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Case Analysis The President, Adarsh Vidya Prasarak Sanstha & Anr vs Savita Gajanan Fatake & Ors 2026 BHC-AS 17751

Synopsis

The petitioners (educational management and school) challenged the order of the School Tribunal which had allowed appeals filed by respondent teachers, holding that their termination amounted to illegal termination from probationary service. The teachers had been appointed as Assistant Teachers in the school during 2005, but the management contended that the appointments were purely temporary and limited to the academic year. The School Tribunal treated the appointments as probationary and set aside the termination. The Bombay High Court quashed the Tribunal’s order, holding that the teachers failed to establish that their appointments were on probation. The court clarified that a temporary appointment against a permanent vacancy does not automatically become probationary; the burden lies on the employee to plead and prove that the temporary nature was a camouflage. The management’s decision to make a temporary appointment, if recorded with reasons, is entitled to weight. The court also laid down guidelines for the School Tribunal’s jurisdiction in such matters.

Court: High Court of Judicature at Bombay

Coram: Justice Amit Borkar

Date of Judgment: 16th April 2026

Citation: Writ Petition No.2014 of 2008 (and connected matters)

Core Law: Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 – Sections 5, 9; Service law – temporary vs probationary appointment

2. Legal Framework

Major laws and provisions involved

Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 (MEPS Act) – Section 5 (filling of permanent vacancies), Section 9 (appeal to School Tribunal against termination)
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – principles of burden of proof
Service jurisprudence – temporary vs probationary appointment

Key legal principles applied

Temporary appointment against a permanent vacancy is permissible: Under the Full Bench decision in Ramkrishna Chauhan, the management can make a temporary appointment even against a permanent vacancy for a limited duration, provided such arrangement is bona fide and warranted by circumstances.
No presumption that appointment against permanent vacancy is probationary: The nature of the appointment is determined by the terms of the appointment order and the intention of the parties, not merely by the fact that the vacancy is permanent. The employee bears the burden to show that the label “temporary” was a camouflage.
Burden of proof on employee challenging temporary appointment: To succeed before the School Tribunal, the employee must plead with specificity that the temporary appointment was a device to circumvent statutory protections, that the management repeatedly resorted to temporary appointments, or that the decision was colourable. Mere satisfactory service does not transform a temporary appointment into a probationary one.
Management must record reasons for making temporary appointment: While the management has discretion, it must contemporaneously record its reasons for not making a regular/probationary appointment and for resorting to a temporary arrangement. Failure to do so may invite adverse inference.
School Tribunal’s jurisdiction is limited: The Tribunal can examine whether the management’s decision was bona fide, based on relevant considerations, and not arbitrary or mala fide. It cannot substitute its own view on suitability of candidates or convert a temporary appointment into a regular one merely because the employee performed satisfactorily.

Relevant precedents relied upon

Ramkrishna Chauhan vs. Seth D.M. High School & Others 2013 (2) Mh.L.J. 713 (Full Bench) – Management can make temporary appointment against permanent vacancy; such appointment does not confer right to permanency.
Abdul Rafique Abdul Hamid vs. Yavatmal Islamia Anglo Urdu Education Society & Others 2014 SCC OnLine Bom 1616 – Termination of probationer requires material showing unsatisfactory performance.
Dhansing Dalsing Rajput vs. State of Maharashtra 2018 SCC OnLine Bom 1965 – Same.
Maharashtra Shikshan Sanstha & Another vs. Dilip Ganpatrao Lanjewar & Another (2017) 14 SCC 298 – Supreme Court on probationary termination.

