Federalism Challenges In Centre–State Environmental Conflicts

Abstract

The Indian Constitution establishes a federal structure, dividing legislative and executive powers between the Union (Centre) and the States through the Union, State, and Concurrent Lists. However, environmental governance, a critical domain in the 21st century, does not find an explicit, dedicated entry in any of these lists. This constitutional ambiguity has become the epicentre of persistent and escalating conflicts between the Centre and the States. This article delves into the intricate challenges that Indian federalism faces in managing environmental conflicts. It begins by examining the constitutional schema, highlighting how environmental jurisdiction is inferred from a mosaic of entries related to land, water, forests, and industries, leading to overlapping competencies. The analysis then progresses to the centralizing tendencies evident in Parliament's use of its residuary powers and the dominance of the Union in Concurrent List subjects, often sidestepping state priorities. Key flashpoints are explored in detail, including conflicts over major developmental projects, the distribution of natural resources, the implementation of nationally determined environmental standards, and the management of inter-state rivers. The article further investigates the role of institutions like the National Green Tribunal and the complexities introduced by global environmental commitments, which are negotiated by the Centre but often implemented by the States. The conclusion argues that the current model of "cooperative federalism" is frequently strained, giving way to a "combative federalism." It proposes a recalibration of the Centre–State dynamic towards a more collaborative, trust-based model that respects the principle of subsidiarity, ensuring that India's environmental imperatives and developmental aspirations are met within a robust and genuinely cooperative federal framework.

1. Introduction

India, as a "Union of States," operates under a constitutional framework that meticulously delineates power between the central government and the constituent states. This division, enshrined in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, is the bedrock of Indian federalism. Yet, the framers of the Constitution, crafting the document in the mid-20th century, could not have fully anticipated the complex, transboundary, and existential nature of environmental challenges that would emerge in the decades to follow. Consequently, the term "environment" is conspicuously absent from the Union, State, or Concurrent Lists. This initial omission has created a fertile ground for continuous interpretation, negotiation, and, frequently, conflict.

The environment, by its very nature, defies artificial political boundaries. Air pollution, river contamination, forest degradation, and loss of biodiversity are problems that spill across state borders, necessitating a national, or at least a regional, approach. Simultaneously, the physical components of the environment—land, water, forests—are intimately tied to the lives and livelihoods of local populations, making state and local governments crucial stakeholders in their management. This inherent duality—the need for centralized standard-setting and the imperative of decentralized management—lies at the heart of Centre–State environmental conflicts.

The post-liberalization era in India, marked by rapid industrialization and ambitious infrastructure projects, has intensified these conflicts. Large projects like dams, mining operations, power plants, and industrial corridors often promise national economic benefits but impose localized environmental and social costs. The Centre, armed with laws like the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, and agencies like the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEFCC) and its regulatory arms, often approves such projects. However, the implementation, monitoring, and, crucially, the political fallout of these decisions rest primarily with the state governments.

This article argues that the existing framework of environmental federalism in India is fraught with challenges that stem from constitutional ambiguities, legislative centralization, institutional overlaps, and competing political economies. It posits that while a strong central role is justified for transboundary issues and setting national minimum standards, the current system often marginalizes state concerns, leading to adversarial relations, implementation deficits, and ultimately, suboptimal environmental outcomes. The article will explore the constitutional foundations of this conflict, analyse its key manifestations, evaluate the role of judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, and consider the impact of international environmentalism, before concluding with potential pathways towards a more harmonious and effective federal environmental governance model.

2. The Constitutional Schema: A Patchwork of Jurisdictions

The distribution of legislative power in India is governed by the Seventh Schedule, which contains three lists: List-I (Union List), List-II (State List), and List-III (Concurrent List). The absence of a specific "environment" entry has meant that both the Union and State governments derive their authority from a patchwork of related entries.

2.1. The State List (List-II): The Foundation of Local Control

States possess primary authority over subjects that are intrinsically linked to the environment. Key entries include:

• Entry 6: Public health and sanitation.

• Entry 14: Agriculture.

• Entry 18: Land, that is, rights in or over land, land tenures, etc.

• Entry 21: Fisheries.

• Entry 23: Regulation of mines and mineral development subject to the provisions of List I with respect to regulation and development under the control of the Union.

These entries provide states with significant control over the day-to-day management of natural resources. Land acquisition, agricultural practices, water use for irrigation, and public health are all state subjects, giving them substantial leverage over projects that impact these domains.

