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Case Snapshot
Case Name: Waris v. State of Madhya Pradesh
Citation: 2026 INSC 1050
Bench: Justice Vikram Nath, Justice Sandeep Mehta, and Justice Vijay Bishnoi
Date of Judgment: September 24, 2026
Area of Law: Criminal Law — Rape and Murder of Child — Death Penalty — Rarest of Rare Doctrine — Sentencing
The Judgment in One Line
The Supreme Court upheld the conviction for raping and murdering a six-year-old child but commuted the death sentence to imprisonment for the remainder of natural life without remission.
Why this Judgement Matters
This judgment is a significant reaffirmation of the principle that the death penalty is reserved only for the rarest of rare cases where the possibility of reformation is completely excluded. The Supreme Court held that even in a heinous crime involving the rape and murder of a child by her stepfather, the death sentence cannot be imposed if the State fails to prove that the accused is beyond reform. The Court also clarified that the mitigating circumstances of the criminal must be given equal weight as the aggravating circumstances of the crime. The judgment underscores the importance of the intermediate sentencing option of life imprisonment without remission, which is "second only to death."
Background
The appellant, Waris, married the victim's mother in 2017. The victim was the wife's daughter from her first marriage, then about five years old. The prosecution alleged that Waris repeatedly sexually assaulted the child within the matrimonial home and threatened the mother when she objected.
On the night of April 21, 2018, Waris allegedly raped the child. Her condition deteriorated over the next two days. On April 23, 2018, when the mother heard the child scream, she saw Waris throttling her with both hands. The child died soon after. The post-mortem confirmed death by asphyxia due to throttling and a fresh tear at the fourchette, indicative of sexual assault.
The Trial Court convicted Waris under Sections 376(2)(f), 376(2)(n), 376AB, 302, and 201 IPC, and Sections 5 and 6 of the POCSO Act. He was sentenced to death. The High Court affirmed the conviction and sentence. Waris appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issues Before the Court
Whether the conviction of the appellant for rape and murder of the child was sustainable.
Whether the death sentence imposed by the courts below was justified or warranted commutation.
Whether the procedure for sentencing under Section 235(2) CrPC was properly followed.
Whether the possibility of reformation of the appellant was excluded by the State.
What Did the Supreme Court Hold?
Conviction Upheld
The Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the prosecution had established the offences beyond reasonable doubt.
The ocular testimony of the mother (PW-1), the sole eyewitness, was found reliable and corroborated by medical evidence, the victim's disclosure admissible under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, the call detail record, and the extra-judicial confession.
The Court rejected the defence of alibi, the counter-narrative of DW-3, and the plea of fabrication.
The Court also rejected the attack on the investigation, holding that defects in investigation do not benefit the accused where the evidence is otherwise reliable.
Death Sentence Commuted
The Court held that the Trial Court erred in imposing the death sentence on the same day as conviction, without affording a meaningful opportunity under Section 235(2) CrPC.
The Court applied the principles of Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, holding that the death sentence is reserved for the rarest of rare cases where the alternative of life imprisonment is unquestionably foreclosed.
The Court found that the aggravating circumstances (extreme youth of the victim, breach of trust, sustained abuse, denial of medical aid, instrumental silencing) were grave.
However, the mitigating circumstances (childhood deprivation, absence of criminal antecedents, satisfactory conduct in custody, family ties) were genuine and substantial.
The State led no evidence to establish that the appellant was beyond reformation.
The Court also emphasised that the High Court erred in assessing the "criminal test" at zero per cent, which effectively declined to weigh the mitigating circumstances.
Intermediate Sentence Adequate
The Court held that the sentence of imprisonment for the remainder of natural life, without remission, would adequately meet the ends of justice.
This sentence would confine the appellant for the whole of his remaining life, protect society, and preserve the possibility of reform.
The Court commuted the death sentence to imprisonment for the remainder of natural life without remission.
Key Legal Principles
Death penalty is exception: Under Section 354(3) CrPC, life imprisonment is the rule and death is the exception, reserved for the rarest of rare cases.
Crime test and criminal test: The sentencing inquiry requires weighing both the aggravating circumstances of the crime and the mitigating circumstances of the criminal.
Reformation must be excluded: The death sentence can be imposed only if the possibility of reformation is completely excluded by the State.
Intermediate sentencing option: Life imprisonment for the remainder of natural life, without remission, is a valid and often adequate alternative to death.
Section 235(2) CrPC: The accused must be afforded a meaningful opportunity to place mitigating material before the sentence is imposed; same-day conviction and sentencing is improper.
Burden on State: The State bears the burden of proving that the accused is beyond reform.
Mitigating circumstances construed liberally: The court must give full and generous weight to mitigating circumstances.
Important Precedents
Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980): Constitution Bench held that death penalty is permissible only in rarest of rare cases and that mitigating circumstances must be given full weight. Relied upon.
Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab (1983): Identified categories of cases warranting death penalty and directed drawing up a balance sheet of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Relied upon.
Shankar Kisanrao Khade v. State of Maharashtra (2013): Formulated the crime test, criminal test, and rarest of rare test. Relied upon.
Union of India v. V. Sriharan (2016): Affirmed the availability of the intermediate sentence of life imprisonment for the remainder of natural life without remission. Relied upon.
Manoj v. State of M.P. (2023): Emphasised the need for individualised sentencing and consideration of the probability of reformation. Relied upon.
Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik v. State of Maharashtra (2019): Held that the probability of reformation must be considered before imposing death penalty. Relied upon.
Lochan Shrivas v. State of Chhattisgarh (2022): Death sentence for rape and murder of child commuted. Relied upon.
Irappad Siddappa Murgannavar v. State of Karnataka (2025): Death sentence for rape and murder of girl child commuted to 30 years without remission. Relied upon.
Practical Impact
For advocates, this judgment provides a comprehensive framework for challenging death sentences in cases involving heinous crimes against children. It reinforces that even the gravest crimes do not automatically warrant death if the possibility of reformation exists. The judgment will be cited in death penalty appeals and sentencing hearings. For litigants, it offers hope that even in cases involving horrific crimes, the law requires a nuanced, individualised sentencing inquiry. For law students, it is a masterclass in the application of the rarest of rare doctrine and the importance of procedural compliance under Section 235(2) CrPC.
Lawcurb Quick Insight
The Supreme Court held that the High Court's assessment of the "criminal test" at zero per cent was an error, as it effectively declined to weigh the mitigating circumstances. This highlights that even in heinous crimes, the criminal must be assessed as a person.
Lawcurb Practice Note
In death penalty cases, always file a comprehensive mitigation report with details of the accused's background, conduct in custody, and psychological evaluation. The failure of the State to lead evidence on incorrigibility is often decisive.
Remember this Ratio
The death sentence is reserved for the rarest of rare cases where the possibility of reformation is completely excluded; life imprisonment for the remainder of natural life without remission is often an adequate alternative.
Final Outcome
The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of the appellant under Sections 302, 376(2)(f), 376(2)(n), 376AB, and 201 IPC, and Sections 5 and 6 of the POCSO Act.
The death sentence imposed by the Trial Court and confirmed by the High Court was set aside.
The sentence was commuted to imprisonment for the remainder of natural life, without remission.
All substantive sentences shall run concurrently.
The appellant shall be liable to punishment under the POCSO Act or the IPC, whichever is greater in degree.
Lawcurb Verdict
This judgment is a significant reaffirmation of the principle that the death penalty is reserved only for the rarest of rare cases where the possibility of reformation is completely excluded. By commuting the death sentence in a case involving the brutal rape and murder of a child, the Supreme Court has demonstrated that even the gravest crimes do not automatically warrant death. The judgment underscores the importance of individualised sentencing, the need for procedural compliance under Section 235(2) CrPC, and the availability of the intermediate sentence of life imprisonment without remission. A well-reasoned and legally sound judgment.
Exam Lens
Question 1: What are the principles governing the imposition of the death penalty in India?
Answer: The death penalty is governed by the principles laid down in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab. It is reserved for the rarest of rare cases where the alternative of life imprisonment is unquestionably foreclosed. The court must weigh both the aggravating circumstances of the crime and the mitigating circumstances of the criminal. The possibility of reformation must be considered, and the State bears the burden of proving that the accused is beyond reform. The intermediate sentence of life imprisonment for the remainder of natural life without remission is often an adequate alternative.
Question 2: What is the significance of Section 235(2) CrPC in death penalty cases?
Answer: Section 235(2) CrPC requires that after a judgment of conviction is pronounced, the accused shall be heard on the question of sentence before the sentence is passed. This is not an empty formality. In death penalty cases, it affords a real and meaningful opportunity to the accused to place before the court all circumstances that bear upon the choice of sentence, including personal circumstances. The recording of conviction and imposition of death sentence on the same day is improper.
Question 3: Why did the Supreme Court commute the death sentence in this case?
Answer: The Supreme Court commuted the death sentence because: (i) the mitigating circumstances of the appellant were genuine and substantial; (ii) the State led no evidence to prove that the appellant was beyond reformation; (iii) the appellant's conduct in custody was satisfactory; (iv) the psychological evaluation disclosed no condition from which incorrigibility could be inferred; and (v) the intermediate sentence of life imprisonment for the remainder of natural life without remission was available and adequate to meet the ends of justice.
This report is prepared by Lawcurb for educational and informational purposes only. It is a concise summary of the judgment and should not be construed as legal advice. Readers are encouraged to refer to the original judgment before relying on any legal proposition.