AMLESH KUMAR VS. STATE OF BIHAR (2025)

2025 INSC 810 (9 June 2025)

Landmark Supreme Court Judgment on Narco-Analysis Tests

Citation

2025 INSC 810
Criminal Appeal No. ______ of 2025 (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No. 5392 of 2024)

• Bench:
  Constitutional Bench: 2-Judge Bench (Justices Sanjay Karol & Prasanna B. Varale).

• Judgment Date: 9 June 2025.

Key Legal Provisions & Details

• Laws Involved:
  Article 20(3), Constitution of India: Right against self-incrimination.
  Article 21, Constitution of India: Right to life and personal liberty.
  Section 27, Indian Evidence Act, 1872: Admissibility of information discovered from voluntary disclosures.

• Related Precedents:
  Selvi & Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2010) 7 SCC 263 (landmark case banning involuntary tests).
  Sangitaben Shaileshbhai Datana v. State of Gujarat (2019) 14 SCC 522.

Step-wise Explanation of the Judgment

Background of the Case

• An FIR was filed against Amlesh Kumar (husband) and his family for dowry harassment and the mysterious disappearance of his wife (August 2022).

• The Patna High Court allowed the Investigating Officer’s request to conduct narco-analysis tests on all accused persons (including Amlesh) during bail proceedings (November 2023).

• Amlesh appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing this violated his fundamental rights.

Key Issues Decided by the Supreme Court

1. Can courts order narco-analysis tests without consent?
   Ruling: No. Forced tests violate Articles 20(3) (right against self-incrimination) and Article 21 (right to personal liberty).
   Reasoning: The Selvi case (2010) clearly bans involuntary tests. The High Court’s order was illegal.

2. Can voluntary narco-test results alone convict an accused?
   Ruling: No. Results of even voluntary tests cannot be direct evidence.
   Reasoning: Information discovered because of the test (e.g., recovery of weapons) may be admissible under Section 27, Evidence Act, but only if supported by other evidence.

3. Does an accused have an absolute right to demand a narco-test?
   Ruling: No. An accused can volunteer, but courts must ensure:
   Genuine consent (recorded before a magistrate).
   Legal safeguards (access to a lawyer, medical supervision).
   Stage for Test: Only during trial (when accused leads evidence), not investigation.

Critical Observations

• High Court’s Error: Ordering narco-tests during bail hearings is illegal. Bail decisions must consider only:
  Gravity of the crime.
  Evidence strength.
  Risk of witness tampering.

• Modern Techniques vs. Rights: Investigative tools cannot override constitutional rights (Para 12).

• Guidelines for Voluntary Tests: Courts must follow Selvi’s safeguards (Para 21), including:
  Consent before a judicial magistrate.
  Legal counsel during the test.
  Independent medical supervision.

Final Decision

• The Supreme Court set aside the Patna High Court’s order allowing narco-tests.

• Directed the High Court to decide Amlesh’s bail plea without relying on forced tests.

• Allowed the appeal (Para 25).

Conclusion

This judgment reinforces constitutional protections against coercive investigative methods. Key takeaways:

1. Forced narco-tests are unconstitutional – they breach privacy and liberty (Articles 20-21).

2. Voluntary tests have limited value – results alone cannot prove guilt.

3. Courts must prioritize rights – even during complex investigations.

4. Strict safeguards are mandatory for voluntary tests to prevent abuse.

Impact: This ruling upholds the Selvi precedent, ensuring police/investigators cannot use narco-analysis as a shortcut at the cost of fundamental rights.

 ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY V. NARESH AGARWAL & ORS

 2024 INSC 856 (8 November 2024)

Supreme Court Landmark Judgement Summary of Aligarh Muslim University v. Naresh Agarwal & Ors

1. Heading

Landmark Ruling on Minority Educational Institutions under Article 30

2. Citation

• Case Name: Aligarh Muslim University v. Naresh Agarwal & Ors.