2.2. The Union List (List-I): The Levers of Centralized Power

The Union government's environmental jurisdiction is derived from entries that allow it to regulate activities of national importance and transboundary nature.

• Entry 52: Industries (the Union can control any industry it declares to be of public interest).

• Entry 53: Regulation and development of oilfields and mineral oil resources.

• Entry 54: Regulation of mines and mineral development to the extent to which such regulation and development under the control of the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest.

• Entry 56: Regulation and development of inter-state rivers and river valleys.

• Entry 97: Residuary powers of legislation (any matter not enumerated in List II or List III).

The residuary power (Entry 97) is particularly potent. It was under this entry that Parliament enacted the landmark Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 (EPA), following the Bhopal Gas Tragedy. The EPA grants the central government sweeping powers to take all measures it deems necessary for "protecting and improving the quality of the environment and preventing, controlling and abating environmental pollution." This includes the power to set nationwide standards, regulate industrial locations, and manage hazardous substances.

2.3. The Concurrent List (List-III): The Arena of Conflict

The Concurrent List contains subjects on which both the Centre and States can legislate. In case of a conflict, the central law prevails. Key environmental-related entries include:

• Entry 17A: Forests.

• Entry 17B: Protection of wild animals and birds.

• Entry 20: Economic and social planning.

• Entry 29: Prevention of the extension from one State to another of infectious or contagious diseases or pests affecting men, animals or plants.

The inclusion of "Forests" and "Protection of wild animals and birds" in the Concurrent List via the 42nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1976, was a pivotal moment. It signalled a shift towards greater centralization in environmental management. This move brought crucial laws like the Indian Forest Act (1927), the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972, and the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980, firmly under the potential dominance of the Union, setting the stage for frequent clashes over forest land diversion for development projects.

3. The Legislative and Executive Centralization of Environmental Governance

The constitutional framework, while appearing balanced, has been operationalized in a manner that heavily favours the Centre. This centralization is evident in several key legislative and executive mechanisms.

3.1. The Dominance of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986

The EPA is the umbrella legislation for environmental protection in India. Its broad and often ambiguous language grants the central government unparalleled authority. Key instruments under the EPA that centralize power include:

Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Notification, 2006: This is the cornerstone of environmental clearance for projects. The notification categorizes projects and requires them to seek clearance from either the central (for large, sensitive projects) or state-level authorities. However, the criteria, process, and terms of reference are dictated by the Centre. States often complain that they are reduced to mere implementing agencies, with limited say in the appraisal of projects that have profound implications for their territory.

Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ) Notifications: The regulation of activities along India's vast coastline is entirely governed by central notifications, often leading to conflicts with coastal states that have their own developmental plans and ecological concerns, as seen in the conflicts between the Kerala government and the Centre regarding the CRZ norms.

Setting of Standards: The power to set national ambient air and water quality standards, and emission standards for industries, rests solely with the Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB), which is under the MoEFCC. While State Pollution Control Boards (SPCBs) are responsible for enforcement, they must adhere to the standards set by the CPCB, even if local conditions warrant a different approach.

3.2. The Role of the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980

Originally enacted to curb the rapid diversion of forest land for non-forest purposes, the FCA requires central government approval for any such diversion. This has become a major flashpoint. State governments, seeking to facilitate mining, irrigation, or infrastructure projects, must seek permission from the Centre. The process is often protracted, and states perceive it as an infringement on their rights over land (a State List subject). They argue that the Centre uses this power to delay or block projects for political reasons, unrelated to environmental concerns.

3.3. The Delegated Legislation Dilemma

A significant amount of environmental law exists in the form of rules, notifications, and orders issued by the central government under the authority of parent acts like the EPA. This delegated legislation allows the executive to make significant policy changes without parliamentary debate, further consolidating power in the hands of the Union executive and reducing the scope for state legislatures to influence national environmental policy.

4. Key Flashpoints of Centre–State Environmental Conflict

The theoretical centralization of power manifests in concrete, often highly politicized, conflicts. Several key areas exemplify the tensions in environmental federalism.

4.1. Major Developmental Projects and Environmental Clearances

This is the most visible arena of conflict. Large projects like dams, nuclear power plants, and highways are often conceived by the Centre or large corporate entities and require environmental, forest, and wildlife clearances from central agencies.

