Legal Review and Analysis of Jemaben vs The State of Gujarat 2025 INSC 1268

In-Short

Case: Jemaben vs. The State of Gujarat, 2025 INSC 1268.

The Supreme Court affirms that a credible and corroborated first dying declaration recorded by a doctor cannot be discarded due to minor discrepancies in subsequent declarations, and an acquittal based on such an error is liable to be reversed.

1. Heading of the Judgment

Case Name: Jemaben vs. The State of Gujarat
Citation: 2025 INSC 1268
Court: Supreme Court of India
Judges: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rajesh Bindal and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Vipul M. Pancholi
Date of Judgment: October 29, 2025

2. Related Laws and Sections

The judgment primarily involves the interpretation and application of the following legal provisions from the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC):

• Section 302 IPC: Punishes the offence of "Murder".

• Section 307 IPC: Punishes the attempt to commit murder.

• Section 436 IPC: Punishes mischief by fire or explosive substance with intent to destroy a house, etc.

• Section 34 IPC: Provides for acts done by several persons in furtherance of a "common intention".

• Section 120B IPC: Punishes criminal conspiracy.

3. Basic Judgment Details

• Originating Case: Sessions Case No. 40 of 2005 before the Additional Sessions Judge, Banaskantha.

• Incident: The intervening night of November 29-30, 2004, where the deceased, Leelaben, was set on fire in her hut, leading to her death on December 4, 2004. Her 4-year-old son also sustained burn injuries.

• Trial Court Verdict (19.11.2005): Acquitted all accused persons, including the appellant Jemaben, primarily due to discrepancies in the multiple dying declarations of the deceased.

• High Court Verdict (21.07.2016): Allowed the State's appeal, reversed the acquittal of the appellant Jemaben, and convicted her under Section 302 IPC, sentencing her to life imprisonment.

• Supreme Court Appeal: The present appeal was filed by Jemaben challenging the High Court's judgment that convicted her.

4. Core Principle and Legal Analysis

Title of Analysis: The Sanctity of the First Dying Declaration and the Reversal of an Erroneous Acquittal

The Central Issue:
The core legal issue before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court was justified in reversing the Trial Court's order of acquittal and convicting the appellant based on the first dying declaration recorded by a doctor, despite the existence of other dying declarations with alleged discrepancies.

The Supreme Court's Address and Reasoning:

A. The Primacy and Reliability of the First Dying Declaration
The Supreme Court placed paramount importance on the first statement made by the deceased to Dr. Shivramhbhai Nagarhbhai Patel (PW-3) when she was first brought to the hospital. This statement, which was contemporaneously recorded in the medical papers and a Yadi (communication) sent to the police, constituted her first dying declaration. In this declaration, the deceased:

• Specifically named the appellant, Jemaben, her aunt-in-law, as the person who poured kerosene on her and set her ablaze.

• Disclosed a motive: Jemaben was compelling the deceased to go with a man named Mania Dabhawala, and the burning was a consequence of her refusal.

The Court emphasized that this declaration was made to an independent witness (a doctor) who certified that the deceased was conscious and in a fit state to make a statement. The Court held that minor discrepancies in subsequent declarations cannot be used to nullify the credibility of this first, crucially important statement.

B. Corroboration by Physical and Medical Evidence
The Supreme Court stressed that the version in the first dying declaration was not standalone. It was strongly corroborated by other pieces of evidence, which the Trial Court had overlooked:

• Medical Evidence: The Medical Certificate (Exhibit 20) confirmed the deceased had 100% burn injuries and that her "whole body and clothing [had] kerosene smelling burns."

• Recovery of Evidence: The panchnama (Exhibit 12) of the scene of crime revealed an empty kerosene container and soil that smelled of kerosene, directly supporting the deceased's account of kerosene being used.

• Injury to the Child: The fact that the deceased's 4-year-old son, sleeping beside her, sustained only 10-12% burns on his lower limbs was inconsistent with a theory of a general accidental fire. This specific injury pattern corroborated the prosecution's case of a targeted attack on the deceased.

C. The High Court's Justified Interference in Acquittal
The Supreme Court affirmed the well-settled principle that an Appellate Court can reverse an acquittal if the Trial Court's view is not only erroneous but also manifestly perverse or impossible. The Supreme Court agreed with the High Court that the Trial Court had committed a fundamental error by focusing on minor discrepancies in other statements while ignoring the consistency, credibility, and corroboration of the first dying declaration.

The Supreme Court cited its own precedent in Nallam Veera Stayanandam & Ors. v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., (2004) 10 SCC 769, reiterating that multiple dying declarations must be evaluated independently on their own merits. The Court held that in this case, the evidence pointed to "only one possible view"—that of the appellant's guilt. Therefore, the High Court's interference was not only permissible but necessary to correct a grave miscarriage of justice.

5. Final Outcome of the Judgment

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant, Jemaben. It affirmed the conviction and sentence imposed by the High Court, holding her guilty under Section 302 of the IPC. The Court found that the prosecution had successfully proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt based on the credible first dying declaration, which was amply corroborated by medical and physical evidence.

6. MCQs Based on the Judgment

Question 1: In the case of Jemaben vs. State of Gujarat (2025 INSC 1268), on what primary ground did the Supreme Court uphold the conviction based on the deceased's dying declaration?
a) The dying declaration was recorded by an Executive Magistrate.
b) The first dying declaration to the doctor was credible, corroborated by other evidence, and the discrepancies in others were minor.
c) The appellant had confessed to the crime during the police investigation.
d) There were no other dying declarations to create confusion.

Question 2: According to the Supreme Court's judgment, which piece of evidence specifically corroborated the deceased's account of a targeted attack as opposed to an accidental fire?
a) The testimony of the complainant (PW-1), who was an eyewitness.
b) The recovery of a weapon from the appellant's house.
c) The fact that the deceased's 4-year-old son, sleeping beside her, sustained only 10-12% burn injuries on his lower limbs.
d) The appellant's refusal to participate in the Test Identification Parade.