Legal Review and Analysis of X vs Speaker of the House of People & Ors 2026 INSC 65

Synopsis

This judgment addresses a significant and previously unresolved question concerning the procedural safeguards for the removal of a High Court Judge under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968. The core legal conundrum involved the interpretation of the first proviso to Section 3(2) of the Act, which deals with the constitution of an inquiry committee when motions for removal are initiated in both Houses of Parliament on the same day. The petitioner, a Judge, challenged the validity of a committee constituted solely by the Speaker of the Lok Sabha after a parallel motion in the Rajya Sabha was not admitted by its Deputy Chairman. The Supreme Court upheld the Speaker's action, providing a definitive interpretation of the statutory scheme and reinforcing the constitutional framework governing such proceedings.

1. Basic Information of the Judgment

Coram: Dipankar Datta, J. and Satish Chandra Sharma, J. (Division Bench)
Jurisdiction: Civil Original Jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.
Case No.: Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1233 of 2025.
Date of Judgment: January 16, 2026.

2. Legal Framework

The judgment revolves primarily around the following constitutional and statutory provisions:

• Primary Statute: The Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 (the "Inquiry Act").
  Section 3: The central provision outlining the procedure for initiating removal proceedings, admission of motions, and constitution of an inquiry committee.
  First Proviso to Section 3(2): Stipulates that where notices of a motion are given "on the same day in both Houses of Parliament, no Committee shall be constituted unless the motion has been admitted in both Houses and where such motion has been admitted in both Houses, the Committee shall be constituted jointly by the Speaker and the Chairman."
  Second Proviso to Section 3(2): Pertains to notices given on different dates.

• Constitutional Provisions:
  Article 124(4) & (5): Lays down the grounds and parliamentary process for the removal of a Supreme Court Judge, made applicable to High Court Judges via Article 217.
  Article 91: Empowers the Deputy Chairman of the Rajya Sabha to perform the duties of the Chairman's office when it is vacant.
  Article 32: Foundation of the writ jurisdiction invoked by the petitioner.

• Key Precedents Relied Upon:
  Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability v. Union of India (1991): Established that the Inquiry Act is a complete code.
  Sarojini Ramaswami v. Union of India (1992): Clarified the role of the Speaker/Chairman in forming a prima facie opinion.
  P.D. Dinakaran (2) v. Judges Inquiry Committee (2011): Affirmed the discretion of the Presiding Officer in admitting a motion.
  Election Commission of India v. Subramaniam Swamy (1996) & Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary v. Gujarat Coop. Milk Mktg. Federation Ltd. (2015): Expounded on the "doctrine of necessity" and the principle of reading constitutional mandates into statutes.
  Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Sunita Mehra (1998): Emphasized that an order must be expressly challenged in pleadings to be quashed.

3. Relevant Facts of the Case

The factual matrix, crucial to understanding the legal issues, is as follows:

• Allegations of misbehaviour were levelled against the petitioner, a High Court Judge, after a fire at his residence in March 2025 led to the discovery of burnt currency notes.

• A Supreme Court in-house committee found the allegations substantiated and recommended initiation of removal proceedings.

• On July 21, 2025 (the first day of the Monsoon Session), notices of motion for the petitioner's removal were given in both the Lok Sabha (signed by over 100 members) and the Rajya Sabha (signed by over 50 members).

• The Chairman of the Rajya Sabha, noting the possibility of a similar notice in the Lok Sabha, directed the Secretary-General to "take necessary steps" but did not admit the motion. He resigned from office later that day.

• The Deputy Chairman, performing the duties of the Chairman under Article 91, upon scrutiny by the Secretary-General, refused to admit the Rajya Sabha motion on August 11, 2025, citing deficiencies.

• Upon being informed of this refusal, the Speaker of the Lok Sabha admitted the motion in his House on August 12, 2025, and constituted a three-member inquiry committee under Section 3(2) of the Inquiry Act.

