Legal Review and Analysis of Haribhau @ Bhausaheb Dinkar Kharuse & Anr vs State of Maharashtra 2025 INSC 1266

In-Short

Case: Haribhau @ Bhausaheb Dinkar Kharuse & Anr. vs State of Maharashtra, 2025 INSC 1266.

Short Caption: The Supreme Court affirms that active participants in an unlawful assembly, including those who facilitate a crime, are vicariously liable for the offences committed by the group in pursuit of their common object.

1. Heading of the Judgment

Case Name: Haribhau @ Bhausaheb Dinkar Kharuse & Anr. vs State of Maharashtra
Citation: 2025 INSC 1266
Court: Supreme Court of India
Judges: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Vipul M. Pancholi
Date of Judgment: October 29, 2025

2. Related Laws and Sections

The judgment primarily revolves around the interpretation and application of the following legal provisions from the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC):

• Section 141 IPC: Defines an "Unlawful Assembly" as an assembly of five or more persons whose common object is one of the kinds specified in the section.

• Section 147 IPC: Punishes the offence of "Rioting".

• Section 148 IPC: Punishes rioting armed with a deadly weapon.

• Section 149 IPC: Embodies the principle of "Vicarious Liability". It states that if an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members knew to be likely to be committed, then every person who, at the time of the committing of that offence, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that offence.

• Section 302 IPC: Punishes the offence of "Murder".

• Section 307 IPC: Punishes the attempt to commit murder.

• Section 34 IPC: Deals with acts done by several persons in furtherance of a "common intention".

3. Basic Judgment Details

• Originating Case: Sessions Case No. 72 of 2000 before the VIII Additional Sessions Judge, Pune.

• Trial Court Verdict (18.05.2001): Convicted Accused 1 and 2 for murder and attempt to murder, and Accused 6 for attempt to murder. It acquitted Accused 3, 4, and 5.

• High Court Verdict (02.02.2011): The State appealed the acquittals. The High Court reversed the acquittals of Accused 3 and 4 and also convicted Accused 6 for murder (Section 302 read with 149 IPC). It confirmed the convictions of the others.

• Supreme Court Appeal: The present appeals were filed by Accused 3, 4, and 6, challenging the High Court's judgment that convicted them.

4. Core Principle and Analysis of the Judgment

Title of Analysis: The Doctrine of Vicarious Liability under Section 149 IPC and the Reversal of Acquittal

The Central Issue:
The core legal issue before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court was justified in reversing the Trial Court's order of acquittal for Appellants (Accused 3, 4, and 6) by convicting them under Sections 302 and 307 read with Section 149 of the IPC, based on the principle of vicarious liability for being members of an "unlawful assembly".

The Supreme Court's Address and Reasoning:

A. Re-evaluation of Evidence and the Power of the Appellate Court
The Supreme Court began by affirming the well-settled legal principle that an appellate court must exercise great caution while interfering with an order of acquittal. However, citing Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415, the Court held that such interference is not only permissible but necessary when the trial court's findings are "manifestly perverse, unreasonable or contrary to the evidence on record." The appellate court has the full power to review, reappreciate, and reconsider the evidence to reach its own conclusions.

In this case, the Supreme Court agreed with the High Court that the Trial Court had fundamentally misappreciated the evidence. The Trial Court overlooked the consistent testimonies of injured eyewitnesses and failed to apply the legal principles of vicarious liability under Section 149 IPC correctly.

B. Scrutiny of Ocular and Medical Evidence
The Court conducted a detailed analysis of the witness depositions (PW-1, PW-7, and PW-9), who were the complainant and injured eyewitnesses. It found their testimonies to be "natural, coherent and mutually corroborative on all material particulars." The witnesses consistently stated that:

• The appellants arrived together on two motorcycles.

• They were armed with deadly weapons like knives and a sattur.

• Accused 3 (Appellant 1) took the jeep's keys and punched the driver (PW-1).

• All accused, including Appellants, dragged the victims out of the jeep.

• Accused 3 held the deceased while Accused 1 and 2 attacked him with weapons.

• Accused 6 (Appellant) inflicted injuries on PW-7.

This ocular evidence was strongly corroborated by the medical evidence (from PW-16, PW-19, and PW-21). The post-mortem report confirmed the deceased died due to "haemorrhagic shock due to multiple injuries to vital organs." The injuries on PW-7 and PW-9 were grievous in nature and were confirmed to be caused by sharp weapons like those described by the eyewitnesses. This harmony between what was seen and what the doctors found left no room for doubt regarding the prosecution's case.

C. The Core Legal Principle: Establishing Common Object and Vicarious Liability
This is the heart of the judgment. The appellants argued that they did not share the "common object" to commit murder and that their actions, at best, amounted to causing hurt. The Supreme Court rejected this contention.

Relying on precedents like Masalti v. State of U.P., AIR 1965 SC 202, the Court reiterated the law on Section 149 IPC:

• No Need for Overt Act: It is not necessary for every member of an unlawful assembly to commit a specific overt act. (Citation: Masalti v. State of U.P.)

• Liability through Membership: Once membership in an unlawful assembly and the sharing of a common object are proven, every member becomes vicariously liable for the offences committed in prosecution of that common object.

• Inference of Common Object: The common object can be inferred from the nature of the assembly, the weapons used, and the behavior of the members before, during, and after the incident.

Applying this to the facts, the Court held that the appellants, by arriving together armed with lethal weapons, facilitating the attack by transporting the main assailants (Accused 3 and 4), and actively participating in the coordinated assault (Accused 6), were integral to the execution of a "premeditated and violent attack." Their actions demonstrated that the common object of the assembly was not merely to cause hurt but to commit murder. Therefore, they were equally guilty of the offences committed by other members of the unlawful assembly.

5. Final Outcome of the Judgment

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals filed by the appellants (Accused 3, 4, and 6). It affirmed the conviction and sentence imposed by the High Court, holding them guilty under Sections 302 and 307 read with Section 149 of the IPC. The Court found that the prosecution had proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt and that the High Court's reversal of the acquittal was legal, reasoned, and based on a correct appreciation of evidence and law.

6. MCQs Based on the Judgment

Question 1: In the case of Haribhau @ Bhausaheb Dinkar Kharuse vs State of Maharashtra, on what primary legal ground did the Supreme Court uphold the conviction of the appellants (Accused 3, 4, and 6) for murder, even though they were not the ones who inflicted the fatal blows?
a) They were the masterminds behind the plan.
b) They were found guilty under Section 149 IPC due to their membership in an unlawful assembly with a common object to commit murder.
c) They voluntarily confessed to their crime during the investigation.
d) The eyewitnesses specifically named them as the main attackers.

Question 2: According to the Supreme Court's judgment, which of the following is NOT a necessary condition to attract vicarious liability under Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code?
a) The existence of an unlawful assembly of five or more persons.
b) The commission of an offence by a member of that assembly.
c) Proof that every member of the assembly personally committed a violent overt act.
d) The offence was committed in prosecution of the common object of the assembly.