects livelihoods of transport drivers (e.g., auto/taxi drivers).
  Urges Parliament to clarify laws for new-age vehicles (e.g., app-based taxis).

Final Decision Date: 6th November 2024.
The Court directed the government to consider policy reforms but upheld the existing framework pending legislative changes.

PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION VS STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

2024 INSC 835 (2024)

Landmark Judgment: Property Owners Association vs State of Maharashtra (2024)

1. Heading

Constitutional Validity of Article 31C and Interpretation of "Material Resources of the Community" under Article 39(b)

2. Citation

2024 INSC 835
Civil Appeal No. 1012 of 2002 (Supreme Court of India)

3. Subject of the Judgment

The Supreme Court addressed two key constitutional questions:

• Whether Article 31C survives after the 42nd Constitutional Amendment was struck down in Minerva Mills (1980).

• Whether Article 39(b)'s phrase "material resources of the community" includes privately owned resources.

The case arose from challenges to the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act (MHADA), 1976, which allowed the state to acquire dilapidated buildings in Mumbai for reconstruction and transfer them to cooperative societies of occupants.

4. Key Details

AspectDetailsDate of Judgment2024Constitutional Bench9-Judge BenchPresiding JudgeDr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, CJIRelated Laws- Constitution: Articles 31C, 39(b), 14, 19, 31 (pre-1978)Statutes: MHADA Act (1976), Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act (1976)Precedents Cited- Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973)
- Minerva Mills v. Union of India (1980)
- Sanjeev Coke Mfg. Co. v. Bharat Coking Coal (1983)

5. Step-wise Explanation of the Judgment

Background of the Case

• Origin: Petitioners (Property Owners Association) challenged Chapter VIII-A of MHADA Act, which allowed the state to acquire old buildings in Mumbai and transfer them to occupant cooperatives.

• Key Grievance: The law allegedly violated Articles 14 (equality) and 19 (property rights). The state claimed immunity under Article 31C, which shields laws implementing Article 39(b) from such challenges.

• Referral to 9-Judge Bench: Lower benches (3, 5, and 7 judges) could not resolve conflicting interpretations of Articles 31C and 39(b).

Issue 1: Survival of Article 31C after Minerva Mills

Arguments

• Petitioners: The 42nd Amendment (1976) deleted the original Article 31C. When this amendment was struck down in Minerva Mills, the deleted text did not "revive."

• State: Invalidating the amendment restores the pre-amendment version of Article 31C.

Court's Reasoning

1. Legislative Intent:
   The 42nd Amendment aimed to expand Article 31C (covering all Directive Principles), not abolish it.
   Parliament would not have deleted the original text without replacing it.

2. Consequences of Non-Revival:
   If Article 31C lapsed, laws protecting welfare goals (e.g., land reforms, nationalisation) would lose immunity, causing chaos.

3. Precedent:
   In NJAC Case (2016), the Court held that invalidating an amendment revives the pre-amendment provision.
   Post-Minerva Mills cases (e.g., Sanjeev Coke) applied Article 31C as if it survived.

Conclusion on Article 31C

Article 31C (pre-42nd Amendment) stands revived. It protects laws implementing Article 39(b) or (c) from challenges under Articles 14 and 19.

Issue 2: Scope of "Material Resources of the Community" under Article 39(b)

Arguments

• Petitioners: "Community resources" mean public/natural resources (e.g., forests, minerals). Private property is excluded.

• State: The phrase includes all resources (public or private) vital for societal welfare (e.g., housing, factories).

Court's Reasoning

1. Textual Interpretation:
   "Community": Refers to society at large, not just the state.
   "Material Resources": Covers man-made assets (e.g., buildings, industries) and natural resources.
   "Distribution": Includes state actions like nationalisation or regulation to ensure equitable access.

2. Constituent Assembly Debates:
   Drafters rejected a proposal to limit resources to those "vested in the state," opting for broad language to future-proof socio-economic policies.

3. Precedents Corrected:
   Sanjeev Coke (1983) erroneously relied on a minority view in Ranganatha Reddy (1977). The 9-judge bench overruled this approach.
   COVID-19 Example: The pandemic showed private resources (e.g., hospitals) can serve "common good."

Conclusion on Article 39(b)

"Material resources of the community" includes privately owned resources (e.g., land, buildings, industries). Laws acquiring/distributing such resources to subserve "common good" are protected under Article 31C.