• Citation: (2024) INSC 856

• Court: Supreme Court of India

• Decided On: November 8, 2024

3. Subject of the Judgment

Whether Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) qualifies as a minority educational institution under Article 30(1) of the Constitution, granting religious/linguistic minorities the right to establish and administer educational institutions.

4. Key Legal Framework

Constitutional Provisions & Statutes:

• Article 30(1): Right of religious/linguistic minorities to establish and administer educational institutions.

• Article 29(2): Prohibition against discrimination in educational institutions.

• Entry 63, List I (7th Schedule): Grants Parliament exclusive power over AMU, BHU, and Delhi University as "institutions of national importance."

• Aligarh Muslim University Act, 1920: Established AMU; amended in 1951, 1965, and 1981.

• National Commission for Minority Educational Institutions (NCMEI) Act, 2004: Defines and regulates minority institutions.

Constitutional Bench:

• 7-Judge Bench comprising:
  CJI Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud
  Justices Sanjiv Khanna, J.B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, Surya Kant (and two others).

• Overruled: S. Azeez Basha v. Union of India (1968).

• Relied On: TMA Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka (2002), St. Xavier’s College v. Gujarat (1974).

5. Step-wise Explanation of the Judgment

Background

• AMU was founded as Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College (1877) by Muslim reformer Sir Syed Ahmed Khan.

• The AMU Act, 1920 converted it into a university. Post-independence amendments (1951, 1965) diluted its Muslim character (e.g., removing compulsory Islamic education).

• The 1981 Amendment declared AMU was "established by Muslims," restoring its minority claim.

Core Issues Decided

1. Applicability of Article 30 to Pre-Constitution Institutions:
   Universities established before 1950 (like AMU) can claim minority status.
   Overruled Azeez Basha, which held only post-1950 institutions qualify.

2. Meaning of "Establish" under Article 30(1):
   "Establish" = Found, not merely incorporate by statute.
   Key Tests:
   Ideation: Idea must originate from the minority community.
   Purpose: Primarily for the minority’s educational/cultural advancement.
   Implementation: Steps (funding, land acquisition) taken by the minority.

3. Role of Statutory Recognition:
   Incorporation via law (e.g., AMU Act, 1920) does not erase minority character.
   Compliance with legal formalities (e.g., degree recognition) is not surrender of minority rights.

4. "Administer" under Article 30(1):
   Autonomy in management (e.g., appointments, admissions) is protected.
   State regulations (e.g., syllabus, fees) must not undermine minority character.

5. Institutions of National Importance (Entry 63):
   "National importance" ≠ Non-minority status. AMU can be both minority-run and nationally significant.

6. Burden of Proof:
   Minority community must prove establishment via historical evidence (letters, resolutions, funding records).

6. Conclusion

• AMU’s minority status must be decided by a regular bench applying the new tests:
  Was AMU established by Muslims through ideation, purpose, and implementation?
  Did its statutory incorporation (1920 Act) erase minority character?

• Key Outcomes:
  Universities can be minority institutions.
  Pre-1950 institutions qualify under Article 30.
  Overruled Azeez Basha (1968) for its "narrow" reading of "establish."

• Final Decision: Referred back to a smaller bench to examine AMU’s case-specific facts.

Date of Judgment: November 8, 2024

Impact: Empowers minorities to reclaim institutional identity while balancing state regulation. Ensures Article 30 protects both pre- and post-Constitution institutions.

ANJUM KADARI VS UNION OF INDIA

2024 INSC 831 (25 November 2024)

Supreme Court Landmark Judgment Analysis: Anjum Kadari vs Union of India

1. Heading
Supreme Court Upholds Validity of UP Madarsa Act 2004 (Partly), Reverses Allahabad HC Ruling

2. Citation
Anjum Kadari & Anr. vs Union of India & Ors.
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 8541 of 2024 (with connected petitions)
2024 INSC 831
Decided on November 5, 2024

3. Subject of the Judgment
The Supreme Court overturned the Allahabad High Court's decision that struck down the Uttar Pradesh Board of Madarsa Education Act, 2004 (Madarsa Act) as unconstitutional. The Court upheld the Act as valid except for provisions related to higher education degrees (Fazil/Kamil), which conflict with central law.

