Summary and Analysis of Shivamma Dead by LRS vs Karnataka Housing Board & Ors 2025 INSC 1104

1. Heading of the Judgment

Case Title: Shivamma (Dead) by LRS vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors.
Citation: 2025 INSC 1104
Court: Supreme Court of India
Civil Appeal No.: 11794 of 2025 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 10704 of 2019)
Bench: J.B. Pardiwala, J.
Date of Judgment: The year is 2025 as per the citation, but the specific date is not mentioned in the provided text.

2. Related Laws and Sections

The judgment primarily interprets and analyzes the following legal provisions:

• Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963: "Extension of prescribed period in certain cases." This is the central provision under scrutiny. The Court provides an in-depth analysis of the phrase "within such period" used in this section.

• Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963: "Bar of limitation." The Court discusses this section to establish the fundamental principles of limitation law, which Section 5 operates as an exception to.

• Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963: Referred to as exceptions to the strict rule of limitation under Section 3.

• Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC): Inherent powers of the court. The High Court had condoned the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act read with Section 151 CPC.

3. Basic Judgment Details

• Parties:
  Appellant: Shivamma (Dead) represented by Legal Representatives (LRS). They were the successful party in the first appeal and are challenging the condonation of delay.
  Respondents: Karnataka Housing Board (KHB) & Others. KHB is a state instrumentality that filed the belated second appeal.

• Background Facts:
  The dispute concerned a parcel of land.
  The Appellant's suit for declaration of title and possession was initially dismissed by the Trial Court in 1997.
  The First Appellate Court allowed the Appellant's appeal on 03.01.2006, decreeing the suit in her favour. However, instead of granting possession (as substantial construction existed on the land), it directed the Respondent-KHB to pay compensation.
  As KHB did not pay, the Appellant initiated execution proceedings in 2011.
  Remarkably, KHB filed a second appeal before the High Court only on 14.02.2017, along with an application to condone a delay of 3966 days (almost 11 years) in filing the appeal.
  The High Court of Karnataka, vide its order dated 21.03.2017, allowed the application and condoned the inordinate delay.
  Aggrieved by this condonation, the Appellant filed the present appeal before the Supreme Court.

• Core Legal Issue: Whether the High Court was justified in condoning an inordinate delay of 3966 days in filing the second appeal by the State Housing Board.

4. Explanation of the Judgment

The Supreme Court's judgment is a seminal ruling on the law of limitation, particularly concerning the condonation of delay. It is structured into a detailed analysis covering multiple legal aspects.

I. Interpretation of "Within Such Period" in Section 5 of the Limitation Act

The Court dedicated significant effort to resolving a conflict in judicial precedent regarding the interpretation of the phrase "within such period" in Section 5.

• The Conflict:
  One line of cases (e.g., Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 361) held that a party only needs to explain the delay for the period after the limitation period has expired, i.e., from the last day of limitation till the actual date of filing.
  Another line of cases (e.g., Ajit Singh Thakur v. State of Gujarat, (1981) 1 SCC 495) held that "sufficient cause" must be shown for the entire period, starting from the date the right to appeal accrues (when the clock of limitation begins to tick) until the date of actual filing. Events occurring after the expiry of limitation are irrelevant if the cause for not filing within limitation is not explained.

• The Supreme Court's Final Ruling:
  The Court authoritatively settled the conflict. It held that the correct interpretation requires the party to explain the delay for the entire continuum—from the date the cause of action accrues (or the judgment is passed, starting the limitation period) until the date the appeal is actually filed. The phrase "within such period" must be read harmoniously with the other phrases in Section 5: "after the prescribed period" and "for not preferring the appeal... within such period." This holistic reading leads to the conclusion that a party must demonstrate "sufficient cause" for not filing the appeal throughout the prescribed limitation period and for the subsequent period of delay.Citation: The Court extensively relied on and affirmed the view in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3612.

II. The Meaning of "Sufficient Cause" and the Shift in Jurisprudence for the State

The Court elaborated on what constitutes "sufficient cause" and specifically addressed the standard applied to the State and its instrumentalities.

• General Principles of "Sufficient Cause":
  The expression "sufficient cause" should receive a liberal construction to advance substantial justice.
  However, this liberality is not for the indolent, the negligent, or those with a lack of bona fides.
  The length of delay is not determinative; the acceptability of the explanation is. A short delay may not be condoned if the explanation is poor, while a long delay may be condoned if the cause is shown to be genuine and compelling.
  Merits of the case are not to be considered at the stage of deciding an application for condonation of delay.

• The Evolution of Law for the State:
  This is a crucial part of the judgment. The Court traced the shift in jurisprudence:
  The Old View: Earlier decisions (e.g., State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani, (1996) 3 SCC 132) granted considerable latitude to the government due to its "bureaucratic machinery" and "impersonal" nature, holding that public interest suffers if government appeals are dismissed on technical grounds.
  The New View (Postmaster General Era): The landmark case of Postmaster General v. Living Media India Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563, marked a paradigm shift. It held that the law of limitation binds everyone equally, including the government. The modernisation of technology means the old excuses of bureaucratic red-tapism are no longer automatically acceptable. The State cannot claim a privileged status.
  The Court affirmed this new view, stating that the State must be held to the same standard as a private litigant. Condonation of delay is an exception, not an anticipated benefit for the government. The Court condemned the tendency of the State to file "certificate cases" – appeals filed belatedly just to obtain a dismissal certificate from the Supreme Court to close the matter.

III. When Can an Appellate Court Interfere with a Discretionary Order on Delay?

The Court outlined the principles governing appellate interference:

• An appellate court should not ordinarily interfere with the discretion exercised by a lower court in condoning delay merely because it might have taken a different view.

• However, interference is justified if the lower court's discretion is exercised capriciously, perversely, or on untenable grounds.

• The appellate court must see if the lower court's view was a plausible one based on the material on record and the law as it existed.

• If the lower court's order is vitiated by a material irregularity, error of law, or a failure to consider relevant factors (like the principles laid down in Postmaster General), the appellate court is duty-bound to interfere.

IV. Application to the Present Case and Final Decision

Applying the above principles, the Supreme Court found the High Court's order condoning the delay of 3966 days to be utterly erroneous and unsustainable.

• The Respondent-KHB's explanation, which blamed a single Executive Engineer for the entire delay, was deemed insufficient to explain an 11-year lapse. The Court found that the KHB itself was lethargic and did not act with due diligence.

• The initiation of disciplinary action against the officer only a month after filing the delay condonation application appeared to be an afterthought to show bona fides.

• The High Court erred by considering the merits of the case (its view that the KHB had a "semblance of right") while deciding the technical question of condonation, which is prohibited.

• The High Court failed to apply the rigorous standards set forth in Postmaster General and subsequent cases, which were already the law when it passed its order in 2017.

Conclusion: 

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal. It set aside the impugned order of the High Court dated 21.03.2017, thereby reviving the High Court's order dismissing the second appeal as barred by limitation. The second appeal filed by the Karnataka Housing Board stood dismissed.