Final Outcome

1. MHADA Act Valid: The law’s acquisition of private buildings for reconstruction falls under Article 39(b) and is shielded by Article 31C.

2. Clarification: Challenges to specific provisions of MHADA (e.g., compensation) may be heard by a regular bench later.

Conclusion

The judgment:

1. Upholds Social Welfare Laws: By reviving Article 31C, it protects laws redistributing resources (public or private) for equitable development.

2. Balances Rights and Welfare: Private property is not absolute; it can be regulated for "common good" (e.g., preventing building collapses in Mumbai).

3. Corrects Judicial Errors: Overrules inconsistent precedents (e.g., Sanjeev Coke) and reaffirms the Constitution’s socialist goals.

Impact: Empowers states to implement housing reforms, poverty-alleviation schemes, and resource-distribution policies without frivolous challenges to equality/property rights.

OMKAR RAMCHANDRA GOND VS. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

2024 INSC 775 (15 October 2024)

Omkar Ramchandra Gond vs. Union of India & Ors. (Disability Rights in Medical Admissions)

1. Heading:
Landmark Judgment on Disability Rights and Medical Education Admission

2. Citation:
Omkar Ramchandra Gond vs. Union of India & Ors., 2024 INSC 775
Civil Appeal No. 10611 of 2024
Decided on: October 15, 2024

3. Subject of the Judgment:
Whether a medical aspirant with a certified 44-45% speech and language disability can be denied admission under the Persons with Disability (PwD) quota solely based on the disability percentage exceeding 40%, without considering their functional ability to pursue the MBBS course.

4. Related Laws & Provisions:

• Constitution of India:
  Article 14: Right to Equality.
  Article 21: Right to Life and Personal Liberty (includes right to education and dignity).
  Article 41: Directive Principle directing the State to secure the right to education, including for persons with disabilities.

• The Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (RPwD Act):
  Section 2(m): Defines "Inclusive Education".
  Section 2(r): Defines "Person with Benchmark Disability" (≥40% disability).
  Section 2(y): Defines "Reasonable Accommodation".
  Section 3: Guarantees Equality and Non-Discrimination.
  Section 15: Designation of support authorities.
  Section 32: Mandates 5% reservation in higher educational institutions for persons with benchmark disabilities.

• National Medical Commission (NMC) Regulations:
  Notification dated 13.05.2019: Amended Graduate Medical Education Regulations, substituting Appendix "H" with Appendix "H-1" (which imposed a blanket ban on MBBS admission for persons with ≥40% speech/language disability).

• Constitutional Bench:
  Bench: Justices B.R. Gavai, Aravind Kumar, and K.V. Viswanathan (who authored the judgment).
  Bench Type: Regular Bench (3 Judges), not a Constitution Bench (5 or more Judges).

5. Explanation of the Judgment (Step-wise):

• Step 1: The Appellant's Case:
  Omkar Gond, a student with repaired bilateral cleft palate causing 44-45% speech/language disability, scored exceptionally well academically (97.2% in Class 10). He qualified NEET-UG 2024 under the OBC and PwD categories. However, a Disability Assessment Board declared him ineligible for MBBS solely because his disability exceeded 40% as per NMC's Appendix H-1 guidelines.

• Step 2: Legal Challenge:
  Omkar challenged this rejection:
  First, in the Bombay High Court (Writ Petition Stamp No. 24821 of 2024), arguing the NMC guideline was discriminatory and ultra vires the RPwD Act. The High Court didn't grant him interim relief.
  He then urgently approached the Supreme Court due to imminent admission deadlines.

• Step 3: Supreme Court's Interim Action:
  On 02.09.2024, the Court ordered a seat to be kept vacant for Omkar pending the outcome.
  Crucially, it directed a fresh medical assessment by a specialized Board at Maulana Azad Medical College, Delhi. This Board was to specifically examine if his disability actually hindered his ability to pursue MBBS, not just quantify the percentage.

• Step 4: Medical Board's Positive Opinion:
  The Medical Board (13.09.2024) explicitly opined that Omkar's "Speech & Language disability... would not come in the way of pursuing the MBBS Course."

• Step 5: Core Legal Issue:
  The Supreme Court framed the central question: Should a candidate be automatically disqualified from PwD quota admission in MBBS merely because their quantified disability is 44%/45% (above 40%), without assessing their actual functional capacity?

