Madanjit Kumar vs Central Electronics Limited 2026 DHC 1168

Synopsis

The petitioner, a Senior Manager (Public Relations) in Central Electronics Limited (CEL), a public sector undertaking, was dismissed from service on charges of misconduct arising from his tweets and public communications alleging corruption and financial irregularities in the organisation. The disciplinary authority found him guilty of acting prejudicially to the interests of the employer, attempting to bring outside influence through media and higher authorities, and bypassing the prescribed channel of grievance redressal. The appellate authority upheld the findings of guilt but converted the penalty from ‘dismissal’ to ‘removal from service’. The petitioner challenged both orders primarily on three grounds: bias and mala fides of the disciplinary authority, violation of his fundamental right to free speech, and gross disproportionality of the punishment.

The High Court, while rejecting the plea of bias and sustaining the findings of misconduct as based on some evidence, held that the extreme penalty of removal from service was disproportionate to the proved charges. The Court found that the disciplinary and appellate orders lacked a calibrated exercise demonstrating why lesser major penalties would be inadequate. Considering the petitioner’s long service and the nature of the misconduct (public dissemination of information, not involving corruption or moral turpitude), the Court remitted the matter solely for reconsideration of the quantum of punishment, thereby affirming the disciplinary findings but interfering with the penalty on the ground of proportionality.

W.P.(C) No. 13377 of 2018

High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Coram: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sanjeev Narula (Single Judge)

Judgment Reserved on: January 5, 2026
Judgment Pronounced on: February 10, 2026
Judgment Uploaded on: February 10, 2026

Neutral Citation: 2026 SCC OnLine Del 1168

1. Legal Framework

1.1. Service Rules and Governing Instruments

Instrument Relevant Provisions Context of Application Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1976 (CEL) Rules 5(6), 5(26), 5(28), 5(30) read with Rules 9, 10(b), 13, 21, 25 Substantive provisions defining misconduct and procedure for disciplinary proceedingsConstitution of India, 1950Article 19(1)(a)Freedom of speech and expression – invoked by petitioner to justify tweetsArticle 226Source of writ jurisdiction for judicial review of disciplinary action

1.2. Precedents Referred and Relied Upon

A. Precedents Cited by the Petitioner

1. Delhi Transport Corporation v. Jagdish Chander, (2018) 13 SCC 106 – On proportionality and interference with disproportionate punishment.

2. Girish Bhushan Goyal v. Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited & Ors., (2015) 16 SCC 574 – On protection of whistleblowers and limits of disciplinary action for making complaints.

3. Kameshwar Prasad v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 1166 – On the scope of freedom of speech of government employees.

4. Gopinath v. State of Kerala, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1021 – On the necessity of a rational basis for imposing major penalties.

B. Precedents Cited by the Respondent

1. M.P. Electricity Board v. Jagdish Chandra Sharma, (2005) 3 SCC 401 – On limited scope of judicial review in disciplinary matters.

2. State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya, (2011) 4 SCC 584 – On non-interference with findings of fact supported by evidence.

3. Vikash Kumar v. NTPC & Ors., (2022) 5 SCC 281 – On deference to employer’s decision on quantum of punishment.

C. Principles of Law Applied by the Court (derived from settled jurisprudence)

• Scope of Judicial Review in Disciplinary Matters – A writ court does not sit as a court of appeal. Interference is warranted only for breach of natural justice, procedural illegality, perversity, or findings unsupported by any evidence.

• Plea of Mala Fides – Must be supported by clear particulars and cogent material; mere inference or subjective apprehension is insufficient.

• Freedom of Speech of Government Employees – While protected under Article 19(1)(a), it is subject to reasonable restrictions and the discipline of service rules; public sector employees do not enjoy an absolute right to publicly amplify allegations against their employer.

• Proportionality in Punishment – Even when findings of misconduct are upheld, the court may interfere if the punishment is so disproportionate that it shocks the conscience. The disciplinary authority must demonstrate a rational evaluation of why lesser penalties are inadequate.

2. Factual Matrix

2.1. Employment History

The petitioner joined Central Electronics Limited (CEL) on 10 December 1993 as Senior Technical Assistant. He was promoted to Senior Manager (Public Relations) with effect from 1 January 2011.

2.2. Prior Disciplinary History

• 2012: Charge-sheet and suspension; departmental enquiry ended in exoneration.

• 2016: Show-cause notice for misuse of leave; penalty of withholding two increments was imposed but set aside in appeal.

