Legal Review and Analysis of GR Selvaraj Dead through LRs vs KJ Prakash Kumar & Ors 2025 INSC 1353
Legal Doctrine
Case: G.R. Selvaraj (Dead), through LRs vs. K.J. Prakash Kumar & Ors., 2025 INSC 1353.
Holding: The Supreme Court affirms the primacy of Order XXI Rule 90(3) CPC, establishing that a judgment debtor's failure to raise available objections to a sale proclamation prior to its finalization constitutes a statutory waiver of such grounds.
1. Heading of the Judgment
Case Name: G.R. Selvaraj (Dead), through LRs vs. K.J. Prakash Kumar & Ors.
Citation: 2025 INSC 1353
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Justice Sanjay Kumar, Justice Alok Aradhe
Date: November 25, 2025
2. Related Laws and Sections
The judgment centers on the interpretation of the following provisions from the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908:
Order XXI Rule 64: Mandates that the court should sell only such property, or a portion thereof, as may be necessary to satisfy the decree.
Order XXI Rule 66: Pertains to the proclamation of sale, which must specify the property to be sold and its estimated value. Sub-rule (2)(a) requires the court to specify "the revenue assessed upon the estate or part of the estate, where the property to be sold is an interest in an estate or in part of an estate paying revenue to the Government."
Order XXI Rule 90: Allows for setting aside a sale on grounds of material irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting it, provided the applicant has sustained substantial injury.
Order XXI Rule 90(3): The pivotal amended provision which states that "No application to set aside a sale under this rule shall be entertained upon any ground which the applicant could have taken on or before the date on which the proclamation of sale was drawn up."
3. Judgment Details
A. Facts of the Case
The case originated from a suit for recovery of a debt, which was decreed in favour of the decree-holder, Rasheeda Yasin. To execute this decree, she sought the sale of a property belonging to the judgment debtors, Komala Ammal and K.J. Prakash Kumar. The execution process was protracted, spanning from 1998 to 2002. The property failed to attract bidders in several auctions, leading the executing court to progressively reduce the "upset price" (the minimum price for a bid) from ₹16,25,000 to ₹11,00,000. The judgment debtors were given notice and participated in some of these proceedings but eventually stopped appearing. Finally, in 2002, the appellant, G.R. Selvaraj, successfully bid for the property at ₹11,03,000, and a sale certificate was issued to him. Subsequently, the judgment debtors filed an application under Order XXI Rule 90 CPC to set aside the sale, arguing that the entire property was sold unnecessarily and that the reduction of the upset price was done without proper notice.
B. Issues Before the Supreme Court
The core legal issue before the Supreme Court was:
Whether the bar under Order XXI Rule 90(3) CPC prevents judgment debtors from raising the ground of non-compliance with Order XXI Rule 66(2)(a) CPC (i.e., the failure to consider selling only a part of the property) at a post-sale stage, when they had the opportunity to raise this objection before the sale proclamation was finalized.
C. Ratio Decidendi (The Court's Reasoning)
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court's order. Its reasoning was as follows:
Distinction Between Amended and Unamended Law: The Court distinguished the precedents relied upon by the High Court (Ambati Narasayya and Takkaseela Pedda Subba Reddi), noting that those cases dealt with the unamended Order XXI Rule 90, which did not contain the statutory bar found in the present sub-rule (3).
The Overriding Effect of Order XXI Rule 90(3): The Court emphasized that the introduction of Rule 90(3) in 1976 created a statutory prohibition. This provision operates as a "caveat emptor" for the judgment debtor, requiring them to be vigilant and raise all possible objections to the sale proclamation before it is drawn up. A failure to do so forecloses their right to raise those grounds later to set aside the sale.
Application to the Facts: The Court found that the judgment debtors in this case had been put on notice at every stage of the prolonged execution proceedings, including the multiple applications for reducing the upset price. They had participated initially but later chose to remain absent. Having failed to raise the specific ground that only a part of the property needed to be sold during these pre-sale proceedings, they were statutorily barred by Order XXI Rule 90(3) from raising it belatedly in an application to set aside the sale.
Duty of Court vs. Vigilance of Party: The Court clarified that while the executing court has a duty under Order XXI Rule 66(2)(a) to consider whether a part of the property would suffice, this duty does not operate in a vacuum. The statutory scheme, particularly Rule 90(3), places a corresponding duty on the judgment debtor to alert the court to such irregularities at the appropriate time. The judgment debtor cannot remain passive and then shift the entire burden onto the court to invalidate a concluded sale.
4. Core Principle of the Judgment
The core principle this judgment addresses is the primacy of the statutory bar under Order XXI Rule 90(3) CPC over a judgment debtor's right to challenge a sale based on pre-sale irregularities.
The Main Issue and the Court's Address:
The central conflict was between a procedural mandate placed on the executing court (to consider the necessity of selling the entire property) and a statutory deadline placed on the judgment debtor (to raise objections before the sale proclamation is finalized). The High Court had prioritized the former, holding that the court's failure to consider this aspect was a fundamental flaw, rendering the bar under Rule 90(3) inapplicable.
The Supreme Court reversed this logic. It held that the amendment introducing Rule 90(3) was a deliberate legislative act to introduce finality and discipline into the execution process. A judgment debtor who sleeps over their rights and fails to raise a legally available objection at the correct juncture cannot be permitted to derail a concluded sale years later. The Court established that the statutory bar in Rule 90(3) is not merely procedural but a substantive provision that extinguishes the right to challenge on specified grounds if not exercised in time. The constitutional right to property is not absolute and is subject to such process-based limitations designed to ensure the efficient enforcement of court decrees.
5. Final Outcome and Supreme Court's Directions
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal filed by the legal heirs of the auction purchaser, G.R. Selvaraj. The operative directions were:
i. The judgment dated 10.02.2009 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras in C.R.P. (NPD) No.2574 of 2007 was set aside.
ii. The judgment dated 13.07.2007 passed by the III Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai, which had upheld the executing court's order dismissing the application to set aside the sale, was confirmed.
iii. As a consequence, the execution sale held on 12.09.2002, through which the appellant purchased the property, was upheld and declared valid.
iv. No order as to costs was passed.
6. MCQs Based on the Judgment
Question 1: The Supreme Court, in G.R. Selvaraj vs. K.J. Prakash Kumar (2025 INSC 1353), primarily interpreted the scope and overriding effect of which provision of the Code of Civil Procedure?
A) Order XXI Rule 64 CPC
B) Order XXI Rule 66(2)(a) CPC
C) Order XXI Rule 90(3) CPC
D) Order XXI Rule 90(1) CPC
Question 2: According to the Supreme Court's ruling, a judgment debtor is barred from raising a ground to set aside a sale if?
A) The ground pertains to a fraud discovered after the sale was conducted.
B) The ground was available to them but they failed to raise it on or before the date the sale proclamation was drawn up.
C) The sale was conducted for a value significantly lower than the market price.
D) The decree holder was related to the auction purchaser.
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