Legal Review and Analysis of Raj Kumar @ Bheema vs State of NCT of Delhi 2025 INSC 1322
In-Short
Case: Raj Kumar @ Bheema vs. State of NCT of Delhi (2025 INSC 1322): Supreme Court acquits a murder convict, highlighting the unreliability of delayed dock identification by a sole eyewitness and setting a procedural mandate for evidence recording via video conferencing.
1. Heading of the Judgment
Case Name: Raj Kumar @ Bheema vs. State of NCT of Delhi
Citation: 2025 INSC 1322
Court: Supreme Court of India
Judges: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Vikram Nath and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Mehta
Date: November 17, 2025
2. Related Laws and Sections
This judgment primarily deals with the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, with references to their new counterparts.
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC):
Section 302: Punishment for Murder.Indian Evidence Act, 1872:
Section 145: Cross-examination as to previous statements in writing.Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC):
Section 313: Power to examine the accused.General Principles:
Test Identification Parade (TIP)
Dock Identification
Appreciation of Sole Eyewitness Testimony
Procedural Safeguards in Video Conferencing Evidence
3. Basic Judgment Details
Appellate Jurisdiction: Criminal Appeal arising from Special Leave Petition (SLP).
Origin: Appeal against the concurrent findings of the Delhi High Court and the Additional Sessions Judge, Saket Courts, New Delhi.
Subject Matter: Conviction of the appellant under Section 302 IPC for murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.
Prosecution's Core Allegation: The appellant was one of several assailants who broke into the victims' house, murdered Shri Madan Mohan Gulati, and caused grievous injuries to Smt. Indra Prabha Gulati (PW-18) during a robbery.
Lower Courts' Outcome: The Trial Court and the High Court convicted the appellant primarily based on the dock identification by the injured eyewitness (PW-18) and certain recoveries.
4. Core Legal Principle and Judicial Analysis
The Core Issue: Whether the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 IPC, based solely on the dock identification by a sole eyewitness after an inordinate delay, and in the face of serious procedural lapses, can be sustained in law.
In-Depth Analysis of the Supreme Court's Reasoning
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and acquitted the appellant after a meticulous analysis that revealed fatal flaws in the prosecution's case. The Court's reasoning can be broken down into three critical areas.
A. The Unreliability of the Sole Eyewitness Testimony
The fulcrum of the prosecution's case was the testimony of Smt. Indra Prabha Gulati (PW-18), the injured eyewitness. The Supreme Court found her testimony to be unworthy of credit for several compelling reasons:
Inordinate Delay in Identification: The witness identified the appellant in court for the first time via video conferencing on May 8, 2017, nearly eight and a half years after the incident in November 2008. The Court held that the possibility of a witness recalling the face of an assailant after such a long lapse of time, without any prior Test Identification Parade (TIP), was "extremely unlikely."
Physical Infirmity and Lack of Aid: The witness admitted in her cross-examination that she suffered from weak distance vision and used spectacles. Crucially, she was not wearing spectacles during her video-conferenced deposition. This cast serious doubt on her ability to clearly identify anyone on a video screen.
Material Improvements and Omissions: The witness introduced new details during her testimony that were absent in her initial statement to the police (under Section 161 CrPC). For instance, she stated for the first time that the appellant was wearing a "black shirt." The Court termed this a "material improvement" and an "embellishment" that suggested an attempt to fill lacunae in the prosecution case. The defense's attempt to confront her with this omission was procedurally stifled.
Denial of Prior Identification: The witness emphatically denied the prosecution's suggestion that she had identified the appellant earlier at the Patiala House Courts. This contradiction further undermined her credibility.
The Court concluded that the testimony of PW-18 did not meet the standard of "sterling quality" required for a sole eyewitness, especially in a capital offence, and hence, it was unsafe to rely upon.
B. Fundamental Flaws in the Test Identification Parade (TIP) Process
The lower courts had drawn an adverse inference against the appellant for refusing to participate in a TIP. The Supreme Court dismantled this finding, highlighting grave infirmities:
Doubtful Sanctity of the TIP: The prosecution claimed that a TIP was arranged on December 24, 2008. However, PW-18 categorically stated she never went to court after her discharge from the hospital on December 24/25, 2008. There was no document, such as a discharge slip, to prove her mobility, and no signature of hers on any TIP document. This created a "grave doubt" that the witness was even present for the TIP, rendering the entire proceeding suspect.
Lack of Muffling (Baparda) of the Accused: The arrest memo of the appellant did not mention that his face was kept muffled. The subsequent recovery memors also lacked this crucial recital. This supported the appellant's defense that he had been shown to the witness or his photographs had been taken before the proposed TIP, vitiating any potential identification. The Court held that the prosecution failed in its duty to prove that the accused was kept baparda from the time of arrest.
C. The Incongruity of Recovery Evidence
The prosecution relied on the recovery of a blood-stained pant and a weapon (chheni) at the instance of the appellant. The Supreme Court found this evidence inconsequential:
No Connection to the Crime: The blood on the pant could not be matched with the blood of the deceased or the injured witness. The Serology report showed "no reaction" for blood grouping.
Non-identification of Recovered Articles: The son of the victims, who had identified the robbed articles in a TIP, was not examined in court. The star witness, PW-18, was also not asked to identify these articles. Consequently, the recovered items could not be conclusively linked to the crime.
5. Final Outcome and Supreme Court's Directions
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned judgments. The Court issued the following conclusive directions:
"The accused-appellant is acquitted of the charges. He has remained in custody for almost 15 and a half years and shall be released from prison forthwith, if not wanted in any other case."
Landmark Procedural Directive:
Furthermore, to prevent similar procedural injustices in the future, the Supreme Court issued a binding directive for the recording of evidence via video conferencing. The Court held:
"In every case where... any previous written statement of such witness... is available and the party concerned is desirous of confronting the witness with such previous statement... the trial Court shall ensure that a copy of the statement/document is transmitted to the witness through electronic transmission mode and the procedure provided under Section 145 of the Evidence Act is followed in letter and spirit, so as to safeguard the fairness and integrity of the trial."
This direction ensures that the right of an accused to effectively cross-examine a witness is not compromised by technological barriers.
6. (MCQs) Based on the Judgment
1. In Raj Kumar @ Bheema vs. State of NCT of Delhi (2025 INSC 1322), the Supreme Court acquitted the appellant primarily because?
a) The appellant had already served a significant portion of his sentence.
b) The testimony of the sole eyewitness was found to be unreliable and untrustworthy.
c) The appellant was a juvenile at the time of the offence.
d) The murder weapon was never recovered.
2. The Supreme Court issued a significant procedural direction regarding the recording of evidence via video conferencing. What was the core of this direction?
a) Video conferencing should be avoided in all serious criminal cases.
b) Witnesses must always be physically present for cross-examination.
c) If a witness is to be confronted with a previous written statement, a copy must be electronically transmitted to them to ensure a fair cross-examination.
d) Only the testimony of expert witnesses can be recorded via video conferencing.




