• Step 6: Court's Analysis & Reasoning:
  The Court strongly rejected the automatic disqualification rule:
  Violates Equality (Art 14): The "one size fits all" 40% cutoff for speech disability under Appendix H-1 was over-inclusive. It lumped together people who could function effectively in medical studies (like Omkar) with those who genuinely couldn't, treating unequals equally. This is irrational discrimination.
  Defeats RPwD Act's Purpose: The Act aims for inclusion, equality of opportunity, and reasonable accommodation (Sections 2(m), 2(y), 3, 32). A blanket ban based solely on percentage contradicts these goals.
  Reasonable Accommodation is Key: Section 2(y) RPwD Act mandates necessary adjustments to ensure equal rights. The Court interpreted this broadly – it's not just about devices but includes adapting rules/procedures to enable participation based on individual capability.
  Directive Principle (Art 41): Reinforces the state's duty to secure the right to education for persons with disabilities.
  Flawed Appendix H-1: The Court noted Appendix H-1 created an absurdity: For speech disability, it left the column "Eligible for Medical Course, Eligible for PwD Quota" blank, meaning no one in this category could ever get the 5% reservation! This couldn't be the law's intent.
  Medical Boards' Role: Boards must go beyond mere quantification. They must positively assess functional competency – will the disability hinder pursuing this specific course?
  Government Action Commended: The Court praised the Union Ministry of Social Justice's communication (25.01.2024) directing NMC to review its regulations, focus on functional classification, improve application forms, and set up appellate mechanisms.

• Step 7: Conclusions & Directions (Issued on 15.10.2024):
  The Supreme Court allowed Omkar's appeal and set aside the High Court's order. It issued binding directions:
  No Automatic Disqualification: Quantified benchmark disability (≥40%) alone cannot disqualify a candidate. Eligibility depends on the Disability Assessment Board's opinion on whether the disability actually hinders pursuing the specific course. Appendix H-1 must be read accordingly pending NMC revision.
  Functional Assessment Mandatory: Disability Assessment Boards must explicitly state in their report whether the disability will hinder the course. Reasons must be given if declaring ineligible.
  Follow Government Guidelines: Boards must consider the Ministry of Social Justice's 25.01.2024 communication (focusing on functional ability, aids, technology) while assessing.
  Appeal Mechanism: Pending a formal appellate body, candidates declared ineligible by a Board can challenge this via judicial review (writ petition). The High Court will then refer the case to a premier medical institute for an independent opinion, which will be binding.
  Omkar's Admission Validated: The Court confirmed Omkar's admission to MBBS (granted via interim order on 18.09.2024 based on the positive medical report) as legally valid.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court's judgment in Omkar Gond vs. UoI (15.10.2024) is a landmark victory for disability rights in India, particularly in professional education. It struck down the discriminatory "one size fits all" approach of the NMC's 2019 guidelines that barred candidates with ≥40% speech disability from MBBS solely based on percentage. The Court emphatically ruled that:

1. Functional ability, not just disability percentage, is paramount.

2. Disability Assessment Boards must assess if the disability actually hinders pursuing the specific course.

3. The principles of equality (Art 14), reasonable accommodation (Sec 2(y) RPwD Act), and inclusive education (Sec 2(m) RPwD Act) must guide admissions.
   This judgment ensures that persons with benchmark disabilities are assessed as individuals with unique capabilities, not excluded by rigid, arbitrary percentages, paving the way for greater inclusion in medical education and beyond. The directions also compel the NMC to urgently reform its regulations.

TEJ PRAKASH PATHAK VS. RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT

2024 INSC 847 (7 November 2024)

Supreme Court Landmark Judgment Summary: Tej Prakash Pathak vs. Rajasthan High Court

1. Heading:
Landmark Judgment on Altering Recruitment Rules Mid-Process

2. Citation:
Tej Prakash Pathak & Ors. vs. Rajasthan High Court & Ors., 2024 INSC 847 (Civil Appeal No. 2634 of 2013)

Date Of Judgment : - November 7, 2024"

• Case Citation: 2024 INSC 847 (Civil Appeal No. 2634 of 2013).

• Bench:
  Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud (CJI)
  Hrishikesh Roy, J.
  Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J.
  Pankaj Mithal, J.
  Manoj Misra, J.