2.3. The CAG Report and the PIL

The Comptroller and Auditor General of India, in its report for 2014‑2016, flagged administrative and financial irregularities in CEL. On 20 January 2017, the petitioner filed W.P.(C) No. 658/2017 before the Delhi High Court seeking an inquiry into the affairs of CEL in light of the CAG report. Notice was issued on 25 January 2017 and the petition remained pending during the relevant period.

2.4. The Impugned Charge-Sheet

On 12 July 2017, the Chairman‑cum‑Managing Director (CMD) issued a charge‑sheet under the CDA Rules, 1976. The allegations were grouped under four Articles of Charge:

• Charge 1: Acting in a manner prejudicial to the interests of the organisation by tweeting and circulating allegations of corruption, thereby tarnishing its image.

• Charge 2: Being instrumental in the publication of a cover story in the February 2017 edition of Telecom LIVE containing allegations of corruption and financial irregularities against CEL. (This charge was not relied upon by the Disciplinary Authority for imposing penalty.)

• Charge 3: Attempting to bring outside influence by approaching authorities and the media, directly and through his spouse.

• Charge 4: Bypassing prescribed channels in raising grievances and making representations to higher authorities and outside persons.

2.5. Departmental Enquiry and Findings

The petitioner submitted a reply denying the allegations. A departmental enquiry was held; the Inquiry Officer submitted a report on 9 June 2018 holding all Articles of Charge proved.

2.6. Disciplinary Order

On 5 October 2018, the Disciplinary Authority imposed the major penalty of dismissal from service. While passing this order, the authority did not rely on Charge 2 (Telecom LIVE publication) and confined itself to Charges 1, 3 and 4.

2.7. Statutory Appeal

The petitioner filed an appeal under Rule 40 of the CDA Rules. The Appellate Authority, by order dated 28 November 2018, upheld the findings of misconduct but modified the penalty from ‘dismissal’ to ‘removal from service’ , apparently to avoid permanently barring the petitioner from future employment.

2.8. Proceedings Before the High Court

The petitioner initially filed W.P.(C) No. 11230/2018, which was disposed of on 23 October 2018 with liberty to exhaust the statutory appeal. After the appellate order, the present writ petition was filed challenging both the disciplinary order dated 5 October 2018 and the appellate order dated 28 November 2018.

3. Issues for Determination

1. Whether the disciplinary proceedings were vitiated by bias or mala fides on account of the CMD acting as the Disciplinary Authority against whom the petitioner had made allegations of corruption.

2. Whether the findings of misconduct on Charges 1, 3 and 4 suffer from procedural impropriety, perversity, or absence of evidence, warranting interference under Article 226.

3. Whether the penalty of removal from service is grossly disproportionate to the proved misconduct so as to shock the conscience of the court, and whether the disciplinary/appellate authorities undertook a calibrated proportionality analysis.

4. Ratio Decidendi

4.1. On Bias and Mala Fides

“The mere circumstance that the Petitioner had earlier raised complaints, or had instituted a PIL in relation to the organisation, does not, without more, establish that the disciplinary process was colourable. A disciplinary authority does not become functus officio or disqualified simply because the delinquent has been critical of management. The relevant question is whether the authority acted as judge in a matter where personal interest demonstrably displaced institutional decision‑making. On the material placed, that threshold is not met.”

Held: A plea of mala fides must be founded on clear particulars and cogent material. Mere allegation or subjective apprehension is insufficient. The fact that the Appellate Authority independently modified the penalty also militates against a predetermined outcome.

4.2. On Sustainability of Findings of Misconduct

“Once the Petitioner admits the foundational acts, namely the tweets and the communications that form the substratum of the charge-sheet, the enquiry is essentially directed to whether those acts, in their context, attract the prohibitions in the Rules. That is a matter for departmental appreciation. In writ review, the question is narrower: whether there was ‘some evidence’ supporting the departmental conclusion, and whether the conclusion is so unreasonable that no rational fact‑finder could reach it.”

Held: The findings on Charges 1, 3 and 4 are based on some evidence—the petitioner’s own admissions regarding the tweets and communications. The subsequent deletion of tweets does not efface the act; it is only a mitigating circumstance. The disciplinary authority’s decision to exclude Charge 2 from the penalty calculus indicates a conscious segregation of proved and unproved/unrelied allegations. Therefore, the findings are neither perverse nor based on ‘no evidence’.

4.3. On Proportionality of Punishment

“The impugned orders do not reflect a calibrated exercise in their reasoning on penalty. The orders proceed on a broad characterisation of reputational harm and institutional threat, but do not articulate why penalties short of termination (within the major penalty range) would not sufficiently serve the objectives of discipline and deterrence on the facts found proved. … The Petitioner had rendered long service with the Respondent organisation. That circumstance does not excuse misconduct, but it remains a legitimate factor in deciding whether the severance of service warranted the harshest consequence.”