3. Basic Facts of the Case

The petitioners are the educational management (Adarsh Vidya Prasarak Sanstha) and the Head Master of Adarsh Vidya Mandir, Kulgaon, District Thane.
Respondent No.1 (Savita Gajanan Fatake in the lead matter) was appointed as an Assistant Teacher in the school during the year 2005. The management claimed that no formal appointment order was issued; the engagement was purely temporary for the academic year.
By communication dated 27th March 2007, the respondent teacher was informed that her services stood discontinued upon conclusion of the academic year. She was not reappointed for the session 2007-2008.
The teacher filed an appeal before the School Tribunal, Navi Mumbai (Appeal Nos. 24, 26, 40 of 2007), alleging that the action amounted to illegal termination.
The School Tribunal, by judgment dated 14th December 2007, held that the teacher’s appointment was in the nature of appointment on probation and that her services could not have been terminated without following the prescribed procedure. The Tribunal allowed the appeals.
Aggrieved, the management filed the present writ petitions under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.
The teacher relied on departmental approval of her appointment and a certificate dated 20th April 2007 from the Head Master certifying her satisfactory performance and behaviour.

4. Issues Before the Court

Issue No. Issue 1 Whether the School Tribunal was correct in treating the respondent teacher’s temporary appointment as an appointment on probation? 2 What is the burden of proof on an employee who challenges a temporary appointment before the School Tribunal? 3 Whether the School Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by granting relief to the teacher without the teacher establishing that the temporary nature was a camouflage?

5. Ratio Decidendi (Principles Laid Down)

A. Temporary appointment does not become probationary merely because the vacancy is permanent (paras 8-10)

The court held that the nature of appointment is determined by the terms of the appointment order. If the appointment order states that the engagement is temporary or for a fixed tenure, that recital cannot be brushed aside merely because the post was a permanent vacancy or because the employee performed regular duties. The burden lies on the employee to establish that the temporary label was a camouflage or a farce.

Key observation (para 8): “The settled principle of law remains that parties entering into service relationship are ordinarily bound by the terms and conditions governing such appointment… The burden lies upon the employee who disputes the temporary appointment to demonstrate that the label of temporary appointment was not genuine but was a farce employed by the Management for ulterior purpose.”

B. Departmental approval and satisfactory service do not convert temporary into probationary (paras 10, 17)

The court held that approval by the Education Department is generally for grant‑in‑aid purposes and does not determine the character of the appointment. Similarly, a certificate of satisfactory performance merely indicates that the employee worked well during the temporary period; it does not change the terms of the appointment or confer probationary status.

C. Management’s power to make temporary appointment is circumscribed by bona fides (paras 11-13)

The court, following Ramkrishna Chauhan, acknowledged that the management has discretion to make temporary appointments even against permanent vacancies. However, this discretion is not absolute. The management must contemporaneously record its reasons for not making a regular appointment and for resorting to a temporary arrangement. Such reasons act as a safeguard against misuse of power. If challenged, the court or Tribunal can examine whether the decision was bona fide or colourable.

D. Pleading and burden of proof before the School Tribunal (paras 14-15)

The court laid down the framework for adjudication under Section 9 of the MEPS Act:

The employee must plead with particulars that the temporary appointment was a camouflage, that the vacancy was permanent, that the management avoided regular selection, that repeated temporary appointments were resorted to with ulterior motive, and that the power was exercised colourably.
Once such pleading is raised, the burden shifts to the management to produce contemporaneous records, including appointment order, selection process records, reasons for rejecting candidates, and the subjective satisfaction for making temporary appointment.
The School Tribunal can examine whether the management’s decision was bona fide, but cannot substitute its own view on suitability of candidates. The Tribunal can set aside the termination and grant relief only if it finds colourable exercise of power or arbitrariness.

E. In the present case, the teacher failed to discharge the burden (paras 16-18)

The court found that the teacher had not pleaded or proved any material to show that the temporary nature was a camouflage. The departmental approval and the satisfactory service certificate were insufficient to alter the character of the appointment. Therefore, the School Tribunal erred in treating the appointment as probationary.

