Legal Review and Analysis of Dharmrao Sharanappa Shabadi & Others vs Syeda Arifa Parveen 2025 INSC 1187

1. Heading of the Judgment

Case Title: Dharmrao Sharanappa Shabadi & Others (Appellants) vs. Syeda Arifa Parveen (Respondent)
Citation: 2025 INSC 1187
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Justice S.V.N. Bhatti and Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah

2. Related Laws and Legal Provisions

The judgment extensively interprets and applies the following laws:

• Mohammedan Law: Principles governing a valid Hiba (oral gift), specifically the three essential conditions of declaration, acceptance, and delivery of possession.

• Indian Evidence Act, 1872:
  Section 50: Admissibility of opinion on relationship when expressed through conduct by a person with special means of knowledge.
  Section 60: Requirement for direct evidence to prove a fact.
  Section 73: Court's power to compare disputed handwriting/signatures.

• Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC):
  Sections 96 & 100: Jurisdiction of appellate courts and the impermissibility of modifying a decree in the absence of a cross-appeal or cross-objections.

• Limitation Act, 1963:
  Article 58: Limitation period of three years for a suit to obtain any declaratory relief from the date the right to sue first accrues.
  Article 59: Limitation period of three years to cancel or set aside an instrument.

• Transfer of Property Act, 1882:
  Section 129: Exclusion of gifts under Mohammedan Law from the requirement of registration under Section 123.
  Section 3: Concept of constructive notice.

3. Basic Judgment Details

This civil appeal arose from a judgment of the High Court of Karnataka. The core dispute concerned the ownership of an agricultural land measuring 24 acres and 28 guntas in Sy. No. 107, Village Kusnoor, Gulbarga.

• Original Owner: Khadijabee, who acquired the property through a partition decree in 1971.

• Plaintiff's Claim (Syeda Arifa Parveen): She claimed to be the sole daughter and heir of Khadijabee. She asserted that Khadijabee made an oral gift (Hiba) of 10 acres to her in 1988, followed by a Memorandum of Gift (Ex. P-8) in 1989. Upon the death of her parents, she claimed ownership of the entire property.

• Defendants' Claim (Dharmrao & Others): They claimed to be bona fide purchasers of the entire property through registered sale deeds (Exs. D-3 to D-7) dated 25.02.1995 from one "Abdul Bas" (whom they claimed was Khadijabee's husband, Abdul Basit). Their names were mutated in the Revenue Records (ROR).

• Lower Courts' Decisions:
  Trial Court: Rejected the oral gift but declared the Plaintiff the owner of a 3/4th share (18 acres 21 guntas) as Khadijabee's heir, holding the sale deeds valid only to the extent of the father's 1/4th share.
  High Court: Upheld the Plaintiff's status as a daughter. It reversed the Trial Court on the oral gift, holding it valid, and declared the Plaintiff the absolute owner of the gifted 10 acres and a 3/4th share in the remaining property.

The Defendants (purchasers) appealed to the Supreme Court against the High Court's judgment.

4. Core Principles and Supreme Court's Analysis

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgments of the courts below and dismissing the Plaintiff's suit entirely. The Court's reasoning is structured around five key issues.

Issue I: Re-appreciation of Evidence under Article 136

The Plaintiff argued that the Supreme Court should not re-appreciate evidence under its discretionary Article 136 jurisdiction since the High Court and Trial Court had recorded concurrent findings.

• Supreme Court's Holding: The Court held that while re-appreciation is not normally undertaken, it is permissible when the High Court has acted perversely, drawn inferences based on presumptions, or when the findings are manifestly unsupportable from the evidence. Citing Mahesh Dattaray Thirthakar v. State of Maharashtra (2009), the Court found that the misreading of evidence and inconsistent findings in the impugned judgments warranted a re-look to prevent a miscarriage of justice.

Issue II: High Court's Jurisdiction to Modify the Decree

The Defendants contended that the High Court erroneously reversed the Trial Court's finding against the oral gift and enhanced the Plaintiff's share, despite the Plaintiff not filing a cross-appeal.

• Supreme Court's Holding: Relying on Banarsi v. Ram Phal (2003), the Court reiterated that an appellate court cannot modify a decree to the advantage of a respondent who has not filed an appeal or cross-objections. The Trial Court had granted the Plaintiff 18 acres 21 guntas. The High Court, by recognizing the oral gift, enhanced this to include an additional 10 acres. This was a substantive alteration of the decree in the Plaintiff's favour without a cross-appeal, which the High Court had no jurisdiction to do.

Issue III: Plaintiff's Status as the Daughter of Khadijabee

The Defendants denied that the Plaintiff was the daughter of Khadijabee and Abdul Basit, arguing that the courts below relied on unreliable oral evidence.

• Supreme Court's Analysis:
  The Court conducted a deep dive into Section 50 of the Evidence Act, citing Dolgobinda Paricha v. Nimai Charan Misra (1959). It clarified that the section allows opinion on relationship expressed through conduct by a person with special means of knowledge. This opinion is an intermediate, relevant fact, not conclusive proof. The court must still weigh this evidence and form its own conclusion.
  The Court found that the Trial Court failed this test. It merely accepted the testimonies of PW2 (a cousin) and PW3 (the Plaintiff's brother-in-law) as conclusive without rigorously testing their credibility, potential bias, or the basis of their "special knowledge."
  The Trial Court further erred by using Section 73 of the Evidence Act to compare the signature of "Abdul Basit" on the disputed Memorandum of Gift (Ex. P-8) with the signature of "Abdul Bas" on the sale deeds (Exs. D-3 to D-7). The Supreme Court, citing Fakhruddin v. State of M.P. (1966), held that such comparison is hazardous and should not be the sole basis for a conclusion, especially when both documents are disputed.
  The Court noted the Plaintiff's failure to produce any primary documentary evidence (birth certificate, school records, ration card) despite being educated, and the inordinate delay of 23 years in asserting her status.