4. Key Laws, Sections, Acts & Bench Details

• Constitutional Provisions:
  Articles 14, 15, 16 (Equality)
  Articles 25–30 (Religious/Cultural Rights, Minority Institutions)
  Article 21A (Right to Education)
  Article 246 & Seventh Schedule (Legislative Powers)
  Entry 25, List III (Concurrent List: "Education")
  Entry 66, List I (Union List: "Higher Education Standards")

• Statutes:
  Uttar Pradesh Board of Madarsa Education Act, 2004
  University Grants Commission (UGC) Act, 1956 (Section 22)
  Right to Education (RTE) Act, 2009 (Section 1(5))

• Doctrines: Basic Structure, Severability, Substantive Equality.

• Bench: 3-Judge Bench comprising CJI Dr Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, Justice J.B. Pardiwala, and Justice Manoj Misra.

5. Step-wise Explanation of the Judgment

Step 1: Background of the Case

• The Allahabad High Court (March 22, 2024) declared the UP Madarsa Act, 2004 unconstitutional, claiming it violated:
  (i) Secularism (basic structure of the Constitution),
  (ii) Articles 14 (Equality) and 21A (Right to Education).

• The Act established a Board to regulate Madarsa education (syllabus, teacher qualifications, exams) in Uttar Pradesh.

• The High Court ordered all Madarsa students to be shifted to regular schools.

Step 2: Supreme Court's Key Findings

A. Secularism and the Madarsa Act

• Secularism ≠ Anti-Religion: Indian secularism ensures equal treatment of all religions (Articles 14–16, 25–30). Regulating Madarsas does not violate secularism.

• Minority Rights Protected: Article 30(1) allows minorities to establish/administer educational institutions. The Madarsa Act regulates standards but doesn’t interfere with religious instruction.

• No Basic Structure Violation: Laws can’t be struck down for violating "basic structure" (like secularism) unless they breach specific constitutional provisions (e.g., Part III). The Act passed this test.

B. Legislative Validity (Entry 25, List III)

• State’s Power Upheld: Entry 25 of the Concurrent List empowers states to legislate on "education," including Madarsas. Religious instruction in Madarsas doesn’t exclude them from "education."

• UGC Act Conflict: Provisions for Fazil (bachelor’s) and Kamil (master’s) degrees under the Madarsa Act clash with Section 22 of the UGC Act (only UGC-recognized institutions can grant degrees).
  Outcome: These specific provisions were struck down as ultra vires (beyond state’s power).

C. Severability of Unconstitutional Parts

• Doctrine Applied: The rest of the Madarsa Act remains valid. Removing Fazil/Kamil provisions doesn’t destroy the Act’s core purpose: regulating school-level Madarsa education.

• Test from Chamarbaugwalla Case:
  Would the legislature have enacted the Act without the invalid parts? Yes.
  Is the remaining Act workable? Yes (it still regulates primary/secondary education).

D. Article 21A (Right to Education)

• RTE Act Exemption Valid: Section 1(5) of the RTE Act excludes Madarsas from its scope. This is constitutional under Article 30 (minority rights).

• State’s Duty Ensured: The Board can prescribe modern subjects (math, science) to ensure students receive quality education.

E. Positive Secularism & Substantive Equality

• The Act promotes substantive equality: It ensures Madarsa students gain skills to participate in society (e.g., by prescribing NCERT books for science/math).

• The State has a duty to support minority institutions without eroding their identity.