6. New Legal Principles Established / What is New

This judgment does not create a new legal principle but elaborates and clarifies the following:

Framework for adjudication of temporary appointment disputes under the MEPS Act: The court set out a detailed burden‑shifting framework – employee must plead camouflage; management must then produce contemporaneous records; Tribunal examines bona fides but cannot substitute its own judgment on suitability.
Satisfactory service alone does not transform temporary into probationary: This is a crucial clarification. Many tribunals have erroneously granted relief to temporary employees merely because they performed well. The court held that satisfactory performance is irrelevant to the nature of appointment.
Management must record reasons for making temporary appointments: While not a statutory requirement, the court strongly indicated that failure to record reasons may lead to an adverse inference. This encourages transparency.
The School Tribunal’s jurisdiction is not appellate on merits but supervisory on decision‑making process: The Tribunal cannot sit as a selection authority. It can only examine whether the management’s decision was arbitrary, mala fide, or colourable.

7. Court’s Examination and Analysis

On the nature of the appointment (paras 8-10)

The court examined the appointment order (or its absence) and the management’s consistent stand that the engagement was temporary. The teacher did not produce any document showing that she was appointed on probation. The court held that the absence of a formal appointment order did not help the teacher; the management’s communication dated 27th March 2007 clearly indicated that the engagement was for the academic year.

On the teacher’s evidence (paras 10, 17)

The teacher relied on departmental approval and a satisfactory service certificate. The court held that these documents only proved that she was approved for grant‑in‑aid and that her work was satisfactory – they did not prove that the appointment was on probation. The court noted that even a temporary employee can render satisfactory service.

On the Full Bench decision in Ramkrishna Chauhan (paras 11-12)

The court quoted the Full Bench’s recognition that management can make temporary appointments against permanent vacancies. However, the court added a crucial qualification: such power is not absolute; the management must act bona fide and record reasons. This qualification was not explicitly stated in the Full Bench decision but was derived from the need to prevent abuse.

On the School Tribunal’s error (paras 16, 18)

The court found that the Tribunal had proceeded on the assumption that because the vacancy was permanent, the appointment must be probationary. This was an error of law. The Tribunal failed to consider the burden of proof and the terms of the engagement.

On the lack of pleading and evidence (para 14)

The court noted that the teacher had not pleaded any specific facts to show that the temporary appointment was a camouflage. She did not allege that the management had repeatedly appointed temporary teachers against the same vacancy, or that suitable candidates were rejected arbitrarily. Therefore, the Tribunal had no basis to go into the bona fides of the management.

8. Critical Analysis and Final Outcome

Critical analysis

This judgment is a significant clarification of service law under the MEPS Act. It rectifies a common error made by School Tribunals – treating every appointment against a permanent vacancy as probationary. The court correctly held that the nature of appointment is determined by the terms of engagement, not by the nature of the vacancy.

The burden‑shifting framework laid down is practical and fair. It requires the employee to first make out a prima facie case of camouflage. Only then does the management need to justify its decision. This prevents frivolous appeals where temporary employees claim probationary status without any evidence.

The court’s insistence on management recording reasons for temporary appointments is a welcome safeguard. However, the judgment stops short of making it a mandatory statutory requirement. In the absence of such a requirement, a management that fails to record reasons may still escape liability if the employee cannot prove camouflage. Future litigants may argue that failure to record reasons should lead to an inference of mala fides, but this judgment does not go that far.

One nuance: The court did not examine whether the management’s decision to appoint the teacher on a temporary basis for a second year (2005-2006 and then not reappoint) was itself a device to avoid regularisation. The teacher had worked for at least one academic year. Under the MEPS Act, a temporary employee may acquire certain rights after continuous service. The court did not address this because the teacher’s appeal was based on the claim of probationary status, not on continuous temporary service. Therefore, the judgment leaves open the possibility that a temporary employee who serves for multiple years may have other claims.

Final outcome

The writ petitions were allowed.
The common judgment and order dated 14th December 2007 passed by the School Tribunal, Navi Mumbai in Appeal Nos. 24/2007, 26/2007 and 40/2007 were quashed and set aside.
The appeals preferred by the respondent teachers before the School Tribunal were dismissed.
No order as to costs.