» The Tehri Dam Project (Uttarakhand): The project faced immense opposition from the state government and local communities on environmental and rehabilitation grounds, yet was pushed through by the Centre.

» The Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant (Tamil Nadu): Widespread protests by local communities, with tacit support from the state government at the time, highlighted the conflict between national energy security priorities and local apprehensions about safety and livelihoods. The state government was caught between supporting its people and acquiescing to central pressure.

» Mining in Tribal Areas (Various States): In states like Odisha, Jharkhand, and Chhattisgarh, the Centre's approval for mining in dense forest areas, often habitats for tribal communities, has pitted the economic interests of the state (which receives royalties) and the developmental agenda of the Centre against the environmental and social welfare responsibilities of both.

4.2. Inter-State River Water Disputes

While Entry 56 of the Union List gives the Centre the power to regulate inter-state rivers, the actual allocation and use of water is a state subject. This has led to some of India's most intractable conflicts.

» Cauvery River Dispute: The long-standing dispute between Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, and Puducherry over the sharing of Cauvery waters is a classic example. The Centre's reluctance to establish a decisive mechanism for decades, and the subsequent formation of the Cauvery Water Management Authority by the Centre, demonstrates the complex interplay of hydro-politics, where the Centre is often seen as partisan by the competing states.

» Mullaperiyar Dam Issue: The dispute between Kerala and Tamil Nadu over the safety and water level of the Mullaperiyar Dam involves conflicting concerns—Tamil Nadu's need for water for irrigation and Kerala's fear of a dam break—that the Centre has struggled to mediate effectively.

4.3. Distribution of Natural Resources and Fiscal Federalism

The royalties from minerals and other natural resources are a significant source of revenue for many states. However, the regulation of major mines is under central control.

» Coal Block Allocations: The controversy over the allocation of coal blocks, which was later struck down by the Supreme Court, highlighted the tension between the Centre's power to allocate national resources and the states' rights over the land from which these resources are extracted.

» Goods and Services Tax (GST) on Natural Resources: The subsumption of various local taxes into the GST regime has impacted the fiscal autonomy of states in managing their natural resources, though a constitutional mechanism (GST Council) exists for decision-making.

4.4. Implementation of National Environmental Standards

The CPCB sets national standards, but the SPCBs are responsible for enforcement. This creates a classic principal-agent problem.

» Under-resourced SPCBs: Many SPCBs are understaffed and underfunded, lacking the technical and financial capacity to effectively monitor and enforce standards.

» Political Pressure on SPCBs: State governments, eager to promote industrial growth within their borders, may exert political pressure on SPCBs to go soft on polluting industries. This leads to a "race to the bottom," where states compete for investment by offering lax environmental enforcement, undermining the national standards set by the Centre.

» The Issue of Stubble Burning: The problem of air pollution in the National Capital Region due to stubble burning in neighbouring states (Punjab, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh) is a stark example. The Centre issues directives, but the onus of providing alternatives to farmers and enforcing bans falls on the state governments, leading to blame games and ineffective solutions.

5. The Role of Adjudicatory and Quasi-Judicial Bodies

The judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court of India, and specialized tribunals have played a profound role in shaping environmental federalism, often stepping into the vacuum created by legislative and executive indecision.

5.1. The Supreme Court and the Expansion of Central Power

Through Public Interest Litigation (PIL), the Supreme Court has often reinforced the central government's authority to protect the environment.

• In the M.C. Mehta cases (ranging from Ganga pollution to vehicular emissions in Delhi), the Court has consistently directed the central government to frame regulations and enforce them, validating the expansive use of the EPA.

• In the Godavarman Thirumulpad case (1996), the Supreme Court's continuing mandamus effectively led to the creation of a centralized forest governance regime, with the Court itself monitoring the diversion of forest land across the country, further curtailing the discretion of state governments.

While these interventions have been crucial for environmental protection, they have also, arguably, tilted the federal balance further towards the Centre by creating a parallel, judiciary-driven governance structure.

5.2. The National Green Tribunal (NGT)

Established in 2010, the NGT provides a specialized forum for the expeditious disposal of environmental disputes. Its jurisdiction extends to all civil cases involving a "substantial question relating to the environment." The NGT's orders are binding and it has the power to penalize non-compliance. However, its relationship with states is complex.