3. Subject:
Whether recruitment authorities can change selection criteria (e.g., cutoff marks) after the selection process has commenced or concluded.

4. Related Laws & Provisions:

• Constitution of India:
  Article 14: Right to Equality (prohibits arbitrary state action).
  Article 16: Equality of opportunity in public employment.
  Article 309: Power to regulate recruitment and service conditions.

• Precedents:
  K. Manjusree v. State of A.P. (2008)
  State of Haryana v. Subash Chander Marwaha (1974)
  Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India (1991)

• Statutory Framework:
  Rajasthan High Court Staff Service Rules, 2002.

5. Step-wise Explanation of the Judgment:

Background of the Case

• Recruitment Process: Rajasthan High Court invited applications for 13 Translator posts (2009).

• Original Rules: Required a qualifying exam (translation test) + interview. No minimum cutoff marks were specified.

• Post-Exam Change: After the exam, the Chief Justice imposed a 75% cutoff for selection. Only 3 candidates qualified (down from 13 vacancies).

• Legal Challenge: Unsuccessful candidates argued this was "changing the rules after the game was played," violating Articles 14 & 16.

Key Legal Questions

1. Can selection criteria (e.g., cutoff marks) be altered after the recruitment process starts?

2. Is there a difference between changing eligibility criteria (qualifications) and selection procedure (cutoffs)?

3. Does placement in a select list guarantee appointment?

Supreme Court's Analysis

A. When Recruitment Starts & Ends

• Commencement: Issuance of advertisement.

• Conclusion: Filling of vacancies.

• Stages: Application, screening, tests, interviews, final selection.

B. The "Rules of the Game" Doctrine

• Eligibility Criteria (e.g., qualifications):
  Cannot be changed mid-process. Candidates apply based on advertised criteria; altering it violates Articles 14 & 16.

• Selection Procedure (e.g., cutoff marks):
  Can be modified only before the relevant stage (e.g., before interviews if cutoff is for interviews).
  Post-hoc changes are illegal as they violate fairness and legitimate expectations.

C. Conflict Between Precedents

• K. Manjusree (2008):
  Fixing interview cutoff after interviews is impermissible.

• Subash Chander Marwaha (1974):
  Authorities need not fill all vacancies; can set higher cutoffs before selection.

• Reconciliation:
  Manjusree deals with right to enter the select list.
  Marwaha deals with right to appointment from the list.
  No conflict: Both judgments operate in distinct spheres.

D. Permissible Flexibility in Selection

• Recruiting bodies can:
  Shortlist candidates based on higher experience/qualifications.
  Set subject-wise cutoffs.
  Design tests/interviews.

• Conditions:
  Must be pre-declared, rational, and non-arbitrary.
  Must align with rules/advertisement.

E. Status of Select List

• Placement in select list ≠ Right to appointment.

• Authorities can leave vacancies unfilled for bona fide reasons (e.g., maintaining service standards).

• However, appointments must follow merit order if vacancies are filled.

6. Conclusion & Key Takeaways

The Supreme Court answered the reference as follows:

1. Eligibility criteria (e.g., qualifications) cannot be altered after recruitment starts.

2. Selection procedures (e.g., cutoffs) can be modified only before the relevant stage (not retrospectively).

3. K. Manjusree is valid law; it does not conflict with Subash Chander Marwaha.

4. Recruiting bodies have flexibility to design procedures, provided they are transparent and fair.

5. Select list confers no automatic right to appointment; vacancies may remain unfilled for valid reasons.

6. Rules with statutory force are binding; administrative instructions can fill gaps if rules are silent.

Final Decision:
The imposition of a 75% cutoff after the exam was illegal. The case was remanded to a regular bench for disposal in line with these principles.

Core Principle:

"The rules of the game cannot be changed after the game has begun."
Recruitment must be predictable, fair, and aligned with constitutional guarantees (Articles 14 & 16).

STATE VS. UNION POWERS OVER ALCOHOL REGULATION

2024 INSC 812 (2024)

Landmark Supreme Court Judgment on State vs. Union Powers Over Alcohol Regulation

1. Heading:
State's Regulatory Power Over All Alcohol Upheld - Union's Control Limited

2. Citation:
State of U.P. & Ors. vs. M/S Lalta Prasad Vaish and Sons, 2024 INSC 812 (Supreme Court of India)

3. Subject of Judgment:
The Supreme Court settled whether State Legislatures have exclusive power to regulate all types of alcohol (including industrial alcohol) under Entry 8 of List II (State List), or if the Union government can control industrial alcohol through the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 (IDRA) under Entry 52 of List I (Union List).