Step 3: High Court’s Errors Corrected

• The High Court wrongly invalidated the entire Act for violating "secularism" without tracing it to a specific constitutional breach.

• It ignored Article 30 protections and the doctrine of severability.

6. Conclusion
On November 5, 2024, the Supreme Court:

1. Partially upheld the UP Madarsa Act, 2004 as constitutionally valid.

2. Struck down only provisions related to higher education (Fazil/Kamil degrees) for conflicting with the UGC Act.

3. Reversed the Allahabad High Court’s order to shut down Madarsas or transfer students.

4. Reaffirmed:
   States can regulate minority educational institutions to ensure education standards.
   Secularism permits religious instruction alongside secular education.
   The Act promotes inclusivity and substantive equality for Muslim students.

Outcome: Madarsas in Uttar Pradesh continue operating under the regulatory framework of the Madarsa Board, except for higher education courses.

BALRAM SINGH VS UNION OF INDIA

2024 INSC 893 (25 November 2025)

Supreme Court Landmark Judgment Analysis: Balram Singh vs Union of India

1. Heading:
Supreme Court Upholds "Socialist" and "Secular" in the Preamble; Dismisses Challenge to 42nd Amendment

2. Citation:
Dr. Balram Singh and Others vs Union of India and Another
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 645 of 2020 (along with connected matters)
2024 INSC 893
Decided on November 25, 2024

3. Subject of the Judgment:
The Supreme Court dismissed petitions challenging the constitutional validity of inserting the words "socialist" and "secular" into the Preamble of the Indian Constitution via the 42nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1976.

4. Key Laws, Sections, Acts & Bench Details:

• Constitutional Provisions Involved:
  Preamble to the Constitution of India (as amended by the 42nd Amendment).
  Article 368: Power of Parliament to amend the Constitution.
  Articles 14, 15, 16: Right to Equality (embodying secular principles).
  Articles 25, 26, 29, 30: Freedom of Religion and Rights of Minorities.
  Article 19(1)(g): Right to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business.
  Article 44: Directive Principle for a Uniform Civil Code.

• Constitutional Amendment Act Challenged:
  The Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976.

• Doctrine Applied: Basic Structure Doctrine (as established in Kesavananda Bharati).

• Bench: Division Bench comprising Justice Sanjiv Khanna and Justice Sanjay Kumar.

• Key Precedents Cited:
  Kesavananda Bharati vs State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 225 (13 Judges) - Established Basic Structure doctrine.
  S.R. Bommai vs Union of India (1994) 3 SCC 1 (9 Judges) - Affirmed Secularism as a Basic Feature.
  R.C. Poudyal vs Union of India (1994) Supp (1) SCC 324 - Explained Secularism.
  M Ismail Faruqui (Dr) vs Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 360 - Elaborated on Indian Secularism.
  Excel Wear vs Union of India (1978) 4 SCC 224 - Discussed impact of 'Socialist' in Preamble.
  Property Owners Association vs State of Maharashtra (2024 INSC 835) (9 Judges) - Clarified economic policy flexibility under Constitution.

5. Explanation of the Judgment (Step-wise):

1. The Petitioners' Challenge: Petitioners filed writ petitions in 2020 challenging the 42nd Amendment (1976) which added the words "socialist" and "secular" (and "integrity") to the Constitution's Preamble. They argued:
   Adding these words retrospectively to the 1949 adopted Preamble created a "falsity".
   The Constituent Assembly deliberately chose not to include these words originally.
   "Socialist" unfairly restricts the economic policy choices available to democratically elected governments.
   The Amendment was passed during the Emergency period (after the normal Lok Sabha term ended on March 18, 1976) and lacked the true sanction of the people's will.

2. Court's Initial Assessment: The Supreme Court found the petitions lacked merit. It stated the flaws in the arguments were "obvious and manifest" and did not warrant a detailed trial.