• Overriding State Authority: The NGT frequently issues orders to state governments, directing them to shut down polluting industries, clean up rivers, or enforce solid waste management rules. States sometimes resist these orders, viewing them as an infringement on their executive domain.

• Federal Imbalance in Structure: The NGT's principal bench is in Delhi, with zonal benches in other regions. Some critics argue that this centralizes environmental adjudication, making it less accessible for local communities and state agencies.

6. The Impact of International Environmentalism

In an increasingly globalized world, international environmental commitments add another layer of complexity to Centre–State relations.

6.1. International Negotiations are a Central Subject

Entering into international treaties and agreements is the exclusive prerogative of the Union government (Entry 10 of the Union List). India is a signatory to major multilateral environmental agreements like the Paris Agreement on climate change, the Convention on Biological Diversity, and the UN Sustainable Development Goals.

6.2. The Implementation Gap

The challenge arises in implementing these international commitments. The Centre sets national targets, such as Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) for reducing greenhouse gas emissions or expanding forest cover. However, the actual policies to achieve these targets—promoting renewable energy, afforestation, sustainable agriculture—require action at the state level. States may have different capacities and priorities. For instance, a coal-rich state may be reluctant to phase out fossil fuels, while a coastal state may bear the brunt of implementing climate adaptation measures. The Centre rarely consults states meaningfully during international negotiations, leading to a "top-down" implementation model that often lacks buy-in from the states.

7. Towards a Collaborative Federalism for Environmental Governance

The persistent conflicts underscore the inadequacy of the current model. A recalibration is necessary to move from a combative to a genuinely cooperative federalism. This would involve several key reforms:

7.1. Strengthening Inter-State Institutions

Bodies like the Inter-State Council, which is a constitutional forum for discussing Centre–State issues, should be revitalized to have dedicated dialogues on environmental and resource-sharing conflicts.

7.2. Reforming the Environmental Clearance Process

While a national framework is essential, the process should be decentralized to the maximum possible extent. State-level Environment Impact Assessment Authorities (SEIAAs) should be granted more autonomy and their capacity built so that they can appraise a larger category of projects with greater sensitivity to local ecological and social conditions.

7.3. Enhancing Fiscal Federalism for Environment

The Finance Commission can play a proactive role by earmarking grants for environmental protection to states, creating fiscal incentives for good environmental performance. States that achieve higher forest cover or better air quality indices could be rewarded with additional funds.

7.4. Embracing the Principle of Subsidiarity

This principle dictates that decisions should be taken at the lowest competent level of governance. The Centre should focus on macro-level policy, standard-setting for transboundary issues, and scientific research. Management, enforcement, and tailoring solutions to local contexts should be the primary responsibility of the states, with support from the Centre.

7.5. Promoting Dialogue and Trust-Building

Ultimately, the solution lies not just in legal and institutional reforms but in fostering a culture of trust and collaboration. Regular, structured dialogues between the MoEFCC, state environment ministers, and technical experts can help align national goals with state-level realities.

8. Conclusion

The challenges of federalism in managing Centre–State environmental conflicts in India are deep-rooted, stemming from a constitutional architecture that was not designed for the ecological crises of the modern era. The subsequent legislative and judicial trends have overwhelmingly centralized environmental governance, often with justifiable intentions of ensuring uniform protection and managing transboundary impacts. However, this centralization has come at a cost. It has frequently alienated state governments, created implementation deficits, and fostered an adversarial relationship that is detrimental to both environmental and developmental goals.

The environment is a shared, collective responsibility. Its effective governance cannot be achieved by the diktat of the Centre nor through the uncoordinated actions of individual states. The path forward lies in reimagining Indian environmental federalism as a partnership of equals, where the Centre provides leadership, scientific expertise, and a framework of minimum national standards, while the states are empowered as the primary managers of their natural resources, with the autonomy and capacity to innovate and implement context-specific solutions. Only through such a collaborative, trust-based, and principled approach, grounded in the spirit of cooperative federalism, can India hope to navigate the treacherous waters of sustainable development in the 21st century.

Here are some questions and answers on the topic:

1. Question: The Indian Constitution does not explicitly mention 'Environment' in any of the three lists. How has this constitutional ambiguity shaped the dynamics of environmental governance and led to conflicts between the Centre and the States?