9. Use in Court (Practical Application)

1. Management defending termination of a temporary teacher

A school management facing an appeal before the School Tribunal from a teacher who was appointed on a temporary basis can cite this judgment to argue that the burden lies on the teacher to prove that the appointment was probationary or that the temporary label was a camouflage. Mere satisfactory service or departmental approval is insufficient.

2. Teacher challenging temporary appointment as camouflage

A teacher who believes that her temporary appointment was a device to avoid regularisation can use this judgment to understand the required pleading. The teacher must specifically plead facts such as repeated temporary appointments against the same vacancy, arbitrary rejection of suitable candidates, or absence of any administrative need for a temporary arrangement. The teacher must also demand that the management produce contemporaneous records of its decision‑making.

3. School Tribunal adjudicating such disputes

The Tribunal can rely on this judgment for the framework of adjudication: (i) examine the employee’s pleading; (ii) if camouflage is pleaded, call upon management to produce records; (iii) assess whether the management’s decision was bona fide; (iv) grant relief only if colourable exercise of power is established.

10. Court Lines

Para 8 (Burden on employee to prove camouflage):

“The burden lies upon the employee who disputes the temporary appointment to demonstrate that the label of temporary appointment was not genuine but was a farce employed by the Management for ulterior purpose. Unless such burden is discharged, the Court would not be justified in discarding the language used in the appointment order.”

Para 12 (Management must record reasons for temporary appointment):

“The Management is under obligation to contemporaneously record its reasons and its subjective satisfaction for adopting such course. Such recording of reasons demonstrates that the decision was taken bona fide, after due consideration of relevant circumstances. The requirement of maintaining such contemporaneous record acts as safeguard against misuse of power.”

Para 17 (Satisfactory service does not transform temporary into probationary):

“Such documents may establish that the respondent rendered satisfactory service, but they do not establish that the appointment itself stood transformed into probation. It is not in dispute before this Court that the respondent may have discharged her duties satisfactorily; however, satisfactory discharge of work does not create an entitlement to continued employment unless the foundation showing appointment on probation or regular basis is established.”

Para 18 (Tribunal’s error – presumption based on permanent vacancy):

“The respondents have failed to establish that their appointment was on probation merely because they were appointed against a vacant post and because their work during the period of service was found satisfactory. Neither of these circumstances is sufficient to displace the character of the appointment when the appointment order itself reflects the engagement to be temporary in nature.”

11. Legal Strategy Insight

A lawyer representing a school management in a termination appeal before the School Tribunal can strategically use this judgment as follows:

First, immediately upon receiving the appeal, the lawyer should examine the appointment order. If the order clearly states that the engagement is “temporary,” “purely temporary,” or “for the academic year,” the lawyer should file a reply citing this judgment and argue that the burden lies on the teacher to plead and prove camouflage. The lawyer should demand that the teacher specify the facts constituting the alleged camouflage.

Second, if the teacher fails to plead such facts, the lawyer should move for dismissal of the appeal on the ground that no case is made out. The Tribunal cannot go on a fishing expedition to find evidence of camouflage on its own.

Third, if the teacher does plead camouflage (e.g., alleges repeated temporary appointments), the lawyer should immediately produce contemporaneous records: the resolution of the management to make a temporary appointment, the reasons for not conducting a regular selection (e.g., urgency, lack of approved selection committee, pending approval of posts), and any correspondence with the Education Department. The lawyer should argue that the decision was bona fide and supported by record.

Fourth, for a lawyer representing a teacher, this judgment is a caution. The lawyer must ensure that the appeal pleading is detailed and specific. The lawyer should also seek discovery of the management’s internal records (minutes of meetings, correspondence) to prove that the temporary appointment was a sham. The lawyer should not rely solely on satisfactory service certificates or departmental approval; those are insufficient. Instead, the lawyer should gather evidence that the same vacancy was filled by multiple temporary appointees over several years, that the management never attempted to make a regular appointment, or that suitable candidates were available but were rejected without reason. Only then will the Tribunal be able to examine the bona fides of the management.