3. Parliament's Amending Power (Article 368): The Court reaffirmed that Parliament has the unquestionable power under Article 368 to amend the Constitution, and this power extends to the Preamble. While amendments can be challenged for violating the "basic structure," the mere fact that the Constitution was adopted in 1949 does not restrict this amending power. The "retrospectivity" argument was rejected as it would undermine all constitutional amendments.

4. "Secularism" is a Basic Feature: The Court emphasized:
   Although the Constituent Assembly didn't include the word "secular" in 1949, the core principles of secularism (state neutrality towards religion, equal treatment of all faiths, religious freedom) were always embedded in Articles 14, 15, 16, 25, 26, 29, and 30.
   Indian secularism means the state has no official religion, guarantees equal freedom of conscience and religion to all, and treats citizens equally regardless of faith.
   Numerous judgments (Kesavananda Bharati, S.R. Bommai, R.C. Poudyal, M Ismail Faruqui) have consistently held that secularism is a basic feature of the Constitution. Adding the word in 1976 merely made explicit what was already inherent.

5. "Socialism" in the Indian Context: The Court clarified:
   "Socialism" in the Indian Preamble does not mandate a specific economic policy (like state ownership of all means of production).
   It signifies the State's commitment to being a welfare state and ensuring equality of opportunity and social and economic justice.
   It does not fetter the choice of economic policies (like mixed economy, liberalization) by elected governments. The Indian economy has always involved significant private sector participation (protected under Article 19(1)(g)).
   The recent 9-judge bench decision in Property Owners Association confirmed the Constitution allows elected governments flexibility in economic governance models.

6. Validity of 42nd Amendment During Emergency: The Court noted that concerns about the Amendment being passed during the Emergency and the extended Lok Sabha term were previously debated during the consideration of the 44th Amendment Act (1978). The inclusion of the words was scrutinized but ultimately retained. The circumstances of its passage did not, in itself, invalidate it.

7. Delay in Challenging (44 Years): The Court found it significant that the challenge was filed 44 years after the amendment. By this time, the terms "socialist" and "secular" had achieved widespread acceptance and understanding among the people of India ("We, the people of India"). The additions had demonstrably not restricted legislative or policy actions of elected governments, provided they didn't violate fundamental rights or the basic structure.

6. Conclusion:

The Supreme Court, on November 25, 2024, dismissed the writ petitions challenging the inclusion of "socialist" and "secular" in the Preamble. The Court conclusively held that:

1. Parliament's power to amend the Constitution under Article 368 validly extends to the Preamble.

2. The principles of secularism were always an integral part of the Constitution's basic structure, even before the word was explicitly added in 1976.

3. The term "socialist" signifies India's commitment to being a welfare state ensuring social and economic justice, but it does not impose a rigid economic model or prevent policy choices favoring private enterprise within a mixed economy.

4. The arguments regarding the amendment's passage during the Emergency and alleged retrospectivity were unsustainable.

5. A challenge filed 44 years after the amendment, when the concepts have become fundamental to India's constitutional identity and widely understood by its citizens, lacked legitimate justification.

The dismissal reaffirmed the settled constitutional position that "socialist" and "secular" are valid, integral parts of the Preamble reflecting core features of the Indian Republic.

CENTRAL ORGANISATION FOR RAILWAY ELECTRIFICATION VS. M/S ECI SPIC SMO MCML (JV)

2025 INSC 857 (16 July 2025)

Landmark Supreme Court Judgment on Arbitrator Impartiality in Government Contracts

1. Heading

Central Organisation for Railway Electrification vs. M/s ECI SPIC SMO MCML (JV)

2. Citation

(2025) INSC 857 (Supreme Court of India)

3. Subject of the Judgment

Validity of arbitration clauses allowing government entities to unilaterally appoint arbitrators or curate arbitrator panels in public contracts.