Answer: The absence of an explicit 'Environment' entry in the Union, State, or Concurrent Lists has created a jurisdictional vacuum that both the Centre and States have sought to fill by interpreting other, related entries in the Seventh Schedule. This has resulted in a patchwork of overlapping authorities where the lines of power are blurred. The Union government has aggressively used its residuary powers under Entry 97 of the Union List to enact overarching legislation like the Environment (Protection) Act of 1986, which grants it sweeping powers to set national standards and regulate projects. Simultaneously, States legitimately claim authority over subjects intrinsically linked to the environment, such as land, water, agriculture, and public health, which are enshrined in the State List. This constitutional ambiguity has become the foundational source of conflict, as the Centre's use of broad, inferred powers to push national projects or standards often directly encroaches upon the States' domain of local governance and resource management, leading to disputes over who has the ultimate authority in specific environmental matters.

2. Question: The Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980, is a major flashpoint in Centre-State relations. Why does this particular law generate so much tension, and what does this conflict reveal about the broader challenges of Indian federalism?

Answer: The Forest (Conservation) Act generates intense tension because it places a central governmental approval mechanism on top of a subject—land—that is unequivocally a state subject under the Constitution. State governments own and manage their forest land, but the FCA strips them of the power to decide its use for non-forest purposes, requiring them to seek permission from the Central government in New Delhi. This creates a classic federal conflict where the state's autonomy over a primary resource is subordinated to a central license raj. The conflict reveals a broader challenge: the Centre's legitimate goal of conserving a national resource like forests often clashes with the States' need for economic development, revenue generation from mining or industry, and addressing local livelihood issues. States often perceive the central clearance process as protracted, politically motivated, and insensitive to their specific developmental contexts, making them feel like mere land-owning subordinates rather than equal partners in federal governance.

3. Question: How does the implementation of nationally determined environmental standards, such as air and water quality norms, expose the principal-agent problem in Indian environmental federalism?

Answer: The implementation of national standards exposes a severe principal-agent problem where the Central Pollution Control Board, as the principal, sets uniform environmental standards for the entire country, but the State Pollution Control Boards, as the agents, are responsible for their on-the-ground enforcement. This structure is fraught with challenges because the SPCBs are institutionally and financially under the control of the state governments, whose primary focus may often be industrial promotion and economic growth rather than environmental regulation. Consequently, a state government, eager to attract investment, may exert political pressure on its SPCB to adopt a lenient approach towards polluting industries, creating a 'race to the bottom' among states competing for business. This leads to a significant enforcement deficit, where national standards exist on paper but are weakly implemented locally, demonstrating a critical failure in the federal chain of command and accountability.

4. Question: In what ways do international environmental commitments, such as the Paris Agreement on climate change, create additional layers of complexity in Centre-State environmental relations?

Answer: International environmental commitments add complexity because the power to negotiate and sign treaties rests solely with the Union government under the Constitution, but the responsibility for fulfilling the promises made in those treaties often falls disproportionately on the states. For instance, when the Centre commits to national targets for renewable energy capacity or forest cover, the actual implementation requires state governments to alter their land-use policies, energy mixes, and agricultural practices. A coal-rich state like Jharkhand or Chhattisgarh may be expected to phase down fossil fuel use, while a coastal state like Odisha or Kerala must implement climate adaptation measures, all in service of a national commitment they had little role in shaping. This creates a top-down dynamic where the Centre dictates targets without adequate consultation, leading to a lack of ownership and potential resistance from states who bear the socio-economic costs of this green transition, thereby straining federal solidarity.

5. Question: The Supreme Court and the National Green Tribunal have played an active role in environmental governance. How have their interventions impacted the traditional balance of power between the Centre and the States in this domain?

Answer: The interventions of the Supreme Court and the National Green Tribunal have significantly altered the federal balance by creating a parallel, judiciary-driven governance structure that often centralizes environmental decision-making. Through Public Interest Litigations, the Supreme Court, in cases like the Godavarman matter on forest conservation or the M.C. Mehta cases on pollution, has issued continuous mandates that effectively micromanage forest and environmental policy across the country, sidelining both central and state executives. Similarly, the NGT, through its binding orders, frequently directs state governments to clean rivers, manage waste, or shut down industries. While these judicial interventions have been crucial for advancing environmental protection, they have also diminished the discretionary space of state governments. States often view these orders as judicial overreach into their executive domain, compelling them to comply with directives from a central tribunal without sufficient consideration for local contexts or capacities, thereby further tilting the federal balance towards a centralized model of environmental control.

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