Held: Although the findings of misconduct are upheld, the penalty of removal from service is manifestly disproportionate. The disciplinary and appellate authorities failed to:

• Consider whether lesser major penalties (e.g., withholding of increments, reduction to a lower stage, etc.) would meet the ends of discipline.

• Weigh the mitigating factors: long service, absence of corruption or moral turpitude, deletion of tweets, and the fact that the complaint emanated from whistleblowing on CAG‑flagged issues.

The punishment shocks the conscience of the court. Accordingly, interference is warranted strictly on the quantum of punishment.

5. Legal Principles Reaffirmed / Clarified

While the judgment is rendered by a Single Bench and does not establish new Supreme Court jurisprudence, it authoritatively reaffirms and applies the following settled principles in the specific context of public sector employment and disciplinary action arising from whistleblowing:

5.1. Disciplinary Action and Whistleblowing

The fact that an employee has approached the constitutional court by way of a Public Interest Litigation, or has made complaints based on a statutory auditor’s report, does not confer a licence to disregard the conduct rules. The manner of raising grievance—particularly public amplification through social media and mobilisation of external pressure—can legitimately constitute misconduct if it transgresses the reasonable restrictions embodied in the service rules.

5.2. Necessity of a Calibrated Proportionality Analysis

Where the penalty imposed is extreme (dismissal/removal), the disciplinary authority must demonstrate in the order that it has consciously considered why lesser major penalties are inadequate. A bald assertion of ‘reputational harm’ or ‘loss of confidence’ without an evidentiary or rational linkage to the specific misconduct may render the punishment vulnerable to judicial correction.

5.3. Relevance of Long Service and Absence of Moral Turpitude

While long service does not immunise an employee from punishment, it is a legitimate mitigating factor to be weighed in the proportionality calculus. Similarly, misconduct that does not involve fraud, corruption, dishonesty, or moral turpitude stands on a different footing from grave financial irregularities. The failure to acknowledge such distinctions may indicate a disproportionate response.

5.4. Limits of Judicial Review – Distinction Between ‘Findings’ and ‘Penalty’

The judgment draws a clear demarcation: the writ court will not re‑appreciate evidence or substitute its own view on the existence of misconduct, but it retains jurisdiction to examine whether the quantum of punishment is proportionate. This dichotomy preserves the institutional autonomy of the disciplinary authority while ensuring that the constitutional safeguard against arbitrary punishment is not rendered illusory.

6. Analysis and Examination by the Court

6.1. Conceptual Framework

The Court’s analysis proceeds in three concentric circles:

First Circle – Procedural Fairness and Bias
The Court applies the real likelihood test and finds no evidence of personal interest or predetermination. The fact that the CMD issued the charge‑sheet and also acted as the disciplinary authority, by itself, does not disqualify him. The petitioner’s earlier complaints and PIL are insufficient to establish that the disciplinary process was a contrivance.

Second Circle – Evidentiary Sufficiency and Perversity
The Court adopts the “some evidence” test. Since the petitioner admitted the tweets and communications, the only contest was over the characterisation of those acts—whether they were legitimate whistleblowing or misconduct. That characterisation is within the domain of the fact‑finding authority. The Court finds that the conclusion reached is not impossible or irrational; hence it refrains from interference.

Third Circle – Proportionality and Remedy
The Court invokes the “shock the conscience” standard. It examines the impugned orders and notes the absence of any discussion on the suitability of lesser penalties. The Court also takes judicial notice of the petitioner’s 24 years of service and the nature of the charges (dissemination of information, not personal gain). It concludes that the punishment is disproportionate and remits the matter solely for reconsideration of penalty.

6.2. Treatment of Precedents

• Petitioner’s reliance on Girish Bhushan Goyal and Kameshwar Prasad: Distinguished on facts. Those cases dealt with bona fide complaints made through proper channels or peaceful demonstrations; the present case involves public amplification and external pressure tactics.

• Respondent’s reliance on Lalit Popli and R.S. Saini: Accepted to the extent that re‑appreciation of evidence is impermissible. However, the Court clarifies that proportionality review is a distinct and well‑established ground of interference.

6.3. Significance of the Appellate Authority’s Modification

The Appellate Authority’s decision to convert ‘dismissal’ to ‘removal’ was not treated as an adequate proportionality exercise. The Court observes that removal is substantively identical to dismissal in its immediate effect (severance of service) and that the authority did not explain why this extreme measure was necessary. The modification, therefore, does not cure the proportionality deficit.