4. Key Details:

• Date of Judgment: 2024

• Constitutional Bench: 9-Judge Bench

• Presiding Judge: Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, Chief Justice of India

• Related Laws/Provisions:
  Constitution of India:
  Entry 8, List II (State List): "Intoxicating liquors, that is to say, the production, manufacture, possession, transport, purchase and sale of intoxicating liquors."
  Entry 52, List I (Union List): "Industries, the control of which by the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest."
  Article 246: Division of legislative powers between Union and States.
  Article 47: Directive Principle urging prohibition of intoxicating drinks.
  Statutes:
  Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 (IDRA), Section 18G: Grants Central Government power to regulate supply/distribution of articles related to scheduled industries.
  Overruled Case:
  Synthetics & Chemicals Ltd. v. State of U.P. (1990): Earlier 7-judge bench judgment which restricted State power only to potable alcohol.

5. Step-wise Explanation of the Judgment:

Background

• States historically regulated all alcohol under excise laws.

• In Synthetics & Chemicals (1990), the SC held that Entry 8 (List II) covers only potable alcohol (for human consumption). Industrial alcohol (e.g., denatured spirit) was held to be under Union control via IDRA.

• This led to confusion, with subsequent judgments (Bihar Distillery, Vam Organic) creating conflicting rules on state vs. union powers.

• The present case referred the issue to a 9-judge bench to reconsider Synthetics.

Core Issues Decided

1. Does Entry 52 (List I) override Entry 8 (List II)?
   Held: No.
   Entry 8 is a specific entry dealing exclusively with intoxicating liquors. Entry 52 is a general entry for industries.
   Parliament cannot use Entry 52 to wholly take over the field of "intoxicating liquors" reserved for States under Entry 8.
   Federal Balance: States retain exclusive power over alcohol regulation; Union control under IDRA is limited to aspects not covered by Entry 8.

2. What does "intoxicating liquors" in Entry 8 include?
   Held: It includes all forms of alcohol – potable (e.g., whiskey, beer) and non-potable (e.g., rectified spirit, denatured alcohol, ENA).
   Reasoning:
   Historical context (pre-Constitution excise laws) defined "liquor" as all liquids containing alcohol.
   Entry 8 covers activities from "production to sale," implying control over raw materials (e.g., ENA) and finished products.
   Purpose: To prevent noxious misuse (e.g., diversion of industrial alcohol for drinking).
   Overruled Synthetics: The 1990 judgment erred in limiting Entry 8 to potable alcohol.

3. Is a notified order under Section 18G (IDRA) necessary for Union control?
   Held: Not relevant to alcohol regulation.
   Since Entry 8 (List II) exclusively covers alcohol, Section 18G of IDRA (Union law) cannot encroach on this field.
   No requirement for the Centre to issue orders under Section 18G to occupy the field.

Clarifications on State Powers

• States can:
  Regulate all stages of alcohol (production, transport, sale).
  Levy excise duties on potable alcohol (Entry 51, List II) and regulatory fees on non-potable alcohol (Entry 66, List II).
  Enforce prohibition (Entry 6, List II) and prevent diversion of industrial alcohol for consumption.

• Union can:
  Regulate alcohol industries only for aspects not covered by Entry 8 (e.g., industrial policy).
  Levy excise duties on non-potable alcohol (Entry 84, List I).

Impact on IDRA

• The 2016 amendment to IDRA (excluding "potable alcohol" from Schedule I) is valid but does not affect State powers over non-potable alcohol.

• States retain authority over all alcohol under Entry 8.

6. Conclusion

• States have exclusive power under Entry 8, List II to regulate all alcohol – whether potable (e.g., beer) or non-potable (e.g., denatured spirit).

• The Union’s power under Entry 52 (List I) and IDRA does not override this state authority. Industrial alcohol remains within State regulatory control.

• The 1990 Synthetics judgment is overruled for incorrectly splitting alcohol into "potable" (State-controlled) and "industrial" (Union-controlled).

• Federal balance is upheld: States retain their constitutional domain over alcohol, while Union control via IDRA is restricted to non-intrusive areas.

