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Legal Review and Analysis of Neeraj Kumar @ Neeraj Yadav vs State of UP & Ors 2025 INSC 1386

Case Synopsis

Synopsis: Supreme Court Reiterates Robust Threshold for Summoning Co-accused; Condemns "Mini-Trial" at Section 319 CrPC Stage. The judgment clarifies that courts must not meticulously weigh evidence when deciding to summon additional accused. It reinforces that trial-stage evidence, including untested examination-in-chief and statements admissible as dying declarations, can form the basis for summoning if they disclose a prima facie case stronger than mere probability. The ruling ensures the effective use of Section 319 CrPC to bring all perpetrators to justice.


1. Heading of the Judgment

Case Name: Neeraj Kumar @ Neeraj Yadav vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
Citation: 2025 INSC 1386
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Honourable Mr. Justice Sanjay Karol and Honourable Mr. Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh
Date of Judgment: December 4, 2025


2. Related Laws and Sections

  • Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC): Section 319 (Power to proceed against other persons appearing to be guilty), Section 161 (Examination of witnesses by police).

  • Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC): Section 307 (Attempt to murder), Section 302 (Murder), Section 316 (Causing death of quick unborn child by act amounting to culpable homicide).

  • Indian Evidence Act, 1872: Section 32(1) (Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found is relevant — statements relating to cause of death).

  • Interpretative Precedents: Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 3 SCC 92; S. Mohammed Ispahani v. Yogendra Chandak (2017) 16 SCC 226; Omi v. State of M.P. (2025) 2 SCC 621; Shiv Baran v. State of U.P. 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1457.


3. Judgment Details

A. Facts of the Case

  1. The appellant, Neeraj Kumar, filed an FIR (No. 187 of 2021) alleging his sister, Nishi, was shot by her husband, Rahul, at their home on March 25, 2021, based on information from his nine-year-old niece, Shristi.

  2. The deceased was hospitalized and gave two statements under Section 161 CrPC (on March 25 and April 18, 2021). The first named her husband; the second implicated her husband's mother (Rajo), brother (Satan/Vineet), and brother-in-law (Gabbar) as instigators.

  3. The deceased succumbed to her injuries on May 15, 2021. The appellant subsequently filed a complaint to include these relatives as accused.

  4. The police filed a chargesheet only against the husband (Rahul). During the trial, the prosecution moved an application under Section 319 CrPC to summon the three relatives as additional accused, relying on the testimonies of the appellant (PW-1) and the minor daughter (PW-2), along with the deceased's statements.

  5. The Trial Court and the Allahabad High Court dismissed the application. The High Court held that the deceased's statements were not dying declarations due to the time lapse, and the testimonies of PW-1 and PW-2 were insufficient as they were not direct eyewitnesses to the firing.

  6. Aggrieved, the appellant approached the Supreme Court.


B. Issues Before the Supreme Court

Whether the Trial Court and the High Court erred in dismissing the application under Section 319 CrPC to summon the private respondents (Relatives No. 2 to 4) as additional accused, by applying an incorrect and overly stringent standard of proof at the summoning stage?


C. Ratio Decidendi (Court’s Reasoning)

I. The Correct Legal Standard for Section 319 CrPC:
The Supreme Court reiterated the well-settled principles from Hardeep Singh and subsequent cases:

  • The power under Section 319 is extraordinary and discretionary, to be used sparingly.

  • The threshold satisfaction required is higher than that for framing charges but lower than that needed for conviction.

  • The court must only see if a prima facie case exists based on evidence adduced during trial. The court should not conduct a "mini-trial" by weighing evidence or testing credibility conclusively at this stage.

  • The evidence can include examination-in-chief, even if untested by cross-examination.


II. Re-evaluation of Evidence on Record:
The Court analyzed the three pillars of evidence:

  1. Testimony of PW-1 (Appellant/Brother): The Court held his testimony, detailing years of harassment and the specific instigation by the relatives, had prima facie value. Omission of some details in the FIR does not negate his trial testimony.

  2. Testimony of PW-2 (Minor Daughter): The Supreme Court strongly criticized the High Court's approach. The High Court discredited her by dissecting her cross-examination (where she mentioned hearing gunshots). The Supreme Court held this was an impermissible "mini-trial." Her chief examination vividly described the relatives' instigation and her father's act. Her Section 161 statement corroborated this. Issues of tutoring or minor inconsistencies are for trial, not for the Section 319 stage.

  3. Statements of the Deceased under Section 161 CrPC: The Court rejected the High Court's finding that these were not dying declarations. Citing Dharmendra Kumar v. State of M.P., it held that a statement to police u/s 161 CrPC, if it relates to the cause or circumstances of death, becomes admissible as a dying declaration u/s 32(1) of the Evidence Act upon the death of the declarant. The lack of a Magistrate or doctor's certification goes to weight, not admissibility, at this stage. The time gap (about 2 months) does not disqualify it.


III. Error of the Courts Below:
The Supreme Court concluded that both lower courts erred by:

  • Applying a standard akin to a final conviction judgment.

  • Improperly weighing evidence and credibility.

  • Misapplying the law on dying declarations.

  • Failing to see the prima facie complicity emerging from the collective evidence.


4. Core Principle of the Judgment

The Supreme Court addressed the core issue of the appropriate judicial threshold for summoning additional accused under Section 319 CrPC, clarifying the distinction between a prima facie evaluation and a mini-trial.


Judicial Analysis on the Summoning Threshold:
The core of the judgment is a robust reaffirmation that the stage of summoning under Section 319 CrPC is not an occasion for the court to sift, weigh, or conclusively adjudicate upon the evidence. The lower courts fell into error by doing precisely that—by treating the minor witness's cross-examination as a tool to discredit her entire testimony and by imposing rigid formalities on the admissibility of the deceased's statements. The Supreme Court emphasized that the inquiry is limited to ascertaining whether there is "more than a mere probability" of the person's complicity based on the trial evidence. If such material exists, the power must be exercised to ensure that all potentially guilty persons face trial, fulfilling the provision's objective that no guilty person escapes the process of law. The ruling prevents the dilution of Section 319's efficacy through an overly cautious and technical pre-trial scrutiny.


5. Final Outcome and Directions

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgments of the Trial Court and the High Court. The application under Section 319 CrPC was granted. The Supreme Court directed that Respondent Nos. 2 to 4 (Rajo @Rajwati, Satan @Vineet, and Gabbar) be summoned to face trial alongside the main accused (Rahul) in Sessions Trial No.1151 of 2021.

  • The parties were directed to appear before the Trial Court on January 8, 2026.

  • The trial was expedited with a direction to avoid unnecessary adjournments.

  • The Court clarified that all observations made were solely for deciding the Section 319 application and should not influence the trial on merits.


6. MCQ Questions Based on the Judgment


Question 1: As per the Supreme Court in Neeraj Kumar v. State of U.P. (2025 INSC 1386), what is the correct standard of satisfaction required for summoning a person as an additional accused under Section 319 CrPC?
A. Satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt, as required for a conviction.
B. Satisfaction that is higher than for framing charges but lower than for conviction.
C. A mere suspicion or probability of complicity is sufficient.
D. The same standard as required for discharging an accused.


Question 2: In the aforementioned judgment, how did the Supreme Court view the deceased's statements recorded under Section 161 CrPC by the police?
A. They are inadmissible as they are hit by the bar under Section 162 CrPC.
B. They can be treated as dying declarations under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act and considered at the Section 319 stage.
C. They are only admissible if recorded in the presence of a Magistrate.
D. They hold no value as the deceased died a substantial time after making them.

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