7. Critical Analysis

7.1. Strengths of the Judgment

1. Principled Restraint – The Court carefully respects the limits of judicial review by refusing to reappraise evidence or substitute its own findings on misconduct. This demonstrates institutional discipline and deference to the departmental fact‑finding mechanism.

2. Nuanced Approach to Free Speech – The judgment avoids the binary of “whistleblower protection” versus “discipline”. It acknowledges that while an employee may raise genuine concerns, the mode of expression can still attract disciplinary sanction if it contravenes service rules. This balanced view prevents the service jurisprudence from becoming a tool to stifle legitimate dissent, while also preserving organisational discipline.

3. Emphasis on Reasoning Deficit – The Court does not hold that removal is per se disproportionate to the charges. Instead, it fault the absence of reasoning—the failure of the disciplinary/appellate authorities to demonstrate a conscious application of mind to the question of quantum. This approach is consistent with the doctrine of reasoned decisions and enhances administrative accountability.

4. Practical Remedy – Instead of quashing the penalty outright or imposing a specific lesser punishment (which would amount to the court usurping the disciplinary function), the Court remits the matter for reconsideration. This respects the statutory scheme while providing an opportunity for the employer to rectify the proportionality deficit.

7.2. Potential Critiques and Unaddressed Questions

1. What Constitutes ‘Some Evidence’? – While the Court correctly applies the ‘some evidence’ test, it does not articulate the quantum or quality of evidence that would cross the threshold of ‘no evidence’. In cases where the only ‘evidence’ is the admitted act itself, the characterisation of that act as misconduct is a legal conclusion, not a factual inference. The judgment could have clarified that when the admitted act is prima facie protected speech, the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate why it falls outside the protected zone. This nuance remains unexplored.

2. Social Media and Service Rules – The judgment deals with tweets that were admittedly posted. It does not address the emerging complexities of social media usage by public sector employees—e.g., whether a ‘retweet’ without comment carries the same culpability as an original tweet; whether deletion cures the harm; or whether there exists a ‘reasonable expectation’ of privacy in personal social media accounts. These questions are likely to recur and deserve more detailed treatment.

3. Role of the CAG Report and PIL – The Court notes the CAG report and the pending PIL but does not assign them any weight in the proportionality analysis. It observes that they do not authorise misconduct. While this is correct, a more robust proportionality analysis might have considered whether the subject matter of the tweets (corruption in a public sector undertaking) was a matter of public interest and whether the disciplinary action, therefore, requires a higher justification threshold. The judgment stops short of this inquiry.

4. Bias Plea – Real Likelihood versus Reasonable Apprehension – The Court applies the stringent test of “demonstrable displacement of institutional decision‑making”. In service jurisprudence, the test for bias in disciplinary proceedings is often the reasonable apprehension test. The judgment does not explicitly address which test it applied and why. A clearer articulation would have aided future benches.

7.3. Comparative and Doctrinal Context

The judgment aligns with the mainstream view in Indian administrative law that proportionality review is available in disciplinary matters, but its invocation is reserved for exceptional cases (see B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749; Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463). It also reflects the cautious approach adopted by the Supreme Court in recent years—neither completely deferring to the employer nor substituting its own penalty.

Where the judgment makes a modest contribution is in requiring a ‘calibrated exercise’ to be apparent from the face of the order. This is a procedural refinement that may compel disciplinary authorities to document their proportionality analysis, thereby facilitating more effective judicial review.

8. Final Outcome and Operative Directions

The Court partly allowed the writ petition and directed as follows:

1. The findings of misconduct on Charges 1, 3 and 4, as recorded in the inquiry report and affirmed by the disciplinary and appellate authorities, are upheld. No interference is warranted on the issue of guilt.

2. The penalty of removal from service imposed vide disciplinary order dated 5 October 2018 and appellate order dated 28 November 2018 is set aside solely on the ground of disproportionality.

3. The matter is remitted to the competent authority for reconsideration of the quantum of punishment afresh.

4. The competent authority shall, after affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, pass a reasoned order that:
   Evaluates the gravity of the proved misconduct;
   Considers lesser major penalties (e.g., withholding of increments, reduction to a lower stage or time scale, etc.) and articulates why such penalties are or are not adequate;
   Takes into account the mitigating circumstances, including the petitioner’s length of service and the absence of allegations of corruption or personal financial gain.

5. Such reasoned order shall be passed within eight weeks from the date of receipt of this judgment.

Disposal: W.P.(C) No. 13377 of 2018 is partly allowed in the above terms.

Order pronounced in open Court on this 10th day of February, 2026.

– SANJEEV NARULA, J.