• Supreme Court's Holding: The findings of the courts below on the Plaintiff's status as a daughter were liberal, suffered from perversity, and were not established by credible evidence.

Issue IV: Validity of the Oral Gift (Hiba)

This was the central legal issue. The Supreme Court elaborately discussed the principles of Hiba under Mohammedan Law.

• Supreme Court's Analysis:
  The Court cited precedents like Abdul Rahim v. Sk. Abdul Zabar (2009), Rasheeda Khatoon v. Ashiq Ali (2014), and Hafeeza Bibi v. Sk. Farid (2011) to reiterate the three essentials of a valid Hiba:
  A clear declaration by the donor.
  Acceptance by the donee.
  Delivery of possession (actual or constructive) to the donee.
  The Court emphasized that delivery of possession is the "critical and necessary element." Constructive possession can be shown by acts like mutation of the donee's name, collecting rent, or holding title deeds.
  Applying these principles, the Court found the Plaintiff's claim of Hiba utterly lacking:
  Contradictory Conduct: After the alleged gift in 1988, Khadijabee herself got the entire property (24 acres 28 guntas) mutated in her own name in 1989 (Ex. P-2). This was completely at odds with having gifted away 10 acres.
  No Mutation by Plaintiff: The Plaintiff never got her name mutated in the revenue records as the owner of the 10 acres, either after the gift, after her mother's death (1990), or after her father's death (2001).
  No Evidence of Possession: There was no evidence (rent receipts, tax payments, cultivation records) to show the Plaintiff exercised "exclusive control" over the 10 acres. The revenue records consistently showed the Defendants and their predecessor-in-title in possession.
  Suspicious Document: Ex. P-8 (Memorandum of Gift) bore Khadijabee's thumb impression, while she was proven to sign her name in Urdu in other documents. This inconsistency remained unexplained.
  Long Silence and Delay: The Plaintiff remained silent for 25 years while the Defendants' names were on the revenue records, paying taxes and enjoying the property.

• Supreme Court's Holding: The Plaintiff failed to prove the delivery of possession, a cornerstone of a valid Hiba. The oral gift and the Memorandum of Gift were not acted upon and could not be relied upon to transfer title.

Issue V: Bar of Limitation

The Defendants argued that the suit, filed in 2013, was barred by limitation.

• Supreme Court's Analysis:
  The Court applied Article 58 of the Limitation Act, which mandates that a suit for declaration must be filed within three years from when the "right to sue first accrues."
  The Court identified several points from which the limitation period began to run: the mutation in Khadijabee's name for the entire property (1989), the mutation in Abdul Basit's name (1991), and the execution of the registered sale deeds in the Defendants' favour (1995).
  The Plaintiff took no action for decades. The Court invoked the doctrine of constructive notice (Noorul Hoda v. Bibi Raifurnisa (1996)), holding that a reasonable and prudent person would have been aware of these public transactions recorded in the revenue records. The Plaintiff's failure to make inquiries amounted to negligence, and she was deemed to have had constructive notice of these events.

• Supreme Court's Holding: The right to sue first accrued in 1995 when the registered sale deeds were executed and mutated. The suit filed in 2013 was hopelessly barred by limitation.

5. Final Outcome

The Supreme Court allowed the Civil Appeal filed by the Defendants (purchasers). The judgments of the High Court and the Trial Court were set aside. The Plaintiff's suit (O.S. No. 212 of 2013) was dismissed in its entirety. Consequently, the Defendants' title over the suit property, derived from the sale deeds of 1995, was upheld.

MCQs Based on the Judgment

1. In the case of Dharmrao Sharanappa vs. Syeda Arifa Parveen, the Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in modifying the decree to grant the Plaintiff an additional 10 acres based on the oral gift. What was the primary legal principle cited for this finding?
a) The High Court cannot re-appreciate evidence under Section 50 of the Evidence Act.
b) An appellate court cannot modify a decree to the advantage of a respondent who has not filed a cross-appeal or cross-objections.
c) A suit for declaration based on an oral gift is not maintainable after three years.
d) The High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by acting as a handwriting expert under Section 73 of the Evidence Act.

b) An appellate court cannot modify a decree to the advantage of a respondent who has not filed a cross-appeal or cross-objections. (This principle was established in Banarsi v. Ram Phal).

2. According to the Supreme Court's analysis of Mohammedan Law on Hiba (oral gift), which of the following is considered the "critical and necessary element" without which the gift is incomplete?
a) A written and registered gift deed.
b) Acceptance of the gift by the donee in writing.
c) Delivery of possession, either actual or constructive, to the donee.
d) The presence of at least two independent witnesses during the declaration.

c) Delivery of possession, either actual or constructive, to the donee. (The Supreme Court repeatedly emphasized that delivery of possession is the cornerstone of a valid Hiba under Mohammedan Law).