4. Key Details

• Date of Judgment: 16 July 2025

• Constitutional Bench: 5-Judge Bench led by Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, CJI

• Related Laws:
  Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Sections 11, 12(5), 18)
  Seventh Schedule (Arbitrator Ineligibility Criteria)
  Indian Contract Act, 1872 (Section 23: Unlawful Agreements)
  Constitution of India (Article 14: Equality)

• Precedents Referenced:
  Voestalpine Schienen GmbH v. DMRC (2017)
  TRF Ltd. v. Energo Engineering (2017)
  Perkins Eastman v. HSCC (2019)
  CORE v. ECI-SPIC-SMO-MCML (2019)

5. Step-by-Step Explanation of the Judgment

A. Background of the Case

• Disputes arose between Central Organisation for Railway Electrification (CORE) and a private contractor (ECI-SPIC-SMO-MCML JV).

• The arbitration clause in their contract allowed:
  Railways to prepare a panel of 4 retired railway officers.
  Contractor to suggest 2 names from this panel.
  Railways’ General Manager to appoint 1 from these 2 as contractor’s nominee + 2 other arbitrators (including the presiding officer).

• Contractor challenged this as biased and violating equality.

B. Key Issues Decided

1. Whether unilateral arbitrator appointments by government entities are valid.

2. Whether the "equality principle" (Section 18, Arbitration Act) applies at the appointment stage.

3. Whether such clauses violate Article 14 of the Constitution.

C. Court’s Analysis

(I) Equality in Arbitrator Appointments (Section 18)

• Section 18 (equal treatment of parties) applies from the appointment stage, not just during proceedings.

• Unilateral control (e.g., Railways curating panels) violates equality:
  Restricts the contractor’s choice.
  Creates "justifiable doubts" about impartiality (Section 12(5)).

• Counter-Balancing Test:
  Mutual appointments (e.g., both parties picking arbitrators) balance influence.
  Unilateral appointments (like in this case) lack this balance.

(II) Doctrine of Bias

• Nemo Judex Rule: No one can be a judge in their own cause.

• Real Likelihood of Bias Test:
  If a party with a stake in the dispute appoints arbitrators, bias is presumed.
  Example: Railways appointing retired employees risks loyalty conflicts.

• Seventh Schedule:
  Current employees/consultants of a party are automatically disqualified as arbitrators.
  Retired officers not automatically barred unless linked to the dispute.

(III) Public Contracts & Public Policy

• Government entities must follow Article 14 (non-arbitrariness) in contracts.

• Unconscionable Clauses:
  Clauses giving one party exclusive control over appointments are "unfair" and "opposed to public policy" (Indian Contract Act, Section 23).
  US Jurisprudence Cited: Similar clauses struck down for violating "fundamental fairness" (Hooters of America v. Phillips).

D. Overruling of Past Judgments

• CORE (2019) Invalidated:
  Earlier allowed Railways’ panel-based appointments.
  New ruling: Such clauses violate Section 18 and Article 14.

• Voestalpine (2017) Clarified:
  Broad-based panels are acceptable, but parties cannot be forced to choose from them.

E. Conclusion & Directives

1. Unilateral Appointments Void: Clauses letting one party (especially government) appoint sole arbitrators or curate exclusive panels are invalid.

2. Prospective Application:
   New rule applies to future disputes and cases where arbitrator not yet appointed.
   Past awards under such clauses not reopened.

3. Waiver Allowed: Parties may expressly waive impartiality requirements after disputes arise (Proviso to Section 12(5)).

4. Government Advisory: PSUs/Railways must amend arbitration clauses to ensure equal participation in arbitrator appointments.

Key Quote from the Judgment

"Party autonomy cannot override the fundamental principles of impartiality and equality. A clause handing absolute control to one party corrodes the very foundation of arbitration."
– Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, CJI

Impact: This judgment ensures private contractors get a fair voice in arbitrator selection, balancing power dynamics in government contracts. It reinforces arbitration as a neutral forum, free from institutional bias.