Final Outcome: The Supreme Court reinforced State supremacy in alcohol regulation, ensuring a unified approach to control production, distribution, and prevention of misuse across all alcohol types.

ROYAL SUNDARAM ALLIANCE INSURANCE CO. LTD. vs SMT. HONNAMMA & ORS.

2025 INSC 625 (5 May 2025)

Issues

1. Whether the insurance company is liable for compensation when the accident involved an uninsured trailer attached to an insured tractor.

2. Whether the compensation amount awarded by the High Court (₹13.28 lakhs) exceeds the statutory or contractual limits of the insurance policy.

3. Whether the principle of "pay and recover" applies if the insurer’s liability is limited.

6. Held by the Supreme Court in the Judgment

• Dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court’s decision to fasten liability on the insurer.

• Ruled that the tractor (insured) was the root cause of the accident, making the insurer liable even though the trailer was uninsured.

• Clarified that the insurer’s liability is capped at the higher of:
  (i) The statutory limit under Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act, or
  (ii) The contractual limit under the insurance policy.

• Granted liberty to the insurer to recover any excess amount (beyond its liability) from the vehicle owner (Respondent No. 4).

7. Importance of the Judgment

• Establishes that insurer liability extends to accidents caused by an insured vehicle, even if the immediate harm involves an uninsured attached vehicle (e.g., trailer).

• Reaffirms the beneficial intent of the Motor Vehicles Act, prioritizing victim compensation over technicalities.

• Clarifies the interplay between statutory limits and policy terms, ensuring insurers are not burdened beyond agreed/legal thresholds.

8. Rationale

• The accident occurred due to the tractor’s negligent operation, not the trailer’s standalone fault. Thus, the insured tractor’s liability extended to the trailer.

• Cited precedents (Ningamma v. United India Insurance, K Ramya v. National Insurance Co.) to emphasize the welfare-oriented interpretation of the Motor Vehicles Act.

• Distinguished Dhondubai v. Hammantappa (which required separate trailer insurance) as inapplicable since the tractor’s movement caused the accident.

• Analyzed the insurance policy clauses and Section 147 of the MV Act, confirming the insurer’s liability is limited but enforceable.

9. Conclusion

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s enhanced compensation (₹13.28 lakhs) but capped the insurer’s liability at the higher of statutory or policy limits. The insurer may recover excess amounts from the vehicle owner. The judgment balances victim compensation with insurer protections, ensuring equitable outcomes under motor accident claims.

KAMAL DEV PRASAD vs MAHESH FORGE

2025 INSC 591 (29 April 2025)

Issues

1. Whether the statutory schedule under the Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923, strictly determines the percentage of disability, or whether functional disability (impact on earning capacity) can be assessed independently.

2. Whether the High Court erred in reducing the disability compensation from 100% to 34% based solely on the statutory schedule, ignoring the actual functional impairment of the worker.

3. Whether aggregation of injuries to multiple fingers warrants higher compensation than the sum of individual injuries listed in the schedule.

6. Held by the Supreme Court in the Judgment

• Partially allowed the appeal, enhancing the disability compensation from 34% to 50%.

• Held that while the statutory schedule provides a baseline, functional disability (e.g., inability to operate machinery) must also be considered, especially for multiple injuries.

• Directed payment of 12% interest from the accident date and 50% penalty on the enhanced compensation for delayed payment by the employer.

7. Importance of the Judgment

• Clarifies that functional disability can override the statutory schedule in cases of multiple injuries causing severe occupational impairment.

• Reinforces the beneficial intent of the Employees’ Compensation Act, ensuring realistic compensation for workers.

• Sets a precedent for liberal interpretation of disability assessment in workplace injury cases.

8. Rationale

• The worker lost phalanges in four fingers of his dominant hand, severely impairing his ability to operate forging machinery.

• The statutory schedule only provided fixed percentages for individual finger injuries (totalling 34%), but the cumulative effect justified higher compensation.

• Explanation 1 to Section 4(1)(c) permits aggregation of injuries, but the Court noted that functional loss (e.g., grip strength) must be practically assessed.

• Cited Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mohd. Nasir (2009) to emphasize liberal construction of beneficial labor laws.

9. Conclusion

The Supreme Court modified the High Court’s order, increasing compensation to 50% disability to account for the worker’s functional impairment. The judgment balances statutory guidelines with equitable relief, ensuring fair compensation for occupational disabilities.

