Synopsis

Six discharged accused (including Arvind Kejriwal, Manish Sisodia, Vijay Nair) in the Delhi Excise Policy case sought recusal of the single judge from hearing the CBI’s revision petition against their discharge order. Grounds included: (i) prima facie observations made in the order dated 09.03.2026 without hearing respondents; (ii) earlier detailed judgments of the same judge in bail and arrest challenges (under PMLA) allegedly containing “conclusive findings”; (iii) alleged undue haste in granting short dates; (iv) judge’s attendance at programmes organised by Akhil Bharatiya Adhivakta Parishad; (v) professional engagements of judge’s relatives as panel counsel for Central Government; and (vi) statement of Union Home Minister. The court rejected all recusal applications, holding that: prima facie observations in interim orders do not indicate bias; earlier judgments were rendered under different statutory provisions (Sections 19, 45 PMLA) and are not disqualifying; attending legal events of a lawyers’ body is part of Bar‑Bench relationship; professional empanelment of relatives does not create conflict; and the test of reasonable apprehension must be objective, not subjective. The court refused to recuse, affirming judicial duty to decide cases assigned by roster.

Court: High Court of Delhi

Coram: Honourable Dr. Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma

Date of Judgment: 20th April 2026

Citation: CRL.REV.P. 134/2026 (2026:DHC:3291)

Core Law: Recusal jurisprudence; bias – reasonable apprehension of bias; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 397/401 (revision); Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 14 (right to fair hearing)

2. Legal Framework

Major laws and provisions involved

• Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 14 (right to impartial adjudication)

• Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 397/401 (revisional jurisdiction)

• Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 – Sections 19 (arrest), 45 (bail) – referred for context

• Recusal jurisprudence – principles of bias, reasonable apprehension, automatic disqualification (financial interest), real danger test

Key legal principles applied

Reasonable apprehension of bias – test: The apprehension must be that of a fair‑minded and reasonably informed person, not the subjective perception of the litigant. Mere unease or anxiety is insufficient. The presumption of judicial impartiality (arising from oath of office) must be rebutted by tangible material, not speculation.

Prima facie observations in interim orders do not constitute bias: Courts often record prima facie views while granting interim relief; such views are tentative, not conclusive. An order passed ex‑parte on the first date of hearing cannot be a ground for recusal; otherwise, no court could grant any interim protection.

Earlier judicial findings in different proceedings are not disqualifying: A judge who has decided bail or arrest matters under a different statutory framework (e.g., PMLA) is not precluded from hearing a revision against a discharge order in the same case. The issues, stage, and legal parameters are distinct. Expressing a view in one proceeding does not amount to “subject‑matter bias” for a later proceeding.

Attending legal programmes of a Bar body is not bias: Judges routinely attend seminars, lectures, and events organised by Bar associations, law universities, and lawyers’ bodies. Such attendance does not indicate ideological alignment unless spec

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