Legal Review and Analysis of Rikhab Chand Jain vs Union of India 2025 INSC 1337

In-Short

Case: Rikhab Chand Jain vs. Union of India (2025 INSC 1337): Supreme Court reiterates that a writ petition under Article 226 is not entertainable when an alternative, equally efficacious statutory appeal to the High Court itself exists and has not been pursued, especially if the delay is due to the petitioner's own fault.

1. Heading of the Judgment

Case Name: Rikhab Chand Jain vs. Union of India & Ors.
Citation: 2025 INSC 1337
Court: Supreme Court of India
Jurisdiction: Civil Appellate Jurisdiction
Civil Appeal No.: 6719 of 2012
Date of Judgment: November 12, 2025
Judges: Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Aravind Kumar

2. Related Laws and Sections

The judgment primarily discusses and interprets the following legal provisions:

• Article 226 of the Constitution of India: Pertaining to the power of High Courts to issue certain writs.

• The Customs Act, 1962:
  Section 129A: Appeal to the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal (CEGAT).
  Section 130: Appeal to the High Court (as it existed at the time, later amended).
  Section 130A: Application to the High Court for reference of questions of law.

• The Limitation Act, 1963:
  Sections 4 to 24: Provisions for condonation of delay.
  Section 29(2): Application of the Limitation Act to special laws.

3. Basic Judgment Details

This appeal was filed before the Supreme Court challenging the order of the Rajasthan High Court (Jaipur Bench) dated March 14, 2011. The High Court had dismissed the appellant's writ petition on two primary grounds:

1. The appellant failed to exhaust the alternative statutory remedy of an appeal under the Customs Act, 1962.

2. The writ petition was devoid of merits.

The Supreme Court granted special leave to appeal and ultimately upheld the High Court's decision, dismissing the civil appeal.

4. Core Principle and In-Depth Analysis of the Judgment

The core of this judgment revolves around the self-imposed restrictions on the exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, especially when an equally efficacious alternative statutory remedy is available, and that forum is the High Court itself.

A. The Central Issue: Writ Jurisdiction vs. Alternative Remedy

The primary issue before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court was justified in refusing to entertain the writ petition under Article 226 on the ground of the appellant's failure to pursue the alternative statutory remedy of an appeal under Section 130 of the Customs Act, 1962.

The appellant had argued that the existence of an alternative remedy does not oust the jurisdiction of the writ court, citing exceptions such as a violation of fundamental rights or principles of natural justice. The Court acknowledged this legal position, referencing Godrej Sarah Lee v. Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority (2023 SCC Online SC 95), which distinguishes between the "maintainability" and "entertainability" of a writ petition.

B. The Supreme Court's Analysis and Key Legal Principles

The Supreme Court, however, analyzed the issue from a distinct perspective, relying on two landmark Constitution Bench decisions.

• The Principle from Thansingh Nathmal v. A. Mazid (AIR 1964 SC 1419):
  The Court resurrected the seminal principle from this case. It held that when the statutorily designated alternative forum is the High Court itself (in a different jurisdiction, such as an appeal or reference), refusing to entertain a writ petition under Article 226 should be the rule, and entertaining it should be the exception. The Court emphasized that allowing a writ petition in such a scenario would permit the litigant to "by-pass" the specific machinery set up by the statute. The statutory appeal process is a structured remedy, and the writ jurisdiction should not be used as an alternative to it.

• The Principle from A. V. Venkateswaran v. Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani (AIR 1961 SC 1506):
  The Court reinforced the principle that a petitioner who, through his own fault, disables himself from availing a statutory remedy (e.g., by missing the limitation period), cannot then use that very disability as a ground to seek the discretionary relief under Article 226. The Court found that the appellant in this case had allowed the limitation period for filing a statutory appeal to lapse without a satisfactory explanation.

• Analysis on Delay and Laches:
  The Court underscored that while there is no fixed period of limitation for filing a writ petition, it must be filed within a "reasonable time." The period of limitation prescribed for the alternative statutory remedy serves as a strong indicator of what constitutes a "reasonable period" for invoking writ jurisdiction. The appellant's delay of several years in approaching the writ court was deemed unreasonable, especially when he could have sought condonation of delay in the statutory appeal itself, as the Limitation Act, 1963, was applicable.

• Analysis on the Merits of the Case:
  The Supreme Court also agreed with the High Court's finding on the lack of merits. It held that while the appellant had technically challenged the confiscation order before the CEGAT in the memo of appeal, the writ petition lacked specific pleadings on oath asserting that this point was actually argued before the CEGAT but was not considered by it. Mere inclusion of a ground in a petition is insufficient; there must be a direct and verified challenge to the lower forum's failure to adjudicate a specific issue.

5. Final Outcome of the Judgment

The Supreme Court dismissed the civil appeal and upheld the impugned order of the High Court. It concluded that:

1. The High Court was correct in refusing to exercise its discretionary writ jurisdiction since the appellant had an equally efficacious alternative remedy in the form of a statutory appeal/reference to the High Court itself, which he failed to pursue in time.

2. The writ petition was rightly dismissed on merits due to a lack of proper pleadings regarding the CEGAT's alleged non-consideration of the confiscation challenge.

6.  (MCQs) Based on the Judgment

MCQ 1: According to the Supreme Court's judgment in Rikhab Chand Jain v. Union of India (2025 INSC 1337), what is the general rule when an alternative statutory remedy is available before the High Court itself?
a) The writ petition must be entertained as it involves a fundamental right.
b) Entertaining the writ petition under Article 226 is the rule.
c) Refusing to entertain the writ petition under Article 226 is the rule.
d) The Limitation Act does not apply to such statutory appeals.

MCQ 2: The Supreme Court held that a petitioner who misses the limitation period for a statutory appeal?
a) Can automatically seek relief under Article 226 as a right.
b) Has a stronger case for the writ court to condone the delay.
c) Cannot use his own fault as a ground to seek discretionary relief under Article 226.
d) Is absolved from the obligation to exhaust alternative remedies.