UNION OF INDIA vs M/S KAMAKHYA TRANSPORT PVT. LTD. & ORS.

2025 INSC 805 (5 June 2025)

Issues

1. Whether the Railways can impose penalties under Section 66 of the Railways Act, 1989 for misdeclaration of goods after delivery.

2. Whether the High Court erred in relying on Section 73 (overloading) and Jagjit Cotton Textile Mills (1998) to bar post-delivery penalties.

3. Whether the demand notices issued by Railways were valid.

6. Held by the Supreme Court in the Judgment

• Allowed the appeal, ruling that Section 66 permits penalties for misdeclaration even after delivery, as it does not specify any timing restriction.

• Distinguished the High Court’s reliance on Jagjit Cotton Textile Mills (which dealt with overloading under Section 73) as inapplicable to Section 66 cases.

• Upheld the Railways’ demand notices as valid, noting no evidence of forgery or mala fides.

7. Importance of the Judgment

• Clarifies that Section 66 (misdeclaration) and Section 73 (overloading) operate independently, with different procedural requirements.

• Reinforces Railways’ authority to detect and penalize fraudulent declarations post-delivery, ensuring compliance with freight rules.

• Overrules the High Court’s restrictive interpretation, ensuring statutory provisions are read as per legislative intent.

8. Rationale

• Section 66 empowers Railways to levy charges if goods are materially misdeclared, with no time-bound limitation (unlike Section 73, which explicitly requires pre-delivery action).

• The High Court erroneously applied Jagjit Cotton Textile Mills (a Section 73 case) to Section 66, ignoring the distinct contexts.

• The demand notices explicitly cited misdeclaration, not overloading, making Section 66 the correct legal basis.

9. Conclusion

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order, upholding the Railways’ right to impose post-delivery penalties under Section 66 for misdeclaration. The judgment safeguards Railways’ revenue interests while ensuring statutory provisions are interpreted contextually.

URMILA DIXIT V. SUNIL SHARAN DIXIT
2025 INSC 20 (2 January 2025)

Issues

Whether the High Court was correct in setting aside the order of the Tribunal, which granted relief under Section 23 of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007, to the Appellant (Urmila Dixit)?
Whether the Gift Deed executed by the Appellant in favor of her son (Respondent) could be declared void under Section 23 of the Act due to the Respondent's failure to provide basic amenities and physical needs to the Appellant?

1. Held by the Supreme Court
   The Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and restored the orders of the Tribunal and the Single Judge.
   The Gift Deed dated 07.09.2019 was declared null and void under Section 23 of the Act, as the Respondent failed to fulfill the condition of maintaining the Appellant.
   The Court directed the possession of the property to be restored to the Appellant by 28.02.2025.

2. Importance of the Judgment
   The judgment reinforces the protective scope of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 as a beneficial legislation for senior citizens.
   It clarifies that Section 23 of the Act must be interpreted liberally to ensure the welfare of senior citizens, even if the conditions for maintenance are not explicitly stated in the transfer deed but are evident from accompanying documents (e.g., promissory notes).
   The ruling emphasizes the social obligation of children to care for their elderly parents and the judiciary's role in safeguarding their rights.

3. Rationale
   The Supreme Court relied on the principle of purposive interpretation for beneficial legislations, noting that the Act aims to provide speedy and inexpensive remedies for senior citizens.
   The Court observed that the Respondent had failed to comply with the conditions outlined in the promissory note and the Gift Deed, which mandated his responsibility to maintain the Appellant.
   The judgment distinguished the case from Sudesh Chhikara v. Ramti Devi, clarifying that strict proof of conditions in the transfer deed is not always necessary if the intent to provide maintenance is evident from surrounding circumstances.
   The Court also affirmed the Tribunal's authority to order the restoration of possession to ensure the protection of senior citizens.

4. Conclusion
   The Supreme Court upheld the rights of senior citizens under the Act, ensuring that transfers of property conditioned on maintenance can be declared void if the transferee fails to fulfill their obligations.
   The judgment serves as a precedent for interpreting beneficial legislations liberally to achieve their social objectives, particularly in cases involving the welfare of vulnerable groups like the elderly.
   The ruling underscores the judiciary's commitment to enforcing constitutional and statutory protections for senior citizens, aligning with the broader vision of social justice.