• The petitioner challenged the committee's constitution, arguing that since notices were given in both Houses on the same day, the first proviso to Section 3(2) was triggered, mandating a joint committee only if both motions were admitted, and that failure in one House invalidated proceedings in the other.

3. Issues Framed by the Court

The Supreme Court crystallized the following five issues for determination:

1. How must the first proviso to Section 3(2) of the Inquiry Act be construed? Does it require a Joint Committee where notices given on the same day are later refused admission in one House but admitted in the other?

2. Whether the Deputy Chairman of the Rajya Sabha was competent to refuse admission of the notice of motion?

3. What is the effect, if any, of the Deputy Chairman's refusal on the validity of the Speaker's action under Section 3(2)?

4. Whether the draft decision prepared by the Secretary-General of the Rajya Sabha, holding the notice "not in order," was justified in law?

5. Whether the petitioner is entitled to any relief?

4. Ratio Decidendi and Court's Analysis

The Court's reasoning and holdings on each issue constitute the core of the judgment:

Issue I: Interpretation of the First Proviso to Section 3(2)

• Holding: The first proviso applies only to the specific situation where notices given on the same day have been admitted in both Houses. It does not apply where a motion is admitted in one House but refused in the other.

• Reasoning:
  The proviso is "situational, not exhaustive." Its object is to prevent parallel committees and provide an additional safeguard only when both Houses have deemed the motion worthy of admission.
  Interpreting it to mean that rejection in one House automatically kills the process in the other would amount to "judicial legislation." It would grant one House a veto, undermine parliamentary autonomy, and be open to abuse (e.g., members deliberately filing a defective notice in one House to scuttle a genuine process in the other).
  The words "given" and "admitted" in Sections 3(1) and 3(2) are distinct. "Admission" involves a substantive, discretionary decision by the Presiding Officer after consultation and consideration of materials.
  The constitutional safeguard for Judges remains intact at later stages (committee investigation and parliamentary vote). The proviso must balance protection with the effective functioning of the removal mechanism.

Issue II: Competence of the Deputy Chairman

• Holding: The Deputy Chairman was fully competent to consider and refuse the motion.

• Reasoning:
  Article 91(1) of the Constitution is a mandatory provision that fills a constitutional vacuum. When the office of the Chairman is vacant, the Deputy Chairman shall perform its duties.
  The Inquiry Act must be read in harmony with the Constitution. A narrow interpretation of the defined term "Chairman" in the Act, ignoring Article 91, would be "incoherent" and render the Act unworkable during a vacancy.
  The limited roles for Deputies under the Inquiry Rules, 1969 (Rules 16 & 17) pertain to a different stage (post-report) and do not override the constitutional mandate of Article 91.
  Hypothetical concerns about bias (e.g., if the Deputy Chairman were a signatory) can be addressed by recusal or the "doctrine of necessity," which ensures that constitutional machinery does not grind to a halt.

Issue III: Effect of Deputy Chairman's Refusal on Speaker's Action

• Holding: The Speaker's action in constituting the committee was valid and independent of the correctness of the Deputy Chairman's decision.

• Reasoning:
  Since the first proviso was not triggered (no admission in both Houses), the Speaker retained independent authority under the main part of Section 3(2) to constitute a committee upon admitting a motion in his House.
  The Speaker acted lawfully based on the official communication of non-admission from the Rajya Sabha. His power was not contingent on the legality of the other House's decision.
  The petitioner had not challenged the Deputy Chairman's order in his pleadings, a fatal procedural defect as per Sunita Mehra.

Issue IV: Role of the Secretary-General

• Holding (Observational): The Court expressed prima facie reservations about the Secretary-General's draft decision declaring the notice "not in order."

• Reasoning (Observational):
  The Secretary-General appeared to exceed his administrative role by undertaking a quasi-adjudicatory scrutiny of the notice's merits, factual accuracy, and drafting form.
  Neither the Act nor the Rules prescribe a mandatory form for a notice. The power to assess sufficiency for admission rests solely with the Presiding Officer, not the Secretariat.
  The Court cautioned that such overreach by the Secretariat should be avoided in future.

Issue V: Entitlement to Relief

• Holding: The petitioner is not entitled to any relief.

• Reasoning: No fundamental right was infringed. The committee was validly constituted, and the petitioner had ample statutory safeguards during the inquiry process.

4. Legal Principles Established and Clarified

This judgment establishes and reinforces several key legal principles:

• Interpretation of Section 3, Inquiry Act: It creates a clear dichotomy: "giving" a motion is a ministerial act; "admitting" it is a discretionary, substantive decision triggering the inquiry process.

• Operation of the First Proviso: It definitively confines the proviso's application to the "admission in both Houses" scenario, rejecting the theory of an inter-House veto at the motion stage.

• Harmonious Construction with Constitution: It powerfully reiterates that statutory interpretation cannot ignore or override express constitutional mandates (like Article 91). The Constitution fills statutory silences.

• Role of Presiding Officers vs. Secretariat: It demarcates the boundary between the constitutional discretion of the Speaker/Chairman and the administrative, non-adjudicatory function of the parliamentary secretariat.

• Doctrine of Necessity in Constitutional Offices: It affirms the application of this doctrine to ensure the continuity of essential constitutional functions, preventing paralysis due to vacancy or potential conflicts.

5. Critical Analysis and Final Outcome

Critical Analysis:
The judgment is a robust exercise in textual, contextual, and purposive interpretation. It prioritizes the smooth functioning of the constitutional removal process while seeking to protect judicial dignity. By rejecting an interpretation that could lead to abuse and stalemate, the Court has opted for a pragmatic reading of the statute.

However, the Court's strong reliance on the absence of a direct challenge to the Deputy Chairman's order (Issue III) is a formalistic procedural ground that somewhat sidesteps a deeper examination of potential substantive illegality. Furthermore, while the observations on the Secretary-General's role are salutary, they remain obiter dicta and non-binding.

The judgment reinforces parliamentary sovereignty within the removal framework, emphasizing that the Presiding Officers of each House act independently in the admission stage. It carefully balances this with the Judge's safeguards, locating them more in the investigative fairness of the committee and the rigorous parliamentary vote than in the preliminary motion stage.

Final Outcome:
The Supreme Court dismissed the writ petition. It upheld the constitution of the inquiry committee by the Speaker of the Lok Sabha as legal and valid. The removal process against the petitioner was to continue as per the provisions of the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968.

(MCQs)

1. According to the Supreme Court's interpretation in this judgment, the first proviso to Section 3(2) of the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 is triggered only when?
a) Notices of motion are given in both Houses of Parliament.
b) Notices of motion are given in both Houses on the same day.
c) Notices of motion given on the same day are admitted in both Houses.
d) A motion for removal is initiated based on an in-house committee report.

2. The Court held that the Deputy Chairman of the Rajya Sabha was competent to refuse the motion based primarily on?
a) The Judges (Inquiry) Rules, 1969.
b) A direction from the former Chairman.
c) Article 91 of the Constitution of India.
d) The doctrine of legitimate expectation.

3. Which of the following was a key reason the Court gave for NOT accepting the petitioner's interpretation of the first proviso?
a) It would make the Inquiry Act redundant.
b) It would grant the presiding officer of one House a veto over the process initiated validly in the other, potentially leading to abuse.
c) It would violate the fundamental right to equality of the members of Parliament.
d) It was inconsistent with the second proviso to Section 3(2).

4. The Supreme Court made obiter observations criticizing the role played by the?
a) Speaker of the Lok Sabha for delaying the admission.
b) Chief Justice of India for forwarding the in-house committee report.
c) Secretary-General of the Rajya Sabha for undertaking a quasi-adjudicatory scrutiny of the motion.
d) Petitioner for not approaching the High Court first.