JYOSTNAMAYEE MISHRA V. THE STATE OF ODISHA
2025 INSC 87 (20 January 2025)

Issues

1. Whether an employee (peon) is entitled to promotion to the post of Tracer when the statutory rules mandate 100% direct recruitment for the post?

2. Whether a vacancy meant for direct recruitment can be filled through internal circulars instead of public advertisements?

3. Whether the petitioner’s claim for promotion was valid under the Orissa Subordinate Architectural Service Rules, 1979?

4. Whether the principle of negative equality (claiming promotion based on others’ illegal appointments) is applicable?

6. Held by the Supreme Court in the Judgment

• The post of Tracer must be filled exclusively by direct recruitment as per Rule 5(1)(e) of the 1979 Rules, and not by promotion from the peon cadre.

• The procedure for direct recruitment (advertisements, competitive tests) under Rule 7 was not followed, rendering any promotions invalid.

• The petitioner’s claim was rejected as she lacked eligibility under the statutory rules.

• The Court refused to apply negative equality, stating illegal appointments of others cannot justify similar relief for the petitioner.

7. Importance of the Judgment

• Clarifies that statutory rules cannot be bypassed through internal circulars or precedents of illegal promotions.

• Reinforces that Article 14 (equality) does not permit negative equality—illegal benefits to some cannot be extended to others.

• Highlights the State’s duty to adhere to rules and avoid unnecessary litigation due to procedural lapses.

8. Rationale

• The 1979 Rules explicitly prescribe direct recruitment for Tracers (Rule 5) and outline a transparent process (Rule 7).

• The petitioner’s certificate in "Tracer Training" did not meet the qualification criteria (Rule 5(3)(d)) requiring a Draftsmanship certificate or 2 years of tracing experience.

• The State’s failure to produce correct rules at earlier stages misled tribunals, emphasizing the need for diligence in litigation.

9. Conclusion

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the primacy of statutory rules and rejecting claims based on past irregularities. It criticized the State’s casual approach and directed corrective measures to prevent similar lapses.

INDEPENDENT SUGAR CORPORATION LIMITED V. GIRISH SRIRAM JUNEJA
2025 INSC 124 (29 January 2025)

Issues

1. Whether the approval of the Competition Commission of India (CCI) for a proposed combination under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) must be obtained before the Committee of Creditors (CoC) approves a resolution plan (mandatory), or if it can be obtained after CoC approval (directory).

2. Whether procedural lapses in obtaining CCI approval (such as lack of notice to the target company) invalidate the resolution plan.

3. Whether discrepancies in data submitted by the resolution applicant (AGI Greenpac) affect the validity of CCI’s conditional approval.

6. Held by the Supreme Court

• The proviso to Section 31(4) of the IBC is mandatory—CCI approval must be obtained before CoC approval of a resolution plan involving a combination.

• AGI Greenpac’s resolution plan was invalid because CCI approval was obtained after CoC approval, violating the IBC.

• The NCLAT’s order treating CCI approval as directory was set aside.

• The CoC must reconsider the appellant’s (INSCO’s) resolution plan and other compliant plans.

• Procedural lapses (such as not issuing notice to the target company under the Competition Act) were noted but did not form the core of the decision.

7. Importance of the Judgment

• Clarifies statutory compliance under IBC: Ensures that competition law approvals are secured before creditors vote on a resolution plan.

• Protects fair competition: Prevents anti-competitive mergers during insolvency.

• Strengthens regulatory harmony: Aligns IBC timelines with Competition Act requirements.

• Reinforces literal interpretation: The Court refused to dilute statutory language for convenience.

8. Rationale

• Literal Interpretation: The words "shall obtain CCI approval prior to CoC approval" in the proviso to Section 31(4) are clear and mandatory.

• Legislative Intent: Parliament intended strict compliance to prevent anti-competitive mergers.

• Consequences of Non-Compliance: Without prior CCI approval, the resolution plan is unenforceable.

• Harmonizing Laws: The IBC’s 330-day timeline can be extended, but competition law compliance cannot be bypassed.

9. Conclusion

The Supreme Court ruled that CCI approval must be obtained before CoC approval in resolution plans involving mergers. AGI Greenpac’s plan was invalid due to non-compliance, and the CoC must reconsider other compliant plans. The judgment ensures that insolvency resolutions do not undermine fair competition.